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Abstract
The concept of autonomy is of crucial importance for understanding life and cognition. Whereas cel-
lular and organismic autonomy is based in the self-production of the material infrastructure sustaining
the existence of living beings as such, we are interested in how biological autonomy can be extended
into forms of autonomous agency, where autonomy as a form of organization is extended into the be-
haviour of an agent in interaction with its environment (and not its material self-production). In this
thesis, we are focus on the development of operational models of sensorimotor agency, exploring the
construction of a domain of interactions creating a dynamical interface between agent and environ-
ment. We present two main contributions to the study of autonomous agency:
First, we contribute to the development of a modelling route for testing, comparing and validating
hypotheses about neurocognitive autonomy. Through the design and analysis specific neurodynamical
models embedded in robotic agents, we explore how an agent is constituted in a sensorimotor space as
an autonomous entity able to adaptively sustaining its own organization. Using two simulation models
and different dynamical analysis and measurement of complex patterns in their behaviour we are able
to tackle some theoretical obstacles preventing the understanding of autonomy in the sensorimotor
domain, and to generate new predictions about the nature of autonomous agency in the neurocognitve
domain.
Second, we explore the extension of sensorimotor forms of autonomy into the social realm. We
analyse two cases from an experimental perspective: the constitution of a collective subject in a sen-
sorimotor social interactive task, and the emergence of an autonomous social identity in a large-scale
technology-mediated social system. Through the analysis of coordination mechanisms and emergent
complex patterns, we are able to gather experimental evidence indicating that in some cases social au-
tonomy might emerge based on mechanisms of coordinated sensorimotor activity, constituting forms
of collective autonomous agency.
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Resumen
El concepto de autonomía es de crucial importancia para entender la vida y la cognición. Mientras que
formas de autonomía celular y organísmicas están basadas en la auto-producción de la infraestructura
material que sostiene la existencia de un ser vivo como tal, en este trabajo nos interesamos en cómo la au-
tonomía biológica puede extenderse a formas de agencialidad autónoma, en las que la autonomía como
forma de organización se extiende al comportamiento de un sistema en interacción con su entorno (y
no únicamente su auto-producción material). Esta tesis se centra el desarrollo de modelos operacionales
de agencialidad sensomotora, explorando la construcción de un dominio de interacción capaz de crear
una frontera dinámica entre agente y entorno. Presentamos dos contribuciones principales al estudio
de la agencialidad autónoma:
En primer lugar, contribuimos al desarrollo de un enfoque basado en modelos para el ensayo, com-
paración y validación de hipótesis sobre autonomía neurocognitiva. A través del diseño y análisis de
modelos neurodinámicos específicos embebidos en agentes robóticos, exploramos cómo un agente se
constituye en el espacio sensomotor como una entidad autónoma capaz de sostener adaptativamente
su propia organización. Usando dos modelos simulados, diferentes análisis dinámicos y medidas de pa-
trones complejos en su comportamiento, somos capaces de abordar algunos obstáculos en la definición
de la autonomía en el dominio sensomotor, así como generar nuevas predicciones sobre la naturaleza
de la agencialidad autónoma en el dominio neurocognitivo.
En segundo lugar, exploramos la extensión de formas de autonomía sensomotora en el campo de
lo social. Analizamos dos casos desde una perspectiva experimental: la constitución de un sujeto colec-
tivo en una tarea de interacción social sensomotora, y la emergencia de una identidad social autónoma
en un sistema social a gran escala construido sobre el uso de herramientas tecnológicas. A través del
análisis de mecansimos de coordinación y de patrones complejos emergentes, somos capaces de reunir
evidencia experimental indicando que en algunos casos una autonomía social puede emerger basada en
mecanismos de actividad sensomotora coordinada, constituyendo formas de agencialidad autónoma
colectiva.
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Conclusiones
En los dos ámbitos, la cognición sensomotora y la interacción social, en primer lugar caracteri-
zamos la constitución de un sujeto en un espacio fundamentalmente interactivo: a través de un agente
robótico en una tarea sensomotora simulada por ordenador en el primer caso, y en un entorno digi-
tal que conecta a dos agentes humanos en el segundo. Posteriormente, exploramos cómo un agente
autónomo puede emerger a partir del espacio de interacción en ambos casos.
En el caso de un agente cognitivo analizamos en detalle cómo un agente autónomo se constituye
a partir de la interacción circular entre sus patrones neurodinámicos, la plasticidad sináptica que reg-
ula su estructura neuronal y los patrones sensomotores que emergen de su interacción con el mundo.
La agencialidad autónoma surge a través de la autoorganización entre diferentes escalas de compor-
tamiento, en un proceso de ruptura de la simetría en la relación circular entre estos tres elementos, en
los que la asimetría en la interacción distingue al entorno, cuya complejidad de estímulos genera una
multiplicidad de respuestas neurodinámicas; y un agente, cuya reorganización interna le permite actuar
de forma coherente y unitaria sobre este entorno.
En el caso de la interacción social, estudiamos cómo formas de organización y movilización social fa-
cilitadas por el uso de tecnologías de la información pueden permitir formas de agencialidad autónoma
similares a las analizadas en agentes neurocognitivos. Observamos cómo ‘identidades multitudinarias’
se configuran mediante patrones de coordinación entre diferentes escalas en una estructura distribuida
e internamente múltiple.
Desde un punto de vista metodológico, mostramos el potencial de indicadores de complejidad
(medidas de teoría de la información, sincronización metastable, exponentes de criticalidad...) como
indicadores de aspectos cuantitativos y cualitativos de la autonomía. El estudio de la interacción (entre
elementos, entre escalas temporales y espaciales, etc.) destaca la importancia de la influencia y modu-
lación entre niveles de actividad – micro, meso y macroscópicos – en un sistema autónomo. La au-
tonomía no es sólo un proceso de clausura y aislamiento respecto al entorno, sino que la agencialidad
autónoma es un proceso que se despliega a diferentes escalas, que son coordinadas a través de influen-
cias causales asimétricas, dando lugar al agente, al mundo sobre el que éste actúa, y al dominio de in-
teracción que conecta a ambos. Más allá de estos indicadores, mostramos cómo aspectos conceptuales
relacionados con la metodología empleada para aplicar estas medidas en nuestros modelos y análisis
experimentales – como la clausura operacional de una red y la precariedad de sus interdependencias, o
la comparación entre agentes situados en su entorno y agentes pasivamente acoplados a él – nos pro-
porcionan una rica perspectiva para analizar las propiedades específicas de la organización autónoma.
Aunque los indicadores de complejidad no son suficientes por sí mismos para detectar formas de orga-
nización autónoma, nos ayudan a probar y delimitar algunos de los aspectos conceptuales relacionados
con ella.
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0
Introduction
The Selfless self: a scientific perspective on autonomy
Throughout the history of science, we can outline a tension between reductionist and holistic
perspectives (Fang and Casadevall, 2011). That is, the contrast between the scientific approach
of looking at specific material parts (we look inside an organism and discover tissues, cells,
molecules), and the approach that retains the whole and yet struggles to explain its macro-
scopic properties. In the reductionist approach, the properties of the parts considered in iso-
lation become simpler and amenable to scientific scrutiny, and yet the very object of study
disappears: the organism, the self, the intention (Broad, 1925; Simon, 1996). For the holistic
approach, the object of study is taken as a whole, though the behaviour of the mechanisms
that built the whole are hindered under a veil of complexity (Weaver, 1991; Campbell, 1974).
This tension is particularly stark when it comes to the study of living beings. Cells, organ-
isms, cognitive agents and communities, make themselves into entities that are different from
the environment that surround them. This entity, the ‘self’ that becomes distinct from yet in
continuous interaction with it, is on one hand a ‘virtual’ entity with no particular location and
not directly reducible to the individual components that conform it, and on the other hand,
this self emerges from a material substrate that allows the interaction of its different parts
among themselves and, specially, with the environment surrounding them (since every living
being needs to be in continuous material and energetic interaction with its environment to
stay alive). Nonetheless, the system as a whole behaves as a unit that emerges in the eyes of an
observer as something different from its surroundings, yet its components are in continuous
interaction with those of its environment. This is what Francisco Varela labelled as a selfless
self (Varela, 1991), whose definition poses the problem of characterizing the constitution of
an autonomous agent and its mode of existence. Autonomous agents actively sustain their
organization, their persistence, in a way that often demands to bring the coordinated whole
into the explanation. Their autonomy demands a continuous circulation between whole and
parts. In a sense the task ahead is extremely challenging, it demands reconciliation of matter
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and form, the mechanical and the ‘spiritual’, to fill the gap between the domain of existence
that made gods or spirits necessary to explain our life and environments (identity, form, per-
sistence) and the domain constituted by the opposing earthly tendencies (difference, matter,
contingency). In the first macroscopic domain, the self appears as a closed coherent entity,
while at the microscopic level, what we observe is fundamentally a set of interactions between
parts of the system and between them and the environment.
As we will see in the next chapter the history of the research trying to tackle the nature
of autonomy is itself complex, multilayered and non-linear. It is a history of scientific ab-
stractions that covers from the generation of principles or systemic organization to forms of
coordination and interaction among its material components. The conceptual progress nec-
essary to bring autonomy into science required deep philosophical insights and innovations.
Further progress required new mathematical tools and creative distinctions like those made
by cybernetists (Pickering, 2010). Other developments were only possible through complex
models and continuing progress demands sophisticated computer simulations (Di Paolo et al.,
2000). During the last decades, a series of conceptual innovations including the framework
of coordination dynamics, self-organized criticality or the ‘edge of chaos’, together with new
methodological and analytical tools have boosted our scientific imagination (Sole and Good-
win, 2008) helping us to understand living systems and imagining new forms of organization
beyond reductionist schemata of both functionalist/computationalist paradigms and simplis-
tic holistic/aggregationist approaches (Pigliucci, 2014; Mazzocchi, 2012). However, there are
still a good number of problems waiting to be resolved. For example, the properties that are
frequently proposed to describe the internal organization of complex autonomous systems
can be displayed by toy models (e.g. sandpile models, chaotic maps, etc.) that do not capture
the richness of autonomous behaviour. Instead, living autonomy arises in open systems exist-
ing within a rich context, constantly changing, growing, evolving, and thereby autonomously
changing the way in which they interact with their surrounding environment. (Holland, 1992;
Ruiz-Mirazo et al., 2007; Sornette, 2006). The patterns that they exhibit are neither imposed
from outside, nor do they arise internally, but are a consequence of the emergence of a do-
main of interaction between endogenous and exogenous self-organized flows. In this context,
this research explores the idea that the explanatory power does not lie that much in the sys-
tem’s internal invariants but in emergent relational invariants capturing the nature of system-
environment interaction and the modulation of such interaction. It is the constitution of
an agent-environment interaction domain where the dichotomy between holistic and reduc-
tionist approaches can be overcome. In this thesis we focus on how interactive self-organized
invariants emerge from and are regulated by agent-environment interaction dynamics them-
selves. We explore how some of these patterns may apply to a wide range of autonomous
behaviour: from sensorimotor coupling in minimal robotics to collective decision making in
massive human social networks.
The constitution of agent-environment interaction domains has been explored for some
time in metabolic and cellular autonomy, with the emergence of a membrane allowing the
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regulation of material and energetic flows between an autonomous organization and the en-
vironment Ruiz-Mirazo et al. (2004). Nevertheless, this is not clear at other levels of auton-
omy. When the relations with the environment are not based in material self-production
but in sensorimotor interaction between agencial beings and their surroundings (Varela et al.,
1993; Kelso, 1995), it is not clear how autonomous organizations are constructed and what
are their boundaries. We define these latter case of autonomy built over sensorimotor ex-
changes as interactive autonomy. We study two particular domains of interactive autonomy:
the behavioural neurocognitive domain and the social domain. In the former, we make use
of simulated robotic models inspired by theoretical neuroscience to characterize in detail the
sensorimotor constitution of autonomous mental or behavioural organization. For the latter,
we explore in two experimental social scenarios the possibilities of an extension of our model
of sensorimotor interactive autonomy to intersubjective interactions and collective entities.
This thesis presents a novelty respect previous work around the concept of autonomy:
we propose to study autonomy through the role of interaction dynamics between an au-
tonomous agent and its environment or between more than one autonomous agents, propos-
ing particular forms of autonomy that are build upon this interactive domain. This view allow
us to propose a notion of identity (be it sensorimotor or collective) which is constructed di-
rectly from an interactive and systemic analysis, without the need to refer to more abstract or
anthropocentric categories to account to psychological or social identity.
Since in this thesis we cover a wide range of topics (from neurodynamic and sensorimotor
autonomous agency to the constitution of social and collective identities), before entering
upon the subject with a theoretical framework about autonomy and interaction, we present
a summary of the structure of the thesis to give the reader a global view of the thesis.
Summary of Chapters
This thesis is divided in three parts. The first one is focused in the conceptual and method-
ological aspects of our approach into the study of autonomy. The second part is centered
on sensorimotor autonomy, exploring neurodynamic and behavioural models through the
use of computer simulations. The third part focuses on forms of social autonomy, analysing
experimental data to advance towards models of autonomy in the social realm1.
Part I. Conceptual and Methodological Review
Part I of this thesis reviews the theoretical foundations that will guide the following chapters,
tracing an evolution of the concepts, framework, analytic and modelling tools and epistemo-
logical choices that precede the contemporary account of autonomy, its characterization and
application to different experimental domains.
1For the summary of chapters, we will not make use of references to the literature to facilitate the flow of the
text. Appropriate references to the literature relevant to each part of the thesis can be found in the chapters.
19
Chapter 1. An Introduction to Autonomy
In the first chapter we review some theoretical notions around the concept of autonomy as an
organizational principle of life (in its widest sense, from biological unicellular life, to mental
and social life). In the first half of the chapter we introduce ideas that are historically con-
nected to the development of modern views of autonomy: persistence, Spinoza’s conatus,
homeostasis, regulatory feedback loops, ultrastability and autopoiesis. These ideas help us
conceptualize how certain forms of organization allow organisms to maintain their identity
while interacting with a changing environment. We introduce autonomous systems as home-
ostatic systems that maintain their own organization as a system capable of reproducing and
maintaining themselves and with the ability to differentiate themselves from their environ-
ment, albeit in a process of continuous coupling with the environment. In the case of the cell,
a continuous flux of material exchange must take place for maintaining the far from equilib-
rium thermodynamics that make its own organization possible. In the case of higher organ-
isms, we hypothesize that similarly a circular coupling between the nervous system and the
stream of sensory modulation in a sensorimotor loop is necessary to constitute its neurocog-
nitive identity.
During the second half of the chapter we present some key theoretical achievements in
complex systems science that help getting a better grasp on the concept of autonomy. We
analyse how in parallel to some conceptual advances reviewed in the first part of the chap-
ter, different approaches to the study and design of complex systems have developed a formal
framework that allow us to operationalize the generating mechanisms of the kind of processes
(self-organized, emergent) underlying autonomous systems. First, we introduce the idea of
self-synchronizing systems that, based on distributed coupling mechanisms, allow the emer-
gence of coherent ensembles required for the self-organization of neural or social systems.
Secondly, we present the notion of metastability, as it depicts coordination modes which are
able to integrate several functional parts and yet also produce individual rhythms in a cooper-
ative and coordinated manner. Finally, the idea of metastability is connected to some recent
concepts from physics, specifically the idea of self-organized criticality, which characterizes a
system where a metastable state spreads throughout multiple scales of the system behaviour.
Self-organized criticality is a property of (classes of) dynamical systems which are able to drive
themselves into the scale-invariant dynamics of phase transition states. This allows a system
to display a self-regulated metastable configuration at multiple scales.
The chapter next introduces the central role of interaction as a constitutive element of
autonomous organization and we extend it to different levels of autonomy. From forms of
cellular and organismic autonomy in which the regulation of the flux of energy and matter
through the cell is performed through the self-production of the material infrastructure of
the living entity, to neurodynamic forms of autonomy in which the material self-constitution
is substituted by the modulation of a sensorimotor stream that constitutes the identity of
the agent in the perception/motion space. As well, we hypothesize about the possibility of
forms of social autonomy, created upon forms of collective agency in interactive communi-
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ties. Then, we extend these ideas to a shared inter-personal space of social interaction through
the idea of collective autonomy. We detail then our hypothesis that autonomy may arise as a
general phenomenon underlying different modes of life at several scales (cellular, organismic,
sensorimotor, social). To conclude, we present a preliminary description of autonomy cover-
ing the different scales of interaction, finding a transition between forms of autonomy based
in the material self-production of the system and those based in the dynamical closure of the
system-environment interactions. We propose that for the latter case further conceptual clar-
ifications are needed in order to formulate a clear definition of sensorimotor and social forms
of autonomy.
Part II. Sensorimotor Constitution of Neurocognitive Autonomy
In Part II we focus on neurocognitive autonomy from a situated and embodied perspective.
Analysing current neuroscientific experimental evidence and theoretical developments we de-
pict a formulation of autonomy that is not limited to the internal self-regulation of an agent
but also captures the construction of an asymmetry in the agent-environment interaction do-
main.
Chapter 2. Constitutive interaction: the Situated-HKB model
In the first part of Chapter 2 we present an analysis of the role of sensorimotor interaction
as a constitutive element of autonomy. We review the recent history of cognitive science and
how internalist and ‘computationalist’ perspectives have dominated the second half of the
20th century2, and how during the last decades this dominance started to be questioned by
dynamical embodied approaches to cognition. We highlight how cognitive science (and cogni-
tive neuroscience in particular) is witnessing an increasing success of dynamical systems mod-
els, which are often displacing computational and representational conceptions of cognitive
functioning in favour of interactive and dynamical views. We review two central contribu-
tions from dynamical systems approaches to cognitive science. First, the impact of the idea
that some aspects of cognitive mechanisms (neural or otherwise) are better modelled and un-
derstood in terms of dynamical systems instead of symbolic representational algorithms. We
review the evolution of dynamical models in cognitive science and we focus especially in ad-
vances in oscillatory and coordination dynamics, a field that has witnessed an increased pop-
ularity in recent decades. As a second central contribution from the dynamical system ap-
proach to cognition, we review situated/embodied perspectives of cognitive science, claiming
that agent-environment coupling shapes brain dynamics in a manner that is essential to be-
havioural or cognitive functionality. We find that in this case some situated/embodied claims
have not been adopted with the same emphasis than dynamical systems approaches, and exist-
ing theoretical frameworks and models in neuroscience are mostly developed without taking
into account sensorimotor dynamics.
2 That of computational functionalism and symbolic Artificial Intelligence, assuming that intelligent be-
haviour is causally explained by computations of symbolic mental representations
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In the second part of the chapter, we analyse the implications of the lack of emphasis in sit-
uated/embodied approaches for analysing autonomous behaviour. Concretely, we propose a
simple model as a thought experiment on how coordination dynamics under a closed senso-
rimotor loop might induce qualitatively different patterns of neural oscillations compared to
those found in isolated systems. We take as a departure point the Haken-Kelso-Bunz (HKB)
model; a generic model of dynamic coordination between two oscillatory components, which
has proven useful for a vast range of applications in cognitive science and whose dynamical
properties are well understood. In order to explore the properties of this model under closed
sensorimotor conditions we present what we call the situated HKB model: a robotic model
that performs a gradient climbing task and whose ‘brain’ is modelled by the HKB equation.
We solve the differential equations that define the agent-environment coupling for increasing
values of the agent’s sensitivity (sensor gain), finding different behavioural strategies. These
results are compared with two different models: a decoupled HKB with no sensory input and
a passively-coupled HKB that is also decoupled but receives a structured input generated by
a situated agent. We precisely quantify and qualitatively describe how the properties of the
system, when studied in coupled conditions, radically change in a manner that cannot be de-
duced from the decoupled HKB models alone. We also present the notion of a neurodynamic
signature as the dynamic pattern that correlates with a specific behaviour and we show how
only a situated agent can display this signature compared to an agent that simply receives the
exact same sensory input. Finally, we discuss the implications of our model to understand the
role of the environment as a constitutive part of cognitive dynamics in autonomous agents.
Chapter 3. Situated autonomy: organizational homeostasis in the sensori-
motor loop
In Chapter 3 we begin by reviewing current theories in neuroscience and psychology related
to autonomous behaviour: from the organization of neural dynamics in the form of neural
assemblies to the information integration theory of consciousness. These theories provide
valuable insights for imagining the kind of neural self-organization that make possible the
existence of a great diversity of patterns and different specialized functional parts, with the
emergence of an integrated and coherent behaviour. Nevertheless, we find that these theo-
ries generally lack convincing explanations of how the sensorimotor loop comes into place or
have a limited role for it (just modulating brain dynamics, or having a linear input-output
relationship with it).
We review different models of autonomous behaviour in synthetic agents, suggesting an
innovation in the design of their neurodynamical controllers using relational homeostatic
mechanisms in which the variables that are subject to homeostatic regulation are not compo-
nent variables but relational or organizational variables. As an implementation of this idea, we
propose an operational model of plastic oscillatory mechanisms for exploring the role of sen-
sorimotor adaptive behaviour into the emergence and reconfiguration of adaptive behaviour.
We evolve a robotic agent with three plastic oscillatory units performing a behavioural pref-
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erence task.
We analyse the behaviour of the different groups of variables of the agent under different
situations, finding that the coordination of sensorimotor variables, the emergence of oscil-
latory patterns and the activation of synaptic plasticity in the neural controller is necessary
for the generation of the agent’s behaviour. Moreover, by analysing the information flows be-
tween different levels of description of the system at different timescales using transfer entropy
measures, our research shows that autonomous behaviour is sustained through a double reg-
ulatory loop: one loop coordinates the activation of plastic mechanisms with the emergence
and maintenance of oscillatory phase-locked patterns, and the other loop coordinates the rela-
tion of the neural controller and the stream of sensorimotor interactions. These loops are both
highly asymmetrical, displaying information flows in one direction at fast scales (from plas-
tic mechanisms to oscillatory patterns and from sensorimotor streams to oscillatory patterns)
and the opposite direction in slow scales (from oscillatory patterns to plastic mechanisms and
from plastic mechanisms to sensorimotor streams) exhibiting a self-organized system with two
embedded emergent levels: one of plastic emergent neurodynamic patterns and the other of
brain-body-environment coupling. We finish by proposing that the asymmetry of these two
embedded levels might be a fundamental aspect of the interaction domain of autonomous
agents and their environment.
Chapter 4. Situated autonomy: complexity, metastability and self-organized
criticality
In Chapter 4 we continue the analysis of the agent in Chapter 3 from a different perspec-
tive. Whereas in the previous chapter the agent was characterized from the point of view of
the information flows of its macroscopic patterns, in this chapter we characterize the interac-
tion among different temporal and spatial scales. Using tools from different complex systems
approaches to cognitive science, we investigate informational complexity and long-range tem-
poral correlations in the agent. Previously, some approaches analysing indices of complex dy-
namics had been criticized for not being able to present mechanistic models explaining how
these behavioural dynamics are connected to actual mechanisms in the brain. Here we aim
to connect the emergence of different indices of complexity with the mechanisms generating
them.
With our model we aim to explore the role of the sensorimotor coupling and synaptic
plasticity to connect macroscopic behaviour with neural self-organized dynamics. We proceed
by comparing the behaviour of different agents: regular situated agents, ‘passively-coupled’
agents, agents without synaptic plasticity, and agents that are both passively-coupled and
without plasticity. First, we explore the flows of informational complexity in the interac-
tions between different scales of the system components. This is undertaken by measuring
TSE complexity (a measure of the levels of simultaneous integration and segregation of infor-
mation in the system) across different subsystems including the agent’s neural oscillators, its
synaptic plasticity and its sensorimotor activity. We observe that when agents have synaptic
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plasticity, complexity of information flows is enhanced for the sets of components that in-
clude sensorimotor variables. In the case of agents without synaptic plasticity, the values of
complexity are the same for situated and passively-coupled agents.
Second, we measure long-range temporal correlations in the macroscopic behaviour of
the agent in the same conditions above, finding that robust 1=f noise and multifractality are
only present simultaneously in internal and sensorimotor variables when the agent is situated
in its environment and plastic mechanisms are active. We find that the emergence of 1=f noise
at different internal and external variables depends on the cross-relations between internal
plasticity and sensorimotor coupling, suggesting that the system as a whole is preserved as a
precarious organization dependent of the continuous interactions between its internal and
sensorimotor dynamical landscapes.
We hypothesize that indices of TSE complexity and 1=f noise are the result of: (1) non-
linear interaction dynamics capable of generating stable collective patterns, (2) internal plastic
mechanisms that allow self-sustained criticality of homeostatic, neurodynamic regimes and
(3) strong sensorimotor coupling with the environment that induces transient metastable
regimes.
Finally, we discuss the implications of our results for understanding the agent-world sym-
metry breaking and the precarious operational closure necessary for autonomous agency within
the domain of sensorimotor interactions. We suggest that the modelling results above allow
us to operationalize the notion of a dynamic core as a means to capture the idea of an organi-
zational structure that maximizes both integration and segregation of its components, not in
an agent’s brain but in the structure of sensorimotor loops the agent is engaged in, allowing
the emergence of an autonomous self in the sensorimotor space.
Part III. Interactive Autonomy in Social Processes
Whereas in Part II of this thesis we have we explored the constitution of a cognitive agent,
its world and the important role of continuous agent-environment interaction, in Part III we
change our focus to social autonomy modelling cases where agents interact together in a shared
environment. We determine the extent to which the model of neurocognitive interactive au-
tonomy depicted in previous chapters is useful for understanding autonomy and agency in
the social realm.
Chapter 5. Social Agency: interaction-dominant dynamics in social reci-
procity
This chapter analyses the constitution of processes of agent-agent interaction as a minimal case
from where to analyse the possibility of collective instances of interactive autonomy. We start
by reviewing current theories stressing the primacy of embodied interaction over detached
social cognition, against traditional emphasis on an individual’s mental processes as the basis
of social awareness. Further, we review experiments that exploit technological interfaces that
have been indispensable for providing support for an interactive approach to social develop-
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ment. A minimal interactive setup is proposed for investigating social interaction: the percep-
tual crossing experiment, which recreates a minimal social environment enabling researchers
to systematically investigate the real-time self-organizing dynamics of dyadic interaction by
mediating embodied interactions of pairs of adults over a minimal human-computer inter-
face.
We explore whether some critical aspects of social interaction in this minimal setup may
not have been observed by previous studies. We consider alternative indicators that could
complete, or even lead us to rethink, the current interpretation of the results obtained from
both experimental and simulated modelling in the fields of social interactions and minimal
perceptual crossing. In particular, we discuss that previous experiments have been analyti-
cally constrained to a short-term dynamic type response from the participating agents. Ad-
ditionally, we propose considering these experiments from a multiscale framework based on
the use and analysis of long-range temporal correlations and fractal dynamics. We reveal ev-
idence supporting the idea that social interactions are deployed along many scales of activity
and propose that a fractal structure may be better suited to characterize the type of social in-
teraction patterns generated in a social engagement. Finally, the results of the experiment are
evaluated in terms of the conceptual framework developed in the previous chapters, general-
izing the notion of sensorimotor autonomy to the idea of an extended mode of autonomous
organization in a shared social sensorimotor space.
Chapter 6. The Collective Mind: large-scale self-organization in massive
social networks
In Chapter 6 we extend the ideas in the previous chapter and deal with the idea of autonomy
in large-scale social networks. Specifically, we analyse whether the shift that new ICT and so-
cial media has promoted in collective patterns of social and political organization hat has the
capacity to generate powerful forms of social and political autonomy. We analyse recent liter-
ature about social organization in the so called ‘networked movements’ (e.g. the Arab Spring,
the 15M movement, Occupy Wall Street) and describe how new communication networks and
practices have opened the door for radically distinct forms of self-organization based on dis-
tributed participation, where centralized hierarchical structures are substituted by a network
of interactions that continuously generates, negotiates and maintains a collective identity.
Also, we review how the emergence of the networked movements from 2011 has opened
the debate around the way in which new communication technologies and practices make
possible innovative forms of collective identities in social movements. We briefly review the
literature on ‘collective identities’, and review the tension between different contemporary po-
sitions from individual connective action to macroscopic aggregative dynamics. In the midst
of this tension, we propose the notion of ‘multitudinous identity’ (a concept based on Hardt
& Negri’s 2004 notion of ‘multitude’) to depict the specific forms of identity displayed by net-
worked movements, characterized by a deep social transversality and heterogeneity, as well as a
transient and distributed leadership composition driven by action initiatives. In order to char-
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acterize the properties of multitudinous identities, we perform a series of analysis connected
to the concepts presented in previous chapters.
We analyse the relationship between internal plastic reconfiguration of activation patterns
in Twitter networks and moments of embodied action in the form of camps and rallies. We
consider Twitter activity during the camps in the initial moments of the 15M movement. First,
we use transfer entropy measures to analyse how the system maintains its operational clo-
sure while continuously changing its structural configuration. Then, we use phase-locking
statistics to analyse how different patterns of synchronization at different scales are connected
with different interactions between online communication networks and collective offline be-
haviour. We depict how synchronization at different frequency bands mediate between mas-
sive collective activity at different spatial scales. Furthermore, we characterize, in connection
with previous chapters, informational complexity and fractal indices displayed by different
moments of mobilization, showing how the presence of multiscale synchronization is coor-
dinated with the emergence of interactive complexity among spatial and temporal scales at
moments of strong embodiment of the protests. Finally, we conclude with a reflection about
large-scale social autonomy in the framework of new sociotechnical practices, evaluating re-
cent advances and possible future developments.
Part IV. Conclusion
In Chapter 7 we present an extended summary of the contributions of the different chapters
of this thesis. Finally, we present a general view of the significance and scope of these con-
tributions in current research into complex adaptive systems, as well as further research lines
that may continue the current work.
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Part I
Conceptual and Methodological Review
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1
An Introduction to Autonomy
Abstract: Contemporary notions of autonomy (as a form of organization that defines the principles
of operation of a system while constituting its identity) rely on a long history of theoretical and scientific
approximation to the holistic properties of organisms. We make a historical and systematic approach to
the concepts that shape contemporary theories of autonomy (persistence, adaptivity, self-organization)
together with models able to operationalize some of these concepts at different levels (self-synchronization,
metastability, self-organized criticality). Finally, we review how the idea of autonomy might operate at
different scales of living activity, and propose a definition of autonomy that will shape the work presented
in this thesis.
Contributions:
• We perform a historical review of notions related to the notion of autonomy, both conceptual and
mechanistic, especially from the cybernetic movement to modern views from complex systems and
neuroscience.
• We provide a first tentative definition of autonomy upon which we will build in the next chapters.
Autonomy is nowadays seen as a pervasive property of living beings (from unicellular and
organismic to neurocognitive and social life; Rosslenbroich, 2014; Bich and Damiano, 2012;
Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno, 2011). Autonomous beings are as those able to display forms of
coherence and identity in which all their components (metabolites, cells, living tissue, organ-
isms, communities, etc.) are coordinated as a unitary system displaying a robust constitution
against external perturbations and, at the same time, are able to flexibly adapt to different
forms of interaction with their surroundings in which they actively stand out as a differen-
tiated entity with respect to them. How does this happen? What kind of structures and or-
ganization support these forms of being and acting? What differentiates autonomous living
beings from massive computational systems or from complex physical phenomena like for
example, tornadoes or earthquakes?
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Somewhat similar to any modern computer, living systems coordinate the activity of a
myriad of heterogeneous parallel processes. Our bodies have countless parallel regulatory
loops coordinating all kinds of metabolic, organismic, neural processes. Nevertheless, unlike
any computer, all these processes do not run independently but there is a coordinated macro-
scopic driving force behind them. Like in a tornado, a macroscopic process emerges becoming
a reference point for the activity of the microscopic processes that constitute it. Furthermore,
in the case of living entities we attribute certain properties to this emergent self – like inten-
tionality, free will, or even consciousness – that actively modulates the interaction with its
environment, allowing us to characterize such entities as autonomous.
Modern formulations of the concept of autonomy are the result of a long history of con-
ceptual development and mathematical contributions that made possible to operationalize
and sharpen more basic and relational notions required to shed light about how autonomous
system arise, maintain themselves and adapt to their environment, as well as what relation-
ships are established between the different scales and domains of existence of the system.
These organizational principles should not only help to explain how a system can operate as
an integrated, coherent and robust unit, and at the same time display complex, ever-changing,
adaptive behavioural patterns. The goal is to conceptualize certain forms of organization that
allow organisms to maintain their identity (as a form of coherence in their own organization)
against a complex and changing environment. We present a historical review of theoretical
notions that precede current views of autonomy, together with complex systems descriptions
aiming to operationalize some of these notions and make them plausible in terms of formal
models.
In the first part of this chapter we study concepts that have led to a modern notion of
autonomy: persistence, identity and self-organization. These concepts try to capture consti-
tutive properties of living beings and eventually have evolved into an operational definition of
autonomy. We follow a historical conceptual thread from (1) notions of persistence where the
robustness of the system is imprinted in its own structure (e.g. homeostatic systems, negative
feedback loops), (2) systems whose persistence resides in the self-regulation of its components
in a region of viability (e.g. Ashby’s Ultrastable System), to (3) systems where its persistence
resides in the constitution and maintentance of its own organization in interaction with its
environment (e.g. autopoietic systems). In the second part, we analyse the development of
operational models of forms of organizational dynamics capable of sustaining modes of co-
herence or coordination proper of autonomous systems. We start with (1) modes of coherence
that arise as the consequence of some structural coordinative property (e.g. spontaneous co-
ordination), following with (2) modes of flexible coordination where the system is able to
enter and exit regions of transient attraction (metastable and soft-assembled systems) and fin-
ish by conceptualizing systems where (3) transient coordination is extended to the different
scales comprising the structure of the system (e.g. systems displaying self-organized criticality).
Finally, we provide a provisional definition of autonomy based on the notions of individual-
ity, interactive asymmetry and normativity, and analyse its domains of aplication at different
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scales of life.
1.1 Persistence and Identity in Living Beings
The first question that a study of autonomous systems faces concerns identity and how it can
be preserved and adapted over time. By identity we will refer to the property allowing some-
thing to be, in a loose sense, ‘nearly identical to itself’, i.e. maintaining a set of invariances
despite being subject to transformations, independently of external influences. Living beings
are able to maintain its identity despite internal transformations or environmental perturba-
tions, presenting certain type of persistence in their being. How does this identity emerge
and how it is maintained against external or internal fluctuations? As we will show, modern
notions of autonomous are rooted in the answers to the problem of identity and persistence.
1.1.1 Persistence and Stability
One of the simplest forms of identity involves mechanisms that allow an agent to maintain
its current state or its current existence as it is. One of the basic properties of living beings is
to present certain type of persistence in their being. This idea was already a central theme in
Spinoza’s philosophy with the idea of conatus.
Conatus
According to Spinoza, ‘each thing, as far as it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its be-
ing’ (Spinoza, 1883, part 3, prop. 6. Originally published in 1677). Moreover, this ‘striving to
persevere’ is not some action that an agent performs in addition to its other activities, instead,
it is ‘nothing but the actual essence of the thing’ (Spinoza, 1883, part 3, prop. 7). The concept
of conatus had been used before by Descartes in a more mechanistic sense to describe the ten-
dency of bodies to move when they collide with each other (Descartes, 1984, Part 2, art. 37-40.
Originally published in 1644). These tendencies were described in terms of centripetal (cona-
tus a centro) or centrifugal (conatus recedendi) forces, and as a generalization of the principle
of inertia (conatus se movendi, or ‘conatus of self-preservation’), which were already developed
and experimentally demonstrated by Galileo, and were formalized by Newton after the death
of Descartes. Spinoza applies the idea of conatus to all things as a resistance to self-destruction.
In particular he applies it to the human body and mind for describing its will and appetites.
As opposed to most philosophers of his time, Spinoza rejected a dualistic separation between
body and mind. Consequently, for Spinoza, the substrate of the conatus is material and sub-
ject to the laws of the universe, which are inescapable. Spinoza claims that the principle of
conatus explains the ‘self-evident’ truth that ‘nothing can be destroyed except by an external
cause’ (Spinoza, 1883, part 3, prop. 4). For Spinoza, this resistance to self-destruction is materi-
alized in terms of a striving to continue to exist. Consequently, the conatus acts as a force or a
loose principle of inertia related to an agent’s current being, in confrontation with the possibil-
ity of self-destruction. A hungry animal strives for food and a thirsty one for water. This way,
31
‘striving for self-preservation’ resolves an organism’s internal tension (threatening the contin-
uation of its existence) by creating an interactional domain (tendencies and inertias) leading
to the satisfaction of such tensions. So, although Spinoza somewhat conflates explanandum
and explanans (how the organisms makes possible its own persistence remains unresolved), in
contrast to previous dualist conceptions of mind and body, the notion of conatus proposes
an interactional mind/brain continuum. Spinoza put the persistance and self-preservation of
living systems at the core of philosophical theorizing.
Homeostasis
Although the concept of conatus influenced other concepts, for example, SchopenhauerWill
to Live, Nietzsche’s Will to Power or Henry Bergson’s concept of élan vital or vital impulse
(a concept which implies a fundamental driving force behind all life), here we want to focus
on a different line of thought that instead of postulating abstract forces, tries to bring these
principles down to the biological mechanisms underlying those impulses of living beings to
self-preserve. A fundamental step in the search of these concepts was the development of the
concept of homeostasis.
A precursor of the concept of homeostasis was developed by Claude Bernard, who, by
1860, had proposed the concept of a ‘milieu intérieur’ as the environment where biological
processes occur. The constancy of this milieu intérieur was a prerequisite to preserve physio-
logical functions within an optimal range. For Bernard ‘[t]he stability of the internal environ-
ment [the milieu intérieur] is the condition for the free and independent life’ (Bernard, 1974).
This idea would be later developed by Walter Cannon who, in 1926, coined the termhomeosta-
sis for describing the ability of living beings to maintain their own stability. Cannon described
living beings as open systems in relation to their environment. Changes in their environment,
he proposed, excite reactions in the organism’s system provoking internal disturbances, that
are automatically maintained within some narrow limits keeping them constant, i.e., at equi-
librium (Cannon, 1929, pp.400-401). The coordinated physiological reactions that maintain
the steady states conforming this equilibrium are the mechanisms required for homeostasis.
States that are kept constant include the material supplies for cellular needs (water, sodium
chloride, calcium, oxygen, etc.) and environmental factors affecting cellular activity (osmotic
pressure, temperature, ion concentration, etc.). Also, cross-relations between homeostatic
states exist (e.g. osmotic pressure in body fluids which is dependent on the proportions of
water, salts and proteins).
However, Cannon did not stop at the cellular level, and explained homeostatic functions
of states such as hunger and thirst (Cannon, 1929, p.417) in terms of previous experiences with
food and drink appetites inviting the renewal of those experiences. If the needs for food or
water are not met, thirst and hunger appear as physiological responses to propel the organism
to eat or drink and bring its state to equilibrium. The big question here is what is the relation
between homeostatic regulation at the level of the whole animal and physiological lower level
of homeostasis? How does homeostasis scale up and how is it implemented?
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Cybernetics feedback mechanisms
In the early 1940s, Norbert Wiener started a fruitful collaboration with Julian Bigelow and
Arturo Rosenblueth that led to some fundamental ideas of cybernetics. Interestingly, Rosen-
blueth had been a former collaborator of Cannon. Cannon had also been a friend of Wiener’s
father and an important influence for Wiener. This collaboration started during World War II,
within the efforts of the American National Defense Research Committee (which employed
Wiener and Bigelow) to discover a better way to direct and control the firing of antiaircraft ar-
tillery. The problem was, at the time, solved manually by crews tracking the position of planes
using binoculars, human computers calculating their projected location and gunners rotating
and aiming the antiaircraft turrets. Wiener and Bilegow’s goal was to develop an automatic
radar-guided antiaircraft tracking device using new British microwave radars. Although their
contributions ultimately failed to produce a practical device to be used in war, they devel-
oped an ingenious new approach to antiaircraft fire prediction, using new statistical methods
of extrapolation, interpolation, and filtering, that were published by (Wiener, 1949, written
in 1942) providing some basis of the cybernetic revolution some years later. Wiener’s report
redefined the whole concept of control, which had been traditionally associated with power
engineering, by defining it as a part of communication engineering, putting the transmission
of messages as the central element – understanding that a telephone conversation is as much
of a message as the signals controlling a motor. It is important to recall that, at the time, the
concept of information, so widespread and ubiquitous today, represented a great change of
perspective. Wiener stated that communication operations are essentially no different from
computational operations, adding statistical computation of time series as a central element
of his approach. In this scenario, the time series of a message is not considered by itself, but as
part of a ‘ensemble of time series’ judged ‘not by their effect in a particular case, but by their
average effect’.
Inspired by their collaboration in antiaircraft fire prediction and control, Wiener, Bigelow
and Rosenblueth plunged into addressing physiological and neurological feedback, extending
the ‘cybernetic vision’ to biological, physiological, and social systems. The contact of Wiener
with what he later called ‘the tragic insolence of the military mind’ (Wiener, 1988, p.xxvii)
ended in 1943, driving him into putting a great effort into elaborating cybernetics as a civilian
discipline and bringing his ideas to broad communities of physiologists, physicians, and social
scientists (Heims, 1993). Soon afterwards, Rosenblueth, Bigelow and Wiener coauthored one
of the founding papers of cybernetics, entitled ‘Behavior, Purpose and Teleology’ (Rosen-
blueth et al., 1943). The paper studies the way that mechanical, biological, and electronic
systems can generate purposeful behaviour, and states that intrinsic, purposeful behaviour
requires negative feedback loops. These ideas instigated the creation of the Teleological Soci-
ety and later the Macy conferences, which, in the words of the members of the Teleological
Society, popularized ‘the study of purpose [...] and how purpose can be imitated by mechan-
ical and electrical means’ (cited in Aspray, 1990, 315).
Wiener, Bigelow and Rosenblueth contributed with both a general description of how
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Figure 1.1: Negative feedback. Organization of a system controlled by a negative feedback loop in interaction with its
environment.
mechanical or biological systems can generate persistent or homeostatic-like behaviour – via
negative feedback loops (Figure 1.1) – and introduced the concept of intrinsic purpose or tele-
ological behaviour as a more general description for this kind of processes. Wiener proposed
that the concept of homeostasis is implemented in a great number of cases in biological sys-
tems in which negative feedback loops are not only present in physiological phenomena but
are ‘absolutely essential for the continuation of life’ (Wiener, 1948, p.114).
Along with many other brilliant cyberneticists, the work of Wiener, Bigelow and Rosen-
blueth propelled a progressive scientific and technological research program which would
shape the basis of the research on intelligence and the mind in the second half of the 20th
century. This research program aims at describing mental activity in terms of the operation
of purely physical mechanisms. Cognitive activity is therefore described in terms of feedback
mechanisms, algorithms and nonlinear dynamical systems, which allow machines to be built
displaying ‘purposeful’ behaviour. In this context, purposeful behaviour generally denoted
that which ‘may be interpreted as directed to the attainment of a goal’ (Rosenblueth et al.,
1943). A paradigmatic example is a negative feedback loop as a mechanism producing goal-
directed behaviour, where there is no difference if it is embedded in a human being or a me-
chanical system. Although Rosenblueth et al. (1943) acknowledge that the statement may be
interpreted (by an external observer) is tremendously vague and operationally meaningless,
they argue that the concept of purpose is useful and should be retained1. This loose defi-
nition of purpose, equating purpose and the mechanisms producing apparently purposeful
behaviour, was shared by other prominent cybertenists. For example, McCulloch and Pitts,
other founding fathers of the cybernetic revolution, wrote a paper which became a manifesto
for both symbolic and connectionist AI equating intentionality with propositional logic im-
1For example, they argue that the basis of the concept of purpose is the awareness of voluntary activity: when
we perform an action we do not command certain muscles to contract in a certain sequence; we merely trip the
purpose and the reaction follows automatically.
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plemented by a neural network (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943). In the classical cybernetic frame-
work, it seems that intelligence is reduced to physical processes creating a mere ‘as-if’ appear-
ance of a subject acting for authentic reasons. This tension was evaded by assuming that intel-
ligence is located in these physical mechanisms (e.g. feedback mechanisms) themselves (Froese,
2010).
1.1.2 Adaptive Behaviour
Ultrastability
In 1946 the British cyberneticist Ross W. Ashby designed what he described as an ‘isomor-
phism making machine’ to develop his concept of an ultrastable system (Ashby, 1946). Along
with many of his cyberneticist colleagues, he believed that the concept of survival (and there-
fore being alive) could be captured by the generic systemic notion of stability. However,
Ashby went further tackling the issue of adaptive behaviour beyond the mere regulation of
feedback loops. For Ashby, ‘a form of behaviour is adaptive if it maintains the essential vari-
ables within physiological limits’ (Ashby, 1954, p.58). As a model of adaptive behaviour, he
developed the notion of an ultrastable system, which he described as:
Two systems of continuous variables (that we called ‘environment’ and ‘reacting
part’) interact, so that a primary feedback (through the complex sensory and mo-
tor channels) exists between them. Another feedback, working intermittently
and at a much slower order of speed, goes from the environment to certain con-
tinuous variables which in their turn affect some step-mechanisms, the effect be-
ing that the step-mechanisms change value when and only when these variables
pass outside given limits. The step-mechanisms affect the reacting part; by acting
as parameters to it they determine how it shall react to the environment (Ashby,
1954, p.98).
As shown in Figure 1.2.a, a reactive system (R) in continuous interaction with its environ-
ment (Env), could maintain under control certain essential variables (S) by triggering random
changes in the configuration of R when S crosses certain bounds. Ashby described S as the
essential variables of an organism which should be kept under control for its correct func-
tioning (e.g. blood temperature, pH). For Ashby, the mechanism for keeping those variables
under control was a step-mechanism triggering random internal parametrical changes which
would eventually return these essential variables to their viability zone. If these changes cre-
ate new dynamics which are able to return S to the established bounds, the organism would
have adapted to the perturbation that provoked S to get out of bounds in the first place (see
Figure 1.2.b) According to Ashby, adaptation processes of an organism in an environment are
based on the existence of feedback loops at two different levels which define the ultrastable
system: (1) The continuous interaction between an agent and its environment, and (2) the
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Figure 1.2: Ultrastability. a) Diagramof an ultrastable system,whereEnv is the environment,R is an organism's reacting
system and S are the organism essential variables, triggering changes in R when they are out of bounds. b) Example of
adaptive behaviour in the ultrastable system, where S1 and S2 represent the phase space of the essential variables, andP
the parametrical configuration of the agent. Both schematics were adapted fromAshby (1954).
regulation of the essential variables of the organism through plastic changes in the agent’s in-
ternal mechanisms. In parallel, some similar ideas were being proposed by Jean Piaget in the
field of psychology 2.
Ashby materialized its design of an ultrastable system in 1948 building the Homeostat, an
adaptive ultrastable machine consisting of four interconnected Royal Air Force bomb control
units with inputs, feedback, and magnetically driven, water-filled potentiometers (see Ashby,
1954, chapter 7). Each unit emits as an output a direct current proportional to the deviation
of its magnet from the central position. These output currents act as inputs for other units
influencing their magnets through a coil. Before each input current reaches its coil, it passes
through a commutator (determining the polarity of entry to the coil) and a potentiometer
(which determines what fraction of the input current reaches the coil). Commutators and
potentiometers act as parameters of the system. The values of the parameters are provided
by a random number generator each time a magnet diverges far from the central position.
Ashby’s machine displays behaviours such as habituation, reinforcement or learning through
its ability to automatically adapt its configuration to stabilize the effects of any disturbances
from its environment. A schema of the organization of Ashby’s implementation of an ultra-
2Piaget published ‘The Psychology of Intelligence’, trying to explain the genesis of higher human capacities
in terms of the ability to organize and re-organize the interaction with the environment in growing forms of
complexity. Thus, Piaget proposes a framework to understand biology and psychology in which the focus is in
the self-regulation of the development of structures that increase their degrees of (dynamic) equilibrium. This
process is mediated by two complementary processes (similar to Ashby’s double feedback loop): (1) assimilation,
or the modification of incoming input according to pre-existing structures, and (2) accommodation, the active
modification of the structure itself as a response to environmental perturbations.
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stable system in the Homeostat is depicted in Figure 1.3, in which local components have an
extra layer of regulation.
The concept of ultrastability and its materialization into the Homeostat challenged some
ideas of the cybernetic framework and opened new perspectives on persistence and purpose
in living beings (Froese, 2010). Intentionality is no longer assumed to be contained within the
structure of the mechanisms of the system (feedback loops or logical functions). Instead, it is
the regulation of some states of the system which makes the rest of the system act intelligently.
As Wiener recognized,
Ashby’s brilliant idea of the unpurposeful random mechanism which seeks for its
own purpose through a process of learning is [...] one of the great philosophical
contributions of the present day [...] Not only can we build purpose into ma-
chines, but in an overwhelming majority of cases a machine designed to avoid
certain pitfalls of breakdown will look for purposes which it can fulfill (Wiener,
1988, p.38. Originally written in 1950).
Despite Wiener’s optimistic view, the key contribution of Ashby’s work was to show that
behaviour that may appear intelligent to an external observer can potentially be accounted
for by quite simple and unintelligent mechanisms driven by random step functions, as long
as they were connected with the maintenance of the right viability regions. Thus, Ahsby’s
model challenges reductionistic views assuming that purpose is embedded in feedback loops
since they contain a representation of a goal-directed behaviour. Instead, one may explain
the functioning of the Homeostat without the need of representation at all, since it does not
represent the world in any formal sense. It can learn to adjust its parameters for interacting
with the world to adapt to various disturbances and maintain certain desirable internal states.
No wonder that Ashby’s ideas were subject to fierce criticism by some cyberneticists present
at the ninth Macy Conference (the only one in which Ashby took part). Wiesner, Pitts, and
particularly Bigelow sustained critical pressure, questioning (among other aspects as the use of
randomness in his model) whether the Homeostat learns when it finds an equilibrium state
(Dupuy, 2009, p.148-155; Husbands and Holland, 2012, p.10-11). Ashby’s design served no
purpose and was designed to carry out no task but to maintain certain internal invariances,
somehow plunging into a crisis part of the previous cybernetic hypothesis, and influencing
the development of a second wave of cybernetic research that would propose new perspec-
tives (Glanville, 2002; Froese, 2010).
Self-Organization
Ashby’s work allows an interesting perspective about the self-organization of a system. An
ultrastable system is to display what appears to be purposeful behaviour without a previous
design specifying how to perform this behaviour. The Homeostat was not designed to per-
form any particular behaviour but it was able to modify its own organization to perform a
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Figure 1.3: Ultrastable regulation of the system components. Organization of an ultrastable system as Ashby imple-
mented it in his Homeostat. A layer of local regulation is added on top of the neural controller, in which local units trigger
changes in its connectivity when their state is not maintained under some bounds.
variety of behaviours while maintaining certain variables under control. Although it can be
argued whether Ashby Homeostat can account for autonomous behaviour, his model poses
the idea that purpose of an agent does not lie in its mechanisms but in the interactions be-
tween its component that allow rearranging the organization of the agent. Ashby tried to
coin some of these ideas under the term of ‘self-organization’, which he introduced into con-
temporary science (Ashby, 1962, originally written in 1947), to be further taken-up by other
cyberneticists for example, Heinz von Foerster, who organized a conference on ‘The Princi-
ples of Self-Organization’ at the University of Illinois’ Allerton Park in June, 1960, leading to
a series of conferences on Self-Organizing Systems. Norbert Wiener also took-up the idea in
the second edition of his ‘Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and
the Machine’ (MIT Press 1961).
Self-organization is typically defined as a process where some form of overall order or co-
ordination arises out of the local interactions between the system components that may be ini-
tially disordered. Self-organization is spontaneous, i.e. it is not controlled by any specific part
of the system or any external system but emerges from the distributed interaction between
the components of the system. Typically, self-organized systems are robust to external fluc-
tuations and able to survive and sustain themselves in the face of perturbations from outside
the system, at least to some extent. As homeostasis is usually modelled in terms of negative
feedback loops correcting deviations of the system, self-organization is usually modelled in
terms of systems with positive feedback loops that amplify random fluctuations in the system
(Heylighen, 2001).
The term ‘self-organizing’ was originally introduced by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of
Judgement, where he argued that teleology is a meaningful concept only if there exists such
an entity whose parts or ‘organs’ are simultaneously ends and means:
For a body, therefore, which is to be judged as a natural end in itself and in
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accordance with its internal possibility, it is required that its parts reciprocally
produce each other, as far as both their form and maintain their combination is
concerned, and thus produce a whole out of their own causality [...] In such a
product of nature each part is conceived as if it exists only through all the others,
thus as if existing for the sake of the others and on account of the whole [...] as
an organ that produces the other parts (consequently each produces the others
reciprocally) [...] only then and on that account can such a product, as an orga-
nized and self-organizing being, be called a natural end [...] An organized being
is thus not a mere machine, for that has only a motive power, while the organized
being possesses in itself a formative power, and indeed one that it communicates
to the matter, which does not have it (it organizes the latter): thus it has a self-
propagating formative power, which cannot be explained through the capacity
for movement alone (that is, mechanism) (Kant, 1987, p.245-246).
Interestingly, when Kant defines self-organization he describes a particular kind of interac-
tion between the parts and the whole. This interaction addresses a formative self-propagating
organization communicated by the whole to the parts, though it is absent in the parts alone.
Kant uses the example of a watch, in which there is one part that makes other parts move,
but it is not the cause that produces the others. As opposed to machines, organized beings not
only have motive forces (the ability of one thing to move another) but a formative force that
propagates itself producing patterns organizing the components of the system. These pat-
terns would also include deviations to cope with different circumstances, guaranteeing the
self-preservation of the organized being (Kant, 1987, p.374-375). For Kant, organisms are sys-
tems in which parts are formed for and from the others, constituting a dynamical unit that
guides the activity of the organism as a whole. This is perhaps the first elaboration of the emer-
gence of a self, which arises from the recursive processes that constitute them, which will be
one of the guiding notions of the work presented here. This notion of self-organization was
very influential on the organicist school of thinking that expanded from German idealism to
some biological and ethological interpretations, but it was not until Ashby that it came to be
reformulated in scientific formal terms.
Ahsby gives two possible descriptions of self-organization (Ashby, 1962). A first type
would be purely structural, producing coordination between the parts of the system and pre-
senting certain resilience to perturbation (Ashby characterizes these systems as ‘self-connecting’,
since they explain the transition from unorganized to organized states). The second meaning
addresses what Ashby defines as ‘changing from a bad organization to a good one’, and he
exemplifies it with the example of a child whose brain organization makes him fire-seeking,
but that after being burnt becomes fire-avoiding (Ashby, 1962, p.115). In the latter normative
sense, Ashby argues that no machine can be described to be self-organizing by itself. If we
define S as the set of states of the machine, and f as the driving function that maps states of S
into S, a self-organizing machine will be such where f is a function of S. This change would
just convert the first machine into a new machine. For Ashby, the only way to conceive a self-
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organizing system without being ‘self-contradictory’ is to conceive a machine which is coupled
to an environment  (Ashby, 1962, p.296). Thus, if changes in f are originally generated by
changes in , we have a machine S that is self-organizing within the whole S + . That is,
according to Ashby a self-organizing system can only be so by being coupled to another sys-
tem. In this way, Ashby conceives self-organization and closure as a process taking place in an
agent-environment interactive domain.
Although greatly inspiring, Ashby’s description and implementation of adaptive behaviour
and self-organization in terms of the stability of a system falls short of characterizing a truly
autonomous behaviour. For example, Ashby’s Homeostat would stay indefinitely trapped in
a particular stable state if it is not perturbed by its environment. Oddly, in the implemen-
tation of the ultrastable system through the Homeostat, the essential variables of the system
are collapsed into the components of the system that interact with the environment, so the
viability region of the system is defined only in terms only of the stability of individual com-
ponents. This description of the system reduced to just one scale of description limits the
possibilities of Ashby’s powerful idea of ultrastability. Nevertheless, Ashby’s work inspired
conceptual developments that would be of great importance for thinking autonomous be-
haviour. Moreover, the concept of self-organization would latter become a common place
in scientific literature with the rise of complex systems science and the development of non-
equilibrium thermodynamics. As we will see later, the study of far-from-equilibrium physical
systems and their role in life by authors as Prigogine or Kauffman will expand the notion of
self-organization to richer possibilities.
1.1.3 Identity, Closure, Self-Reference and Circularity
Although the concept of homeostasis has been a milestone inspiring dynamical characteriza-
tions of systems stability, the idea soon provoked calls to go further than the mere tendency
toward equilibrium. One of the defendants of such position was Ludwig von Bertalanffy,
one of the founders of general systems theory, an interdisciplinary discipline that tries to find
‘principles which apply to systems in general, whatever the nature of their component ele-
ments or the relations or “forces” between them’ (Bertalanffy, 1950). Bertalanffy argued that
the equilibrium principle of homeostasis ‘misses the fact that psychological and behavioral ac-
tivities are more than relaxation of tensions’ (Bertalanffy, 1969, p.108), and claims that home-
ostasis cannot explain certain aspects of life (e.g. play, exploratory activity, creativity or self-
realization; but also many aspects of human culture), and some disturbances of living beings
for example, psychosis-like episodes in sensory-deprivation experiments.
Equifinality
To solve this problem, Bertalanffy proposes that it is fundamental to understand the differ-
ence between closed and open systems and think about organisms in terms of the later. Bio-
logical systems, which are in a perpetual state of change of their components (e.g. chemical
compounds, cells, but also organisms, or species in ecological systems) constitute an example
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of open systems. For Bertalanffy, a major difference between closed system and open system
is equifinality, i.e., a property of systems whereby the final state may be reached from differ-
ent initial conditions and in different ways. In closed systems, equifinality cannot be found
since (according to the second law of thermodynamics) they always tend to a state of maxi-
mum entropy, i.e. a time-independent state of equilibrium where the composition remains
constant. Conversely, open systems, which continuously exchange matter with their environ-
ment, under some constraints, can attain a stationary state in which through the inflow and
outflow of materials the system reaches a steady state. Thus, under the right set of constrains,
a system may reach the same steady state independently of the initial configuration of its ele-
ments. An example used by Bertalanffy is the development of sea urchin larvae (Bertalanffy,
1950). Normally, a larva develops from a normal germ of the sea urchin, but if the germ is
cut in half, or if we fuse two germs into one, a similar larva will develop from the resulting
(half or double) germ. A similar process takes place in the development of twins in humans
and other species. For Bertalanffy, this is an example of equifinality, systems with completely
different starting conditions will result in the same steady state (exemplified by a living larva;
Bertalanffy, 1950). Bertalanffy explains that these phenomena cannot be explained in terms of
the microlevel physico-chemical forces, but in terms of the properties that set up the equilib-
rium steady state, depending on the constants of reactions and the inflows/outlows of matter
in the system. That is, equilibrium does not depend on the stability of the components of the
system alone, but in the stability of the system as a whole.
Bertalanffy discusses the differences between inert and living systems in terms of the kind
of finality in those systems (Bertalanffy, 1950). Specifically, he characterized certain modes of
finality as dynamic teleologies, stressing the difference between:
1. Directiveness based upon structure: where the structure of the system itself leads the
process in a certain way. This may be said of human-made machines aiming some per-
formance, but also of certain biological processes of homeostasis.
2. Equifinality: where regulations of the system cannot be based upon predetermined
structures or mechanisms, but they are based in the configuration of steady states in
open systems and determined by phenomena of production of order in far-from-equi-
librium thermodynamics.
For the second types of processes there is a special relation between the components and
the whole of a system: that of circular causation.
Circularity and Operational Closure
Apart from notions of ultrastability, one of Ashby’s most influential contributions was the
idea of closure applied to adaptive organisms. According to Ashby, the ultrastable system
solves the problem of how an organism changes from the unadapted to the adapted condition,
but this is only a first step towards understanding living entities. The exigences of adaptivity
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in real world situations demands time and efficiency of the adaptation (Ashby, 1954, chapter
10). Here, the concept of closure is fundamental to understand the persistence or the survival
of an organism. Ashby defines closure as:
When an operator acts on a set of operands it may happen that the set of trans-
forms obtained contains no element that is not already present in the set of ope-
rands, i.e. the transformation creates no new element [...]. When this occurs,
the set of operands is closed under the transformation (Ashby, 1962, p.11).
Ashby uses the example in which we can define a ‘living mouse’ as being a mouse in a state
contained in a subset fMigi=1:::N. We can say that the mouse survives an operation C if the
result of all possible C(Mi) is also a state contained in fMig. If we were to describe the states
in fMig in terms of variables, these states would correspond to those in which certain essential
variables are kept within the assigned homeostatic limits (Ashby, 1962, p.197). The property
of operational closure guarantees that the identity (organization) of the living system is well
defined and that it will persist throughout its operation.
This idea of closure in living beings was further developed by Humberto Maturana:
Living systems as they exist on earth today are characterized by exergonic meta-
bolism, growth and internal molecular reproduction, all organized in a closed
causal circular process that allows for evolutionary change in the way the circu-
larity is maintained, but not for the loss of the circularity itself [...]. This circular
organization constitutes a homeostatic system whose function is to produce and
maintain this very same circular organization by determining that the compo-
nents that specify it be those whose synthesis or maintenance it secures. Further-
more, this circular organization defines a living system as a unit of interactions
and is essential for its maintenance as a unit; that which is not in it is external
to it or does not exist. The circular organization in which the components that
specify it are those whose synthesis or maintenance it secures in a manner such
that the product of their functioning is the same functioning organization that
produces them, is the living organization (Maturana, 1970, p.9).
Maturana reinterprets the concept of ultrastability (Froese and Stewart, 2010) to develop
what he called the circular organization of the living, defining a living system as ‘an homeo-
static system whose homeostatic organization has its own organization as the variable that it
maintains constant through the production and functioning of the components that specify
it, and is defined as a unit of interactions by this very organization’ (Maturana, 1970, p.48).
Thus, living beings would be a kind of system that not only maintains a stable organization
but also produces it. This organization defines the organism as a unit of interactions occur-
ring in a cyclic manner. If those cycles are interrupted, the organism disintegrates (Maturana,
1970, p.10).
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Autopoiesis and Autonomy
The circularity of the living organization has been reformulated by Maturana and Varela’s con-
cept of autopoiesis to define the type of organization which constitutes living beings, steer-
ing away from a static conception of cybernetic feedback mechanisms (Maturana and Varela,
1980). They extend the previous definition of living beings stating that autopoietic organiza-
tion is a sufficient condition for life. An autopoietic system is defined as a network of processes
of production (transformation and destruction) of components which (1) through their in-
teractions and transformations continuously realize and regenerate the network of processes
(relations) that produced them; and (2) constitute the system as a concrete unity in the space
in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization
as such a network (Maturana and Varela, 1980, p.78-79).
The paradigmatic example of autopoietic organization is cellular metabolism, where a net-
work of chemical reactions produces molecules that ‘(i) through their interactions generate
and participate recursively in the same network of relations which produced them, and (ii)
realize the cell as a material unity’ (Varela et al., 1974, p.188). The first condition acknowledges
the importance of the material self-production of living beings, addressing the importance of
materiality and embodiment within an environment. The second one rejects the static con-
ception of living homeostatic systems, where the systems components are maintained con-
stantly, favouring a view where what the system maintains constantly are ‘certain relations
between components otherwise in continuous flow or change’ (Maturana and Varela, 1980,
p.81). The organization of the system has to be captured by relational variables between the
different dynamic processes that constitute the system. These relational variables are the ones
that need to be regulated through homeostatic-like mechanisms in order to ensure the survival
of the organism. A schematic of cellular autopoiesis is displayed in Figure 1.4.
Varela’s idea of autopoiesis was modelled in a computer simulation of a two-dimensional
cellular automaton (Varela et al., 1974) where substrate and catalyst elements were defined as
moving randomly in the space of a quadratic grid, producing ‘link’ elements capable of bond-
ing when they interact. The model is able to simulate a network of productions of compo-
nents that effectively produces a boundary or membrane that distinguishes the system from
the environment, being able to re-establish the boundary when it is broken by spontaneous
decay of links.
For Varela, autopoiesis characterizes an instance of a form of organization endowing liv-
ing system with a broader property: autonomy (Varela, 1981). Here, autonomy is defined as
a general phenomenon applicable to other domains of interaction, such as neural or immune
systems; whereas autopoiesis is only a particular case that applies to the mechanisms that pro-
duce the unitary character of living organisms in the physical space. Although the relation
between autonomy and autopoiesis is not always clear in Maturana and Varela’s literature, it
is usually connected with the notion of closure and the affirmation that all autonomous sys-
tems are operationally closed. In Varela’s words, autonomous systems are operationally closed
implying that ‘their organization is characterized by processes such that (i) the processes are
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Figure 1.4: Autopoietic organization. A circular network ofmetabolic processes produces amembrane that encloses the
system in space, regulating its interactions with the environment. Adapted fromVarela (1997)
related as a network, so that they recursively depend on each other in the generation and real-
ization of the processes themselves, and (ii) they constitute the system as a unity recognizable
in the space (domain) in which the processes exist’ (Varela, 1979, p.55). A good example of how
autonomy may be extended to other domains is the work of Francisco Varela and colleagues
conceptualizing and modelling autonomy in immune systems (Varela and Coutinho, 1991),
where the autonomy of the immune system is characterized as fluctuation patterns of natural
antibodies able to define an organism’s molecular and cellular identity (and therefore aspects
such as tolerance and self-nonself discrimination, memory and the evolution of the immune
system). Another example is cognitive behaviour, which is the result of the autonomy at the
level of the nervous system. The dynamic organization of neural networks defines a series of
invariant patterns of sensorimotor correlations that define the organism as a mobile unit in
space (Varela, 1997).
Self-Organization and Autonomy in Far-from-equilibrium Physical Systems
As Bertalanffy pointed out, circular organization is closely related to far-from equilibrium
physical structures. Although Maturana and Varela sought to develop a general system’s de-
scription of an autopoietic system, many researches have urged taking into account the physi-
cal dissipative structures that may sustain such processes (Moreno et al., 1994). The theory of
dissipative structures was developed by Ilya Prigogine, with strong implications for the study
of biological processes. For Prigogine, biological problems such as the origin of life are as
much connected to physics as to biology. For example, he postulates non-equilibrium ther-
modynamics as a solution for the apparent contradiction between biological evolution, in
which an irreversible increase of organization of more complex structures takes place, and the
second law of thermodynamics, which postulates that the evolution of every system is directed
44
towards continuous disorganization (Prigogine and Nicolis, 1971).
Systems in thermodynamic equilibrium always tend to the ‘most probable’ state, corre-
sponding to the state of maximum disorder. According to Boltzmann principles Boltzmann
(1995), the resulting disorder is the product of a competition between energy and tempera-
ture at a molecular level, whose results are directly translated to the macroscopic level. Take
for example the ferromagnetic Ising model (which will be described in section 1.2.3), in which
the temperature acts as a control parameter in a one-to-one mapping between molecular and
macroscopic behaviour. For system’s in thermodynamic equilibrium, order is only possi-
ble at low temperatures. When the temperature raises energy flows fairly rapidly among the
spin states of interacting atoms, which makes the creation of ordered structures very difficult.
However, Prigogine described in depth a different kind of thermodynamical systems, those
in non-equilibrium situations, in which order arises more easily. A recurrent example is that
of Bénard cells. Consider a horizontal fluid layer heated from below. A temperature gradient
is created through the fluid, opposing gravitational forces. When the gradient is large enough
it reaches a critical value at which an internal convective motion emerges spontaneously. This
convective motion forms very regular patterns such as hexagonal cells. Bénard cells are an ex-
ample of a dissipative system, in which an external energy exchange (the temperature gradient)
drives the system out of equilibrium allowing the system to give rise to regular flow patterns
that would be highly unlikely to appear under thermodynamic equilibrium. Prigogine ex-
plains how the emergence of structured patterns in dissipative system is connected with the
existence of specific nonlinear kinetic laws that amplify fluctuations at the molecular level,
reaching a macroscopic level and stabilizing new, emergent structures (Prigogine and Nicolis,
1971). For Prigogine, the existence of different levels of organization in living beings is con-
nected with a succession of instabilities amplified and stabilized through nonlinear dynamics.
With these developments Prigogine established the basis for a formal description of cir-
cularity in self-organization of physical and biological systems. Far-from-equilibrium ther-
modynamics introduce an interesting new perspective on how systems may be persistent. In
equilibrium thermodynamic (conservative structures), systems may persist when they are as-
sembled into spatially ordered forms (e.g. rocks, crystals or planetary systems). These systems
will stay as they are indefinitely once created, since they are energetically conservative. The per-
sistence of those systems is displayed in a form of cohesion that is maintained by the forces that
hold the different parts together (e.g. chemical bonds or gravitational forces). These type of
systems are not good candidates to support autonomous forms of organization (Barandiaran,
2008, p.93) since: (1) they tend to maximize their entropy levels and their level of complexity is
defined by their boundary conditions (i.e. they are not capable of generating variable internal
states by themselves), and (2) these systems can perform no work (i.e. useful directed release
of energy), which according to some authors, for example Stuart Kauffman, will be a basic
requirement for autonomy (Kauffman, 2002).
On the other hand, far-from-equilibrium systems generate dissipative structures which
give rise to cohesive dynamic patterns under an energy gradient (e.g. whirls, hurricanes or
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lasers). In these systems a great number of microscopic elements create a global, macroscopic
ordered pattern in the presence of a flow of matter and energy. Interestingly, the emergence of
ordered patterns is not only a consequence of the boundary conditions and the material prop-
erties of the elements, but the result of a process of interaction that creates a circular causality
in which the generated macroscopic pattern contributes, in a non-trivial manner, to the main-
tenance of some cohesive or invariant relationships among microscopic elements. Neverthe-
less, complex forms of organization in living beings are too different from self-organizing sys-
tems that arise spontaneously in far-from-equilibirum conditions. Although the boundary
conditions do not determinate the activity of the system, in standard dissipative structures,
global emergent patterns only emerge when the system is under the appropriate boundary
conditions. If those conditions (generally externally controlled) are not met, e.g. the energy
flow sustaining the system disappears, the self-organizing system vanishes. This leads us to ask
how autonomous forms of organization can come about in far-from equilibrium systems.
Kauffman defines autonomy as a necessary and sufficient condition for life. For him, an
autonomous agent would be an agent defined as a ‘self-reproducing system able to perform
at least one thermodynamic work cycle’ (Kauffman, 2002, p.49), where self-maintenance of a
system is described as a work-constraint cycle – work being defined as ‘constrained release of
energy into relatively few degrees of freedom’ (Kauffman, 2003, p.1094). To perform work,
a system needs to build constraints but, at the same time, work is required to create those
constraints. In this context, the self-maintenance of the system can be achieved as a coupling
between: (1) exergonic reactions, which release energy in the form of work (e.g. diffusion,
transport along a gradient), and (2) endergonic processes, which absorb energy in the form of
work (e.g. synthesis of molecules, transport against a gradient). Therefore, a work-constraint
cycle (Kauffman, 2002, 2003) arises when exergonic processes are constrained so that work
is used to generate endergonic processes which generate those constraints, which in turn al-
low exergonic processes to occur. In Kauffman’s words: ‘work begets constraints beget work’
(Kauffman, 2002).
On similar lines, Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno (2004) claim that autonomous organization
is only possible if it generates constraints that modulate the flows of energy so that those con-
straints are generated and contribute in this way to the recursive maintenance of the orga-
nization. They propose the notion of ‘basic autonomy’ as a property of self-constructing
(cellular) systems in which endergonic-exergonic couplings involve: (1) the functional and or-
ganizational integration of inner constitutive processes and (2) the regulation of the boundary
conditions through the control of the flow of matter and energy through the boundary. The
constitution of a physical boundary in the form of a membrane is the requirement that avoids
the problem of diffusion and dilution and allows the control of energy and material flows, al-
lowing the system to display these two requirements for basic autonomy.
This poses a serious challenge to the cybernetic conceptions of negative feedback loops
as the generators of purpose and self-maintenance. Imagine a system controlled by a simple
negative feedback loop. It cannot generate anything by itself other than a state of stability
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that will not change if it is not challenged from the outside. The system is not able to generate
any work, or modify the boundary conditions that force the system to converge to a certain
point. Even in Ashby’s elaboration of an ultrastable system, without perturbations from the
outside world, the system would end in a conservative state in which an immutable order is
maintained. Thus, in order to describe far-from-equilibrium systems we need a different for-
mal descriptions than the proposed by early cyberneticists. As we will see in the next section,
nonlinear amplification and coordination dynamics are important aspects of the behaviour
of far-from-equilibrium systems and are more suited to modelling them.
1.1.4 Towards an operationalization of autonomy
In this section we have described the historical development of some theoretical concepts use-
ful for defining autonomous systems: conatus, homeostasis, utrastability, equifinality, oper-
ational closure, circularity, autopoiesis or far-from-equilibrium systems. Specifically, we have
reviewed three notions that allow us to think about the properties that define an autonomous
system and its capability to display an emergent identity that differentiates it from its envi-
ronment while at the same time it is able to compensate or adapt to perturbations from or
interactions with it:
• Persistence of a system showing a tendency towards stability at certain states.
• Self-organized adaptation and reconfiguration of the system through regulatory mech-
anisms modulating agent-environment exchanges.
• Integration of persistence and adaptation through causal circularity between different
levels of the system (physical substrate and emergent order parameters) through the
regulation of interaction between system and environment.
At this point, we may provisionally rewrite Varela’s description of an autonomous system
as a system in which (1) integration of internal constitutive processes in a network of circu-
lar dependencies allowing the emergence of persistent high-order coherence patterns (2) the
active regulation of processes of exchange with the environment through adaptive breaking
mechanisms, and (3) the constitution of the system as a unity recognizable in the space (do-
main) in which it exists through its process of interaction with its environment. Barandiaran
et al. (2009) describe an autonomous agent as a system which meets three conditions: indi-
viduality, interactional asymmetry and normativity, meaning that an autonomous system, to
be so, must be able to constitute itself as an entity different from its environment, it must
be an active source of activity in its environment, and it must regulate its activity in relation
to certain norms that guarantee the continuation of its existence. Our provisional definition
allows an agent to meet these conditions.
Furthermore, we have addressed some operationalizations of these concepts that took
place in parallel with these theoretical developments: the feedback loop, the Homeostat (with
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its second order plastic feedback loop) or the self-organization of a cellular membrane. Nev-
ertheless, some definitions, for example, autopoietic or autonomous systems being homeo-
static systems having ‘their own organization as the variable that they maintain constant’, or
far-from-equilibrium systems with different levels of organization are still way too abstract
and not easy to operationalize.
Together with the formal definition of concepts related to autonomy, during the last cou-
ple of decades we have observed an increasing interest in operationalizing concepts in cog-
nitive science and neuroscience. Although some conceptual notions defined in this section
were operationalized by its authors (e.g. Ashby’s Ultrastability and its implementation in the
Homeostat, or in Varela’s models of autopoiesis and immune networks), recent advances in
dynamic systems models allow defining through notions that help us to operationalize some
concepts about autonomy. A parallel history of operational developments was underway,
sometimes strongly intertwined with the former, and others branching out and opening new
doors to both conceptual and operational innovations.
1.2 Metastability, Soft-Assemblies & Critical Self-Organization
If in the last section we focused on conceptual notions around autonomy, here we proceed to
the description of mechanisms with the objective of operationalizing these notions. We do not
claim that a strong boundary exists between the development of the two (as we just saw the
conceptual development of ideas as ultrastability and autopoiesis happened in parallel with
their operationalizations), nevertheless, the objective of this section is to offer a perspective on
other lines of thought that widen our understanding about autonomy in terms of mechanistic
models reproducing modes of adaptive coherence and circular interaction between scales.
As we described in previous sections, one of the limitations of early cybernetic opera-
tionalizations of persistence and coherence in adaptive systems was the focus on the stabil-
ity of particular components of the system. Without an interactive domain of description of
the system, our perspective is limited to a single scale of operation of the system, escaping the
possibility of a holistic description of a system.
In the 1950’s Arthur Iberall developed the concept of homeokinetics to apply the laws of
thermodynamics to self-organizing living systems. Iberall was interested in using physics for
overcoming a static definition of homeostasis, where the internal states of an organism are
preserved at equilibrium despite changes in the external environment. In sharp contrast, the
physical scheme outlined by Iberall tries to capture the essence of the dynamic regulations and
interactions that constitute and preserve life. He studied how complex systems generate their
own pressures for action, which emerge from the great number of internal degrees of freedom
of the system (Iberall, 1977).
Starting from the idea that periodicities of cycles constitute the only form of dynamic sta-
bility for nonlinear systems whose processes degrade large amounts of free energy, the central
feature of homeokinetics is the dynamic regulation of a system’s internal degrees of freedom
by means of coupled ensembles of limit cycle oscillatory processes. Dynamical regulation of
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a system involves switching among various marginally stable operating regimes, where differ-
ent thermodynamical engines follow limit-cycle trajectories. Homeokinetic regulation consist
in the modulation of these oscillatory processes, which are coupled or entrained constitut-
ing constellations of oscillators displaying a frequency spectrum that characterizes the overall,
particular operating model. For Iberall, the nervous system constitutes a complex ensemble
of thermodynamical engines (Llinás and Iberall, 1977). Iberall proposed a novel description
of the organization of living beings:
An essential characteristic of a living system is its marginal instability [...] Both
the external and internal environment constantly present the organism with an
impulsive (vicissitudinous) input against a background of the slowly searched,
changing milieu. As a result, the motor systems of the organism are plunged into
intermittent search modes to satisfy all of its hungers [...] The motor-actuated
living system unfolds its states, posture by moment. In each posture (the action
of the body on the body), the system is temporarily locked into an orbital constel-
lation of all of its oscillators. The psychological-physiological ‘moment’ emerges
from the many oscillatory chains that enter into the constellation (Iberall and
McCulloch, 1969).
Iberall’s pioneering research opened up the road for the emergence of the modern field of
coordination dynamics (Kelso, 1995). Disappointed with the representationalist turn that
started to dominate cognitive science after the disintegration of cybernetics, Peter Kugler,
Scott Kelso and Michael Turvey proposed to pick up Iberall’s work and developed a frame
of analysis where dissipative structures could be reduced to coordinative structures composed
of far-from-equilibrium thermodynamical engines working in a periodic, limit-cycle fashion
(Kugler et al., 1980). Their driving example was the coordination of sets of individual mus-
cles creating ensembles of muscle collectives which are responsible for coordinated human
movement (Kelso et al., 1981). For them, physical considerations of far-from-equilibrium ther-
modynamics could be dismissed as long as the properties of limit-cycle processes were taken
into account. That is, description of dissipative systems should characterize (1) a tendency to a
fixed amplitude and frequency robust to perturbations and (2) a tendency to mutually entrain
or synchronize. Relying on the experimental evidence of the independence between timing
and energetic considerations in muscle activity, they claim that self-organizing phenomena
in animal behaviour can be modelled by coupled limit cycle oscillators dissociated from the
thermodynamical system that generated them.
1.2.1 Coherence in self-synchronizing systems
The connection between far-from-equilibrium systems and coordinating structures opened
the road to integrate a long line of operational models traditionally associated with the field of
physics into a conceptual framework of life and autonomy. However, this exchange was also
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happening spontaneously and the study of oscillations and coordination in nature had been
there for some time. The idea is that the stability or the coherence of a system can emerge, not
in terms of the individual dynamics of the components (which can be continuously changing)
but in the relationships of coordination of those components in self-synchronized systems
(Strogatz, 2004).
One of the first scientific reports on self-synchronization was made in the 17th century
by Christiaan Huygens. In 1656, Huygens invented the pendulum clock. By determining the
mathematical formula that related pendulum length to time (99.38 cm for a one second move-
ment), Huygens discovered how to compute precisely the internal timing of a pendulum-
driven machine. Before Huygens, clocks were much more inaccurate being based on springs,
which can create an oscillatory behaviour when connected to a bouncing weight or to the
axle of a turning wheel, which presented the problem of how to have the clock running at a
constant rate as the spring ran down. More interestingly for us, Huygens also discovered the
phenomena of entrainment. In a letter to his father dated 26 February 1665 (Huygens et al.,
1888, p.243), Huygens describes how being confined in his room by a minor illness, he stared at
two of his pendulum clocks mounted next to each other on the same support. He discovered
a striking phenomenon, the two pendulums were synchronized swinging in opposite direc-
tions. He tried to disturb them, but within half an hour the pendulums regained synchrony.
In contrast, when the two pendulums were placed in opposite sides of the room they lost syn-
chrony. Huygens referred to this synchronized tendency as ‘an odd kind of sympathy’, and
hypothesized that the pendulums must have influenced each other somehow through small
vibrations in their support or through movements in the air (this hypothesis was to be con-
firmed by modern mathematical models c.f. Oliveira and Melo, 2015). This was the start of
the study of coupled oscillations.
It was not until more recently when coordinated oscillatory activity was found in the hu-
man body, and particularly in the brain. In 1929, Hans Berger published a paper with his
findings about the brain’s electrical activity. Initially motivated by the possibility of electro-
magnetic forces in the brain being the carrier of some form of telepathic activity, he performed
numerous experiments analysing the behaviour of neural activity through a galvanometer, dis-
criminating the activity coming from the brain from artefacts consequential of blood pressure
changes or scalp skin. In his paper, he concluded that the most prominent electrical activity
could be recorded from the occipital part of the skull when the subject’s eyes were closed. Al-
though this electrical activity was too small to support the possibility of any type of telepathic
activity, Berger’s paper provided a groundbreaking discovery: the recorded activity presented
patterns distinguishing two types of waves. The first waves were large-amplitude rhythms or
‘alpha’ rhythms about 10 waves per second, induced when the subject was calm and with her
eyes closed. The second type where faster smaller amplitude waves or ‘beta’ waves, present
when the eyes were open. Berger’s discovery opened a path that, especially during the last
decades, has promoted the study of brain oscillations which has brought considerable progress
in the understanding of a variety of cognitive phenomena. The self-organization, emergent
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patterns, phase-synchrony and oscillatory rhythms are now common issues in the study of
brain dynamics (Buzsaki, 2006).
A couple of decades later, Norbert Wiener published his bookCybernetics (Wiener, 1948),
popularizing a term that would gather under a unified framework some of the most impor-
tant scientific advances of his time. The framework proposed by Wiener allowed thinking
about problems of communication and control, no matter the system under analysis. This
facilitated designing mathematical tools that could be applied to understand the functioning
of machines, neural networks, animals or societies alike.
At that time, although the evidence for oscillatory brains in the wave was solid, nobody re-
ally knew why the brain’s signals should oscillate. Wiener hypothesized that alpha oscillations
in the brain work as a master clock for the brain. However, evidence at the time showed that
individual neurons did not made for very efficient clocks; they were ‘too imprecise’. Instead,
Wiener thought that this clock may be a collective clock. Somewhere in the brain, groups
comprising millions of neurons oscillating at different frequencies may spontaneously syn-
chronize by pulling on one another’s frequency through some kind of control mechanism.
Wiener suggested that a very short-range form of radiation might be present in neurons, pro-
ducing a resonance phenomenon pulling together large masses of neurons into a synchronized
alpha rhythm (Wiener and Schadé, 1965, p.7). Beyond brain activity, Wiener also pointed
out that mass synchronization was ubiquitous in nature: chirping crickets, croaking frogs or
flashing fireflies also produce a ‘natural rhythm’, and urged biologists to conduct experiments
following this research line. Wiener even proposed a signature of what the resulting spectrum
of this synchronized activity might look like, modifying a Gaussian distribution of neuron
frequencies into a narrow peak of synchronized frequencies, with two dips at the extremes
of frequencies falling too far away (Strogatz, 2004, p.45). However, Wiener could not find
convincing evidence of this signature.
Some years later Arthur Winfree discovered a much more fruitful approach to give a re-
sponse to Wiener’s intuition. Instead of thinking about the frequencies of the oscillators and
how these may be ‘pulled together’, Winfree focused in the oscillators themselves, proposing
a model that described the oscillators in terms of their natural frequencies, but also character-
izing the interactions between oscillators. Winfree proposed a general description of a family
of relaxation oscillators, in which an ‘influence function’ varies depending on the oscillators’
activity, and a ‘sensitivity function’ representing how an oscillator responds to the signals it
receives (Winfree, 1967):
_i = !i +

N
NX
j=1
P(j)R(i) (1.1)
where i represents the phase of oscillator i, !i is its natural frequency,  is the coupling
strength between oscillators, N represents the number of oscillators in the system, and func-
tions P and R represent the influence and sensitivity functions of the oscillator, typically de-
scribed through sinusoidal functions.
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For simplicity, every oscillator was identical to others, except in the value of its natural fre-
quency that, as in Wiener’s assumption, followed a Gaussian distribution. Moreover, connec-
tivity across oscillators was uniform and all oscillators were equally affected by others. Winfree
derived the set of differential equations describing his system. Since the differential equations
were nonlinear, traditional methods for linear differential equation systems were not useful
for solving the system. Instead, Winfree combined mathematical analysis together with ex-
periments with electronic systems and computer simulations to analyse the behaviour of the
system.
These experiments showed how the behaviour of the system was quite counter-intuitive
and contradicted in part the predictions made by Wiener. First, Winfree discovered that de-
pending on the influence and sensitivity functions, the system displayed different behaviours.
For some configurations, the oscillators actively opposed synchronization, while for others,
they synchronized spontaneously, independently of their initial configuration. In these cases,
synchronization emerged cooperatively, in a process in which a few oscillators synchronized
by chance, exerting a stronger influence over other oscillators in a process of positive feedback,
expanding synchrony to a larger cluster of oscillators. The system was self-synchronizing.
Furthermore, a curious effect appeared. If the coupling factor  was too weak, oscillators
were unsynchronized. But increasing slightly the value of  did not at first have an apparent
effect on the collective amplitude of the oscillators; they were still out of synchrony. How-
ever, further increase of the value of  reached a point in which the collective amplitude of
the oscillators (i.e., their level of synchrony) raised abruptly (Winfree, 1967). Suddenly, the
system changed its behaviour from uncoordinated activity to a synchronized pack after a cer-
tain threshold was reached. The behaviour of the system does not correspond to statistical
aggregation as Wiener imagined but to nonlinear interaction. Winfree discovered a phase
transition.
In 1975, Yoshiki Kuramoto extended Winfree’s work proposing a different set of equations
as a more tractable special case of his model (Kuramoto, 1975, 2003):
_i = !i +

N
NX
j=1
sin(j   i) (1.2)
where the influence and sensitive functions have been substituted by a simple sinusoidal func-
tion of the phase difference between oscillators. Kuramoto focused on this simpler version of
the model and showed how to solve it exactly. This symmetrical rule materialized Wiener’s
concept of frequency pulling. Another interesting contribution, instead of focusing on the
collective amplitude between oscillators to quantify synchronization, was to propose a specific
variable called the order parameter (ranging between 0 and 1) capturing precisely the collec-
tive coherence of the system. Kuramoto’s formula predicts the value of the threshold when the
system goes from uncoordinated activity and synchronized clusters arise. Moreover, the or-
der parameter allows describing a degree of ‘partial synchrony’, characterizing a state in which
part of the oscillators in the system are synchronized and other parts are oscillating faster or
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slower. The order parameter describes the state of this partially synchronized network as a
value between total phase inhomogeneity and perfect synchrony.
Interestingly, Kuramoto model is rich enough to display a large variety of synchronization
patterns and simple enough to adapt it flexibly to different contexts and analyse it mathemati-
cally, prompting an avalanche of literature exploring its possibilities (cf. Acebrón et al., 2005).
Synergetics
Like Kuramoto’s model, many complex systems self-organize effectively reducing the dimen-
sionality of their patterns. In many cases, the relaxation of many variables of the system is
much faster than the slowest variables in the system, allowing an adiabatic elimination of
these fastest variables. This is called by Haken the slaving principle, which allows reducing
considerably the number of degrees of freedom in a system (Haken, 1978, p.191-199). The en-
slaving principle does not always completely dominate the system, and there are situations in
which after a threshold is met the slaving principle can be transiently broken by, for example,
chaotic motion (Haken, 1978, p.328-329).
Haken extends the notions of order parameter and collective variables from their tradi-
tional application in homogeneous physical systems to ‘more complex’ self-organizing sys-
tems. Order parameters typically addressed how individual atoms in a substance are con-
strained by other atoms. For example, a gas presents an order parameter equal to 0 since
atoms move independently. As the gas is cooled down, there are temperature thresholds (crit-
ical points) where the substance goes through phase transitions, where the order parameter
exhibits a discontinuous jump.
The use of order parameters proposed by synergetics allow us to operationalize the idea
of reduction of the number of degrees of freedom that takes place in the self-organization of
far-from-equilibrium systems, and the locking into an orbital constellation of oscillators that
Iberall described (Iberall, 1977). It also generalizes phenomena like the nonlinear thresholds
in large-scale synchronization we saw above.
1.2.2 Flexible coordination
In the last section we have described basic mechanisms which can create tendencies in a system
to joint its components together in a temporal coherence. However, this is not of much use if
the system gets permanently trapped in a state of synchronization, or if it can only respond to
the external perturbation of a synchronized state. Nevertheless, synchronizing mechanisms
can also display modes which not only represent states of absolute coordination but also more
flexible coordinating tendencies.
Relative Coordination
In the early 20th Century, Erich von Holst developed two principles for analysing movement
coordination and locomotion in animals for example, lip fish and centipedes. These two prin-
ciples characterize the coordinative properties of neural oscillations:
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• A maintenance tendency of an oscillator to keep a steady rhythm. That is, each lipfish
fin or each centipede leg was observed to have its preferred frequency of oscillation.
• A magnet effect that influences oscillators drawing them together to oscillate in syn-
chrony.
A classic example for this phenomenon was devised by Kelso (Kelso, 1995, p.128) describ-
ing a parent and child walking hand in hand. Since the longer legs of the parent have a lower
preferred frequency than the shorter legs of the child (i.e. they have different maintenance
tendencies), there is be a tendency for their movements to be out of phase. However, holding
hands provokes the complimentary effect driving them to synchronize their movement (the
magnet effect). The result of both tendencies is that the parent and child’s strides are in phase
for intermittent periods of time, drifting out of phase in some instants in which the child may
perform an extra stride to cope with the larger strides of the parent.
This idea was conceptualized by von Holst under the term of relative coordination. As
we can see in his recordings of limb oscillations (Figure 1.5), relative coordination differs from
absolute synchronization in the sense that the elements are coordinated in a much looser sense
than required by strict phase-locking between their frequencies. Phase differences tend to
particular stable relations, but this tendency is not absolute and the system is posed in a state
where maintenance and magnet effects continuously compete but never completely dominate
each other.
As a result of the combination of these opposing tendencies, an infinite number of vari-
able couplings are possible: limbs may go in and out of phase depending on a changing balance
between magnet and maintenance tendencies. As described in (Kelso, 1995, pp.74-79), ani-
mals with quadrupedal gaits may display a repertoire of different pattern depending on the in-
trinsic frequency of their movement and their coupling tendencies. The equilibrium between
the two explains the transitions between jump, pace, bound and trot. Similarly, centipedes
crawl by oscillating their legs in travelling waves from anterior to posterior. These waves vary
phase relations among legs over time performing the centipede’s locomotion. Moreover, von
Holst discovered that amputating the legs of centipede leaving four or six, the resulting cen-
tipede engaged phase relations similar to those of four or six-legged creatures.
The idea of relative coordination depicts the behaviour of systems in which the behaviour
cannot be explained from the individual behaviours of each element. Instead, the behaviour
of the system emerges from the interaction between individual and collective tendencies in
the system.
Metastability
Inspired by the development of synergetics, the notion of relative coordination has been op-
erationalized under Scott Kelso’s framework of Coordination Dynamics (Kelso, 1995), which
combines experiments and formal theoretical models to study how the components of a sys-
tem interact and produce coherent coordination patterns. Specifically, relative coordination
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Figure 1.5: Relative and absolute coordination. Recordings of limb oscillations taken by von Holst under two different
conditions. The signals come from pectoral (upper time series) and dorsal (lower time series) fin movements of a fish.
Absolute coordination (left) and relative coordination (right). The top plots display the distribution of possible phase
relations between the two signals under twoconditions. Thedistance fromS toSon the abscissa spans thephase interval
0 to 2rad. The bottom plots display the corresponding time series fromwhich the phase relation is extracted. The left
plot shows dominance of themagnet effect and the right plot shows relative coordination in the balance ofmagnet effect
andmaintenance tendency. Adapted fromKelso (1995).
has been typically exemplified under the concept of metastability in Kelso’s most famous
model: theHKBmodel. The HKB model describes a system composed of two coupled oscilla-
tors reduced to a single equation where the main variable is the relative phase between the two
oscillators, and whose dynamics are shaped by the difference between the natural frequency
of the oscillators and their coupling strength:
_' = !   a  sin(')  2b  sin(2') (1.3)
The relative phase or phase difference,', represents the order parameter or collective vari-
able that emerges from lower-level interactions of the two coupled oscillators, a and b are the
coupling coefficients between the two oscillators, and ! is the difference between their in-
trinsic frequencies. Despite its simplicity, this equation captures a wide range of self-organized
phenomena. Different combinations of the control parameters a, b (or rather b=a) and !
give rise to different collective behaviours. For example, when shifting the value of ! while
the values of a and b are held fixed, the system experiences phase transitions between three
different modes of behaviour: monostable, bistable and metastable (Figure 1.6).
The monostable mode only has an in-phase synchronization stable point, whereas the
bistable mode has two stable points corresponding to in-phase and anti-phase synchroniza-
tion. Interestingly, the metastable region presents a surprising behaviour: the relative phase
tends to in-phase synchronization and spends most of its time around this point. However,
after some time the relative phase ‘slips’ and one of the oscillators advances a full cycle respect
to the other until they find each other almost in-phase (Figure 1.7).
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Figure 1.6: Phase space of the extended HKB equation for fixed values of the coupling coefficients a and b. The sys-
tem exhibits three different types of phase space depending on the control parameter!, showing multistable (black),
monostable (dark grey) or metastable (light grey) dynamics. Black and white dots represent respectively the attractors
and repellers of the system for different values of!.
Metastable systems do not need to be defined as either being attracted or repelled by an at-
tractor as two incompatible states, but they constantly dwell transiently near attractive states,
switching flexibly and quickly between them. In this sense, metastability allows an opera-
tional description where attraction and repulsion influences coexist in a continuous scale of
tendencies for dynamical groups to coordinate and segregate. The existence of a metastable
continuum between attraction and repulsion seems to be supported by the presence of non-
linear asynchronous couplings in the brain (Friston, 2000a,b), which support the ability of a
system to create dynamical instabilities (i.e. metastabiliy) that is fundamental to generate the
diversity necessary for adaptive behaviour in the brain (Friston, 2000b).
A metastable regime is characterized by transient periods of stability, which allow the sys-
tem to display coherent activity at the same time as it has some degrees of flexibility. Kelso
claims that metastability ‘is essential for flexibly entering and exiting coherent neural patterns
and avoiding resonant mode-locked states [...] This is necessary if the mind is not to get stuck,
or worse still, fly apart’ (Kelso, 1995, p.225).
Soft-Assemblies and the Dynamic Core Hypothesis
Some of the most relevant characteristics of biological systems is that, in certain conditions,
they may exhibit behaviours generated by transient coalitions between their components.
These coalitions, sometimes addressed as soft assemblies are functional groupings of a series
of structural elements of the systems that are temporally forced by the influence of metastable
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Figure1.7: Exampleofmetastabledynamics. Twovariables1 and2 arecoupled inamestastablemode. Wecanobserve
the oscillations of both signals displaying moments of synchronization and desynchronization (top) and the evolution of
their phase difference presenting moments of stability and phase slippage (bottom). Moments of quasi-synchronization
are indicated with an arrow.
couplings to act as a unified coherent entity (Kello and Van Orden, 2009). This view contrasts
with ‘component-dominant’ dynamics or ‘hard-assembled’ systems, in which the resulting dy-
namics would be either a linear combination or a fixed function of the elements of the system.
The idea of soft-assemblies underlying coherent global behaviour is far from new, at least
in neuroscience. Already half a century ago Donald Hebb (Hebb, 1952) developed the notion
of a ‘cell-assembly’ as a ‘diffuse structure comprising cells [...] capable of acting briefly as a
closed system, delivering facilitation to other such systems and usually having a specific motor
facilitation’ (Hebb, 1952, p.xix). Such cell-assemblies act as transient ‘memories’ of a particular
stimulus, in which repetition of the same excitation patterns provoke structural changes in the
neural space associating neurons that are frequently activated together. For Hebb, neurons
do not work in isolation and they cannot account by themselves for any percept or ability. In
contrast, Hebb suggests that individual neurons may participate in different cell assemblies
and be involved in multiple functions. This view is still alive in modern neuroscience. For
example, hypothesis based on neural assemblies have been proposed for solving the so-called
‘binding problem’, i.e., how coherent representational states are established in the distributed
neuronal systems subserving these functions (Engel et al., 1999).
Moreover, metastable modes of soft-assembling have been proposed as mechanisms that
may mediate a compromise between large-scale integration in the brain and the ability to give
rise to an extraordinary variety of complex, coordinated patterns (Kelso, 1995; Friston, 2000a;
Werner, 2007a; Le Van Quyen, 2011). One of the most promising approaches to this problem
was suggested by Francisco Varela (Varela, 1995), proposing that mental-cognitive states are
mediated by a specific neural ensemble that emerges through transient phase locking of dis-
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tributed neural regions. Every cognitive act corresponds to the emergence of one dominant
ensemble which incorporates or discards cortical and subcortical regions into a unified and
transitory whole. Latter, Tononi and Edelman (Tononi and Edelman, 1998) used the term
‘dynamic core’ to describe this process, emphasizing both its integration and its ability to gen-
erate an extraordinary variety of complex patterns. Ever since the notion of a dynamic core
has become relatively widespread in large-scale neuroscience studies (Varela et al., 2001a; Seth
et al., 2006; Edelman, 2011; Ward, 2011).
Many of these views focus (as we will see in Chapter 4) on the interactive activity of the
system at different spatial and temporal scales. If we want to take seriously the idea of extend-
ing metastable mechanisms to large-scale systems, we need an adequate framework to address
how different scales and levels of description of the system might be interrelated maintaining
an overall metastable state (Le Van Quyen, 2011). In the next section, we connect the concept
of self-organized criticality with the idea of pervasive metastable mechanisms.
1.2.3 Self-Organized Criticality and Long-range Correlations
Paradigmatic examples of the conceptual tools of the complex systems approach, with applica-
tions in several domains (in particular in cognitive science and neuroscience), are the concepts
of self-organized criticality (SOC hereafter) and 1=f noise (also known as scale-free or pink
noise) (Bak et al., 1987; Jensen, 1998). The concept of SOC was initially proposed by Bak,
Tang and Wiesenfeld (Bak et al., 1987) to define certain classes of dynamical systems which
have a critical point as an attractor, displaying critical behaviour without any significant ‘tun-
ing’ of the system from outside. Critical systems present very interesting properties: the most
characteristic of which is the lack of a dominant scale of activity.
A popular example of criticality is the Ising model (Christensen and Moloney, 2005, Chap-
ter 2), originally formulated to represent the behaviour of ferromagnetic elements. The model
depicts the behaviour of a mesh of atoms with two dipoles oriented in one direction (the spin
of the unit) interacting with their neighbours through their mutual attracting magnetic forces.
If these forces are strong, the spin of all the units is aligned in the same direction, they are all
aggregated and the complexity of the system is reduced to one dimension. However, if the
attracting forces between the units are weak, each unit will face a random direction, and the
system will be utterly disordered. Interestingly, at a point between order and disorder the
critical state emerges, a permanent state of non-equilibrium where atoms’ spins are config-
ured in transient, complex patterns in a process of continuous evolution (Figure 1.8.c). When
the Ising mode is in this state between order and disorder it shows complex dynamical re-
sponses and their statistical properties have to be described by power laws. This point is a
critical point of phase transition between uniform phases. Near this critical point the effect of
thermal noise (independent spins) is balanced against neighbour interactions (interdependent
spins), and this balance allows the emergence of complex transient patterns of aligned spins.
More generally, critical systems typically display temporal and spatial scale invariance in the
form of fractals and 1=f noise, reflecting the process of propagation of long-range interactions
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based on local effects. In contrast, SOC systems display a critical behaviour but, unlike the
Ising model, their criticality does not depend on a fine tuning of their parameters. Instead,
they are self-organized to operate under a critical regime, and they can do so spontaneously
under a range of parametrical configurations. In SOC systems critical dynamics emerge from
interaction-dominated threshold activity, in which many degrees of freedom interact, and the
dynamics of the system is dominated by the mutual interaction between those degrees of free-
dom (Jensen, 1998). Remarkably, as critical systems do not present a specific scale of activity,
they act as system displaying metastable behaviour at all scales. Moreover, SOC systems are
self-organized to preserve this pervasive metastable configuration.
It has been shown that the brain stands in a continuous regime of SOC. Experimental
evidence supports this hypothesis and also artificial neural network models. Criticality in
the brain is suggested by power law scaling in degree distributions of functional brain net-
works or avalanche size distributions (Chialvo, 2006). Long-range correlations have been
broadly found in EEG and MEG measures of brain activity in alpha, mu, and beta oscilla-
tions (Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2001). Scale free neocortical dynamics was also ascertained
by Freeman (2005) in the EEG of rabbits. In addition, there are many instances of models of
critically self-organized behaviour in artificial network models, which provide some interest-
ing insights (Rybarsch and Bornholdt, 2012).
SOC and long-range correlations have also been broadly found in cognitive science and
psychology. Van Orden, Holden and Turvey (Van Orden et al., 2003, 2005) used long-range
correlations in different tasks to gather evidence to defend the hypothesis that certain systems
are not modular and decomposable but ‘softly assembled’ systems sustained by interaction-
dominant dynamics (IDD hereafter) as opposed to component-dominant dynamics (Van Or-
den et al., 2003). That is, IDD systems do not consist in additive interactions of their compo-
nents, but multiplicative interactions that imply coordination between the different timescales
in the system.
Extended Criticality
Although critically self-organized systems provide insights into the kinds of organization that
may operate behind living beings, most models of SOC are far from resembling living be-
ings. SOC models such as sand hips or earthquakes display SOC properties in perfectly ‘flat’
and homogeneous systems, without any differentiation between levels of organization or any
modularity in the system. Actually, what distinguishes biological and cognitive systems from
inert systems lies in the role played by mechanisms of regulatory control in the functioning
of these systems (Christensen, 2006; Moreno et al., 2011). That is, certain parts of the system
(components or substructures) influence or modulate others to functionally constrain them
and channel their dynamics to ensure or improve the maintenance of the system as a whole.
A system permanently poised in a state of critical phase transition suggests a configuration
of a system where the local states depend upon (are correlated to) the global situation. How-
ever, Giuseppe Longo suggests that while in physics critical phase transitions are pointwise
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Figure 1.8: Criticality in the IsingModel. a) Example of instances of the Isingmodel binary 128x128 lattices showing the
configurationof spinsafter2,000timestepsat lowtemperature (left); critical temperature (middle); andhightemperature
(right). At hot temperature the spins are randomly configured, at low temperature they are close to an entirely ordered
state, and at critical temperature they have a fractal configuration. (b) Probability distribution of phase lock interval (PLI)
between pairs of processes at critical (black line) and at hot temperature (red line) plotted on a log-log scale. The black
dashed line represents a power lawwith slope . (c) Probability distribution of lability of global synchronization at critical
temperature (black line) and at hot temperature (red dotted line). For the cold Ising model the equilibrium state of the
system is a monolithic lattice with either all spins up or down, resulting in an entirely static system for which the PLI
distribution is a Dirac Delta peak at the duration of the time series. Extracted fromKitzbichler et al. (2009).
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(around a critical value of the control parameter), living systems may behave more as coher-
ent structures posed in continual extended critical transitions (Longo and Montevil, 2012).
These transitions are extended in spacetime and with respect to all relevant control param-
eters (e.g. pressure, temperature, etc.), and coordinated through integratory and regulatory
mechanisms of the organism’s global structure.
An important aspect stressed by Longo is that extended criticality is extended in both
space and time, in the sense that critical transitions are maintained and persist in their many
dimensions, while preserving all the physical properties of pointwise criticality (long-range
correlations, new coherence structures, symmetry changes, etc.). This requires an active main-
tenance of organization (what Longo addresses as anti-entropy), i.e. the formation and main-
tenance of a global coherence structure that underlies this extended critical transition.
1.2.4 Operational Tools for Modelling Autonomy
For Varela autonomy can be understood in terms of two interdependent properties (Varela,
1997). The first one is that organisms are fundamentally a process of constitution of identity.
Identity here refers to a coherence in the system that provides it with some unitary quality.
This is created by an operational closure of the system, that is, a circular interdependence of
the parts of the system in which the system is the cause of its own production. Therefore,
identity emerges without the need of any central controller but from a web of interactions, as
an emergent process. The second property is that this emergent identity determines a point of
reference for a domain of interactions. This means that what is produced with the emergence
of an identity is not a process bound to a closed system, but an emerging interactive level
between the system and its environment, which is the source of the informational, intentional
or semantic value of the living being.
In this section we have focused on the possibilities of coordinative structures for represent-
ing processes typical of far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics. Specifically, different forms
of coordination dynamics are useful for operationalizing concepts we described in the previ-
ous section. We have seen how mass self-synchronizing systems can account for phenomena
of emergent persistence and coherence in large scale distributed systems, reflected in the emer-
gence of an order parameter that influences the components of the system into a network of
circular independences (order parameters emerge from the joint state of the oscillatory units of
the system, and at the same time order parameters channel and regulate its activity). Moreover,
the pulling tendencies of the order parameter of synchronizing systems also allow describing
metastable dynamics, in which moments of quasi-synchronization are combined with mo-
ments of phase scattering, providing a flexible mechanism to break moments of synchroniza-
tion and find new configurations of the system. Int his way, the control parameter serves as a
point of reference of the system’s activity (although it is not located in any specific location).
Although in the models above we have not differentiated what is a system and what is an en-
vironment, we can easily imagine how in a metastable coordination between an autonomous
system and its environment, we cannot understand the history of interaction between the
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two of them in terms of their individual activity, but instead as a result of the multilevel co-
regulation between their individual activity and the emergent order parameter between them.
The dynamics that dominate the process is not located in any particular component of the
system, but in their shared interactive space. Moreover, we have seen how these interaction-
driven systems tend to display scale-free dynamics and self-organized criticality when different
levels of activity are involved. In such a way, SOC arises as a signature of complex interaction-
driven processes, extending the notion of metastability to multiple scales. This allows us to
conceptualize autonomous organization like a nested systems of interrelated interactive layers.
1.3 Autonomy as an Organizational Principle of Life: from cells to brains
to society
Above we have introduced a series of conceptual and methodological tools to analyse auton-
omy as an abstract systems property. We have described autonomy as a property ascribed to
living beings, but we have not analysed in detail to what domains of life autonomy is applica-
ble (e.g. molecular, cellular, organismic or social). Moreover, some properties described above
can be applied to self-organized physical and chemical processes that are not alive in any sense.
Thus, what is the relation between the concepts described so far and autonomy at different
scales? We now explore whether different modes of autonomy may emerge at different scales
in terms of these properties.
Dissipative Autonomy?
As we saw before, far-from-equilibrium or dissipative systems typically display emergent self-
organized patterns. These systems are able to escape stochasticity at a microscopic level to
generate global coherent patterns of order. All living beings depend on dissipative structures
too, but there are many examples of non-living dissipative structures in which self-organized
patterns emerge under a flux of energy. Previously, we described the behaviour of Bénard cells,
but many examples can be found in nature including earthquakes, auroral substorms, or solar
flares, which also frequently display properties as self-organized criticality. Are dissipative sys-
tems autonomous? The emergence of order patterns may provide the system with some kind
of coherence in which a web of interactions constitutes the system as a unity. Nevertheless,
this emergent identity does not generate a domain of interactions between the system and the
environment. As we will see below, living systems are able to constitute themselves as an iden-
tity able to regulate the loop of its own interaction with the environment, generating a history
of interactions in which the system acts and adapts to its environment to guarantee its own
conservation. Dissipative systems may be able to sustain themselves while a flux of energy or
matter is present, but are not generally able to interact with the environment for maintaining
the conditions of this loop.
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Metabolic and Cellular Autonomy
As we saw when analysing cellular autopoiesis, cells can create their own identity through
processes of metabolic self-production of the network that produces the cell, and constitut-
ing the cell as a unit and a domain of interactions with its environment through the consti-
tution of a permeable membrane that contains the cell. Autopoietic theory proposes that the
autonomy of the cell should be understood in terms of regulatory interactions between its
metabolic structure and its environment that makes possible the maintenance of its organi-
zational invariance. Several models have analysed how autopoiesis, emergence of boundaries,
cell-environment interaction and so forth may take place in chemical media (Luisi, 2003; Solé
et al., 2007; Ruiz-Mirazo and Mavelli, 2008; Hanczyc and Ikegami, 2010).
Here, the system does not become a distinguishable entity because of its molecular com-
position or its internal configuration. In contrast, what is maintained in the system is its own
organization which not only involves internal metabolic cycles but the cell-environment cycles
that allow a continuous regeneration of materials while preventing the cell from dissolving in
its chemical milieu through the formation and active maintenance of a cellular membrane.
The existence of this invariant organization is constantly challenged by internal and external
perturbations, which the system counteracts. It is precisely these breakdowns in autopoiesis
(even if they are minor, like changes in chemical concentrations, or major, like disruptions of
the membrane) that creates significance and value about the surrounding environment. It is
the creation and regulation of the membrane (which allows the material and energetic flows
between cell and environment that sustain the existence of the cell) allowing both the consti-
tution of the system as a distinct unit from its surroundings and the active regulation by the
cell of the interactions with its environment. This active regulation creates an asymmetry in
these interactions in which the cell as a virtual entity constitutes the point of reference of these
interactions.
Organismic Autonomy
Integrity and self-preservation of the organism depend on regulatory cycles involving brain
and body at multiple levels. Multicellular living beings are built over many cells that interact
in a medium that generates the coordination that constitute collective organisms. Multicellu-
lar organisms actively regulate that tridimensional boundary with their environment, so the
resulting system can operate as a single organism against its environment. The systemic regu-
lation of the boundaries of the organism and its cellular structure allows the emergence of its
ontogenetic development. Over multiple timescales, developmental processes are subject to
processes of selection and differentiation (Elman et al., 1998; Gottlieb, 2007). The energetic
and organizational maintenance of multicellular systems requires inter-cellular mechanisms
of control of cell differentiation and cell division processes. This regulatory control allows
organisms to exhibit a funtionally differentiated but globally integrated depelopmental orga-
nization, which consitutes an ensemble of cells as a self-determining collective entity (Arnellos
et al., 2013; Arnellos and Moreno, 2015).
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Another level of multicellular organisms’ autonony is constructed by immune network.
The central characteristic of the immune network is the definition of the organism’s molecular
identity (Varela and Coutinho, 1991). From the assertion of this identity an organism is able
to derive assects as tolerance and self-nonself discrimination. Natural tolerance is the result
of a dynamic pattern of assertion of this identity: ‘self is what the system has learned to “see”
as self and to discriminate from all other antigens that did not take part in its constitution’
(Varela and Coutinho, 1991, p.165).
In animals, organismic regulation also has an affective and conscious dimension. Propo-
nents of affective neuroscience (Damasio, 2000; Panksepp, 1997, 1998) have emphasized the de-
pendence of a background consciousness on the homeodynamic regulation of the whole body:
different parts of the cortex, brain stem and hypothalamus process neuronal and humoral
signals from the body and integrate them into a ‘body landscape’ that is constantly chang-
ing. This body landscape would include interoceptive and proprioceptive signals, as well as
the state of the inner milieu (hormone concentrations, pH-value of the blood, glucose levels,
etc.). Thus, brain and body influence each other on a constant circular feedback of organ-
ismic self-regulation. This interaction results in a background feeling of being alive, a basic
self-affection which lends a sense of ‘mindness’ to all our experiences (Fuchs, 2011). Moods,
emotion and every conscious state are ultimately rooted in a loop of homeodynamic regula-
tion between brain and body that integrates the state of the organism as a whole.
Sensorimotor autonomy
When we move up to the autonomy of multicellular organisms, we find a quite different sce-
nario compared with single-cell autonomy. Organisms do not depend anymore on a physical
membrane to maintain a continuous flux of material exchange or to prevent being dissolved
into its surroundings. Furthermore, in the case of organisms with nervous systems, the emer-
gence of identity is defined not only in terms of the physical construction of the organism
and the physiological coordination of multicellular tissues and organs, but a different level
of identity emerges. The key point is that the development of a neural system is closely con-
nected to motion being an integral part of the lifestyle of the organism (in order to correlate
muscles, secretions and other effectors to sensory surfaces). Neurocognitive identities emerge
not in the physico-chemical interactions between the agent and its surroundings, but rather in
the space in which the movement of the agent is coupled to a stream of sensory modulations
(Varela, 1997). This interaction creates an equivalent circular relation between a network of
neural interactions and a series of sensory streams that continuously create invariant patterns
of sensorimotor correlations. This gives rise to the agent as a behavioural mobile unit in space
that is in continuous interaction with its environment.
This view of autonomy connects directly with sensorimotor theories of cognition and sit-
uated approaches. For these perspectives sensory input is much more that an information
flow to be processed by the brain. Rather, situated approaches to cognitive behaviour claim
that the agent-environment coupling shapes brain dynamics in a manner that is essential to be-
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havioural or cognitive functionality (Steels, 1990; Clark, 1997; Chiel and Beer, 1997). In other
words, macroscopic functional behaviour (e.g. intentional grasping or perception) emerges
from microscopic sensorimotor dynamics (e.g. propioceptive and visual feedback in grasping
or saccadic movements in visual perception). Thus, cognitive behaviour is not the result of a
linear computational sequence involving sensation ! perceptive-categorization ! planning
! action-selection!motor-execution, but the result of recurrent sensorimotor and brain os-
cillatory coordination at multiple scales. The central role that sensorimotor dynamics play in
cognitive phenomenology has been recently highlighted by Sensorimotor Contingency The-
ory (O’Regan and Noë, 2001), defending that what is constitutive of visual perceptual aware-
ness (and, it could be argued, other cognitive processes) is not a specific internal state of an
agent, but the structure of sensorimotor contingencies. For O’Regan and Noë, vision is ‘a
mode of skilful encounter with the environment, requiring knowledge of sensorimotor con-
tingencies and also the ability to make use of that knowledge for the purpose of guiding action,
thought, and (in humans) language use’ (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p.959-960). To perceive is
to act in a specific manner that brings forth the structure of sensory changes in relation to the
activity of the agent. To see or to perceive is something that is done and lies on the very senso-
rimotor coupled dynamics of an agent. In neuroscience, the ‘radical embodiment’ framework
proposed byThompson and Varela (2001) suggest that processes that are crucial for conscious-
ness are not confined inside the brain but cut across brain-body-world divisions. According to
this view, the brain is organized in resonant neural assemblies that are transiently integrated,
each specific assembly underlying the operation of determinate cognitive acts. These assem-
blies crucially depend on the manner in which brain dynamics are embedded in the somatic
and environmental context of the agent’s life.
All of these perspectives share the idea that an emergent interactive level reshapes the do-
main of behaviour. This level is constituted by the interaction itself between the agent and
the environment, through a stream of sensorimotor interactive loops. It is the constitution of
the system as a distinct entity in space that constitutes a cognitive self acting as an autonomous
system, creating a point of reference leading the action of an agent over its world and allowing
the emergence of the autonomous agent.
Social autonomy
A special case of the kind of autonomy above is the case when the ‘environment’ contains
other autonomous agents, as in the case of social interaction. In such cases a process of inter-
action between individuals creates a process of coordinations of movements and utterances.
Social interaction frequently generates collective coherent patterns in which the dimension-
ality of the system is reduced in a synergistic way, creating interpersonal patterns exhibiting
circular regulation (Oullier and Kelso, 2009b; Riley et al., 2011). Some authors argue that
the process of social interaction itself can take a form of autonomy. The underlying idea is
that the process of interaction itself may become leading over the two interactors: the interac-
tion process gains ‘a life of its own’ (Jaegher and Paolo, 2007; Fuchs and Jaegher, 2009). The
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process of sense-making out of agent-world interaction necessary for autonomy is elaborated
here as a participatory sense-making. This notion addresses different cases where the identity
of the process generated is not defined in terms of an individual organism but is generated
among two or more autonomous organisms. Along the same lines, Evan Thomson argues
that in humans and other social creatures embodied cognition emerges from the dynamic co-
determination of self and other, affording in some cases non-egocentric or self-transcendent
modes of consciousness (what Thomson calls ‘interbeing’) (Thompson, 2001). Social auton-
omy arises when neural and somatic activity of the participating subjects is regulated by the
ongoing embodied awareness and interaction between them.
Moreover, these forms of social autonomy can be applied to a transient dyadic interac-
tion, but also to a large-scale social level. One examples is Niklas Luhmann’s idea of social
autopoiesis (Luhmann, 1986). According to some perspectives on social autopoiesis, differ-
ent social entities as a political party or a family can be autopoietic since the rules that define
them can act as a kind of boundary formed by the social structure. These social boundaries
are open systems, which allow members to join or leave the structure. Also, as in biological
autopoietis the social structure that acts as a boundary emerges from a recursive network of
the members of the structure, which is what allows the constitution of the social structure
as a differentiated unity in respect to its environment. However, Maturana and Varela have
argued at different moments that autopoiesis is not directly applicable to the biological realm
(Mingers, 1992), and Varela is concerned about the effects of the authoritarian implications of
a direct transposition of the concept of autopoiesis to the social realm (Protevi, 2009, p.12-13).
During the last decades, the idea of large-scale autonomous social organization has become
even more attractive due to the possibility of digital communication tools. Howard Rhein-
gold has coined the term smart mobs, to characterize large groups that cooperate in novel ways
taking advantage of the communication and computing capabilities of widespread techno-
logical devices (Rheingold, 2007). A smart mob, in contrast with the usual connotations of a
mob, would be able to behave in intelligent and efficient ways as a unitary system, thanks to
the connectivity enabling people to coordinate as a coherent social entity. Others have stressed
the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the emergence of collec-
tive intelligence based in distributed, enhanced, real time coordination resulting in effective
mobilization of skills (Levy, 1999), and by creating a collective pool of social knowledge by ex-
panding the domain of human interactions (Flew, 2011). Manuel Castells has proposed that
the development of interactive, horizontal networks of digital communications tools over the
Internet and wireless communication networks has induced the rise of a new form of com-
munication – mass self-communication (Castells, 2007). Castells argues that the autonomy
and influence of insurgent politics and social movements in enhanced as historical shifts of
the public sphere take place from the institutional realm to a new communication space.
The possibilities of a social autonomy requires the interaction between a community of
individuals and the outside of the community to be mediated by the emergence of a collective
self, which both determines interactively who belongs to the community and serves as a point
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of reference for the action of a collective self as an autonomous entity.
1.4 Exploring Autonomous Agency
Among the different modes of autonomous organization of the living, we observe that there
is a transition from modes of autonomy based in the material and energetic constitution of
living beings (in cellular and organismic autonomy) to the sensorimotor interactive constitu-
tion of individual or collective agents. For the first, the study of the role of material interfaces
that allow the constitution of the agent as a material unity in front of its environment has
been a central element of the characterization of autonomous organization. Nevertheless, the
agent-environment boundary is much more fuzzy for the second group. Autonomy, with its
emphasis on closure and system-environment distinction, seems to be challenged when the
interactions between agent and environment are open and recurrent, which is characteristic
of cognitive and social life.
As we saw above, cellular autopoiesis is a well characterized case of autonomy, and fre-
quent attempts have been made to extrapolate cellular autonomy to other domains like cog-
nitive or social autonomy. As we will see in the following chapters, these attempts have at
best fallen short of obtaining a convincing and experimentally testable extrapolation from bi-
ological into neurocogitive or social autonomy. In contrast, we believe that in these domains
the modes of autonomy in operation are fundamentally different from those present in a cell.
They do not have much to do with the construction of a physical boundary of the system,
but with the emergence and maintenance of embodied forms of agent-environment coordi-
nation. The distinction between biological forms of autonomy and those built over forms of
open and recurrent interaction deserves to develop a clear framework to account for the latter.
The contribution of this thesis aims to advance in models and analytical tools to define and
delimit a notion of interactive autonomy rooted in the history and conceptual tradition of
biological autonomy.
In section 1.1.4 we defined autonomous agency in terms of the conditions, proposed by
Barandiaran et al. (2009), of individuality, interactional asymmetry and normativity. The no-
tion of autonomous agency allows defining forms of autonomy that are not (only) based on
its material self-production but in the interaction dynamics between an agent and its envi-
ronment. Nevertheless, several questions are to be clarified. For example, what is the relation
between the operational closure of the system (its individuality) and the (asymmetric) inter-
actions with its environment? What is the role of internal and external coordination in the
generation of identity? Imagine the case of a wave surfer. We know that she is an organismic
autonomous system, since she is a healthy human being able to maintain her own biological
organization. However, what characterizes her as an autonomous cognitive agent in the very
act of surfing?
As we described above, the emergence of high-order coherence patterns (e.g. in the form
of self-synchronized processes), is a good candidate to define the individuality of a system,
defining the operationally closed network that defines a system. Other processes may define
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the individuality of a system under certain circumstances, but emergent order parameters is a
characterization general enough and experimentally plausible enough to apply to a vast range
of circumstances at neural and behavioural levels (Buzsaki, 2006; Strogatz, 2004). In the case
of the surfer, when she rides a wave, her body is coordinated by several synchronized waves
of movement that equilibrate her body, her arms, her legs, to move as a unit that is different
to the sea and the wind, or other organisms around her. Furthermore, when she is surfing a
wave, the surfboard, or even some mesoscopic flows of water in the wave synchronize with her
movement, creating a transient wave-board-surfer dynamical unit. In these cases, the skilled
surfer does not have to think how to control the surfboard or the wave as something ‘external’.
Instead, she ‘sees through’ them, but they become ‘transparent’ (Dotov et al., 2010), that is,
absorbed into the dynamics of her own activity. This absorption does not have anything to
do with an external observer deciding which is the cognitive agent performing the action, but
with the emergent order parameter modulating the wave-surfboard-surfer dynamics.
On the other hand, interactional asymmetry is somewhat more problematic. Although
there are forms to characterize it through energetic considerations or in terms of statistical
correlations, they are limited and contain challenges (Barandiaran et al., 2009, p.3-4). Baran-
diaran, Di Paolo and Rohde define interactional asymmetry as the condition in which ‘an
agent as a whole drives itself, breaking the symmetry of its coupling with the environment,
so as to modulate it from within’. However, there are many cases in which it is not clear how
this asymmetry might work. In the case of the surfer on top of a wave, the dynamics of the
wave probably propels the surfer much more than the surfer propels herself, and obviously
the wave provides much more energy to the surfer’s movement than vice versa. Nevertheless,
the surfer continuously equilibrates herself in order to modulate the effect of the wave over
her, coupling and decoupling herself from the different flows that compose the wave, taking
advantage of them to control its movement. Our intuition, which we will test in detail in
chapters 3 and 4, is that what matters here is not a mere asymmetry, but an asymmetry in the
circularity of the causal relations between surfer and waves. Probably, in a short timescale, it
is the perturbations and flows of the wave which drive the dynamics of the surfer, which only
has the option to be seized by the wave or lose its equilibrium and fall. However, in a longer
timescale, a series of subtle movements, reequilibrations and reorientations of her movement
allow she to ride the wave, i.e. to control it. We propose that the asymmetry between agent
and environment is basically a matter of multiscale causal relationships, in which a necessary
condition for agency is to be able to be reactive to the microscale perturbations from the en-
vironment, and at the same time be able to act as a macroscopic entity over the environment,
modulating the effect of environmental perturbations in the long run.
Finally, normativity emerges from the precariousness of the system’s autonomous organi-
zation. That is, normativity is defined as the conditions of viability of the system. Actions are
good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate depending if they contribute or not to supporting
the system as an autonomous organization (Christensen and Bickhard, 2002). While viability
of the system has been generally understood in terms of the physiological viability (e.g. home-
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ostatic mechanisms maintaining temperature or nutrient levels), in forms of autonomy not
based only in biological regulation, we face the question of how do we define the boundaries
of viability of a process of autonomous interaction (Barandiaran and Egbert, 2014). In the case
of the surfer, since the wave-board-surfer system is constituted in an interactional domain, the
very existence of the system depends on maintaining a specific coupling between the surfer,
her surfboard and the waves. The act of surfing itself defines some needs and norms required
to its own viability. We can imagine how different events as failing to maintain coordination
or the impact of a wave might end the system itself: making the surfer lose equilibrium and
fall, breaking the surfboard, or even ending her life in the most extreme cases. The consti-
tution of a wave-riding autonomous entity is what creates a domain of perspective by which
actions might be adequate or not to ensure the survival of the action of surfing. The series
of interactions between autonomous agent and embodiment can maintain its own organi-
zation or be the cause in the breakdowns of its vital, psychological or cultural requirements
(Barandiaran et al., 2009, p.5).
Along the next chapters of this thesis, we will explore the mechanisms sustaining that each
condition for autonomous agency is met and what is the relation between them. Using the
tools described in this chapter, we will describe the coordination processes that constitute the
operational closure of the system in a sensorimotor space, as well as the system environment
asymmetric interaction for different cases. In the second part of this thesis we will present a
robotic model of autonomous behaviour to explore this idea, characterizing in detail a model
of interactive sensorimotor autonomy and its properties. In the third part of this thesis, we
will assess whether autonomous agents can arise from processes of collective interaction in
the social domain. Our objective is to contribute to the characterization of a particular type
of autonomy, that of autonomous agency, and specifically to describe what kind of processes
of interaction dynamics can make it possible.
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Part II
Sensorimotor Constitution of
Neurocognitive Autonomy
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2
Constitutive Interaction:
the situated-HKB model
Abstract: We address the constitution of neurocognitive identity and argue that it is built in a sensori-
motor space. In contrast with much modern neuroscience, we analyse in detail what might be lost when a
sensorimotor coupled system is treated in isolation.
Contributions:
• We extend the popular HKB model embedding it into a minimal robotic model to explicitly address
the issue of embodiment for a simple coordinative controller.
• We solve the dynamical system of the situated HKB model, and compare it with a passively-coupled
HKB model, in order to reveal the quantitative and qualitative differences provided by situatedness.
Related publications:
• Aguilera, M., Bedia, M. G., Santos, B. A., and Barandiaran, X. E. (2013a). The situated HKB model:
how sensorimotor spatial coupling can alter oscillatory brain dynamics. Frontiers in Computational
Neuroscience, 7:117.
• Santos, B., Barandiaran, X., Husbands, P., Aguilera, M., and Bedia, M. (2012). Sensorimotor co-
ordination and metastability in a situated HKB model. Connection Science, 24(4):143–161.
Embodiment is becoming and increasingly popular idea in robotics, cognitive science and
neuroscience. The idea that our brain is intimately entangled with our body seems like a
more plausible hypothesis than it being confined into our skull sending orders to a merely
reactive body. In this and the following chapter we present the idea of interaction between
an agent and its environment as a constitutive element for the creation of the identity of an
autonomous agent as a mobile unit in space. In Chapter 1 we proposed that neurocognitive
identities scale up from metabolic and organismic forms of autonomy in a way that autonomy
is not based on the maintenance of a network of physico-chemical interactions, but rather the
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maintenance of a space of sensorimotor interaction in which the actions of the agent are cou-
pled to a stream of sensorimotor modulations maintaining some organizational invariants.
This interaction creates an equivalent circular relation between a network of neural interac-
tions and a series of sensorimotor loops that continuously create invariant patterns of senso-
rimotor correlations.
Nevertheless, although many cognitive scientists and neuroscientists would agree that the
brain is continuously modulated or biased by the body and the environment, the idea of brain-
body-environment coupling as a constitutive element of neurocognitive identity is more con-
troversial. Where does such resistance come from? We argue that the dominion of the com-
putationalist paradigm during most of the second half of the 20th century still has a great in-
fluence in present-day science, and, that even now that embodied or dynamical explanations
are much more common, many of these explanations ultimately depend on a representational
and internalist view of cognitive processes. To support this claim we first review recent his-
tory of cognitive science, since the rise of computationalism to the emergence of new dynam-
ical and embodied approaches. We argue that, even when dynamical approaches have been
largely accepted in neuroscience, situated and embodied views are usually neglected in favour
of representational relations with the environment. We present a minimal model, the situ-
ated HKB model, which illustrates what internalist approaches might be missing. The model
presents different modes of engagement with the environment by varying a sensory control
parameter. The model is simple enough to perform a full dynamical analysis and extract the
underlying dynamical landscape governing each behavioural mode. Assuming that cognitive
autonomy is built over an interactive domain instead of a purely internal one, we consider
what consequences this implies. We explore this issue by comparing our robot situated in its
environment with an exact copy of the robot that only receives an input signal recorded from
the first robot. The model shows that after removing sensorimotor coupling from a simple
robot, even when it is presented with an identical input, the internal neurodynamic configu-
ration changes dramatically. The model shows how fine grained sensorimotor contingencies
are strictly necessary or constitutive of functionally distinct neural signatures.
2.1 Situatedness and Embodiment in Cognitive Science
2.1.1 Dualism, Experimental Psychology and Passively-Coupled Kittens
The idea that cognitive autonomy is constructed over a domain of sensorimotor interactions
clashes radically with the pervasive dualist tradition in western thought. Although a dualistic
conception of body and mind was already present in Plato and Aristotle, Stoic and Augus-
tinian traditions, and scholastic philosophy, Descartes it is thought to have provided dualism
with an unprecedented protagonism stating that the human mind is separated and operates
independently from the body, being a completely different entity. The body is conceived
as an automaton comparable with man-made machines, which can be understood in purely
mechanicistic terms of physical causes and effects. Descartes conceived that stimuli were able
74
to set up vibrations in sense organs, which in turn would tug tiny fibres through the nerves,
opening small valves letting a cerebral-spinal fluid into the muscles, which fattened up and
shortened producing movement. In De Homine, Descartes illustrates these mechanisms by
means of the automatic reaction that is triggered when we touch fire, thus providing the first
clear discussion of reflex action in the history of science (Clarac, 2008). Descartes imagines
that animal behaviour can be entirely accounted for by such automatic, reflexive mechanisms
as a hydraulic machine. Other faculties, such as the ability to think and reason, consciousness,
(i.e. the ability to think and act independently of the physical causes affecting the body) are
ascribed to the soul. For Descartes, the soul is informed of the vibrations in sense organs, and
could gain control over the movement of the body by pushing the plineal gland and altering
the flow of cerebral-spinal fluid to influence muscles.
This dualistic conception of the mind leads Kant to claim that a psychological science is
not possible, since pure thought lacks spatial dimensions rendering impossible the application
of mathematical laws. It was not until the second half of the 19th century that experimental
psychology arose, contradicting Kant’s claim, promoted by Wilhelm Wundt. Experimental
approaches to psychology soon brought a quite different perception of how body and mind
interact. One of the first to propose a different schema of interaction between mind and body
was William James. He proposed that a reflex action was composed by three elements: a sen-
sation followed by a mediation of the nervous system (spinal cord or brain), and finally by
a response or action (James, 1879). With this schema he stressed the role played by the cen-
tral nervous system as closely connected with the other two, and entirely purposed to lead to
action. For James:
The structural unit of the nervous system is in fact a triad, neither of whose ele-
ments has any independent existence. The sensory impression exist only for the
sake of awaking the central process of reflection, and the central process of re-
flection exists only for the sake of calling forth the final act. All action is thus
re-action upon the outer world; and the middle stage of consideration or con-
templation or thinking is only a place of transit (James, 1896, p.113).
The interrelation between perceptual and action processes, as opposed to one-way stimulus-
response links, was further stressed by John Dewey. According to Dewey, a sensory stimulus
is not an isolated trigger for the perception-action process. Instead,
We begin not with a sensory stimulus, but with a sensory-motor coordination
[...] In a certain sense it is the movement which is primary, and the sensation
which is secondary, the movement of the body, head, and eye muscles determin-
ing the quality of what is experienced. In other words, the real beginning is with
the act of seeing; it is looking, and not a sensation of light (Dewey, 1896, p.358)
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For Dewey, both sensory and motor process are coupled so ‘[a]ctions are not reactions to
stimuli; they are actions into the stimuli’ (Dewey, 1914).
Donald Hebb developed in 1949 a theory of brain organization, proposing the idea that
neurons are able to group together in diffuse structures he labelled as ‘cell assemblies’ that
result from simultaneous activation (frequently expressed by the dictum ‘neurons that fire
together wire together’). Hebb rejects the assumption of a sensory dominance of behaviour
and introduced the interest in motor aspects of perception (Hebb, 1952, p.3). Hebb also re-
jects Gestalt notions of perception and learning dependent upon the ‘pattern, or shape of the
sensory excitation’. On the contrary, Hebb takes interest in the motor aspects of perception
arguing ‘that “simple” perceptions are in fact complex: that they are additive, that they de-
pend on motor activity and that their apparent simplicity is only the result of a long learning
process’ (Hebb, 1952, p.17). For example, Hebb sees eye movements as activities that facili-
tated perception and enabled complex perceptions to take place. These movements facilitate
the emergence of a particular cell assembly, thus allowing the succession of phase sequences
of perceptual events (Hebb, 1952, Chapter 5).
Hebb’s work inspired experimental research on the effects of exposure to the environment
in the development of spatial perception and coordination, often involving rearing animals in
conditions of sensory deprivation by placing them in restricted environments. For example,
after constraining kittens to environments of diffused or patterned visual experiences under
holders, they failed to learn a movement discrimination task in a patterned environment with
an exercise pen, while normal kittens could perform the task correctly (Riesen and Aarons,
1959). However, Richard Held and Alan Hein claimed that in such experiments it can still be
argued that rather than sensorimotor coordination, what was lacking is the variation in visual
stimulation for the kittens under holders. Thus, they designed a clever experiment, in which
two neonatal kittens were harnessed to a carousel (Held and Hein, 1963). One of the kittens
was harnessed but could move the carousel as it walked. The other kitten could not move
the carousel and was driven by the other kitten movement. Kittens raised in the dark were
given their first experience in light at 8 to 12 weeks of age. The experience consisted of a short
daily period of controlled visual stimulation in a patterned environment. They spent the re-
mainder of the day in the dark. The environment presented a vertical pattern that the kittens
experienced as they moved. Interestingly, the visual input of both kittens is similar, but the
coordination between movement and visual stimulation is not. One kitten perceives the en-
vironment as a result of its own movement while the other just passively perceives a signal
structured by the movements of the other. The second kitten’s movement is correlated to the
visual patterns it perceives but it is not really producing the variation in sensory stimulation:
it is passively-coupled. After a number of hours of exposure to the experiment, the kittens are
faced with a task consisting in discriminating a visual cliff (suggestive of the ability of depth
perception), and only the kitten that was able to move when experiencing visual stimulation
is capable of successfully accomplishing the task. For Held and Hein this proves that coordi-
nation between self-produced movement and its concurrent visual feedback is necessary for
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the development of visually guided behaviour. The co-occurrence of visual stimulation and
movement produced by other means (although having the exact same structure) is not suffi-
cient.
The experiment developed by Held and Hein provides interesting insights into the emer-
gence of cognitive autonomy and the role of sensorimotor coordination. Unfortunately, the
dominating psychological current at the time, behaviourism, was not particularly interested in
the internal nature of mental processes. The next dominating paradigm in cognitive science,
as we will see below, would shift its focus towards and internalist perspective making difficult
to take into account the role of sensorimotor processes. How could Held and Hein’s exper-
imental results be operationalized and modelled? For most of the computationalist models
that dominated the imagination of cognitive scientists in subsequent decades (and up untill
now in many cases), there is no difference between perceiving a sensory pattern generated by
the movement of the agent and passively perceiving the same input.
2.1.2 Computationalism and Internalist Perspectives
Early cognitive science was born in opposition to behaviourism and led by the idea that be-
haviour is mediated by something internal to the organism. One major landmark for the
emergence of cognitive science was Noam Chomsky’s review (Chomsky, 1959) of Skinner’s
1957 book, Verbal Behavior. Chomsky points out that, contrary to Skinner’s claims, language
learning and use are too complex to be explained by stimulus-response mechanisms, even if
these are chained in sequences. In contrast, he claims that mental structures (hierarchical ar-
chitectures, internal rules and representations, generative algorithmic mechanisms that can
produce grammatical structures) play an internal mediation between perception and action.
Soon this argument was generalized in cognitive science from language to all complex cogni-
tive behaviours (e.g. maze navigation and spatial representation), bringing representations at
the centre of mental processes. At the time, research on perception suggested that our sensory
access to the world was not very good (Marr, 1982), thus encouraging a view in which the brain
has to deal with impoverished, probabilistic information and hasto bring all its computational
capacities to build accurate models of its changing environment (Wilson and Golonka, 2013).
Since the world is not directly accessible in a reliable way, internally represented knowledge
in the form of discrete symbols is a necessary mediator between sensory inputs and motor
outputs. In parallel, the development of computers and the birth of Artificial Intelligence
provided an empirical ground alongside experimental psychology. Quite often, the idea of
representation was reduced to discrete symbolic representations that could easily be processed
by the logical rules of computer programs. Thus, cognitive science was confined to identifying
how the brain codifies, accesses and uses content in the form of discrete symbolic representa-
tions (Dietrich and Markman, 2003). This computationalist/cognitivist framework can be
summed up in the following ideas: (1) representationalism – cognition requires the media-
tion of internal characterizations of the world – (2) computationalism – cognition consists in
the manipulation of symbolic representations through a set of rules – and (3) functionalism
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– particular cognitive mechanisms are defined in terms of their computational functions (i.e.
the input-output relationships that computational rules establish). These assumptions con-
ceptualize cognition as a process generated by a computational architecture (e.g. Fodor, 1983;
Pinker, 1997; Carruthers, 2006).
However, the dominant position of the computationalist perspectives on cognition has
been relaxed after the 1980s. The relative failure of symbolic Artificial Intelligence propelled
new departures in the field, for example connectionist approaches to distributed parallel pro-
cessing (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986), which weakened some assumptions about the
brain operating as a merely computational device. The moderate success of connectionist
models inspired in neural structures allowed an approach to biology that, in tandem with the
technological advances in the development of sophisticated tools of brain imagery, shifted the
focus from abstract computational models to the research of brain functioning. However,
this was only a first step. Advances in perception action research, especially the work of Gib-
son on direct perception (Gibson, 1966, 1986) revealed that our perception is not limited but
allows a high quality online access to the world. Researchers on emotion (Damasio, 2000),
perception (O’Regan and Noë, 2001), or action (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2007) concluded
that cognitive processes may go beyond the brain and extend to the whole body and envi-
ronment. A popular concept reflecting such embodiment was conceptualized by the notion
of extended cognition (Clark and Chalmers, 1998), which included the body, tools and other
minds as part of our cognitive processes.
However, although these changes widened the perspectives and possibilities in cognitive
science and computational neuroscience, frequently they failed to imply a radical departure
from the postulates of computationalism. Connectionist models allowed the explanation and
reproduction of cognitive phenomena that had been ignored or left in the background (pat-
tern recognition, associative memory, robustness respect to local disruptions...). Nevertheless,
while the functionalist approach presents a subtle twist in connectionist models (also referred
to as subsymbolic, since the symbols are distributed among the network parameters), con-
nectionism keeps the core of computational assumptions: cognition is a computational and
representational disembodied process decoupled from its biological grounding (Clark, 1989).
2.1.3 Situatedness: brains, bodies and dynamical systems
During the late 80s and early 90s a series of new perspectives in cognitive science arose from
diverse disciplines (e.g. robotics, psychology, philosophy or artificial life) that started to bring
into question some of the principles and methods of representational functionalism. One of
the pioneers of such approaches was Rodney Brooks, who argued that Artificial Intelligence
had been unnecessarily focused on the issue of representation (Brooks, 1991). Against this,
he proposes a robotic approach based on loosely coupled modules able to produce behaviour
without a central controller. Interestingly, rather than communicating to each other to a large
degree, every module produces behaviour (avoid objects, explore, wander, and so forth) by
being directly connected to the world through a perception and action loop (Brooks, 1985).
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The different modules are coordinated in a decentralized manner by feeding its outputs as
inputs of other modules, or via inhibition links between modules that block certain inputs
or outputs when activated. The framework presented by Brooks differs from the previous
connectionist framework at least in three important aspects: (1) a fundamental aspect of the
robots is that they are continuously coupled to the world (whereas connectionist models at
the time where mostly disembodied), (2) the system is not composed of homogeneous nodes
whose particular connectivity instantiated a function. Instead, behaviour-centred modules
are combined in a subsumption architecture and (3) while connectionist models were usually
assumed to incarnate a distributed representation of their perceived world, Brooks claims that
representations play no role in the behaviour of his robots and only appears in the mind of
the observer.
The pioneering work of Brooks was followed by a wave of research and development in
robotics that deepened criticism of computationalism and gave rise to the field of autonomous
or situated robotics (Maes, 1991), that by opposing rule-based architectures, emphasizes in-
stead direct coupling between sensing and action and distributed and decentralized dynamic
interaction with the environment. Between 1992 and 1993, three research groups (at the EPFL
in Lausanne, COGS at the University of Sussex and at the University of Southern California)
reported promising results from experiments on artificial evolution of autonomous robots
(Cliff et al., 1992; Lewis et al., 1992; Floreano, 1993). Their success triggered a wave of activity
in labs around the world focused on the analysis of neural networks designed by artificial evo-
lution in simulations of situated agents. The qualitative change responded to the fact that the
network was not designed first following representational or functional criteria (and only af-
ter inserted in an interactive domain), instead it was designed through evolution in a recurrent
process of agent-environment interaction.
The 90s also brought an intense emphasis in dynamical systems models and analyses. The
change displacing computational and representational conceptions of cognition in favour of
dynamic and interactive ones was not exactly new, since it can be traced back to early cyber-
netics (Ashby, 1954; Walter, 1963; Powers, 1973), neuroscience (Holst, 1973) phenomenology
(Merleau-Ponty, 1942) and pragmatism (Dewey, 1896, 1922). However, during the 90s it pro-
pelled a strong paradigmatic shift among a variety of fields: autonomous robotics (Brooks,
1991), adaptive behaviour (Beer, 1990, 1997), coordination dynamics (Kelso, 1995), neuroscience
(Skarda and Freeman, 1987), developmental psychology (Thelen and Smith, 1994) and philos-
ophy of mind (Port and Gelder, 1995; Clark, 1997). Most of this change of paradigm has been
labelled under the term of the dynamical systems approach to cognitive science (Chemero and
Richardson, 2014).
In a nutshell, dynamical systems approaches propose two central contributions to cogni-
tive science: (1) that cognitive mechanisms (neural or otherwise) could be better effectively
modelled and understood in terms of dynamical systems (Haken, 1978; Kelso, 1995; Freeman,
2001) instead of symbolic representational algorithms (e.g. Fodor, 1983; Pinker, 1997; Car-
ruthers, 2006) and (2) that cognitive behaviour could emerge out of recurrent sensorimotor
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loops in a self-organized manner, without the need for explicit encoding and planning on
the side of the agent. And yet the relationship between both contributions remains relatively
under-explored: how does the self-organization of behaviour change the dynamical proper-
ties of brains? What is lost when we study brain dynamics in isolation from the sensorimotor
loops they are naturally embedded in?
2.1.4 Not-so-embodied Dynamical Approaches to Cognition and Neuroscience
The apparent disconnection between these two issues patent given that when some fields have
just focused on one of these contributions neglecting the other. For example, some of the lat-
est progress at both mechanistic (neurodynamic) and behavioural levels of dynamic modelling
a related to oscillatory dynamics. Interactions between oscillatory components (neurons, brain
regions, limbs or humans interacting with each other) are studied in terms of synchronization
and phase-difference at various scales where macroscopic variables provide indexes of emer-
gent collective behaviour (Strogatz, 2004; Buzsaki, 2006). Oscillations are ubiquitous in na-
ture, from planetary motion to circadian rhythms (Pittendrigh, 1960), from predator-prey
population dynamics (Lotka, 1920) to chemical systems (Kuramoto, 1984). Oscillatory activ-
ity is also present at different levels of the nervous system (Freeman, 2001). At the individual
neural level, neurons undergo cyclic alterations on their membrane potential following differ-
ent dynamical regimes depending on the cell properties (Izhikevich, 2006). At higher levels,
global oscillations are observed as a collective phenomenon generated by groups of neural cells
that fire synchronously (entrained by pacemaker cells or as a result of recurrent network activ-
ity with inhibitory and excitatory connections; Buzsaki, 2006). Different aspects of large-scale
brain oscillatory activity (e.g. self-organization of emergent patterns, synchronization and os-
cillatory rhythms) have become a common explanatory resource in behavioural and cognitive
neuroscience. Some of the phenomena that have been explored from this approach include
the binding of the different perceived features of an object (Phillips and Singer, 1997), the rep-
resentation of position information in navigation tasks (O’Keefe and Recce, 1993), attention
(Deco and Thiele, 2009), memory (Jensen et al., 2007) and conscious experience (Crick and
Koch, 1990; Engel et al., 1999; Varela et al., 2001b).
Despite the significant progress recently achieved by investigating oscillatory dynamics in
cognitive neuroscience, existing theoretical frameworks and models are generally developed
without taking into account sensorimotor dynamics and, and frequently are limited to the
establishment of oscillatory correlations arising after a given stimulus onset. For example, the
analysis of neural synchronization generally assumes dynamical mechanisms, but at the same
time it typically assumes neural synchronization to play a key role in the generation of repre-
sentations of sensory inputs. This idea is based on observations of how spatially separated cells
responding to the same input display strong synchronization, and how this synchronization
is reduced when cells respond to independent stimuli moving in different directions (Engel
and Singer, 2001). However, evidence favouring this internalist view of neural synchroniza-
tion has been obtained through equally internalist experimental designs. For example, many
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experiments in perception and neural synchronization have been conducted analysing corti-
cal and subcortical neurons in paralysed anaesthetized cats (Gray et al., 1989; Engel et al., 1991;
Freiwald et al., 1995; Brosch et al., 1997; Brecht et al., 1999; Castelo-Branco et al., 2000) or cor-
tical cells in anaesthetized monkeys (Livingstone, 1996). Moreover, behavioural experiments
performed in awake monkeys analysing temporal encoding of information related to differ-
ent tasks, has involved monkey training with simple input-output tasks in which the monkey
has to fixate its attention on a sensory stimulus and provide a response after a cue was given
(Abeles et al., 1993; Kreiter and Singer, 1996; Prut et al., 1998). As a result, the focus on oscil-
latory brain dynamics is often centred on those aspects of oscillatory activity within the brain
that might carry information about a particular stimulus, without considering the coupled
brain-body-environment dynamics. This is even true for non-representational approaches to
cognition that acknowledge the theoretical relevance of situated cognition but conduct most
of their studies in search of cognitive correlates in oscillatory brain activity leaving aside the
potential effects of the sensorimotor coupling (e.g. Skarda and Freeman, 1987; Varela et al.,
2001b).
On the modelling side, computational simulations are generally built without considering
the body and the environment and often assuming a representational theory of brain func-
tion. That is, they assume that the main job of the brain is to create a representation or model
of the environment, and focus on neuronal mechanisms capable of supporting the processing
of such a model. For example, in a recent review paper, Andy Clark depicts a wave of work
around Bayesian predictive neurodynamics (Clark, 2013). Here, Clark argues that brains be-
have essentially as prediction machines, where neural networks constantly attempt to match
incoming sensory inputs with top-down expectations or predictions. The Bayesian predictive
approach hypothesizes the existence of a hierarchical generative model that aims to minimize
prediction error within a bidirectional cascade of cortical processing. Computationally, the
appeal of this perspective lies in the fact that all that needs to be passed forward through the
system is the error signal (which is what remains once predictions and driving signals have
been matched). In these models it is therefore the backward (recurrent) connectivity that car-
ries the main information processing load. Neural architecture is depicted as a kind of duplex
architecture: one that at each level combines both traditional representation of inputs with
processing of prediction errors. While ‘representation units’ generate the predictions nec-
essary to instantiate a potent context-dependent dynamical system, ‘error units’ correct the
error signals to continuously adapting brain dynamics to different situations. Clark’s view
brings a number of interesting elements from a dynamical systems perspective. He proposes
that it is not only sensory input that is predicted, but he rescues Karl Friston’s perspective to
the framework, generalizing hierarchical predictive processing to include action, or ‘action-
oriented predictive processing’ (Friston et al., 2010). Motor action would be predicted in the
same way as perceptual inputs but with the difference that motor error signals would be cor-
rected by movements instead of neural activity in an intimate coordination between action
and sensation. Moreover, Friston’s free energy formulation postulates that prediction errors
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are quantified by means of entropy, allowing the system to minimize prediction error by self-
organizing to minimize the entropy levels in the system.
What is important here is that there is still a pervasive kind of ontological divide between
agent and environment: what lies within the agent is a representational device, an inference
engine, and outside lies the world to be represented. The interaction between the two is lim-
ited to prediction and error correction. The fine grained temporal structure of interaction
including the sensorimotor entrainment of brain dynamics and the embodied shaping of ex-
perience is left out of the picture. Even the most dynamicist versions of Bayesian predictive
approaches still assume that the brain is the indisputable centre of cognitive life. Ultimately,
everything consists in generating predictive models inside the brain – i.e. representations in
terms of probability distributions – about the outside world. These representations are stored
in parameters distributed across a hierarchical neural architecture which are tuned to minimize
prediction errors about the body and the environment. In that sense the framework proposed
by Clark, as pointed out by Anderson and Chemero (2013), does not understand prediction
in the broader sense of correlations (which may fit well with a dynamicist embodied perspec-
tive) but in the sense of abductive inference. Thus, cognition would consist in inferring the
causes of our observations and predicting future ones. This inevitably leads to exclusively in-
ternalist processes, in which the world we experience is a projection of the predictive models
generated by our minds. This assumption neglects the possibility that some aspects of the en-
vironment can be accessed directly from the constraints of the agent-environment interaction
at an ecological scale (Calvo et al., 2012, see next section).
In general, the notion of embodied cognition is becoming increasingly popular, and it is
widely accepted that cognition can be modulated or biased by the senses (Llinás et al., 1998),
the body (Eerland et al., 2011) and the environment (Adam and Galinsky, 2012), or that cog-
nitive processes are grounded in the biological substrate and our computational capacities are
not abstract but shaped by the peculiarities of our bodies (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999). Still,
these approaches do not break completely with the dominating internalist paradigm, and still
characterize cognition as a fundamentally representationalist, computationalist and function-
alist process, even when cognitive functions can be composed by parts of the body or the en-
vironment. Thus, under these assumptions embodied cognition does not follow through on
the necessary consequences of allowing cognition to involve more than the brain (e.g. Dietrich
and Markman, 2003).
2.1.5 Radical Embodiment and Sensorimotor Theories of Cognition
As we have shown, throughout the history of cognitive science, problems posed by previ-
ous dualist philosophical frameworks were solved by relaxing some assumptions about how
cognition may be bound to particular modules located in the brain. In contrast, other ap-
proaches proposed that cognition should be a more distributed process involving a network
of processing units (connectionism), computation through the body and the environment
(embodiment) and dissolution of representations in favour of emergent dynamical processes
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(dynamical systems approaches). Nevertheless, these approaches have frequently been un-
able to escape a basically internalist perspective on cognition and giving the brain a privileged
position as the domain within which cognition is confined (even if it can take advantage of
some processes going in the body or the environment). In this context, some authors have
proposed the need to completely abandon of the representational nature of cognitive archi-
tectures. This has given rise to what has been labelled as the radical embodiment approach
to cognitive science, based on both dynamical systems theory approaches to cognition and
ecological psychology (Chemero, 2009).
Sensorimotor Contingencies
Sensorimotor coordination implies more than the statement that sensory input, through its
influence on brain dynamics, creates an action that, in turn, produces a change that leads to
a new perceptual state. The central claim of situated approaches to cognitive behaviour is
that the agent-environment coupling shapes brain dynamics in a manner that is essential to
behavioural or cognitive functionality (Steels, 1990; Beer, 1995a; Clark, 1997). In other words,
macroscopic functional behaviour (e.g. intentional grasping or perception) emerges from mi-
croscopic sensorimotor dynamics (e.g. propioceptive and visual feedback in grasping or sac-
cadic movements in visual perception). More recently, the Sensorimotor Contingency The-
ory (O’Regan and Noë, 2001) has defended the notion that what is constitutive of perceptual
awareness (and, it could be argued, of other cognitive states) is not a specific internal state
of an agent, but the structure of sensorimotor contingencies. To perceive is to act in a spe-
cific manner that brings forth the structure of sensory changes in relation to the activity of
the agent. To see or to perceive is something that is done and relies on the very sensorimo-
tor coupled dynamics of an agent. In the words of Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë, ‘to have
a sensation is to exercise one’s mastery of the relevant sensorimotor contingencies and in this
sense to be ‘attuned’ to the ways in which one’s movements will affect the character of input’
(O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p.84). They use the example of Braitenberg vehicles (Braitenberg,
1986), in which a wheeled vehicle is equipped with two front mounted light sensors, the left
sensor being linked to the right wheel and the right sensor to the left wheel. As result of its
wiring, the vehicle drives itself toward light sources exhibiting a phototactic-like behaviour:
the ability of this extremely simple mechanism to ‘sense light’ does not consist
just in the fact of activity in the sensor. Light causally affects the sensors, to be
sure. But the vehicle’s ability to sense the light consists in the ways in which it
makes use of the raw stimulation of the light on the sensor [...] The sensation
does not occur in the brain any more than it occurs in the sensors of the vehicle.
The occurrence of sensation is a system or creature-wide phenomenon. Mastery
of sensorimotor contingencies may be neurally encoded, but this mastery does
not itself reside in the brain. To the extent that it makes sense to speak of mastery
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residing anywhere, then it resides in the creature as a whole, in the whole neurally
enlivened body (O’Regan and Noë, 2001, p.84-85).
An illustration of this may be the sensation of softness one experiences when manipulating
a sponge (Myin, 2003). We perceive the softness of the sponge because when we press it, it
squishes. ‘Having the sensation of softness consists in being aware that one can exercise certain
practical skills with respect to the sponge: one can for example press it, and it will yield under
the pressure. The experience of softness of the sponge is characterized by a variety of such
possible patterns of interaction with the sponge, and the laws that describe these sensorimotor
interactions’ (O’Regan et al., 2005).
Enslaving of the Brain by the Agent-Environment System
How can perceptual awareness or a cognitive state emerge from a structure of sensorimotor
interactions? In Chapter 1 we presented the notions of collective variable, order parameter and
the slaving principle, and how nonlinear dynamics can provide the analytical tools to under-
stand the circular relation between top-down and bottom-up influences between microscopic
and macroscopic variables 1.2.1. However, this approach has been frequently applied to brain
activity alone. For example, Haken states that while the chemical and electrical activities of
neurons constitute the microscopic variables, ‘order-parameters are ultimately the thoughts’
(Haken, 1978, p.15). That is, order parameters are strictly defined in terms of neural activa-
tion. However, a careful analysis of Haken’s work shows that his approach assumes an inter-
nalist perspective of cognitive self-organization. For example, he describes the ‘emergence of
meaning’ in pattern recognition in purely internal terms (Haken, 1995). According to Haken,
semantic information of different patterns arises because they are able to produce an effect
in the dynamical landscape of neural networks, ‘opening or closing of perception attractors
can be achieved by changing attention parameters [...]. Therefore, we may say that meaning
is attached in each case to a specific order parameter’ (Haken, 1995, p.42).
A different approach has been proposed from ecological psychology (Reed, 1996; Warren,
2006; Chemero, 2009). Ecological psychologists do not assume that order parameters gov-
erning cognitive behaviour are in the brain but at the level of the agent-environment system.
Therefore, organized behaviour does not need to be attributed to a centralized controller, or
internal models or representations, but instead they present models in which control is dis-
tributed over the whole agent-environment behavioural dynamics. ‘Interactions between the
agent and environment under physical, informational, and task constraints give rise to the
behavioural dynamics, an evolving vector field that reciprocally captures the agent’s behavior’
(Warren, 2006). That is, it is the existence of supra-brain order parameters (in the form of
behavioural dynamical patterns) which control behaviour. This approach has been proven to
be quite fruitful at least at a behavioural level (Warren, 2006; Dotov et al., 2010; Gibson, 1986;
Lee, 1976). However, ecological psychology perspectives typically rule out the neurodynamics
of the system and just focus on finding the higher behavioural order parameters that govern
the interaction.
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The assumption underlying these perspectives, is that neural substrate is enslaved by higher-
order dynamical patterns of motor behaviour at the level of behaviour in an environment
(Dotov, 2014). This idea was proposed by Van Orden et al. (2012) in his blue collar brain
hypothesis, suggesting that since the timescales of body and environment are slower that the
timescales of the brain, the latter must be constrained and controlled by slower flow of context
and behaviour, limiting the degrees of freedom about what can happen next1. In a similar vein,
Fuchs (2011) conceives the brain as a large set of latent open loops or attractors coupled to the
environment, and the sole role of the brain is to mediate and modulate the cycles of embodied
interaction (i.e. not to produce its content). This idea is supported by Dotov’s provocative
claim stating that we may already ‘know most of what we need to know about the brain, there
is no hidden neural code to be decoded’ (Dotov, 2014, p.7). Reviewing the successes of the
Blue Brain Project (Markram, 2006), which used the computational capacities of IBM’s Blue
Gene supercomputer for building biologically accurate models of the brain, Dotov claims that
detailed dynamical modelling of neuronal cortical columns displays patterns with the form of
emergent collective phenomena at the level of the whole column, such as propagating waves of
synchronous activation. Moreover, these patterns are similar to the ones generated with rela-
tively simple neurodynamical models running in a regular laptop (Izhikevich, 2006). Dotov’s
proposes that neural tissue by itself does not exhibit much more than spontaneous synchro-
nization and other phenomena typical of nonlinear dynamical systems. Therefore, complex
behaviour does not arise from a complex ‘self complicating’ neural structure. Instead, it arises
when neural tissue is coupled into a field of environmental and bodily activity. That is, the
brain has not evolved to ‘generate’ complicated behaviour but to coordinate with the body
and environment in complex ways.
2.1.6 Filling the Gap
We have described how the dominant views in cognitive systems have been mainly focused on
an internalist perspective, where the processes constitutive of cognition are bound to the lim-
its of the brain. In contrast, different sensorimotor and ecological approaches have proposed
a radically different perspective in which the emergence of agent-environment order parame-
ters is the constitutive element of cognition. Filling the gap between the study of neural and
situated sensorimotor dynamics is essential if we want to understand the nature of neurocog-
nitive autonomy. However, despite the repeated emphasis on the importance of sensorimotor
coupling for neurodynamic approaches2, current understanding of brain oscillatory dynam-
ics mostly focuses on ‘passive’ conditions. The dynamical properties of oscillatory networks
1 This assumption about the timescales of body and brain has not been proven. However, it has been pro-
posed that the body, as the brain, is self-organized in a (multi)fractal tensegrity structure comprising from indi-
vidual cells, to muscular-skeletal structures which may embed the brain (Turvey and Fonseca, 2014)
2By neurodynamic approaches we refer to dynamical system approaches to the understanding of neural activ-
ity (Gelder, 1998; Freeman, 2001; Buzsaki, 2006, , etc.). There are very few examples of these types of models that
exploit sensorimotor coupling and almost none for oscillatory models (some recent exceptions include Santos
et al., 2011; Moioli et al., 2010).
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(even when studied within the context of behavioural or cognitive neuroscience, see Strogatz,
2004) are deduced from mathematical and computational models that have constant or no
input at all, and the effect of sensorimotor or situated dynamics on the oscillatory properties
of such networks is rarely considered.
The goal of this chapter is to make a theoretical contribution in the direction of explicitly
quantifying the difference between the dynamics that results from isolated versus situated
oscillatory controllers, and those that result from actively versus passively coupled systems.
Inspired by Held and Hein’s experiment above in which two kittens were compared, one
of them moving freely and the other being only allowed to passively receive a visual pattern
product of the movement of the other kitten (Held and Hein, 1963), we have designed an
experiment to study a similar situation in a minimal dynamical system3. Our objective is to
determine the simplest system that can reproduce the difference between these two modes of
perception (coupled to the environment and ‘passively coupled’). For doing so, we have cho-
sen the Haken-Kelso-Bunz (HKB) model presented in section 1.2.2 as a paradigmatic example
of oscillatory dynamics and behaviour to address these questions. There are a number of good
reasons to choose the HKB model. First, the HKB model is simple enough to be treated ana-
lytically. Second, it has been used both to model behavioural phenomena and to model brain
dynamics. Finally, to our knowledge, no variation of the HKB model exists that uses it as a
controller of a sensorimotor system, and no analytical study exists of a comparison between
the dynamics of the HKB studied in isolation (with a parametric analysis) and its dynamics
under sensorimotor loop conditions (with few exceptions as, for instance, Kelso et al., 2009).
By filling in this gap we can address the following questions: How does the HKB model
change its properties when it is situated (i.e. under closed-loop sensorimotor coupling in a
spatial environment)? Is there any qualitative change that comes out of this coupling? Can
the behavioural properties of an oscillatory ‘brain’, or controller, be inferred from the study
of the brain in isolation or under constant input, or even from variation of the input corre-
sponding to those found in the coupled system? In this chapter, we explore the answer to
these questions by modelling a ‘situated HKB’ and analytically solving the coupled agent-
environment system and comparing it with isolated and passively coupled conditions. The
structure of the rest of the chapter is as follows: (1) First, we introduce the well known HKB
model and the coordination dynamics framework; (2) next, we characterize the notion of dy-
namically coupled and spatially situated system and present a novel extension of the HKB
model with sensorimotor embodiment that we call the situated HKB model; (3) then, we an-
alytically solve a particular case of the situated HKB model performing a gradient climbing
task in a 2D environment. Subsequently, (4) we compare the obtained dynamics of the cou-
pled system with the dynamics of a decoupled HKB and with a passively-coupled HKB model
for an equivalent parametric analysis. Qualitative changes between the eigenvalues describing
3Although the developmental aspect of Held and Hein’s experiment was a fundamental part of it, for sim-
plicity, our design only considers the difference between a system coupled to the environment and one that is
only ‘passively coupled’ to it.
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the three HKB-system dynamics are identified, as well as experimental measures characteriz-
ing the transformation of the complete phase space of the agent produced by sensorimotor
coupling. Finally, (5) we discuss some implications for the study of oscillatory brain dynamics.
2.2 The HKB model
We have chosen the HKB model because (1) it is one of the simplest models describing co-
ordination phenomena, and (2) despite its simplicity it has been widely used as representa-
tive model of dynamicist approaches and it describes a rich spectrum of possible behaviours.
Thereby, the HKB model has been a driving example of coordination dynamics, describing
the behaviour of two non-linearly coupled oscillators. The model was originally formulated
in 1985 to explain experimental observations in the relative phase dynamics of bimanual coor-
dination (Haken et al., 1985) but it has also been shown to capture the coordination dynamics
of different behavioural (Kelso, 1995), neural (Jirsa et al., 1994) and social (Oullier and Kelso,
2009a) phenomena. Using the language of synergetics (order parameters, control parameters,
instability, etc., see Haken, 1978), the HKB describes a simple nonlinearly coupled dynamical
system that captures the self-organized behaviour of two generic coordinated nodes or units
(Fuchs et al., 1995). More specifically, the HKB model was conceived to provide insights into:
(1) the formation of ordered states of coordination; (2) the multistability of those states; and
(3) the conditions that give rise to switching among coordinative states (Kelso, 1995). More-
over, the HKB model has been proven to describe fundamental features of self-organization
such as multistability, phase transitions and hysteresis (Kelso, 1995).
Here we use the ‘extended HKB’ equation (Kelso et al., 1990)4, in which a system com-
posed of two coupled oscillators is reduced to a single equation where the main variable is the
relative phase between the two oscillators, and whose dynamics are shaped by the difference
between the natural frequency of the oscillators and their coupling strength:
_' = !   a  sin(')  2b  sin(2') (2.1)
The relative phase or phase difference,', represents the order parameter or collective vari-
able that emerges from lower-level interactions of the two coupled oscillators, a and b are the
coupling coefficients between the two oscillators, and ! is the difference between their in-
trinsic frequencies. Despite its simplicity, this equation captures a wide range of self-organized
phenomena. Different combinations of the control parameters a, b (or rather b=a) and !
give rise to different collective behaviours. For example, when shifting the value of ! while
the values of a and b are held fixed, the system experiences phase transitions between three
different modes of behaviour: monostable, bistable and metastable (Figure 1.6).
4 We shall hereafter use the terms ‘HKB model’ or ‘HKB system’ to refer to the ‘extended HKB model’ (Kelso
et al., 1990) rather than the original (and simpler) HKB model (Haken et al., 1985). The reason for this is that
we are going to distinguish additional situated, decoupled and passively-coupled versions of the extended HKB
model and names such as ‘passively-coupled extended HKB’ would interrupt the flow of the text.
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The HKB has been used to model different kinds of coordination phenomena but rarely
used as a controller of an embodied agent. To be fair to the HKB model, this was never in-
tended by the original authors. The HKB model (and its extended version) was rather con-
ceived to describe the behavioural dynamics at the macroscopic level (i.e. ' representing the
collective variable of phase difference between two ‘behaving’ oscillatory components, like
fingers, oscillating armchairs in social coordination, etc.). It can be said that the HKB model
was designed to capture the global agent-environment dynamics, not any explicit behaviour
generating mechanism that is coupled through sensors and motors to an environment. In ad-
dition, the HKB was also used to model inter-areal coordination in the cortex (Tognoli and
Kelso, 2009), ignoring the potential influence of the coupling between brain and environ-
ment. In short, previous uses of the HKB model involved either full behavioural phenomena
or ‘isolated’ brain dynamics. Thus, there is a theoretical modelling gap that remains under-
explored: namely the HKB as a controller of an agent that can modulate the control parameter
(influenced by sensory input) through the behaviour it generates when embodied in a robot.
2.3 The Situated HKB Model
2.3.1 Sensorimotor Embodiment of the HKB Equation
In this section we describe what we have called the situated HKB system: a robotic model
where the HKB equation describes the ‘neural system’ of the agent which is embodied with
sensors and motors and, in turn, situated in an environment. The agent has a circular body of
radius R with two diametrically opposed motors (see Figure 2.1.a), that can move forward or
backwards with different velocities in a 2D arena, and a single sensor that provides an input
to the HKB neural controller.
Thereby, the HKB equation provides the macroscopic description of the dynamics of the
two coupled oscillators. It allows us to describe the behaviour of the situated HKB system
in the following manner: (1) the agent has a ‘brain’ where two regions (e.g. sensory and mo-
tor cortex) oscillate with their corresponding natural or intrinsic frequency (the difference
between these frequencies is expressed by !0); (2) when a sensory input I modifies the nat-
ural frequency of one of the oscillators (e.g. sensory cortex), the frequency difference term
changes5; (3) since the frequency difference term is the control parameter of the phase differ-
ence,', we can consider that the situated HKB agent modulates its control parameter through
sensorimotor contingencies: i.e. through the sensory changes that result from motor actions
and the displacements they generate.
The dynamics of our agent’s controller is driven by the following equation:
_' = (!0 + I)  a  sin(')  2b  sin(2') (2.2)
5The term ! of the original extended HKB equation has been substituted by the term !0 + I, where I
is the sensory input term whose effect is mathematically equivalent to changing the natural frequency of one of
the oscillators (see Figure 2.1.a)
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It is assumed that the agent is situated in a two-dimensional environment where a radial gra-
dient of a stimulus  is present with its peak on the origin of coordinates (one can interpret
this environment in different manners, e.g. as a light source or a chemical gradient diffused
in all directions from a central point with radial symmetry).
With regard to the ‘sensory system’ of the model, since the agent lives in a world of gra-
dients, we have designed its sensor not to perceive the absolute amount of stimulus present
in the environment but its change. Thus, the agent is sensitive to changes in  mediated by a
sensitivity factor s that characterizes the sensor gain:
I = _  s (2.3)
where the perceived intensity signal decays linearly with the distance d to the source of the
gradient. With respect to the ‘motor system’ of the model, we define the activations of the
motors as functions of the state of the controller,
Mr(') = m  cos(')
Ml(') = m  cos('+ c) (2.4)
where Mr and Ml represent the right and left motors respectively, m is a speed parameter, and
c is a bias parameter that breaks the symmetry between the right and left motors.
Thus, brain-body-environment coupling can be understood as a process that repeats a
cycled-course of four stages involving successive transformations of I(t),!(t),'(t),M('(t))
and back to I(t) (see Figure 2.1.b).
2.4 Three-Dimensional Description of the Situated-HKB Model
To fully describe the movement of the agent we include an additional variable describing the
angle  of the agent’s orientation relative to the peak of the gradient (see Figure 2.1.c). The
behaviour of the situated HKB agent is completely addressed by the variable'(t) and the po-
sition of the motors of the agent M('(t)) at each time t. The process can be characterized as
follows: (1) with the movement of the agent in the environment (variation of d) the sensor
receives a new input I, (2) the input influences the firing rate of the oscillators, changing the
frequency difference between the HKB nodes (variation of !); (3) these frequency differ-
ences translates into a change in the phase difference between the oscillators (variation of ')
and, finally, (4) the new value of the phase difference changes the state of the motors (variation
of M(')) moving the robot (variation of ) and starting the cycle again.
As a direct result of assuming radial symmetry in the problem: (1) we can use a polar coor-
dinate system (distance d of the agent to the centre of the gradient, and angle of orientation
of the agent relative to the peak of the gradient) as the reference frame, and (2) it is considered
that the variation of the gradient in terms of the polar coordinates does not depend on the
angle, _(d; ) = _(d).
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Figure 2.1: Situated HKB agent. a) Structure of the agent, consisting in a sensor, two oscillatory controllers and two
motors. b) Sensorimotor loop of the agent. c) Representation of the agent interactingwith its environment. The position
and orientation of the agent with respect to the centre of the gradient are represented through the variables d and.
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Figure 2.2: Schema of the situated HKB system equations. The equations of themovement of the agent can be deduced
from this schema
• Assumption 1: The choice of polar coordinates (d representing the distance to the
source and  representing the relative angle between the agent’s orientation and the
source), instead of cartesian coordinates allows us to reduce the dimensionality of the
model.
Assuming that the agent’s mass is small enough to be discounted (in order to avoid iner-
tial resistance), we can describe the speed of the agent as follows: the translational speed
of the robot Vt is calculated as the vectorial average of the motor velocities, and the an-
gular speed Va as the difference of the motor velocities divided by the body diameter.
Vt(') = (Mr(') +Ml('))=2
Va(') = (Mr(') Ml('))=2  R (2.5)
Assuming the tangential and angular velocities of the robot Vt and Va are known, we
can deduce the movement of the agent in terms of polar coordinates (see Figure 2.2):
Considering t;d; ! 0, we get
Vt t  cos() + (d+d)cos() = d (2.6)
from which, the next equation is easily obtained
_d =  cos()  Vt (2.7)
Similarly, if we take
Vt t+ (d+d)  cos( ++ Vt t) = d  cos() (2.8)
we find that
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Vt + d  sin()  ( _ + Va) + _d  cos() = 0 (2.9)
Putting together (2.7) and (2.9), we obtain the movement equations:
_d =  cos()  Vt
_ = sin()=d  Vt + Va (2.10)
where we know that Vt and Va depend on the speed of the motors:
• Assumption 2: For simplicity, it is considered that  = d0 d, where d is the distance
to the centre of the gradient and d0 is the intensity of the stimulus at the centre of the
gradient, which decreases linearly with d.
Since  and d are inversely proportional and radial symmetry allows us to dismiss the
angle of the position of the agent respect to the gradient when we describe it in polar
coordinates. The change of the perceived gradient only depends on the position of the
agent and the gradient itself,
_ = _F(d; ) = @F(d; )=@d  _d+ @F(d; )=@  _ (2.11)
and the set of equations describing the system-environment coupling can be reduce to
only three:
_' = !0 + _  s  asin(')  2b  sin(2')
_ = cos()  (Mr(') +Ml('))=2
_ = sin()=(d0   )  (Mr(') +Ml('))=2+ (Mr(') Ml('))=(2R)
(2.12)
• Assumption 3: Without loss of generality, we choose m = 2, !0 = 1, d0 = 0 and
radius of the body R = 1, obtaining:
_' = 1+ _  s  a  sin(')  2b  sin(2')
_ = cos()  (cos(') + cos('+ c))
_ =  sin()=  (cos(') + cos('+ c)) + (cos(')  cos('+ c))
(2.13)
where a, b, c and s are the parameters of the system.
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Behavioural analysis
We have chosen a basic gradient climbing6 task for our agent to solve. That is, we ask the agent
to climb up a linear gradient and maintain itself as close as possible to the maximum peak. A
simple trial-and-error hand-tuning of the parameters gives us combinations that perform the
desired behaviour. We chose to adjust the parameters to a = 5, b = 1, and c = 5, leaving the
sensitivity parameter s unspecified in order to have one free parameter that allow us to explore
different kinds of behaviour. This selection is arbitrary (except for the relation of a=b, which
was chosen to ensure that the HKB is always in a monostable mode of functioning) but other
combinations of parameters which result in gradient climbing behaviour lead us to similar
results in the analysis. For the experiments, the value of s is defined in the interval [0; 15].
For these parameters, we see that the agent displays different behavioural strategies de-
pending on the value of its sensitivity parameter s (Figure 2.3): (1) for values of s 2 [0; 2:4]
displaying cycloidal strategies where the agent turns over itself with a corkscrew-like move-
ment, to (2) spiral paths where the agent slowly climbs the gradient, when s 2 [2:6; 15]. At
the frontier between these two behavioural strategies, we find (3) a critical region (s  2:5)
where the agent displays the most efficient gradient navigation (in terms of time and trajectory
efficiency), taking a curved approximation path ending in a spiral-circular pattern around the
peak of the gradient. These different behaviours are shown in Figure 2.3, where the efficiency
of each gradient climbing strategy is computed with a parameter Fd = 1  d(t=t1)d(t=0) , that repre-
sents how close the agent gets to the centre of the gradient in a given time (we use t1 = 40s:).
How do these behavioural strategies work? In the critical region (s  2:5) the agent maps
the highest gradient ‘sensation’ with high activation of both motors, moving effectively to-
wards the peak of the gradient. On the one hand, as we increase the value of s, sensory stimu-
lation is more intense, so the agent needs an strategy to make the approach to the gradient peak
slower in order to maintain a compensated activation between the motors. At the same time,
as the value of s is decreased, the agent experiences difficulties maintaining an equilibrated ve-
locity for both motors, having to turn around periodically to regain a trajectory where a high
sensor input is perceived.
2.4.1 Analytical solution for the situated-HKB system
We shall now analytically solve the coupled brain-body-environment system in order to un-
derstand the emergence of the qualitatively different kinds of behaviour that appear as we
6Gradient climbing is a minimal (yet not totally trivial) task, which is widespread in nature. Most of small
scale adaptive behaviour occurs along chemical gradients. The microscopic world is a world of gradients (like
thermal gradients or light gradients but mostly chemical gradients). The adaptive behaviour of small animals
(e.g. C. elegans) and individual motile cells (e.g. bacteria but also animal cells migrating during development) is
mostly a gradient-related adaptive behaviour. Navigating smell and heat gradients are also stereotypical adaptive
tasks for higher animals. Moreover many instances of higher-level behaviour can also be interpreted as abstract
gradient climbing (e.g. a human can move up a gradient of social popularity or economic wealth involving com-
plex strategic decisions combined with an emotional gradient climbing of the perceived result of such strategies).
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Figure 2.3: Behaviour of the situated HKB system. Different behaviours performed by the situated HKB system. We
observe how different gradient climbing strategies arise depending on the value of s. For s = 1:5, the agent follows a
cycloidal trajectory continuously turning over itself, for s = 2:5, the agent finds a direct path towards the peak of the
gradient, and for s = 8 the agent slowly approaches the gradient peak following a spiral path.
increase the sensitivity s of the agent. As usual, if we want to understand the behaviour of an
artefact modelled by a dynamical system, we need to calculate the linearization of the system
around its fixed points (Strogatz, 2001).
Thus, if we take the situated-HKB system of equations to be solved,
_' = (1+ _(d; )  s)  asin(')  2b  sin(2'))
_ = cos()  (cos(') + cos('+ c))
_ =  sin()=  (cos(') + cos('+ c)) + (cos(')  cos('+ c))
(2.14)
where the parameter s (sensitivity) is used as a control parameter to analyse the solutions
in our range of interest (s 2 [0; 15]), the two fixed points can be obtained as follows: (1) the
first one is an attractor with values of '; ;  at (0:11; 2:28; =2) and (2) the second one is a
repeller at (2:53; 0:43; =2).
Computing the Jacobian matrix of the system at the fixed points, and making an analy-
sis of the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the system, we get the behaviour of our dynamical
system around the regions of its state space that bear qualitative significance. Figure 2.4 il-
lustrates the range of different values of the eigenvalues (denoted by 1; 2 and 3) at each
of the fixed points, depending on the parameter s (that corresponds to different observed
behavioural patterns for gradient climbing, see Figure 2.3). We find regions that present sim-
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Figure 2.4: Solution of the situated HKB system. Eigenvalues (1; 2 and 3) of the attractor (left) and repeller (right)
fixed points of the situated-HKB: force of the attraction/repulsion vs. variation of the control parameter s. Real part
(solid), Imaginary part (dashed).
ple attractor/repulsion dynamics (when 1, 2, 3 are real numbers) whereas other regions
present a spiral attraction or repulsion (when 1, 2, 3 have complex values).
Now, we show a detailed description of the relations between eigenvalues and behaviour,
analysing the transitions of the eigenvalues for both the attractor and the repeller (see Figure
2.4) and focusing on the correspondences between those transitions and the respective transi-
tions in the behavioural modes (Figure 2.5). Specifically, as depicted in the Figure we analyse
the transitions from real to complex eigenvalues (from regular attraction to spiral attraction),
and the behavioural transitions from underdamped to overdamped behaviour (the system
finds equilibrium with or without oscillating) on the one hand and from spiral to cycloidal
movement of the agent on the other.
Attractor:
• Transition at s = 5:1: At this point, the attractor experiences a change in its dynam-
ics. A spiral attraction in the plane 12 disappears and the attraction of the system no
longer has a spiral shape. At the same point, the approaching strategy of the agent ex-
periences a change. For s < 5:1 the agent enters the final stable circular trajectory from
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within, whereas for s > 5:1 the agent enters from outside the circle. These approaching
strategies correspond respectively to an under-damped and an over-damped behaviour
of the situated HKB system.
• Transition at s = 10:4: The attractor changes again into a spiral shape, now in
the plane 23. The behavioural change here is more subtle. It appears at the initial
turning behaviour of the agent until it finds a stable trajectory and enters into the spiral
trajectory of the robot. When s < 10:4, the robot enters into the trajectory by softly
adjusting the value ofwith an over-damped behaviour, while when s > 10:4 the value
of oscillates around the trajectory, thus adjusting to the optimal value with an under-
damped behaviour. This damping behaviour also affects ' and . Oscillations are too
small to be clearly appreciated in the trajectory of the robot. That is why in Figure 2.5,
in the enlarged boxes, we just represent the orientation of the agent , which shows
how the robot adjusts its behaviour to the final trajectory.
Repeller:
• Transition at s = 2:4: At this point, a different kind of transition takes place. While
transitions in the attractor were gradual, the change in the repeller at this value is an
abrupt bifurcation. The system suddenly changes from a spiral in the plane 12 to a
spiral in the plane 23. Also, a redistribution of the values of the real part of 1 and
3 (i.e. the ‘strength’ of the repulsion) takes place in the transition. Consequently, in
this case the change in the agent’s behaviour is more dramatic. As we saw in Figure
2.3, the agent changes from a cycloidal trajectory to a more stable strategy where the
agent continuously approaches to the gradient source (either directly or following more
pronounced spirals as s increases).
of its state space that bear qualitative significance. In Figure 2.4, it is illustrated
2.5 Comparison between Situated, Passively-Coupled and Decoupled
HKB systems
In the previous section we provided a full dynamical analysis and explained how, in the situ-
ated HKB, the coupled brain-body-environment system gives rise to a gradient climbing be-
haviour. We also analysed the transitions that took place as we increase the sensitivity param-
eter.
Now, we want to explore the effect of the sensorimotor situatedness of the system (i.e. the
role of the closed sensorimotor loop) upon the dynamics of the HKB equation by comparing
the situated HKB with two homologous systems (see Figure 2.6):
1. A decoupled HKB system, such as the one originally used by Kelso, in which the effect
of situated interaction with an external environment is not taken into account.
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Figure 2.5: Transitions in the phase space and changes in the agent's behaviour. We can observe how changes in be-
haviour coincide with transition points in the dynamical description of the system: (s = 2:4) an abrupt transition of the
repeller's plane of spiral repulsion explains the switch from cycloidal to stable movement in the agent, (s = 5:1) as the
effect of spiral attraction vanishes, the agent changes fromentering from inside to thefinal circular trajectory to entering
from outside, and (s = 10:4) when the spiral attraction appears in a different plane, the agent displays an oscillatory
movement for adjusting the followed trajectory (the effect of the oscillations is shownover the value of in the enlarged
box, its amplitude is damped too fast to be appreciated in the plot of the agent's trajectory)
2. A passively-coupled HKB system, where the HKB equation receives a structured input
resulting from a real interaction between a situated HKB system and its environment,
but where this input does not directly correspond to the activity of the system but is
received from a recording or virtual input of a truly behaving agent.
The second condition is equivalent to Held and Hein’s classic experiment (Held and Hein,
1963) where two kittens were reared by holding one immobile and attached to the other, so
that both received the same sensory stimulation, yet only one had freedom to control move-
ment. In the following subsections, we analyse the dynamics of these HKB models, under
equivalent parametric conditions, searching for the qualitative difference that highlight the
functional and neurodynamic significance of the closed sensorimotor loop.
2.5.1 Case 1: No sensory input. The decoupled HKB system
The decoupled HKB system simply consists of the classical HKB equation (2.1) whose dy-
namics have been widely analysed. Given the classical HKB equation with the parameters
used above for the situated HKB (!0 = 1; a = 5 and b = 1) and after removing the sensory
input, we get:
_' = !0   a  sin(')  2b  sin(2') (2.15)
97
2
1
2
1
Passively-coupled
HKB
Situated
HKB
2
1
Decoupled
HKB
Figure 2.6: Representation of a situated, decoupled and passively-coupled HKB systems. The situated HKB system re-
ceives an input from its interaction with a gradient source. The passively-coupled HKB receives the copy of the input
generated by a situated HKB. The decoupled HKB receives no input at all.
It is easy to see that, for this equation, two fixed points (or equilibrium points) are ob-
tained by finding which values of ' make _' = 0. The fixed or equilibrium points are found
at' = 0:11 and' = 2:53. Computing the Jacobian matrix of the equation for these values of
', J(0:11) =  8:87 (attractor) and J(2:53) = 2:75 (repeller), provides us with the values for
the eigenvalue of the decoupled HKB at each point (denoted as 4 and represented in Figure
2.7).
As we see in Figure 2.7, the eigenvalue is a real number at each fixed point, generating a sim-
ple pattern of attraction/repulsion in the dynamics of the system. Thus, the decoupled HKB
alone cannot explain the behavioural changes shown in Figure 2.4, where simple patterns of
attraction/repulsion are transformed into spiral cycles, or abrupt changes arise changing the
plane of the resulting patterns. The decoupled HKB system displays simple attraction and
repulsion forces around every fixed point and, therefore, the dynamics of the system can be
described by constant attraction and repulsion forces regardless of the value of the parameter
s.
In the situated HKB however, we observed how the system displays ‘qualitatively dif-
ferent’ behaviours, that is, behaviours that are not just due to gradual variations of a single
dynamical regime but are a consequence of a phase transition in the system dynamics. This is
a phenomenon that can also appear for the original HKB equation (under certain conditions
the system is able to switch from one attractor to another; see Kelso, 1995). However, for the
situated-HKB with the parametric configuration used here (a = 5 and b = 1) ' remains
within the monostable region (except for brief instants of time when the system visits the
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Figure 2.7: Solution of the decoupled HKB system. Eigenvalues of the decoupled HKB (4): Force of the attrac-
tion/repulsion vs. variation of the control parameter s. Real part (solid), Imaginary part (dashed).
metastable region before stabilizing in the monostable region). Thus, it cannot display the
phase transitions observed in the bistable configuration of the HKB. Taking the decoupled
HKB as a reference, the situated HKB should not present, in principle, qualitative changes
that are not due to external factors.
Thus, the observed phase transition in the situated HKB system cannot be explained by
the dynamics of the HKB model alone. Instead, the reason for this transition lies in the joint
dynamics of the agent-environment system, as we illustrated when we solved the eigenvalues
of the system. However, it is true that, in a certain sense, the difference of dimensionality of
the two models is enough to substantially modify the dynamics of the system, independently
of the fact that these extra dimensions correspond to the agent or the environment. The very
fact that the situated HKB has three dimensions instead of one makes both systems somewhat
incommensurable.
This inconmensurability further supports the situatedness thesis. It is clearly proven by
the fact that the eigenvalues that determine the qualitative evolution of the system cannot be
translated or mapped from the situated to the decoupled conditions: the whole brain-body-
environment system defines a new coordinate system where the ‘brain’ contribution cannot
be isolated.
The decoupled HKB is affected by a constant force of attraction/repulsion (see Figure
2.8.b) while the situated HKB is subject to forces in three different dimensions that contin-
uously modulate each other (Figure 2.8.a). Note that even if we were feeding a constant in-
put into the system (anywhere in the input range displayed by the situated system) the result
would be equivalent.
The next logical step is to question whether the specific structure of the input is the crucial
factor when comparing the decoupled and situated HKB systems. In order to address this
question we introduce the passively-coupled HKB model where the HKB equation receives
the exact same input as the freely behaving situated HKB.
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Figure 2.8: Attractor's behaviour. Comparison of the evolution of the system around the attractor for (a) the situated
HKBwith s = 2:5 and (b) the decoupled HKB (with! = 1, both with a = 5 and b = 1). The black line in the vertical
axis represents the evolution over time (right vertical axis) of ', which has been simulated during 6.5 seconds with an
Euler step of 0.1 with arbitrary initial values of ' = 0:65;  =  2:78, and  =  2:07. The blue line represents
the phase space of the HKB, representing the attractors as filled dots and the repellers as empty dots. We observe how
the decoupled HKB is only affected by a simple attraction force with constant strength while a much richer dynamics is
shown in the situated HKB, where different forces of attraction interact tomodulate the systems evolution
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2.5.2 Case 2: Externally structured sensory input. The passively-coupled
HKB system
We can model the passively-coupled HKB system by just adding a new variable' that receives
the same input as ' (i.e., a new equation _' = 1+ _  s  a  sin(')  2b  sin(2') is added
to the previous system (equation 2.14), see Figure 2.6). As a result, we have to solve a four-
dimensional system under the same conditions as before (parameters a = 5, b = 1, and
c = 5, and the value of s defined in [0; 15]).
Analogously to the previous system we get two fixed points. There is an attractor at po-
sition (0:11; 2:28; =2; 0:11) and a repeller at (2:53; 0:43; =2; 2:53) (as shown in Figure
2.7), and through the diagonalization of the respective Jacobian matrices, four eigenvalues
(1; 2; 3; 4) are obtained.
As we will see below, although the term 4 is decoupled from the activity of the situated
HKB (and therefore independent of the type of coupling, i.e. independent of the value of s),
the behaviour of the new variable ' is necessarily described by a combination of the eigen-
values of the situated HKB system (1; 2; 3) and the decoupled HKB equation (4). This
provides us with a qualitative difference between the activity in ' and '.
In order to show this, we need to remind ourselves how the general solution of a dynamical
system is built. It is well-known that the eigenvalues of a linearized dynamical system define
the behaviour of the system around the fixed points as a series of exponential functions which
converge to an attractor or diverge from a repeller (Strogatz, 2001). For both the attractor and
the repeller, the solution of any variable of the passively-coupled HKB system has the form:
x(t) = x0 + A1  v1xe 1t + A2  v2xe 2t + A3  v3xe 3t + A4  v4xe 4t (2.16)
where x can stand for ('; ;  or '), i and vix in general have complex values (where vix are
the eigenvectors of the solution and i are the eigenvalues, i = 1; 2; 3; 4), x0 represents the
position of the fixed point and Ai are the coefficients that fix the initial state of the system
(with i = 1; 2; 3; 4).
After making some simple calculations, we find that: (1) some eigenvectors are null (i.e.
v4'; v4; v4 = 0) so 4 are only be part of the solution of '; (2) moreover, others share
the same values (v1' = v1' ; v2' = v2' and v3' = v3'), so 1; 2 and 3 are equally
present in the dynamics of' and', (3) finally, we can simplify the system a little more because
(v4' = 1) and ('0 = '0) for any value of s.
Given the previous simplifications, the solutions of the system around x0 become:
'(t) = '0 + A1  v1'e 1t + A2  v2'e 2t + A3  v3'e 3t
(t) = 0 + A1  v1e 1t + A2  v2e 2t + A3  v3e 3t
(t) = 0 + A1  v1e 1t + A2  v2e 2t + A3  v3e 3t
'(t) = '0 + A1  v1'e 1t + A2  v2'e 2t + A3  v3'e 3t + A4  e 4t
(2.17)
Here, we can see that the dynamics of ' corresponds to the dynamics of ' plus an extra
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term which determines the difference between the situated and the decoupled model:
'(t) = '(t) + A4  e 4t (2.18)
From now on, this term will be denoted as '(t) = A4  e 4t, representing the difference
between the situated and passively-coupled HKB. We now quantify the influence of this extra
term. The solution in t = 0 around the fixed points is:
A4 = '(0)  '(0) (2.19)
That is, the influence of the decoupled term around the fixed points depends on the linear
difference between the initial conditions of ' and '.
Therefore, we can interpret the dynamics of the partially-coupled HKB, '(t), as com-
posed of two ‘partially-decoupled’ terms '(t) and '(t) (partially decoupled because '(t)
influences '(t) but not the other way around). What is the difference between these two
terms?
On the one hand,'(t) follows a complex dynamic unfolding, intertwined with and mod-
ulated by the dynamics of (t) and (t) as a combination of the eigenvalues 1; 2 and 3
(Figure 2.8.a). On the other hand, the dynamics of '(t) are much simpler as they are de-
fined by a unique eigenvalue 4 (Figure 2.8.b). However, we are analysing a highly idealized
situation, where the system easily converges into its attractor without having to deal with any
kind of perturbation.
In the subsection below we quantify the contribution of the'(t) term to the dynamics
of the system in a more realistic situation. We analytically derive a theoretical expression to
calculate '(t) in the presence of persistent perturbations and we validate the results with
numerical experimentation.
Comparing Situated and Partially-Coupled HKB Systems under Perturbations
Typically, in a real system, variables are not only subject to differences in initial conditions
as the term '(0)   '(0) represents, but also suffer continuous fluctuations under differ-
ent forms. Each fluctuation in the difference between '(t) and '(t) (that is, the difference
between the fluctuations of '(t) and the fluctuations of '(t)) will provoke an effect as a
function with the form A4  e 4t, with A4 being equal to the amplitude in the fluctuation
at time t, and 4 the eigenvalue of the decoupled HKB in the attractor (thus assuming that
the value of '(t) is small). If fluctuations are present at different instants, the result is a
linear combination of all the exponential functions multiplied by the respective values of A4
for each instant of time. If the fluctuations between '(t) and '(t) (i.e. the difference of the
fluctuations affecting the two variables) are given by the function (t), we can compute the
final expression of the passively-coupled HKB around the fixed points as a Green’s function
(Alimov, 2001):
'(t) = '(t) + '(t) = '(t) +
Z t
0
()  e 4( t) d (2.20)
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Figure 2.9: Effect of fluctuations in the passively coupled system. (t) (grey line): difference of the introduced fluctu-
ations in '(t) and '(t), and'(t) (black line): fluctuations in the difference between '(t) and '(t) computed
through equation (2.20).
Without internal fluctuation the value of '(t) would converge to the value of '(t) af-
ter an initial phase of adjustment. But if fluctuations are present, we can use the expression
above to compare the fluctuations in the situated model with the fluctuations in the passively-
coupled model.
As an example, we simulate the situated HKB system with a passively-coupled HKB con-
nected to it with an Euler step of 1ms during a period of 5s. We introduce an additive white
noise to the variables ' and ' with a variance of 10 4. Then, (t) is equal to the difference
between these two sources of noise, which conserve their white noise structure with twice its
variance (2  10 4) (Figure 2.9, grey line). By applying equation (2.20) we can compute the
resulting fluctuation '(t) that determines the differences between the values of '(t) and
'(t) (Figure 2.9, black line). We can observe how the fluctuations in '(t) lose the uncor-
related white noise structure of the initial fluctuation, and get a radically different structure
with different temporal correlations induced by the e 4t term. We can validate this result
by comparing '(t) computed with equation (2.20) with the difference between '(t) and
'(t) measured experimentally without the effects that reduce the system to a linear system
around the attractor. That is, we can measure the error in the estimation of the fluctuation as
follows:
e(t) = ('(t)  '(t)) '(t) (2.21)
By computing e(t) we find that the amplitude of the error is significantly smaller than
the amplitude of the theoretical measures of fluctuation '(t). Calculating how well the
theoretical results adjust to experimental data, we obtain that ('(t)   '(t)) fits '(t)
with an R2 coefficient of 0.95, which indicates a good fit.
If we compute the variance of'(t)we find that it is equal to 12:3 10 4, that is, about 6
times larger than the fluctuation introduced to the system. Thus, when measuring a passively-
coupled version of a phenomenon we are interested in, we would expect a bigger amount of
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fluctuation than in the real situated case. Furthermore, in the passively-coupled model fast
fluctuations are modulated by slow fluctuations, since we can see that low frequencies dom-
inate the signal. This may represent an important advantage in different tasks; whereas the
original white noise introduced to the system may be averaged out and removed, the fluctua-
tions added to the passively-coupled variable'(t) present correlations at different scales that
cannot be filtered easily.
Dynamical Signature
Above we have presented proof of the dynamical differences between a situated HKB sys-
tem and a passively-coupled HKB system in the transients around the attractor and repeller
of the system. Also, we have compared the results with experimental measures during the
whole trajectory and without the effects of the linearization of the dynamical system, and
demonstrated similar results. We have concluded that these changes are the product of the
different modes of interaction of the situated and passively-coupled agent, which modulate
the dynamical landscape of the brain-body-environment system. What do we mean when we
say that the different types of coupling transform the dynamical landscape of the system? To
clarify this, we analyse the dynamical signature of the HKB equation for the situated HKB
and the passively-coupled HKB.
With the idea of a dynamical signature, we intend to obtain a simplified representation of
the phase space of the system which allows us to directly observe some of the characteristics of
the system. In our case, we extract the dynamic signature of the system by collapsing the phase
space of the agent to a statistical description of the behaviour of one variable and its represen-
tative. We can interpret this dynamic signature as the functional ‘brain correlate’ of gradient
climbing behaviour. No single brain ‘state’ (i.e. value of') is functionally significant in terms
of behaviour. What matters is the shape of the temporal pattern of phase relation among os-
cillators. In this sense, the ‘gradient-climbing behaviour’, as a unit of explanation, is not the
result of a set of brain states encoding a decision or a motor-program output, but results from
a specific coordination pattern between sensor and motor surfaces, mediated by a specific co-
ordination pattern between ‘brain oscillations’. The specific pattern of internal coordination
that corresponds to gradient climbing behaviour is here called ‘dynamic signature’ and refers
to the temporal structure of internal changes that is both cause and effect of different instances
of a particular behaviour.
To obtain and compare the dynamic signature of our agents, we have simulated the sit-
uated HKB system (with the sensitivity parameter s = 2:5) and a passively-coupled HKB
connected to it, with an Euler step of 1ms and a duration 10000s, and we periodically reset
the variables of the system (',  and ) to new randomized values with intervals of 20ms.
The goal of this randomization is to sample a wide range of initial conditions of the system,
that is, to capture a sufficient range of different situations to constitute the abstract category
of ‘gradient climbing behaviour’. This way we can identify what a ‘neural signature’ or dy-
namic pattern trace corresponds to all the instances of this form of behaviour. We formally
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define the dynamic signature of the HKB system as the density distribution of the derivative
of the relative phase _' with respect to ' (or in terms of ' in the passively-coupled case).
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Figure 2.10: Dynamical Signature. Signature of the situatedHKBwith s = 2:5 and the corresponding passively-coupled
HKB. It represents the density distribution of the effective phase space of the HKB equation when it is coupled with an
environment, showing the difference between situated and passive coupling.
What we see (Figure 2.10) is that the dynamical signature of the system changes severely
when the system is situated in an environment. Whereas the passively-coupled HKB displays
the shape of the original HKB phase space with a ‘blurring’ effect created by the addition of a
structured input (we can see it in Figure 2.10 as a ‘thick’ line shaped with the form of the HKB
original phase space), in the situated system the structure of the dynamical signature no longer
resembles the original HKB phase space. The situated system has modulated or re-shaped its
state space into a specific pattern through sensorimotor coordination.
If we look for the signature for different configurations of the Situated HKB model, we
observe that each value of s produces a particular signature pattern (Figure 2.11), representing
the different dynamical configurations of the ‘brain correlate’ of a particular sensorimotor pat-
tern of the agent. As we see, the dynamic shape of the neural controller changes when it is en-
gaged in different sensorimotor loops (even although the HKB equation has exactly the same
attractor in all cases). This shows that, even in relatively simple models like this, analysing cor-
relations of brain activity as if they were in isolation from their surrounding world, ignores the
richer dynamics that one would expect form agents strongly coupled to their environments.
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Figure 2.11: Dynamical Signature. Signature of the situated HKB with s = 1:5 (top left) and s = 8 (top right), and
the corresponding passively-coupled HKB (bottom left and right). It represents the density distribution of the effective
phase space of the HKB equation when it is coupled with an environment, showing the difference between situated and
passive coupling.
2.6 Discussion
We have just shown how the HKB system displays qualitatively different dynamics under sit-
uated conditions, as compared to decoupled and passively-coupled conditions. We can restate
the main results as follows:
1. Transitions between qualitatively different types of sensorimotor behaviour, that are
generated by the situated HKB with increasing sensitivity, cannot be deduced from the
behaviour of the decoupled HKB nor from the analysis of the passively coupled HKB
alone. The nature of these transitions can only be revealed through the analysis of the
whole brain-body-environment system.
2. Even for a single fixed value of the sensitivity parameter, the transient trajectory of the
situated HKB system towards its attractor is far from trivial and unfolds at different
temporal scales. The transient trajectory of the decoupled HKB system, instead, is rel-
atively simple and monotonic.
3. A passively-coupled agent receiving an input generated by a situated agent shows inter-
correlated and amplified fluctuations that are not present in the situated agent.
4. Finally, the dynamical signature of the agents shows how the type of coupling (passive
or situated) severely transforms the phase space of the HKB system. The specificity of
functional neural signatures is lost when studying the brain out of the closed sensori-
motor loop, even if it is subjected to exactly the same input.
The differences between situated and decoupled oscillatory controllers illustrate how much
we would miss if we analysed the ‘brain’ of an agent isolated from its embodied situatedness
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in an environment. On the one hand, the brain-body-environment system constitutes a dy-
namical holistic continuum where phase transitions can take place, without necessarily cor-
responding to phase transitions that would occur in an isolated brain. On the contrary, this
joint dynamical structure would generally not be deduced from the isolated controller of an
agent. On the other hand, the unfolding of behaviour shown by a system is modulated by
the continuous interplay with the environment at different time-scales that generally are not
present in the dynamics of the controller system alone, giving rise to much richer behavioural
dynamics.
Our situated HKB is a case of double coordination: sensorimotor coordination of the
coordinated dynamics of the two oscillatory components (modelled by the HKB equation).
What is crucial is the fact that under situated conditions the dynamics of the HKB can be mod-
ulated by the precise and interactively structured coordination between its internal dynamics
and the sensorimotor environment. The mode in which sensory input (the control parameter)
changes as a function of the motor output (which is in turn generated by internal dynam-
ics) through the environment, enables this higher order coordination. It can be said that the
agent modulates its internal dynamics through sensorimotor coordination, in a manner that
is not available to the decoupled or passively-coupled system, resulting in functionally specific
internal patterns that we have demonstrated with the dynamic signature.
It is important to note that we have focused on the most simple configuration of the HKB
model; with an extremely simplified body and environment. Regarding the internal configu-
ration of the HKB, we have studied it under the simplest parametric configuration that pro-
duces a single attractor instead of two or none, which is due to the a=b coefficient value that we
kept fixed. Even for this simple configuration we have found qualitative differences between
the transient dynamics of the system before falling into the attractor —see' = 0:11 and tran-
sient dynamics around ( 1; 2:50) in Figure 2.8. The behaviour of the system shows strong
differences under the situated and decoupled conditions. But the HKB can display much
richer behaviour on its bistable configuration (with two attractors and repellers) or along the
metastable region (see light grey area in Figure 1.6) where there are no fixed points but just
attractor and repeller shadows, a phenomenon that appears for high values of difference be-
tween the natural frequencies ! (Kelso, 1995, this is something that did not occur on our
model given the low value of !0).
The differences we found between decoupled, passively-coupled and situated dynamics
can be expected to be amplified for richer parametric configurations of the HKB model. For
example, the dynamics of the same situated HKB model have been analysed performing a
gradient climbing task under metastable regimes of ' (Santos et al., 2012). In this case the ef-
fect of sensorimotor modulation of the HKB dynamics was much stronger, shaping specific
metastable regimes and transitions between them, whereas passively-coupled agents showed
different regimes and transitions. We want to stress that the appearance of qualitative dif-
ferences between situated and decoupled systems is not a contingent result of the parameter
values chosen here (nor those of Santos et al., 2012). We observed the same changes for dif-
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ferent parameter values and also with different oscillatory controllers (such as homeostatic
Kuramoto oscillators, as we see in the next chapter).
As far as the experimental setup is concerned, we demonstrated that a simple linear and
radially symmetric 2D gradient environment, a single sensor and two motors were sufficient
for the HKB to exploit the sensorimotor coupling to modulate its internal dynamics in qual-
itatively different manners under different coupling conditions. Richer environments, more
complex tasks and multimodal and higher dimensional sensory and motor surfaces could in-
crease the divergences we showed here. It was also shown that in cross-modal perception, per-
turbations to one sensory modality can be compensated by other sensory modalities (Ernst
and Banks, 2002), it is therefore to be expected that multi-modal sensorimotor engagement
could have an even greater effect on brain dynamics than a single sensorimotor modality.
Could these results be generalized to other neurocognitive agents? Not directly. We have
just provided a proof of concept of how severely oscillatory brain dynamics can be altered by
sensorimotor coordination. However, even if true for our extremely simplified model this
conclusion has still to be proven for neuro-biological systems. We are not aware of any neu-
roscientific study comparing situated and passively coupled recordings for perceptuomotor
tasks, but new recording techniques (Linderman et al., 2006; Santhanam et al., 2007; Fan et al.,
2011) might help replicate the experiments we have developed in this chapter. Although it is
much more complicated to measure neural activity in a moving animal due to noise from mo-
tor activity, an interesting technique has been developed recently to overcome some of these
limitations. The technique consists of a spherical treadmill where a head-restrained mouse in-
teracts with a virtual-reality system. The mouse is surrounded by a toroidal screen that covers
its field of vision, and images are updated on the basis of the movements of the animal and
they are measured as rotations of the spherical treadmill using an optical computer mouse
(Dombeck et al., 2007; Harvey et al., 2009; Dombeck et al., 2010; Harvey et al., 2012). Some
of the results using this technique highlighted the importance of analysing situated activity to
understand neural mechanisms. In (Harvey et al., 2012) it was found that activity in the pre-
frontal cortex in mice in a navigation decision task showed much more heterogeneity than in
previous recordings and models of prefrontal activity in mice in other experimental settings,
in which the activity is much more stereotyped and low-dimensional. A key aspect of such
result is that the behavioural task in the experiment did not isolate the decision-making pro-
cess, so the trajectories of neural activity may have been modulated by sensory information
(Harvey et al., 2012, p.67).
What would the results of applying passively coupled conditions to humans or other an-
imals be? The cognitive or psychological effects of different degrees of disruption of the sen-
sorimotor loop could range from a complete lack of perceptual capacity (e.g. when inducing
sensory streams resulting from input recorded from saccadic exploration) to a loose sense of
reality when sensorimotor coupling conditions in virtual reality are not optimal. In humans,
new experimental paradigms in substitutional reality (playing back recorded visual experience
to re-create realistic scenes, see Suzuki et al., 2012) showed that ‘a major factor influencing suc-
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cessful substitution in the SR [Substitutional Reality] system is consistent visuo-motor cou-
pling throughout the experience’ (Suzuki et al., 2012, p.6).
At a more abstract level, the present model makes a theoretical contribution to the on-
going debate around the causal vs. constitutive role of action in perception. If we consider
a perceptual state X as a collection of past and present processes and relations, we may con-
sider different situations according to X’s context and the causal role of this context. We may
summarize the different explanatory possibilities for the elements influencing X (De Jaegher
et al., 2010, p.443) as (1): F can be considered a contextual factor if variations in F produce vari-
ations in X, (2) C is an enabling condition if the absence of C prevents X from occurring, and
(3) P is a constitutive element if P is part of the processes that produce X. Roughly speaking,
causal theories (Prinz, 2006; Adams and Aizawa, 2008) claim that movement can certainly be a
cause of the right sensory input that in turn causes perceptual states but it is not strictly neces-
sary. Constitutive theories on the other hand (O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Noë, 2004) claim that
movement itself is part of the perceptual process. Causal theories are generally internalist by
asserting that what matters is the brain state (caused by the sensory input), whereas constitu-
tion theories tend to align with externalism (perception is a process that involves a distributed
set of brain, body and environmental components, all of them constituting the same percept).
Our model can be used to show how, even if favouring internalism, the neural signature that
corresponds to a given cognitive episode can be qualitatively different from the neural signa-
ture obtained when the very same input (cause) is induced into a passively-coupled system and
fine grained sensorimotor contingencies become strictly necessary or constitutive of function-
ally distinct neural signatures. Whether this holds also true for natural systems is a matter for
further experimentation but the conceptual discussion, which is often obscured by a lack of
clear models, can benefit from the findings presented here.
2.6.1 Conclusion
Contemporary neuroscience often assumes that it is possible to deduce the behavioural prop-
erties of the brain by simply studying its dynamics under ‘passive’ input conditions (e.g. neu-
ral recordings in anaesthetized animals) or building models that ignore sensorimotor dynam-
ics (like large scale networks with noise-inputs or otherwise non behaviourally controllable
input). The brain-body-environment coupled dynamics is rarely considered as a unified dy-
namical system and there is still a limited understanding of the interplay between sensorimo-
tor and neural dynamics.
In this chapter we have illustrated what neuroscience misses when ignoring the role of sen-
sorimotor coordination, particularly when drawing models of brain dynamics out of neural
recordings in the absence of closed sensorimotor loops. We have presented a minimal model
that shows the qualitative differences that can arise under situated and decoupled sensorimo-
tor conditions. We have shown how some features – such as (1) the phase transition that takes
place modifying a sensitivity parameter, (2) the attraction patterns, (3) the neurodynamic sig-
natures and (4) the modulatory capacity of the situated system – need to be explained by a
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framework that takes into account the coupled dynamics of the brain-body-environment sys-
tem.
The model presented in this chapter allows us to understand the importance of a dynamic
sensorimotor landscape for the emergence of different modes of engagement with the envi-
ronment. By varying a parameter s, we can observe how different modes of coordinated sen-
sorimotor activity emerge (Figure 2.3). Each one of these modes is characterized by a dynami-
cal signature reflecting a particular pattern of sensorimotor interaction (Figures 2.11 and 2.11).
With this model we have shown that sensorimotor dynamics can be constitutive of the specific
patterns of oscillation of a controller. This challenges some notions of autonomy: those that
emphasize closure and openness as reactions to simple perturbations from the environment.
We have also shown how strong sensorimotor situatedness might involve a fine grained senso-
rimotor coordination that is necessary to produce the functionally relevant brain dynamics.
In order to illustrate the simplest case of strong sensorimotor situatedness we have made
use of the HKB model, whose ‘internal’ dynamics make it relatively simple to address some
key aspects of autonomy (such as homeostasis or maintenance of organizational invariants).
Somehow, the neural controller of the situated HKB is ‘enslaved’ into a specific brain-body-
environment dynamical system, and we can only modulate the dynamical landscape of the
agent by externally tuning its sensitivity parameter. However, an agent permanently trapped
into the coupling of an environmental dynamical field cannot be considered as autonomous.
How does autonomous agency arise from strongly coupled sensorimotor agents? What kind
of modulation do they exert over the control parameters that regulate behaviour? This is what
we will explore in the next chapter. Beyond the constitution of the agent in a sensorimotor
domain, we will analyse another fundamental aspect of cognitive autonomy: how an agent
may be able to modulate the flow of sensorimotor interactions, breaking the symmetry be-
tween agent and environment. We will present a more complex model involving plasticity
able to capture the regulation of sensorimotor engagement.
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Situated Autonomy: organizational
homeostasis in the sensorimotor loop
Abstract: We explore a definition of neurocognitive autonomy through a simulated robotic agent. We
find that the coordination of internal plastic mechanisms and sensorimotor adaptive regulation is able to
create an agent-environment asymmetric circular loop which supports the constitution of the agent in front
of its environment.
Contributions:
• We propose a neurodynamic model based on relational homeostasis in an oscillator network.
• We test our model in a behavioural preference task, observing that our model presents some advan-
tages in respect to previous models based in component-based homeostasis.
• Using information theory tools we are able to analyse the relations between neurodynamic plas-
tic regulatory loops and sensorimotor coupling, depicting a circular relationship between levels of
autonomous organization.
• Based on experimental results, we propose new perspectives to improve current definitions of neu-
rocognitive autonomy.
Related publications:
• Aguilera, M., Barandiaran, X. E., Bedia, M. G., and Seron, F. (2015). Self-Organized Criticality,
Plasticity and Sensorimotor Coupling. Explorations with a Neurorobotic Model in a Behavioural
Preference Task. PLoS ONE, 10(2):e0117465.
In previous chapters we reviewed different notions around the ideas of persistence, self-regula-
tion, identity, and so forth, trying to characterize what kind of mechanisms may be suited for
generating autonomous behaviour. We concluded that two crucial aspects for autonomous
organization, first, the ability of the system to constitute its own identity, generating some
form of cohesive unity through the recurrent interaction of its components, and secondly,
the ability of this unity to regulate the interaction with its environment, creating a domain in
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which the system emerges as a differentiated entity with respect to its environment. We have
proposed that these aspects are captured by the notions of operational closure, interactive
asymmetry and precariousness in the behaviour of an agent, which we considered as sufficient
for characterizing it as autonomous.
As we described in Chapter 1, the organization of unicellular organisms is a clear exam-
ple of autonomous organization: the recurrent metabolic processes within the cell build and
sustain a membrane that encloses it in space as a unit and, at the same time, the membrane
regulates material and energetic flows through the cell to constitute the cell as a differenti-
ated entity in continuous and asymmetrical interaction with its environment. Nevertheless,
for other levels like sensorimotor agency, the agent-environment interface is no longer a self-
produced physical boundary which confines the autonomous self. Instead, the interface lies
in an interactional domain of sensorimotor processes. This chapter focuses on how we can
define such autonomous closure presenting a robotic model controlled by an adaptive neuro-
dynamic controller.
3.1 Decision-Making, Habits and Autonomy
How do autonomous agents constitute a dynamical coherent unit in front of a changing en-
vironment? What neural and bodily mechanisms are involved in this process and how can
we model them and their interactions? In this chapter we explore these questions using a
robotic agent in a behavioural preference task. Imagine a simplified world with two possible
routes of action: action A and action B. An autonomous agent would start interacting with
its world, learning ways to perform A or B as it encounters opportunities to do so. At some
point, the agent may encounter preferred forms of performing one or other action, it will de-
velop a habit. However, habits are not permanent, and will be influenced by new experiences
encountered by the agent. Let’s explore this idea with an everyday life example.
3.1.1 A Bike-Scientist-Route Autonomous Complex
We can imagine a cognitive scientist who bikes to work every day. She has to choose between
a more direct road to the university, which she has to share with regular traffic, or using some
extra time to take a small detour through a more pleasant bike lane traversing a park. There
are several factors influencing the decision, the amount of traffic on the road, whether or not
she is in a hurry, or simply the fact that it is a nice day conductive to enjoying the ride. As an
autonomous agent, every morning our scientist is faced with the decision of which route to
take. In the previous chapter, we argued that cognitive autonomy is not a process that can be
restricted to events happening inside the brain. Indeed, the decision of taking one route or
another will be influenced by events happening in a sensorimotor space including her body
and the environment. For example, the decision to avoid the road may be influenced by the
perception of danger as the cars pass by in a heavy traffic day, or a sensation of well-being when
feeling the sun and breeze on her face while cycling. Similarly, the decision of taking the road
after a bad night’s sleep may be influenced by a sensation of weariness when starting cycling,
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making her feel that it is not worth travelling distance of the bike lane. Alternatively, on a
blustery day, the feeling like pedalling with the brake blocks rubbing on the rim when facing
headwind may influence her to cycle through the road where nearby buildings act as parapets
for the wind.
Moreover, these everyday decisions do not only depend on the instant correlation of fac-
tors favouring one or other option. After several days taking the bike lane, the scientist will
develop a habit displaying a preference for that behaviour. The more this route is taken, the
more she may becomee familiar with it reinforcing the preference towards using the bike lane.
Of course, this preference will not be permanent, and a series of windy days may make her
change her preference and develop a new habit in which she takes the road every morning.
Thus, the constitution of our biking scientist as an autonomous entity is not restricted to
a single identifiable material domain. Her brain obviously has a fundamental role, but also
the state of her body, the state of the traffic, together with an intricate history of previous
decisions which shape the neurodynamic structures of the scientist making her more or less
sensitive to different aspects of her body and the environment. Even the bike itself and how
it feels when she rides it is a fundamental part in this autonomous decision-making. A lighter
bike would make pedalling easier when facing headwind. A road bike may feel safer when
riding into traffic since it is faster and allows the rider more control, whereas a touring bike
might be more comfortable when enjoying the park’s bike lane.
In our example, autonomy is not a property or a function that is created by any inde-
pendent part of the system, but is a process that cuts across many scales of the system: the
bike, the scientist, the sensorimotor perception of the conditions for biking in a precise in-
stant, the constraints of the environment (traffic, weather, an appointment at the university),
the history of previous decisions is solidified in particular behavioural habits and so forth. If
one of these elements dominates the others, we cannot say that the decision is being taken
autonomously. For example, if the traffic is so heavy every day that the road is no longer a
viable option, we can no longer consider the decision autonomous, since there is only one real
option to be chosen (under some limits ensuring the survival of the scientist). Returning to
the analogy with autonomy at the level of the cell: what is the unity that is constructed here
and what it is the environment that interacts with it? Is the bike part of the environment or
of the autonomous entity? What about the wind or the traffic? We can clearly identify the
scientist as a unity because she is a biological entity based on metabolic and organismic au-
tonomy. But what if we were to replace her by a robotic bike controlled by an artificial neural
network which is not alive in a biological sense? What if the bike was to be remotely controlled
from a software computer using meteorological and traffic data as inputs? Is there a system-
atic operational manner to distinguish an autonomous identity out of a complex network of
interacting processes? In this chapter we present a model of neurocognitive autonomy that
proposes answers for such questions, based on recent developments in neurodynamics, radical
embodiment, and autonomous robotics.
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3.1.2 Towards a model of neurocognitive autonomy
In this chapter we propose an operational model of sensorimotor autonomy for exploring the
role of the modulation of sensorimotor adaptive behaviour by the emergence and reconfigu-
ration of homeostatically regulated phase-locking dynamics in the brain. Typically, neurody-
namic approaches have focused mostly in understanding the kind of neural organization that
can cope with the requirements of conscious, autonomous activity. However, there is a cru-
cial aspect of cognitive dynamics not always present: the sensorimotor coordination that con-
tinuously feeds back into brain dynamics (from saccadic eye movements to proprioception;
from perception to action; O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Aguilera et al., 2013a). The emergence of
different ‘cognitive acts’ should not be limited to neural events in the brain, but need to be
established through a continuous interaction between brain, body and environment. Thus,
synchronizing and de-synchornizing mechanisms should also be studied as embedded in or-
ganismic, sensorimotor, and intersubjective regulatory cycles, whose interaction is responsi-
ble for the emergence of global organism-environment processes that define the cognitive acts
that neural ensembles account for. Conversely, embodied robotic models focusing on sen-
sorimotor interaction through dynamical systems coupling (e.g. the model presented in the
previous chapter), typically are locked-in a particular mode of sensorimotor engagement and
do not actively regulate this coupling with the environment, therefore failing to represent a
key aspect of autonomous behaviour: the ability to break agent-environment symmetry and
actively define the conditions of the sensorimotor interaction.
In this chapter we present some notions about sensorimotor autonomy, and develop and
analyse in detail a minimal model of a plastic neurodynamic controller as a behaviour gener-
ating mechanism to test the role of phase-locking/scattering mechanisms and sensorimotor
regulation in the emergence and maintenance of behavioural and neurodynamic relational
invariants. We update previous models from autonomous robotics proposing phase relation-
ships between oscillatory nodes as a better suited regulatory variable to maintain organiza-
tional invariances in the system (e.g. the maintenance of specific neural ensembles), finding
that the proposed model presents some advantages over previous ones. To explore the po-
tential of the model we analyse a minimal agent controlled by three oscillatory nodes with
synaptic plasticity. The agent is evolved to perform behavioural preference task where two
divergent possibilities of behaviour are presented (approach two different types of lights).
By using tools of nonlinear dynamical systems analysis and information theory we are able
to determine that some phase-locking relations between oscillators are dynamically linked to
particular sensorimotor loops, and to describe in detail how the agent’s behaviour emerges as
a result of a double loop of interaction between sensorimotor and internal regulatory cycles.
Comparing information flows in active situated agents with a passively-coupled agent that re-
ceives the same recorded signal as the situated agent but is not able to influence the world,
we are able to assess the contribution of sensorimotor interaction to the resulting neural en-
sembles, supporting the idea that the creation and dissolution of transient neural patterns is
dynamically intertwined to the sensorimotor coordination between the agent and its envi-
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ronment. Moreover, we are able to describe the emergence of an autonomous regulation of
the organisms in terms of the asymmetric information flows between different levels of de-
scription of the agent’s activity, in the form of a double regulatory feedback loop of internal
emergent oscillatory patterns and sensorimotor behavioural patterns.
3.2 Neurocognitive Autonomy
We consider two relevant aspects for characterizing neurocognitive autonomy: (1) what kind
of neural structures can support a type of organization that dynamically sustains a sensori-
motor operational closure required for autonomous agency and (2) how neural, bodily and
environmental processes can be coordinated so that this operational closure can be sustained
across brain-body-environment boundaries. During the last few decades, interesting advances
in both aspects have been developed in systems neuroscience, autonomous robotics, and eco-
logical psychology. In this section, we aim to put them together into a common frame as a
conceptual base for our model.
3.2.1 Resonant Cell Assemblies in the Brain
One of the pervasive problems in neuroscience has been that of the binding problem, which
brings the question of how brains segregate elements in complex perceptive patterns so that
they are allocated to discrete objects. It is typically exemplified by the situation of a person
looking at a red square and a blue circle at the same time. In this case, the binding problem
addresses what kind of mechanisms make sure that, from the discrete perceptions of red, blue,
square and circle, the person perceives a red square and a blue circle. Classically, the solution
to this problem was constructed in terms of a combination of feature-sensitive neurons orga-
nized in a tree-like hierarchical structure for associating different aspects of the environment
into coherent percepts. Nevertheless, this kind of approach presents critical deficiencies, such
as the combinatorial explosion of possible associations when the system scales up. Today, it
is generally assumed that synchronization between neurons correlated with different sensory
inputs is a more adequate mechanism for binding different related features of the environ-
ment (von der Malsburg, 1995). Purely theoretical formulations of the binding-by-synchrony
hypothesis were proposed earlier by Milner (1974), Grossberg (1988), and von der Malsburg
(1981), and the Singer lab was the first to obtain experimental evidence supporting the poten-
tial role of synchrony as a relational code (see Singer, 1993, 2007). Antonio Damasio proposed
phase-locking between multiple sensory and motor brain regions, creating a temporally coher-
ent entity that generates consciousness of the disaggregated representations of information
perceived by the senses (Damasio, 1989). Inspired by such findings, Francisco Varela proposes
a novel interpretation of these ideas, defending the idea that synchronized groups of neurons
or (referred to as cell assemblies or neural ensembles, Hebb, 1952) play a crucial role in the gen-
eration of every conscious state (Varela, 1995). For Varela: (1) ‘[a] singular, specific cell assem-
bly underlies the emergence and operation of every cognitive act’ and (2) ‘[a] specific CA [cell
assembly] is selected through the fast, transient phase locking of activated neurons belonging
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to sub-threshold competing CAs’ (Varela, 1995, p.82). These two ideas are reformulated as
the core hypothesis, stating that ‘[m]ental-cognitive states are interpretations of current neural
activity, carried out in reference to a transient coherency-generating process generated by that
nervous system’ (Varela, 1995, p.90-91). Thus, Varela proposes a universal mechanism (sup-
ported by the nervous system of most animals) for the generation of a primary consciousness.
The emergence of cognitive states depends on the constitution of an assembly that incorpo-
rates or discards into a coherent whole different sources of neural activity. This coherence goes
further than the binding of particular sensory attributes; it compresses ‘the overall integration
of all dimensions of a cognitive act’ (Varela and Thompson, 2003). In contrast with previous
descriptions of mental life, Varela’s view does not lie in a topographical space in which differ-
ent cognitive aspects lie in certain anatomical regions in a topological hypergraph of neural
synchronization. The core hypothesis guarantees that mental events occur in a unitary space
(since only one cell assembly can be dominant at a particular moment), and that the duration
of mental states is transitory (since fast synchrony allows the successive emergence of different
assemblies at different moments).
In parallel, an empirically tested theoretical framework to systematize the functioning of
the synchronizing brain was being developed by Scott Kelso. This is the framework of Co-
ordination Dynamics, which brings the notion of metastability as a fundamental feature for
adaptive behaviour (Kelso, 1995). For Kelso the brain ‘is fundamentally a pattern forming self-
organized system governed by [...] cooperative interactions among neural clusters’ (Kelso,
1995, p.257). But, phase-locking between neural areas is not sufficient to for explain brain dy-
namics, since ‘a nervous system trapped even temporarily in resonant mode-locked states is
too stable, and hence too rigid and inflexible’ (Kelso, 1995, p.255). In contrast, a model of the
brain should contain mechanism for (1) ‘entering and exiting coherent spatiotemporal pat-
terns of neural activity’ and (2) ‘flexibly engaging and disengaging participating subsystems’
(Kelso, 1995, p.255). Instead of phase-locking, Kelso proposes the notion of metastable coordi-
nation between oscillatory systems (which we described in section 1.2.2). Metastable systems,
rather than residing in attractors of a neural network, dwell transiently near attractive states,
switching flexibly and quickly between them. The brain is depicted as a ‘twinkling metastable
system living on the brink of instability’ (Kelso, 1995, p.200).
Soon after, Varela’s core hypothesis was reformulated by Giulio Tononi and Gerald Edel-
man, focusing on two complementary properties of the brain: (1) conscious experience is inte-
grated (we experience conscious states as unified and cannot be decomposed into independent
components) and (2) at the same time it is highly differentiated (we can experience a vast num-
ber of different conscious states over a short time) (Tononi and Edelman, 1998). Tononi and
Edelman formulated the dynamic core hypothesis as follows:
1. ‘A group of neurons can contribute directly to conscious experience only if it is part of
a distributed functional cluster that achieves high integration in hundreds of millisec-
onds’.
2. ‘To sustain conscious experience, it is essential that this functional cluster be highly
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differentiated, as indicated by high values of complexity’.
For Tononi and Edelman rapid integration or binding must be achieved through strong and
rapid reentrant – ongoing, recursive and highly parallel feedback – interactions, creating a dy-
namic core as a functional cluster of neuronal groups that interact much more strongly among
themselves than with the rest of the brain. Furthermore, they propose different mathematical
measures to characterize this state sustaining this behaviour in terms of integrated informa-
tion (Tononi and Edelman, 1998; Tononi, 2004). Subsequently, the notion of a dynamic core
has become relatively widespread in large-scale neuroscience studies (Varela et al., 2001a; Seth
et al., 2006; Werner, 2007a; Edelman, 2011; Ward, 2011; Le Van Quyen, 2011).
3.2.2 Radical Embodiment & Autonomy
As we saw in the previous chapter, neurodynamic approaches are now well established in cog-
nitive neuroscience but we cannot say the same for embodied dynamical perspectives. Differ-
ent formulations of the dynamic core hypothesis have stressed the contribution of different
parts of the brain to conscious processes: from distributed computation in the cortex (Tononi
and Edelman, 1998), to synchronized activity in cortico-thalamic circuits (Llinás et al., 1998),
or thalamic neural activity comprising an active blackboard displaying the results of cortical
computations (Ward, 2011). Although these approaches do not deny the role of sensorimo-
tor interaction, they are almost exclusively focused on the mechanisms for brain organization
and information processing. In contrast, this chapter brings together some insights from both
neurodynamics and situated and embodied cognition to offer a brain-body-environment in-
teractive view of the constitution of neurodynamic autonomy. We argue that there is room to
make progress in situated autonomous robotics integrating some of the insights and findings
related to the dynamic core hypotheses and situated/embodied perspectives of cognition.
The enactive school, in the field of neurodynamics, has contributed with interesting ideas
about how a dynamic core may be grounded in the body and the embodiment. For exam-
ple, the prominent role of sensorimotor interaction has been highlighted in Thompson and
Varela’s radical embodiment approach to neural dynamics and consciousness, in which they
suggest that:
the processes crucial for consciousness cut across the brain-body-world divisions,
rather than being limited to neural events in the head [...] Neural, somatic and
environmental elements are likely to interact to produce (via emergence as up-
ward causation) global organism-environment processes, which in turn affect
(via downward causation) their constituent elements (Thompson and Varela,
2001).
Varela and Thompson propose that the integrated complexity required for conscious ac-
tivity emerges through the combination of large scale synchronization in the form of phase-
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Figure 3.1: Organizational closure of neurocognitive agency. Adapted fromVarela (1997).
locking of widely distributed neuronal sub-populations or regions, combined with active un-
coupling or phase-scattering mechanisms that mediate the transition between different syn-
chronous neuronal assemblies or cognitive acts (Varela and Thompson, 2003). Synchronizing
and de-synchronizing mechanisms must be embedded in organismic, sensorimotor, and in-
tersubjective regulatory cycles, whose interaction is responsible for the emergence of global
organism-environment processes that define the cognitive acts that neural assemblies account
for. An illustration of this depicted in Figure 3.1, where the coordinated activity of the neural
system gives rise to neural ensembles in a circular manner, where the latter drives the behaviour
of the organism, which in turn generates a sensory input into the neural system closing the
double loop. However, Thompson and Varela do not explain how these cycles are constitu-
tive for cognitive activity, nor what kind of interaction takes place between neural, bodily,
sensorimotor and social cycles.
Following this idea, Thomas Fuchs has conceived of the brain as ‘a plastic system of open
loops that are formed in the process of life and closed to full functional cycles in every interac-
tion with the environment’ (Fuchs, 2011). In Fuchs’ view, the brain’s structure is shaped by ex-
periential process through brain plasticity, where the ‘spatial, temporal, logical and symbolic
structures of interaction processes are extracted and transformed into neural micro-structures
that facilitate corresponding future interaction’ (p.211). These microstructures would just cre-
ate neural dispositions in terms of ‘attractors’ or ‘resonances’. Fuchs argues that primitive
organisms without a central nervous system were already coupled to their environment in af-
ferent and efferent cycles. The central nervous system would appear inserted into this already
existing system as a transforming and diversifying organ. Thus, the role of the brain is to
mediate and modulate the cycles of embodied interaction that the organism engages in. The
repertoire of possible behaviours is created interactively in the coupling between behavioural
and neuro-plastic dynamics, which is sedimented in the form of organic habits, dispositions
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and interactive schemes. Similarly, (Dotov, 2014) suggests that the main function of neural tis-
sue does little more than exhibiting spontaneous synchronization and other behaviours com-
mon for nonlinear dynamical systems. For Dotov, the solution to complex behaviour does
not lie in a configuration of a massive neural architecture with many independent functional
modules, but in how neural tissue is embedded into a field of environmental and bodily ac-
tivity. Dotov proposes the idea of a metastable circuit breaker as a fundamental functionality
of the brain that is sensitive simultaneously to multiple threats and opportunities in the en-
vironment, and allows the brain to flexibly switch between different dynamic fields of agent-
environment engagement. These views may be supported by neuroscientific theories like the
massive redeployment hypothesis or the neuronal recycling hypothesis, which opposing of the
idea of the brain as a highly selective and specialized architecture of localized brain functions,
they propose that reuse of neural circuitry for various cognitive purposes is a central organiza-
tional principle of the brain (Anderson, 2010), extending into reuse of parts of the body and
the environment (Anderson et al., 2012).
Along the same line, Xabier Barandiaran proposes habits as a basic building block for
autonomous behaviour. He defines a habit as ‘a self-sustaining pattern of behaviour that is
formed when the stability of a particular mode of sensorimotor engagement is dynamically
coupled with the stability of the mechanisms generating it’ (Barandiaran, 2008, p.284). Thus,
a habit emerges when stability of both behaviour and the neurodynamical structures of an
agent is sustained by the coupling of the two of them through sensorimotor correlations.
Habits depends on the plasticity of the neurodynamical structures supporting them, so that
the recurrence of a habit reinforces it, and successive enactment of habits can create dynamic
stability dependencies between their neurodynamical structures. The latter case gives rise to
‘a nested web of neurodynamic structures: an interdependent bundle of habits that contin-
uously maintains itself through interactions’ (Barandiaran, 2008, p.293). By integrating this
notion of habit bundling with large-scale brain mechanisms, Barandiaran is able to establish
a notion of self-sustaining autonomous agency that is empirically plausible and sets up an
operational framework to specify a simulation model and behavioural autonomy.
3.3 A Situated Dynamic Core
In Chapter 1 we reviewed how cellular autonomy is proposed to be constituted through the
self-production of the cell as a material unit enclosed by a membrane and the interaction be-
tween the cell and its environment as it regulates material flows through the same membrane.
These theoretical claims were effectively illustrated by different models (e.g. Varela et al., 1974).
Nevertheless, in the case of neurodynamic autonomy, although there are many models depict-
ing large-scale neuronal coordination, there are almost no models explicitly targeting how to
explore the constitution of an agent as an autonomous sensorimotor entity. Worse still, some
of the most prominent models existing when Varela presented his views about neurocognitive
autonomy contain serious theoretical pitfalls that make it impossible to use them to under-
stand the interaction between neurodynamic and sensorimotor structures (e.g. the problems
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of Bittorio as a model of sensorimotor autonomy; Barandiaran, 2015; Varela, 1988). We there-
fore consider that is crucial to propose models of neurocognitive identity to clarify some of
the surrounding theoretical definitions and reconcile them with experimental evidence.
For example, (Varela, 1997, p.82) describes neurocognitive autonomy as a process in which:
the nervous system is organized by the operational closure of a network of recip-
rocally related modular subnetworks giving rise to ensembles of coherent activity
such that:
i. they continuously mediate invariant patterns of sensory-motor correlation
of the sensory and effector surfaces; and
ii. they give rise to a behavior for the total organism as a mobile unit in space
[...]
The operational closure of the nervous system then brings forth a specific mode
of coherence, which is embedded in the organism. This coherence is a cogni-
tive identity: a unit of perception/motion in space, sensory-motor invariances
mediated through the interneuron network.
Nevertheless, this definition (and others theoretical definitions of autonomy) remains unclear
about specific aspects of the characterization of neurocognitive autonomy: What exactly is the
relationship between neural ‘modular subnetworks’ and ‘invariant patterns of sensory-motor
correlations’? What kind of ‘specific mode of coherence’ emerges from the operational closure
of the system, and how is it ‘embedded in the organism’? How exactly is a ‘unit of percep-
tion/motion in space’ constituted? and so forth (for a more complete review of conceptual
problems with definitions of sensorimotor autonomy see Barandiaran, 2015).
These questions are very difficult to answer from theoretical elaboration alone or from
available experimental understanding of the brain. Our goal is to present a model to connect
and reconcile theoretical and experimental notions about autonomy, trying to shed some light
on how to operationalize neurocognitive autonomy.
We provide a tentative definition of neurocognitive autonomy providing a more specific
definition on what are the generative phenomena that allow autonomous agency integrat-
ing the theoretical and experimental contributions reviewed so far. Inspired by Barandiaran
et al. (2009), we consider an autonomous system S and an environment E, coupled through a
senosorimotor loop C, if meets the following conditions:
1. Operational closure among a set of processes a system S can be distinguished as a
network of interdependent processes whereby every process belonging to the network
depends on at least another process of the network and enables at least another one.
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2. Interactive asymmetry in the interaction between S and E, which modulates the
coupling C between S and E adaptively. Modulation indicates an alteration in the set
of constraints that determine the coupling between A and E, and adaptive means that
change in the coupling C contributes to the maintenance of some process that consti-
tute S.
3. Precariousness. By virtue of the two properties above, the processes that constitute
S are actively created and maintained by the system as a whole, so that if we were to
isolate from the system any process of S it would tend to run down or extinguish.
This definition is illustrated through Figure 3.2, which illustrates this double loop of opera-
tional closure and regulation of such closure. However, without specific models implement-
ing this kind of behaviour it is not easy to illustrate how such a system would operate and
what kind of mechanisms might be underlying these processes. Thus, below we review recent
advances in modeling in autonomous robotics as a departure point to propose a model for
sensorimotor autonomy integrating the dynamic core hypothesis of neural organization.
System Environment
modulation of the coupling
couplingAGENCY
Figure 3.2: Autonomous Agency. The figure illustrates the definition of agency: the system is constituted by a self-
sustained network of processes (pictured as a circle, left) coupled to the environment; the systems exerts regulatory
constraints over its coupling giving rise to agency. Adapted fromBarandiaran et al. (2009).
3.3.1 Operational Models
In the previous chapter we have explored a minimal gradient-climbing robotic model, show-
ing how neurodynamic states of the robot are coupled (through the body) to the environ-
ment and thereby deeply grounded in an interactive space of perception/action. The exis-
tence of such couplings is essential for the emergence and persistence of structured behaviour.
Nonetheless, we were addressing a quite simplified situation in which just one behaviour (gra-
dient climbing) was available for the agent. An autonomous agent, in order to be so-called,
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should be able to transit different models of dynamical engagement with its surroundings,
learning to adapt to new unencountered situations, and should do so while maintaining its
own ‘identity’.
During the last decade, some researchers have taken an interest in redefining the concept
of autonomy in robotics. Autonomy in robotics is frequently used in a very loose sense, of-
ten applied to any kind of robot that is able to adapt, self-recharge or able to behave robustly
in a real-world environment. Nevertheless, the functionalities a robot can display are often
explicitly defined by the designer. Even when the robot is able to perform a wide variety of be-
haviours, they are frequently predesigned and the robot can switch from one another as easily
as switching the value of a variable. Researchers as Ezequiel Di Paolo and Hiroyuki Iizuka
have argued that these kind of robots cannot be autonomous in a strong sense. For exam-
ple, Di Paolo and Iizuka (2008) describe an agent that can display two possible behaviours
depending on the value of a binary variable. Imagine an agent that displays a preference for a
type A of objects when its binary variable is 0, and type B objects when the binary variable is
1. Imagine also that the value of the variable is determined by an internal module of the robot
depending on its own state and the state of the environment through a function. In some
sense, we may say that the agent is self-determined, since it creates the rules that determine
its behaviour. Most of the time we would intuitively say that the robot has some degree of
autonomy. However, Di Paolo and Iizuka argue that we may imagine an equivalent situa-
tion in which the variable controlling the behaviour of the robot is not inside the robot but
in another room, as an independent system (implementing the same function as the robot’s
internal module) telling the robot what to do at each moment. Or we may imagine a human
operator switching the value of the variable at her will. In those cases we would not think that
it is appropriate to call the robot autonomous. The problem here is that the ‘autonomous
robot’ in this case is a system by convention, and it is only integrated in a nominal sense. If
a module behaving independently of the rest of the robot can determine its behaviour (even
if it uses the state of the robot as an input) it cannot make the robot more autonomous in
any sense. In Di Paolo and Iizuka’s words, ‘autonomy is not a function [...] autonomy is not
something that a system does, it is a property of how the system is organized and re-organizes
itself so as to channel its functionalities towards newly generated interactions’ (Di Paolo and
Iizuka, 2008, p.15-16).
Instead, Di Paolo and Iizuka propose that the very structure of an autonomous robot
should by itself select and regulate a sensorimotor flow based on the effects it has on the main-
tenance of an internal organization. For doing so, they propose a neural architecture based
on continuous-time recurrent neural networks with a homeostatic mechanism inspired by
Ashby’s Homeostat. They define the net’s neurons as having one (or sometimes more) home-
ostatic region, that triggers plastic changes in the connections between neurons when the ac-
tivation rates of the neuron is outside of such zone. Neuronal activity out of the homeostatic
bounds would trigger network connectivity changes that would bring the neuron back to its
homeostatic activity range. Di Paolo and Iizuka propose that artificial evolution of an agent
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with such homeostatic neural controllers is useful to generate a dynamical system that encap-
sulates the mutual constraining between higher levels of sensorimotor performance and lower
neural dynamics.
This approach was first inspired by the studies of readaptation of visual inversion de-
veloped in the 50s and 60s by Ivo Kohler (Kohler, 1962), through the use of goggles built
with mirrors so that the visual field of the subject had a right-left inversion and other distor-
tions. Subjects wearing distorted glasses at first presented severe difficulties in coordinating
behaviour. Although, after some weeks wearing inverted goggles, subjects started to behave
coherently, and soon after subjects reported that the whole perceptive left-right regularities
started to emerge again in the perceptual experience of the world, re-inverting the visual effect
of the goggles. Interestingly, after goggles were removed subjects perceived their visual field as
reversed again, and they only recovered ‘normal’ vision after a further process of readaptation.
Inspired by such findings, Di Paolo (2000) evolved a robot controlled by a homeostatic neural
network to simultaneously perform long-term phototaxis and maintain its internal variables
within homeostatic bounds. After evolution, the visual field of the agents was inverted, pro-
voking a breakdown of coordinated behaviour. This breakdown provoked a series of plastic
changes in the controller of the agent, that in some of the agents ended up in normal photo-
tactic behaviour after a process of rehabituation. The agents were also able to adapt to other
severe disruptions that had not been experienced before. Di Paolo’s interpretation is that such
agents develop a dynamical link between phototactic behaviour and internal homeostasis, so
that a disruption of sensorimotor coordination results in internal instability, which triggers
plastic internal changes until stability is regained. Di Paolo stresses the circular relationship
between plastic neural dynamics and agent-level behaviour, where behaviour is generated and
modified by neural activity and behaviour triggers plastic changes when it drives the agent
outside of its homeostatic bounds. The result is a subset of behavioural patterns that produce
dynamics that maintain the same set of patterns. This is what Di Paolo calls a habit. Fur-
thermore, habits share the properties of operational closure shared by autopoietic systems,
guaranteeing the autonomy of their formation.
An extension of this model was developed by Iizuka and Di Paolo to model behavioural
preferences (Iizuka and Di Paolo, 2007). This model presented two homeostatic zones instead
of one, allowing the agent to display two stable coordinated modes of behaviour. In it, the
agent was evolved to perform phototaxis towards two different types of lights, developing
self-sustained preferences and switching spontaneously from one light to the other 1. That is,
the agent tended to maintain a preference for the light visited previously, but this preference
was transient and at some point the agent ended turning to the other light. An analysis of
the agent behaviour revealed that these self-sustained preferences were generated by a flow of
alternating high and low susceptibility to sensory influences (Di Paolo and Iizuka, 2008).
Another interesting model of robotic autonomy was developed in parallel by Takashi
1Note that during evolution the agent was selected to associate each behaviour with one of the two homeo-
static regions
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Ikegami around the concept of embodied chaotic itinerancy (Ikegami, 2007). Using a Fitz-
Hugh-Nagumo neural network with delayed signal transmissions Ikegami modelled an agent
that moved around a patterned space. The agent displayed a variety of motion styles and a
spontaneous selection of different behavioural modes triggered by its embodied dynamics.
Chaotic itinerant dynamics is typical of chaotic systems with high degrees of freedom and an
itinerant behaviour among chaotic quasi-attractors, with the particularity that in Ikegami’s
model this dynamics emerge from the embodied agent as a whole. Interestingly, chaotic itin-
erancy was developed through a sequence of attachment-detachment from sensory influences
similar to Di Paolo and Iizuka’s homeostatic model. Thus, autonomy of the robot is mod-
elled in terms of unstable coupled neural dynamics, in which the perception of the world is
not based on a snapshot of sensory input but in its temporal flow. Ikegami connects this with
the idea of autopoiesis as the interplay between motion and internal chaotic dynamics creat-
ing an interface between the inside and outside of the system. This dynamic boundary would
play a role similar to the membrane of an autopoietic cell in Maturana and Varela’s concep-
tion. This boundary is maintained dynamically by the internal network, and autonomy is
maintained by regulating the flow of sensory input.
Although these models are greatly valuable, we consider that they still fall short of clar-
ifying important aspects of a definition of neurocognitive autonomy. Although the mod-
els are designed to shed some light on the kind of mechanisms generating autonomous be-
haviour and how neurodynamic and sensorimotor structures interact, they do not character-
ize in depth how the dynamics of the models operate and, instead, the analysis of the robots
is based largely on behavioural descriptions. We propose the design of an agent based on the
robot modelled by Di Paolo and Iizuka (2008), as well as develop the analysis required to
clarify the interrelations between different elements of the model and their relation with our
theoretical characterization of autonomous behaviour.
3.4 Model of a Neurodynamic Controller with Relational Homeostasis Em-
bedded in a Robotic Agent
In this chapter we have reviewed different notions about how an autonomous organization
might be achieved in the brain. We follow the work of Di Paolo and colleagues on autonomy
in evolutionary robotics (Rohde and Di Paolo, 2006; Iizuka and Di Paolo, 2007; Di Paolo and
Iizuka, 2008), extending previous models of homeostatic adaptation. Unlike previous mod-
els, for which continuous time recurrent neural networks (CTRNN) controlled the robot,
this model is implemented in a simulated mobile agent with a plastic Kuramoto network as a
neural controller, and with an additional loop of homeostatic regulation by which the home-
ostatic zone favours some preferred phase relations between the network’s oscillators. The
simulated robot is presented with two lights of different colours that are perceived by two dif-
ferent pairs of sensors, and evolved using a genetic algorithm to develop transient but robust
preferences to the two types of lights. All parameter values (except where otherwise specified)
are fixed by a genetic algorithm within the indicated range.
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3.4.1 Neural Controller: Kuramoto oscillator networks with relational
homeostatic plasticity
A fully connected Kuramoto network (Acebrón et al., 2005) with three oscillators is used as
the agent’s controller. The evolution of the state of each oscillator is defined by:
_i = !i + Ii +
NX
j=1
Kij  sin(j   i) (3.1)
where i represents the phase of oscillator i, !i is its natural frequency (range [0; 5]), Kij is
the strength of the coupling between the oscillator i and the oscillator j, and Ii represents the
sensory inputs, which are given only to sensory neuronal oscillators 1 and 2.
The model is not intended to represent the activity of individual neurons but, more gen-
erally, to capture the dynamics of neural oscillations at a mesoscopic level. Integration mech-
anisms in the brain are hypothesized to be based on phase synchronization processes between
neuronal groups (Varela et al., 2001b), thus we aim to represent the large-scale synchronization
of brain regions that are far apart in the brain.
Nevertheless, we hypothesized above that the coordination of neural ensembles alone can-
not stand for autonomous behaviour. Instead, they should be modulated by plastic mecha-
nisms shaping the neurodynamic patterns of the agent, coupling it to its sensorimotor in-
teractions while maintaining constant the organization of the agent, i.e., maintaining some
relational invariants between the different variables of the agent. (Maturana and Varela, 1980,
p.78) describe an autopoietic machine as ‘an homeostatic (or rather a relations-static) system
which has its own organization (defining network of relations) as the fundamental variable
which it maintains constant [...] autopoietic machines are unities whose organization is de-
fined by a particular network of processes (relations) of production of components, the au-
topoietic network, not by the components themselves or their static relations’. Following this
formulation, if we model autonomous robots controllers as regulators of the relations be-
tween internal variables, we can design systems that conserve certain invariants of their orga-
nization as a whole, allowing the kind of local-global relationships needed for the maintenance
of a unitary identity (see Figure 3.1).
In order to represent relational variables able to preserve some organizational invariances
of the system, we have extended the Kuramoto model to include the relations of one oscillator
with respect to its neighbours. This new parameter  is computed by the phase difference of
one oscillator with respect to the sum of the oscillator cluster connected to it weighted by the
strength of their connections. It is represented by:
i = \(
NX
j=1
Kij  ei(j i)) (3.2)
where\ denotes the phase of a complex value and i is the imaginary unit. Here i represents
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the weighted phase relation between oscillator i with respect to the other oscillators with it is
connected.
We add plastic mechanism to the Kuramoto network to homeostatically modify the weights
of the connections between neurons. Homeostatic regulation is defined by a stepwise func-
tion that determines synaptic plasticity as a function of the phase relations  between an os-
cillator and its connected cluster, p(i 0i ), where the homeostatic region is located around
a preferred phase relation 0i (range [ 2 ;

2 ]). The function p(x) (Figure 3.3.b) is defined by
two activation thresholds H1 and H2. The value of p(x) is 0 when x < H1, it increases linearly
while H1 < x < H2 and it is equal to 1 when H2 < x. We have arbitrarily set the values of
H1 = 0:2 and H2 = 0:2. That is, neural oscillations connect to each other in such a way
that they can show preferred phase relations with other oscillating clusters. This function de-
termines the level of plastic change for all incoming weights. Within the homeostatic region
the value of the plastic function is 0, which means that no plastic changes take place while the
oscillator stands within the boundaries of its preferred phase relation with the cluster to which
it is connected. Though the implemented homeostatic mechanism may be arbitrary, there is
evidence to show how brain networks adjust their temporal relations with great precision by
plastic mechanisms (Singer, 1999).
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Figure 3.3: The robotic agent with three plastic oscillatory units. a) Schema of the agent, the environment, sensors and
motors, and the neural controller b) Plastic functionp(i  0i ), in which plasticity depends on the difference between
theweightedphaserelationi of theneuraloscillator iwithrespect tootheroscillatorsandthepreferredweightedphase
relation0i c)Mapping functionF(Kij)which transformsweight values Kij into the actual value of coupling strengths
between oscillatorsKij.
Changes in the value of the incoming weights of oscillator i depend on the local plasticity
of oscillator i, p(i 0i ), multiplied by an extra term which determines the level of synchro-
nization between oscillator i and each incoming oscillator j, the plasticity being smaller for
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oscillators with higher levels of phase synchronization:
 _Kij = ij  p(i   0i )  sin((j   i)  0i ) (3.3)
where Kij are the connection weights which are initialized randomly at the beginning of each
trial and, ij is the rate of plastic change (range [0; 0:9]) of each connection.
Finally, the actual connection strengths are mapped by a modified sinusoidal function
of the weights Kij (denoted by F(Kij)). A similar strategy was already used in Iizuka and
Di Paolo (2008) in homeostatic neural networks, instead of using a Hebbian-like rule, to avoid
saturation of synaptic strengths. This mechanism ensures that there is enough variability for
plastic reconfigurations in order to explore the whole space of connection weights. In our case,
we have modified the sinusoidal mapping multiplying it by a positive square wave with half its
frequency in order to allow the possibility of total disconnection between oscillators. Thus,
when plastic changes take place, connection strengths follow a continuous non-monotonic
function Kij =   F(Kij) (see Figure 3.3.c) capable of exploring the full configuration space,
where  is a constant (range [0; 5]) that regulates how strong the oscillator coupling can be.
In a nutshell, this minimal model works under the assumption that large-scale neural oscil-
latory components try to maintain an invariant preferred phase relation with respect to other
oscillatory components by means of plastically regulating the strength of their connectivity.
3.4.2 Minimal Robotic Embodiment: behavioural preference task
The agent is modelled as a simulated wheeled robot with a circular body of radius 4 and two
diametrically opposed motors (Figure 3.3.a). The motors can drive the agent forward and
backwards. We assume that the agent’s mass is small enough to be neglected (in order to avoid
inertial resistance), so we can describe the speed of the agent as follows: the translational speed
of the robot is calculated as the vectorial average of the motor velocities, and the angular speed
as the difference of the motor velocities divided by the body diameter. The motor outputs are
calculated from the phase relation  of the effector oscillator (oscillator 3). The speed of the
motor is obtained by multiplying the motor output by a gain parameter of value 2:
Mr = 2  sin(3   r)
Ml = 2  sin(3   l) (3.4)
where r and l (range [0; 2]) are bias terms which map the motor output into the actual
motor activation.
The agent has two pairs of sensors (right and left) for each of the different light sources
A and B. Each sensor points to a direction at =3 radians from the forward direction. Light
A sensors are connected to oscillator 1 and light B sensors are connected to oscillator 2. The
activation of the sensor depends on the angle between the sensor and the light, such that the
maximal activation happens when the sensor faces the light. The effects of both the angle and
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the distance on the sensor activation are represented by the following function:
IDX =
( sDX0:5(1+cos(DX))
1+ea(dDX b) ; jDXj  =2
0; jDXj > =2
(3.5)
where X can represent either light A or B, D stands for either right or left sensor, DX is the
angle of sensor DX to light X, dDX is the distance between sensor DX and light X, and a and
b have the arbitrary values of 0:03 and 100 respectively. The light intensity received at each
sensor is multiplied by a gain parameter sDX (range [ 8; 8]). The resulting value is fed to the
corresponding oscillator’s input Ii. A full schema of the robot is represented in Figure 3.3.a.
3.4.3 Artificial Evolution: Fitness Function
Interactions between coordinating neural units, plastic mechanisms and higher order beha-
vioural patterns at the whole-agent level can take many complex forms that are not easy or in-
tuitive to design. Frequently, these interactions cannot be reduced to one-to-one relations but
many-to-many interactions. Evolutionary robotics has been a greatly productive tool to model
systems exhibiting such properties and finding non-intuitive solutions to complex problems
(Harvey et al., 2005; Nolfi and Floreano, 2000), therefore, we have chosen to use a genetic
algorithm to model our agent.
A population of 20 agents is evolved using a rank-based genetic algorithm with elitism.
Each of the agent parameters!i; sDX; ; ij;r;l and0i is encoded into a 5 bits string repre-
senting a real number within the specified range. For each generation, the best 4 agents (20%
of the population) pass to the next generation without change. For the remaining slots, pairs
of individuals are selected for crossover with a probability proportional to their fitness value,
and new individuals are created mixing their genes (bit series) adding a mutation probability
of 3% for each gene.
The agents are evaluated for 4 different tasks as in Iizuka and Di Paolo (2007): a single
light A, a single light B, one light A and a blinking light B, one light B and a blinking light
A. In the two first tasks, only one light (either A or B) is present, and the agent gains fitness
by approaching the light. In the two latter tasks, two lights are presented (one of type A
and one of type B) and one of them is blinking. The agent gains fitness by approaching the
non-blinking light. The blinking light emits light only with a probability of 0.15 for each
time step. The objective of this is to create a ‘dummy’ that encourages the agent to learn to
ignore one of the lights while approaching the other. The lights appear at a random distance,
[100; 150]. When two lights are present, they appear, from the agent’s point of view, with a
random separation within the range [=2; 3=2]. The length of each trial is 125s.
Each individual agent is tested for 12 independent runs (3 for each of the 4 tasks, see Figure
3.4). Each run consists of some trials where a light or a pair of lights are presented to the agents
for a fixed time. At the beginning of each run, the synaptic weights Kij are reset to initial
random values (note that this is different from (Iizuka and Di Paolo, 2007), where weights
were reset to a fixed initial value obtained by evolution). Each run consists of 8 trials. For each
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trial, one or two lights (depending on the task) are presented to the agent for a specified time.
After the trial is finished, a new trial begins and two new lights are presented at new positions.
Only the last 3 trials of each run are evaluated in order not to penalize slow plastic changes and
bootstrap evolution.
Single run: Ftrial Ftrial Ftrial
Frun
Frun Frun Frun Frun Frun Frun Frun Frun Frun Frun Frun Frun
Task 1: Light A Task 2: Light B Task 3: Lights A-B* Task 4: Lights A*-B
1 run
Ftotal
Fitness test:
1 trial
12 runs
8 trials
Figure 3.4: Structure of the task evaluated in the genetic algorithm. Each agent is tested for 12 different runs (3 for one
of the 4 tasks), averaging their fitness values to obtain the total fitness. Each run consists of 8 different trials. For each
trial, two lights are presented to an agent during a period of 125s. Only the three last trials of a run are taken into account
for computing the fitness of the run in order to avoid penalizing slow plasticity.
Fitness for each trial is calculated in three terms, Ftrial = (FD + Fp)  FH. The term FD
represents how close to the light the agent has got at the end on each trial. For each trial,
FD = 1   df=di, where df and di respectively correspond to the final and initial distances to
the target light. Fp indicates the proportion of time that the agent spends within a distance
of less than 4 times its body radius (i.e. a distance of 16) to the target light during a trial.
Finally, FH represents the proportion of homeostasis in the system, computing the degree
of homeostasis 1   p(i   0i ) (i.e., 1 minus the level of plasticity) for each oscillator and
averaging the result over time and over the three oscillators. This way we select agents that
remain as homeostatic as possible. This combination of fitness ensures that the agent develops
a phototactic behaviour (through FD and Fp) and also that this behaviour is evolved to display
patterns of activity that lie within the homeostatic bounds of the neural controller (through
parameter FH). The total fitness is calculated and then averaged over all 12 runs 2
3.5 Behavioural Analysis of the Evolved Agent
Once the agent is defined and we have evolved its parameters to perform the behavioural pref-
erence task, we want to analyse in detail its behaviour, with special interest in the interaction
between oscillator dynamics, synaptic plasticity and the agent’s behaviour. Our hypothesis is
2 The code simulating the behaviour of the agent and the parameters obtained from the ge-
netic algorithm can be accessed from the following repository https://github.com/IsaacLab/HNA-robotic-
model/tree/master/minimal-preference-task.
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that the mechanisms of relational homeostasis embedded in the agent’s controller can exem-
plify some characteristics of neurodynamic autonomy, in particular the operational closure
of the system through the coupling of neurodynamic and sensorimotor structures in a web of
self-sustaining behavioural patterns or habits.
After running the genetic algorithm we select the evolved agent from the last generation
that obtained the best fitness value. In what follows we analyse the behaviour of this agent but
the results can be extended to many other agents that we found to display similar dynamics
(i.e. the agent under analysis in this section displays a typical behaviour of this and other
evolutionary runs). The different agents are tested in an environment where the two lights
have the same intensity (no dummies). Note that this task (two lights presented with the
same intensity) was never experienced during evolution.
First, we describe the behaviour of the agent under different conditions, showing that
habits emerge in the form of self-sustained behavioural preference patterns. Second, we de-
scribe the dynamics of the agent oscillatory and synaptic patterns. Finally, we perform a de-
tailed analysis using information theory tools to understand the interplay between the differ-
ent elements of the system for generating the emergent patterns of behaviour.
3.5.1 Description of Behavioural Patterns
The first step consists of analysing the behaviour of the agent in a descriptive manner. We
present the agent with a series of 60 pairs of lights, and we provide the agent a time of 125s
to choose and approach one of them. We measure the final distance to both lights at time
t = 125s, obtaining the series represented in Figure 3.5.a. As shown, the agent is able to
develop stable preferences towards one of the lights, maintaining it for several trials until the
preference is changed. A video of the behaviour of the agent (including plastic mechanisms)
can be found at https://vimeo.com/53847420.
We can test the role of plasticity in the emergence of a new preference by stopping plastic
mechanisms at a particular point. We have taken the results of the simulation represented
in Figure 3.5.a, and run the simulation again under exactly the same initial conditions but
freezing the plasticity in the midpoint of a particular trial. We observe in Figure 3.5.b and
3.5.c that when plasticity is stopped the preference is frozen and the robot always chooses the
same light. Thus, we can say that plastic mechanisms mediate the creation and destruction of
behavioural preferences. These results show how preferences arise from a complex interplay
between the agent’s interaction with its environment and the neural mechanisms of synaptic
plasticity. That is, preferences emerge and are maintained when a certain plastic configuration
(e.g. sensitiveness to light A and blindness to light B) are met with certain environmental
conditions that allow the agent to maintain its configuration (e.g. the stimuli received from
the lights do not trigger plastic mechanisms that can destroy the current sensitiveness of the
agent).
Moreover, if we try to stop plasticity during a transition trial (precisely at the moment
in which the agent is about to switch its preference, as shown in Figure 3.5.d), we observe
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Figure 3.5: Distance to the two lights at the end of each trial for different agents. A normal agent a), and three agents in
which plastic mechanisms have been frozen at different instants; b) in a situation of preference to light A (trial 5); c) in a
situation of preference towards lightB (trial 15), and d) at a moment in which the preference switches fromB toA (trial
38).
that the agent continuously alternates between the two lights, being unable to hold a specific
preference. When the weights are frozen at specific transition points (like the agent in Figure
3.5.d) the agent seems to go indifferently to either one of the two lights. We call these unde-
cided agents. However, the question arises as to whether these agents are really indifferent
for choosing one light or the other, or do they have preferences that simply last for a shorter
amount of time?
To answer this question we simulate different runs of an agent with synaptic plasticity
and several agents without synaptic plasticity of the undecided type. We run the simulations
for 1000 trials. For each simulation, we create a time series with the result of the 1000 trials,
having a value of 1 when the agent goes to light A, and  1 when light B is chosen. The time
series L(n) represents the decisions of the agent for all trials n.
First, we can analyse whether the sequences of consecutive trials choosing the same light
constitute a consistent preference, or if the agent just chooses randomly and the sequences of
same-light consecutive trials are merely coincidences. We hold the hypothesis that the agent we
called ‘undecided’ (whose connection weights are frozen from an instant in which the agent
was just switching preferences) does not really possess an internal bias for any light source and
whose behavioural choice is merely the result of environmental contingencies. As the config-
uration of the environment at each trial is completely random, the series of decisions L(n)will
be totally uncorrelated if there is no mechanism that makes subsequent decisions dependent
on the choice of the agent in this trial. Thus, we can test the existence of consistent preferences
simply by computing the autocorrelation ofL(n), obtaining(n) =P=1000= 1000 L()  L( + n).
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Figure 3.6: Cross-correlation in the series of agent's decisions. We compute the cross-correlation between the time
series of the decisionsmade by the agent at the end of each trial (where 1means lightA and 1 lightB). We observe how
consistent trial-to-trial cross-correlations only arise for the agent with synaptic plasticity.
In Figure 3.6.a we observe how the agent with plasticity displays strong correlations in its
sequence of decisions. The correlation function shows how decisions are positively correlated
to the decisions taken in the 20 previous and posterior trials, suggesting that this is the average
duration of preferences. In contrast, we see in Figure 3.6.b how the ‘undecided’ agent is gen-
uinely undecided and presents no correlations between one decision and the next, meaning
that decisions are determined by the randomly generated configuration of the environment.
We observe how synaptic plasticity indeed plays a crucial role in the emergence of behavioural
preferences, since it is a necessary element to produce correlations between one decision and
the next.
Degrees of Engagement with the Environment
We have demonstrated that plasticity allows the agent to generate preferences that are main-
tained during a number of trials and then vanish to give place to a new preference. How do
preferences arise from the interaction of plastic mechanisms and different modes of engage-
ment with the environment? For testing this, we reinitialize the simulation with the same
conditions as those shown in Figure 3.5.a, but this time we fix the initial distance of both lights
to 125. For each trial, we perform the following experiment: we record the initial conditions
of the trial (robot position, network state, etc.), and we simulate the same again except that
we modify the angle of the position of the two lights, trying 800 different possible combina-
tions, with the angle between the two lights between the interval [=2; 3=2] (this analysis
was also performed for a different homeostatic agent by Di Paolo, 2000). In Figure 3.7.c we
can see the behaviour of the robot for trials 30, 38 and 46, where light grey dots correspond to
a situation where the final distance of the agent to light A is less than 50 (that is, we interpret
that the agent has chosen a light when it reaches closer than 50 units to the light, considering
that the initial distance is between 100 and 150 units), dark grey to the final distance of the
agent to light B being less than 50 (that is, we interpret that the agent has chosen when the
agent reaches closer than 50 units) and black dots to a situations where none of these condi-
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tions are met. For the whole simulation, we can plot how the proportion of light/dark grey
and back dots changes from trial to trial (Figure 3.7.b), seeing how the behavioural preference
is modulated over time. We can observe how there are periods where the preference for one
of the lights completely dominates the other (no matter what the positions of the light are),
and periods where the agent is open to external stimulus and they can influence the action
developed. This suggests some kind of spontaneous intermittency in which the behaviour
of the robot switches between states in which it is just driven by internal preferences and it
is ‘blind’ to environmental or external factors, and states in which the agent is very sensitive
to the configuration of its environment and the emergent preferences depend on the kind of
interaction between agent and environment.
Also, we can analyse the homeostatic region of the agent at each moment of time. Since
homeostasis is not defined for individual variables of each oscillator but for relational variables
i (which depend on the phase relations j   i and the weights of their synapses Kij), if we
define the homeostatic region in terms of the phases of the oscillators i, what we see is that
the homeostatic region for each individual variable changes with changes in K. We can define
the global plasticity of the system as P = P3i=1 p(i), and plot the homeostatic region in
terms of the phases i for a particular state of synapses Kij. We can observe the homeostatic
regions at the beginning of trials 30, 38 and 46 in Figure 3.7.d (note that 1   3 and 2   3
represent all possible phase combinations since 1 2 = (1 3) - (2 3)). Furthermore, the
homeostatic box containing the viable region for phase relations changes when the preference
of an agent is changed, from a horizontal box that triggers plastic changes when 2 and 3
lose their synchronization, to a vertical box that triggers plastic changes when 1 and 3 lose
their synchronization. In the middle, we find a state of transition where the shape of the box
is between the other two. Whereas in the original model from Di Paolo and Iizuka (2008)
different preferences were defined a priori forcing the behaviour to be constrained by two
separated homeostatic regions, our model presents a unique box that changes its shape when
synaptic changes take place.
3.6 Dynamics and Information Flows in the System
So far, just analysing the behaviour of the agent under some controlled conditions, we have
observed the interplay between the emergence of different behavioural patterns and the plastic
changes triggered when the relational homeostasis of the oscillator network is challenged. This
interaction generates self-sustained patterns of behaviour characterized by preference towards
one of the lights. Moreover, in some cases, these patterns are not closed to attend or approach a
single light source, but they are open to perform one or other action depending on the position
of the light. Nevertheless, in order to get a better understanding about how these interactions
operate between the different elements of the neural controller and the agent’s behaviour we
need more sophisticated tools. Thus, we make use of dynamical systems and information
theory analysis to get a better understanding about the agent’s behaviour.
We can observe any particular moment of time, and observe how conduct is correlated
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Figure 3.7: Openness of the agent to each type of light. For each trial in the simulation, we reset the agentwith the same
initial parameters and change the angles of the two lights. In b)we can see the behaviour of the robot for trials 30, 38 and
46,where light greydots correspond toa situationwhere thefinal distanceof theagent to lightA is less than50, darkgrey
to the final distance of the agent to lightB being less than 50 and black dots to situationswhere none of these conditions
are met. In c) it is displayed how the proportion of light/dark grey and back dots changes from trial to trial. In d) we can
observe the shape of the homeostatic 'box' in which the behaviour does not trigger plastic changes.
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with behavioural changes in different variables of the system. For example, in Figure 3.8, we
can observe how a specific preference switch is correlated with changes in both the oscilla-
tory patterns that are stabilized and the change in the synaptic weights values. The oscillatory
patterns are defined as the relative phase of the oscillators i with respect to an average phase
0 = \(
P3
j=1 eij). The question to answer here is what the relation between behavioural,
oscillatory and synaptic patterns is. Does one of them determine the behaviour of the other?
Are they co-regulated in any way? Here, our task is to disentangle the dynamic and causal
relations between the different levels of the system.
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Figure 3.8: Correlation between behavioural and neural patterns. All patterns are defined for 6 specific trials in which a
changeofbehaviouralpreferencetakesplace. Oscillatorypatterns (top)aredefinedas therelativephaseof theoscillators
i with respect to an average phase 0 = \(
P3
j=1 eij)(top). Weight values (middle) are represented as a function
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For example, we can analyse the full series of oscillatory patterns. In Figure 3.9 we can
observe the relative phase of the oscillators i with respect to 0. Comparing the results with
Figure 3.5.a, we can observe that particular configurations of the oscillators are sustained in
coordination with different modes of behaviour. We can consider that each possible con-
figuration of the phases of the oscillators correspond to a particular cluster of neurons that
emerges sustaining particular cell assemblies in the neural controller of the agent. But, how
are these cell assemblies generated? What is their relation with plasticity, and with behaviour?
Throughout the rest of this chapter we will unveil these intricate relations between these non-
linearly coupled elements.
Although we can visualize the evolution of phase relations in our oscillatory controller, it is
much harder to analyse the evolution of their synaptic connectivity (since with 6 variables the
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Figure 3.9: Oscillatory patterns in the neural controller. Sine of the relative phase of the oscillators i respect to an
average phase 0 = \
P3
j=1 eij during 60 trials for a normal agent. We observe that particular configurations are
maintained in coordination with the behaviour of the agent depicted in Figure 3.5.a.
possible relations grow exponentially). In order to analyse the role of synaptic connectivity,
we need to find useful descriptions of the patterns that arise for synaptic plasticity.
Synapsembles
Although we have observed the evolution of neural ensembles in Figure 3.9, if we analyse
just the state of the oscillators in the system alone we are just capturing a small space of the
variables controlling the agent. Although the agent is composed of just three oscillators, its
behaviour it is also controlled by 6 extra differential equations corresponding to the change
of the synaptic weights between the oscillators. Similarly, although activation of neurons is
generally regarded as the main source of information in the brain, short-term synaptic plastic-
ity can also serve different behavioural functions (Abbott and Regehr, 2004; Mongillo et al.,
2008). Moreover, since there are orders of more synapses in the brain than there are neu-
rons, they are being postulated as a richer source of information. Inspired by this idea György
Buzsàki has focused on the notion of synapsemble, in which analogously to cell assemblies ‘a
particular constellation of synaptic weights in a defined time window can be conceived of as
an assembly of synapses or “synapsemble”’ (Buzsáki, 2010, p.12). Buzsàki hypothesizes that
synapsembles may be critical for (1) building up and dissolving cell assemblies, limiting their
lifetime to timescales no longer than a few seconds, and (2) linking together sequences of cell
assemblies despite the cessation of spiking activity.
Although experimental evidence supporting the role of synapsembles is hard to find in
the brain (because of the lack of tools to directly measure synaptic connectivity in a behaving
animal), our model allows us a detailed analysis of the evolution of synapse ensembles since we
have access to the state of the weights at any moment. Nevertheless, since there are 6 different
synapses we cannot display the dynamical field of synapses in three dimensions. Thus, we
have performed a PCA analysis for the states of the six weights. We have simulated an agent
for 1000 trials of 125s. For each pair of neurons i and j, we have fed the values of sin(0:5 Ki;j)
(since the values of the weights are 4 periodic) to the PCA algorithm. In order to display the
behaviour of the system, we take the first two components of the PCA analysis, which stand
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for 54:2% of the variance (which means that a significant proportion of the variance cannot be
captured). For each value of the agent weights, we computed the proportion of the trials this
value showed when the agent was approaching a type A light or a type B light. The difference
between the two calculations gives us a value L between 1 and 1 (1 for all A lights, and 1 for
all B lights).
Synapsembles vs. Behavioural Modes
To compute the landscape of the agent’s behaviour for each configuration of weights, we
mapped the values of L over the first two components of the PCA, discretizing their values
using 20 bins and convolving the result with a bidimensional sigmoid kernel with a standard
deviation equivalent to one bin. We plotted the result in figure 3.10, where the red areas cor-
respond to behaviour of the trials where the agent goes to light A and blue areas to light B.
On top of the landscape, we plotted the sequence of states at the beginning of the trial of the
sequence displayed in Figure 3.5, where we can observe how the synapsemble configuration of
the agent evolves for sixty trials. The colour of the dots corresponds to the proportions each
light is chosen during that particular trial on different initial conditions as we did in Figure
3.7.
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We can see how this landscape of synapsemble configurations has areas that are clearly
linked with one or other behavioural mode. For example, trials 10 to 20 are clearly connected
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with preference towards light B, or trials from 41 to 53 are clearly connected with preference
towards light B. Nevertheless, there are moments in which the agent enters a different area of
the landscape but keeps the previous behaviour for some trials as we can see in trials 54 to 59.
This suggests that synapsemble configurations do not completely determine the behaviour
of the agent, so a more complex interplay between cell assemblies and synapsembles may be
taking place here. However, this is not clear since we are missing part of the picture since the
PCA analysis only allows us to analyse a 54:2% in the synapsemble configuration. Thus, we
need a visualization of the behaviour of the agent that shows a better representation of all the
dimensions of the agent controller.
Coordination Between Cell and Synapse Assemblies
Analysing the coordination between neural ensembles and synapsembles is not an easy task
due to the moderately high dimensionality of the system (9 dimensions of the neural con-
troller, plus the dimensions of body and environment). For this reason, we have simplified
the analysis by reducing both the state of neural ensembles and synapsembles to two discrete
values representing the state of a network. To accomplish this, we define different discrete
states based on the configuration of cell and synapse assemblies. Since Figure 3.9 suggests that
the configuration of the oscillators in the assembly is the relevant variable for generating one
or other type of behaviour, we define cell assemblies depending on the relative phase of the
oscillators. We can codify the state of the cell assembly with a string of three bits CA (where
bit 1 encodes whether oscillator 1 precedes oscillator 2, bit 2 whether oscillator 1 precedes 3, and
bit 3 whether oscillator 2 precedes 3; note that from all the three combinations of these condi-
tions only 6 are non-contradictory and therefore possible). As for the synapse assemblies, we
define each synapse as active or inactive if the value of the synapse is higher than 4 3 (recall that
 is the maximum possible value for the weights). The state of the synapsemble SA is codified
with a string of 6 bits (where each bit codifies whether one of the synapses is active).
We define whether a particular cell or synapse ensemble is active using a set of binary vari-
ables CAi and SAj, which represent if a specific ensemble is active at a particular moment of
time. For improving the visualization, instead of binary activation values, we filtered the re-
sulting signal using a Gaussian kernel with a standard deviation of 12:5s to represent the aver-
age activation over a window of time. In Figure 3.11 we can observe the evolution of CAi and
CAj. The figure shows that, although cell assemblies may be connected with particular be-
haviours of the agent, at different moments there are always different cell assemblies struggling
to emerge. Also, the interaction between cell ensembles influences the change of synapsem-
bles at a lower timescale, creating and destroying preference patterns in the behaviour of the
agent as the state of synapses travels through the complex landscape we characterized in Figure
3.10. On an even longer timescale, some cell assemblies are sustained for even longer than the
duration of particular synapsembles, emerging over all the others for several trials.
3Since is the maximum possible value of the weights, 4 is an arbitrary threshold for capturing when weights
are active and sufficiently strong. Different values have been tested without altering the results significantly.
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Figure 3.11: Evolution of neural ensembles and synapsembles. Each line of the plot represents the activation of a partic-
ular cell or synapse ensemble, filtered by a Gaussian kernel with a standard deviation of 12:5s to represent the average
activation over a window of time.
Network Visualization
How can we map these complex relations at different timescales? In a first approach we can
make use of a network visualization of the state of the system. Since the PCA analysis has
problems for capturing the dimensionality of the system just in the case of the synapse dy-
namics, the discrete description of our agent will allow us to depict how the system travels
through different patterns.
Having defined the patterns of the system, we can define a network in which each state
corresponds to a node, and transitions between patterns are represented as edges of the net-
work (Figure 3.12). In addition, we map the amount of time the system spends in any one state
into the size of the node. Finally, for each state, we compute the relative amount of time that
state appeared in trials in which the agent was approaching lightA and lightB into a variable L,
whose values lie between 1 and -1. A trial was assigned to a particular light when at the end of
the trial the distance from the agent to the light was less than 50 units. We map the values of L
into the network into the colour of the nodes, which ranges from blue to red proportionally
with the value of L.
Now that we have codified the oscillatory, synaptic and behavioural patterns of the agent,
we can easily represent the evolution of the system as a discrete system. For example, if we
may represent the state of the neural controller for the series represented in Figure 3.8. We can
join the patterns CA and SA into a string of 9 bits to describe the state of the controller in a
particular moment (Figure 3.8). In such a way, we can describe the system as a state diagram.
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Figure 3.12: State diagram of the discretized states of the agent. The series of states represent the transitions of the
evolution ofCA (3 former bits) and SA (6 latter bits) in the series depicted in Figure 3.8.
We know that neural ensembles in the agent emerge displaying different phase-locked re-
lations made possible or constrained by their synaptic configuration, that is in turn triggered
when the oscillator network is not able to maintain some relational homeostatic invariances.
Moreover, the stability of patterns of behaviour is tightly coupled to the behaviour of the
agent itself. How exactly do these three levels of behaviour relate to each other? Is there a role
for situatedness and motility in the generation of the agent behaviour, or it is just reacting to
particular inputs in a non-autonomous way? Here we analyse in detail the behaviour of the
agent to understand this complex loop of interaction. As in Chapter 2, in order to discover
the influence of the sensorimotor loop in behaviour-generating mechanisms we compare a
situated agent with a disrupted sensorimotor loop. To achieve this we compare:
1. A situated agent with normal sensorimotor interaction.
2. A passively-coupled agent, in which the input fed to the agent is recorded from a real
interaction from the situated agent, thus decoupling the received input from the acti-
vation of the motors but maintaining the structure of an input generated by a situated
agent.
In Figure 3.13 we depict the resulting network. We can observe that the network is struc-
tured in different clusters, which in general correspond to the same behavioural pattern (all
nodes have the same colour, see e.g. the bottom left cluster and the middle right cluster). Also,
some clusters present nodes of both colours (e.g. top right cluster). Moreover, we can observe
that, in general, nodes belonging to a particular cluster share their first threebits, meaning
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that they correspond to the same cell assembly. With respect to the second string of six bits
of each cluster, they generally comprise a subset of the possible synapsembles (there is a total
of 64 possible synapsembles), suggesting that each possible cell assembly is sustained by a set
of possible synapsembles, and that these synapsembles may change within the same set main-
taining the resulting assembly. This is also what we observed in Figure 3.11. The global picture
is a map of the mental life of the agent, with clusters of dynamical patterns corresponding with
particular modes of behaviour, and clusters corresponding with states in which the agent may
choose different behaviours. In these clusters the stability of a set of neurodynamical states is
coupled with the stability of a behavioural pattern, as in the definition of habit by Barandi-
aran (2008) we described in section 3.2.2. The different clusters and the paths between them
display a web of neurodynamic structures that is tightly coupled with the behaviour of the
agent.
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Figure 3.13: Network of state transitions of the situated agent. Each node corresponds to a discrete state in which the
first three bits codify the cell assembly active in the agent and the six following bits codify the active synapses. The size
of the nodes codify how frequently a state is visited and its colour the behaviour (preference for lightA or preference for
lightB) in a span of tones from blue to red.
We can also observe what happens when we decouple these neurodynamic structures from
behaviour. As in chapter 2, we define a passively-coupled agent as a copy of our agent that is
fed with a recording of the input of the original agent instead of a real input generated by its
own behaviour. By doing so, we are decoupling the internal mechanisms generating neurody-
namical structures and the behaviour generating mechanisms. We can generate a network as
in Figure 3.13 , although in this case the values of L should be defined from the behaviour of the
situated agent that actually generates the input (since passively-coupled agents do no not move
141
in the environment), and the rest of the values from the passively-coupled agents. In Figure
3.14 we can observe that, although both agents receive the same input, the resulting network is
quite different. Although clusters of nodes are generated, these clusters are not organized any
more by the behaviour that generates the input that is fed into the agent. We observe that red
and blue nodes are distributed among clusters in an apparently random distribution. Also,
whereas in the previous network the vast majority of the nodes where clearly corresponding to
red or blue, we find a greater number of nodes with intermediate colours, meaning that they
are not completely ascribed to one particular behaviour. Note that the colour of the nodes
does not arise form the real behaviour of the agent (which does not move), but from the be-
haviour of the agent that generates the input that we fed into the passively-coupled agent.
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Figure 3.14: Network of state transitions of the passively-coupled agent. Each node corresponds to a discrete state in
which the first three bits codify the cell assembly active in the agent and the six following bits codify the active synapses.
The size of the nodes codify how frequently a state is visited and its colour the behaviour (preference for lightA or pref-
erence for lightB) in a span of tones from blue to red.
We can quantify the difference between the two networks dividing the network in two
communities (the nodes that correspond mostly to behaviour of approaching light A and the
nodes corresponding to lightB) and analysing what percentage of links in the network connect
nodes inside the same community and nodes between the two different communities. By
doing so, we obtain the result that in the case of the situated agent 80:16% of the links connect
nodes within the same community, and in the case of the passively-coupled agent only 61:01%
of the link do so (note that 50% would be the case of a uniformly random distribution of
links).
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Information Flows
The analysis above describes how the different scales of the system are intertwined and de-
ployed in a coordinated manner, but it does not show what the causal relations are between
the different elements. Here we quantitatively define the relation between behaviour, cell as-
semblies and synapsembles, applying information theory tools for characterizing nonlinear
relations between elements of the system.
We previously defined the different cell and synapse assemblies as discrete units of be-
haviour. All possible relationships between oscillators give rise to 6 possible states for the
cell assemblies, and all possible activated synapses give rise to 64 possible combinations or
synapsembles. Therefore, we can codify the active cell assembly or the active synapsemble
with two discrete variables CA and SA ranging from 1 to 6 and 1 to 64 respectively. Similarly,
for each trial we can codify the emergent behaviour of the agent. For each trial we define a
variable L, which is equal to 1 if the agent’s final distance to light A is less than 50 units,  1 if
the final distance to light B is less than 50 units, or 0 otherwise.
Having defined these macro-variables of the system in a discrete manner, we can use in-
formation theory tools to determine the relation between variables. Information theory is
built over a set of general measures for quantifying the uncertainty associated with individual
variables and characterizing the nonlinear relationships between them (Cover and Thomas,
1991). In our model, we can use these measures to quantify relationships between the state
of different elements in the neural controller of the agent, or between such components and
features of the environment surrounding the agent.
Information is quantified in terms of entropy, i.e. the information contained in a random
variable, which is generally defined as:
H(X) =  
X
x2X
p(x)log(p(x)) (3.6)
where X is a set of states of a variable.
The information shared between two random variables X and Y is given by their mutual
information:
I(X;Y) = H(Y) H(YjX) =
X
x2X
X
y2Y
p(x; y)log p(x; y)p(x)p(y) (3.7)
By definition, I(X;Y) = I(Y;X), thus no causal relationship can be detected through
mutual information. Thus, to analyse causal relationships between variables typically trans-
fer entropy measures are employed. The decrease of uncertainty in the state of a variable by
knowing its uncertainty from the past history of other variables is defined as transfer entropy
between two variables:
143
TE(X ! Y) = H(Yt+ jY(d0)t ) H(Yt+ jY(d
0)
t ;X(d)t ) =
=
X
xt+ ;xt2X
X
yt2Y
p(xt+ ; x(d)t ; y(d)t )log
p(xt+ ; x(d)t ; y(d)t )p(x(d)t )
p(xt+ ; x(d)t )p(x(d)t ; y(d)t )
(3.8)
whereX(d)t denotes the past history ofx counted from time t and lengthd (i.e. xt; xt 1; :::; xt d).
With these methodological tools, we analyse the information flows for a situated and a
passively-coupled agent simulated during 1000 trials of 125s. Although the analysis is just
performed over one simulation for each agent.
Mututal Information
We first analyse what information is shared by the emergent cell assemblies and synapse assem-
blies and the light chosen by the agent at the end of each trial. For doing so, we can measure
mutual information along the time series of values of each variable. In Figure 3.15 we can ob-
serve how the three variables CA, SA and L share an important amount of information. The
entropy of L (which is the variable with the lowest entropy) is 0:86, thus the shared entropy
is, in most cases, in the same order of magnitude. In the case of the situated agent, we can
observe in Figure 3.15 (left) that all variables share a relevant amount of information. How-
ever, in Figure 3.15 (right) we observe that the information shared between SA and L decreases
dramatically, suggesting that the interaction between the two variables is lost.
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Figure 3.15: Mutual Information. Values of mutual information between cell assemblies (CA), synapsembles (SA) and
behaviour (L).
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Transfer Entropy
We can get a clearer picture by measuring transfer entropy between variables. We do so by
using equation 3.8, with d = d0 = 1 as the length of the past history that we consider4 and
a logarithmically distributed series of values of  from 0:1s to 62500s (half the length of the
1000 trials), with multiplicative intervals of 100:1. In Figure 3.16 (left) we can observe a complex
chart of information flows for the situated agent. For example, we can observe the interaction
between variables CA and SA where at small and medium values of  the information flows
mainly from CA to SA, whereas at longer values of  the flow of the information is reversed.
This suggests a circular causal chain in which, at short timescales, the structure of the current
synapsemble determines the cell assemblies that can emerge, but at long timescales it is the
self-sustainment of particular assemblies during different trials that determines the stability
of the possible synapsembles (note that the duration of a trial corresponds to a value of 
of 125s). Also, we observe that while there is an important information flow from L to CA,
the flow does not exist in the opposite direction (Figure 3.16 middle-left), suggesting that the
light chosen by the agent influences the cell assembly that emerges, but that the assembly that
is active at a particular moment of time is not decisive for the behaviour that the agent will
choose. In turn, there is an important bidirectional exchange of information between SA and
L. This suggests that SA is the variable that determines the behaviour that will be chosen
by the agent. Also, we can observe that TEL!SA and TECA!SA are very similar in value and
shape (if we integrate the area of the difference between TEL!SA and TECA!SA and divide
it by TECA!SA the result is 0.11, showing that both functions coincide with almost 90% of
accuracy). This is supported by the fact that there is no functional dependency from L to SA,
since change in the weights  _K is only a function of K and . As we can easily check, all the
other information flows present in Figure 3.16 correspond to actual functional dependencies
depicted by the equations defining the systems5. This suggests (since L influences CA and not
otherwise), that L causally determinesCAwhich in turn influences SA in their circular mutual
interaction 6.
Putting together the information flows above, we may summarize them in the schema at
Figure 3.17 (left). The behaviour of the agent L generates an input that determines the emer-
4we tested different values of d and d0 up to 5 for a series of representative values of  with similar results,
therefore we used d = d0 = 1 to reduce the computational cost, since just varying the value of  seems to be
enough for capture the different timescales of information flows.
5Since _ is a function of ,K and sDX, and _sDX is a function of ,K and sDX. The only functional dependency
that presents no informational content is TECA!L
6It is worthy to note that in the experiments depicted in Figure 3.16 the variableL is defined as the macroscopic
behaviour of the agent, whereas CA and SA are patterns of low level variables of the agent. To test that this
difference did not distorted in any way the result of our analysis, we repeated the analysis substituting L by a
variable S defined as a string of 4 bits (one for each sensor of the robot), in which each bit was equal to one
if the activity of its corresponding sensor is higher than its average activation. The results of transfer entropy
measures where strikingly similar to those displayed in Figure 3.16, indicating that the series of sensory activation
are strongly correlated with particular behavioural macroscopic patterns of the agent. Since the use ofL simplifies
other analyses performed in this chapter, we have chosen to use this variable instead of S.
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Figure 3.16: Transfer Entropy. Values of transfer entropy at different timescales among cell assemblies (CA), synapsem-
bles (SA) and the behaviour (L).
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Figure3.17: Operational closure. Simplified informationflows for the situated (left) andpassively-coupled (right) agents.
gence of cell assembliesCA. A circular relation between the emergent cell assemblies and their
underlying synapse ensembles SA generates a particular behaviour L which is determined by
the state of SA. This schema is surprisingly similar to the one proposed by Varela (1997) and
depicted in Figure 3.1
Moreover, if we ‘cut’ the sensorimotor loop by feeding the agent a recorded input, the
information flows from SA to L and from SA to CA are disrupted, whereas information flows
from CA to SA (which are almost equivalent to flows from L to SA, supporting our suspicion
that they represent the same thing), thus dissolving the self-sustained neurodynamic struc-
tures that generate a coordinated behaviour and reinforcing unidirectional influence fromCA
to SA, as we depict at Figure at Figure 3.17 (right). Thus, these results strongly suggest that the
generation of complex and integrated neurodynamic structures is a product of a double loop
that strongly couples (1) neural mechanisms and higher order parameters (synaptic ensembles
in this case) and (2) these neurodynamic circular structures with the behaviour they generate.
Temporal Information Flows
The informational analysis above only shows a static picture of information flows on aver-
age, but does not tell us much about how these flows unfold on time (even when it gives
information about the different timescales of the system). To overcome this limitation, Beer
and Williams (2015) have proposed a framework combining information flow and dynamical
analyses, exploring how a simulated model agent in a relational categorization task integrates
information at different moments of time about a cue used for solving the task. Instead of
analysing information as an average of the dependences between variables along a time series,
they run the same task several times for different initial conditions and compute information
measures for each time instant. Instead of using a series of temporal values of a variable, they
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use a series of values of a variable on each instant along different starting conditions. Similarly,
we can fold our time series into 1000 time series in which e.g. CA0(i; t) = CA(t+(i  1)125),
where 125 is the duration of a trial. Now, for each value of t we have series of 1000 values for
CA, SA and L.
For six trials (i.e. t = 0; :::; 6  125s) we compute the mutual information between the
neurodynamic variables of the agent CA0 and SA0 and the light chosen at the end of the sixth
trial L0. Also, we can compute the joint mutual information thatCA0 and SA0 share with L0. In
Figure 3.18 (left) we can observe the result for the situated agent. We observe how the mutual
information I(CA0; L0) increases during the middle of the trial, fading out at the beginning and
the end. Also, from one trial to the next the information at the peak increases, being maximum
at the sixth trial. We can interpret this as a self-sustaining behaviour of cell assemblies: when a
cell assembly emerges, it reinforces itself and has more probabilities to emerge again the next
trial. Similarly, I(SA0; L0) steadily increases until a cell assembly is activated at the middle of the
sixth trial. However, mutual information between SA0 and L0 is steadily accumulated and does
not decrease, thus we can hypothesize that the configuration of the synapse ensembles ‘stores’
information about the behaviour that the agent will develop. Furthermore, when we analyse
the joint contribution I(CA0; SA0; L0), we observe that it is always higher that the individual
contributions. Moreover, it increases when I(CA0; L0)decreases at the transitions between one
trial and another. Also, I(CA0; SA0; L0) decreases when at the middle of the trial a cell assembly
is activated, except in the last trial. This portrays an interesting picture, where information
is flowing back and forth between the emergent cell assemblies and the collective cell-synapse
assemblies, until at the sixth trial an assembly emerges producing behaviour L0.
If we analyse the passively-coupled agent we observe a quite different picture. Although
I(SA0; L0) is quite similar in both situations (its values are slightly smaller in the passively-
coupled condition), I(SA0; L0) does not integrate any information. This suggest that even
when the input produced by behaviour L0 is able to influence the cell assemblies that emerge,
coordination between behaviour and the stabilization of synapse assemblies does not take
place. Furthermore, the joint information I(CA0; SA0; L0) does not integrate much informa-
tion either, and the anticorrelation between I(CA0; L0) and I(CA0; SA0; L0) disappears. This
suggests that the passively-coupled agent losses the struggle between information flows through
individual and collective variables, indicating that the important moments for generating the
behaviour of the agent are not only synchronizing moments of emergence of cell assemblies,
but most information is built mostly at desynchronizing instants corresponding to transition
from one assembly to the next.
Recapitulation
The different analysis present a picture in which for the situated agent a closed network of in-
teraction at different scales is circularly organized. On one hand, sensory activity and synaptic
configurations can trigger the emergence of cell assemblies at fast scales, provoking different
conducts in the agent. On the other, synaptic weights integrate information about the oscil-
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Figure 3.18: Information flows. Mutual information at different instants between cell assemblies (CA0), synapsembles
(SA0) and behaviour (L0)
latory patterns that are being homeostatically maintained, allowing to emergent behavioural
patterns that build a repertoire of habits for an agent. If the sensorimotor loop is disrupted
(e.g. when the agent is passively-coupled, and probably for more severe sensorimotor disrup-
tions), this circular closure disappears and autonomous organization of the agent vanishes.
In our model, the constitution of an agent as such depends on different neural, synaptic and
behavioural processes intertwined into a circular organization, from where asymmetries nec-
essary for differentiating between agent and world emerge from the recurrent interaction of
the different levels of activity.
3.7 Discussion
In this chapter we have proposed a characterization of neurocognitive autonomy based on (1)
the integration of transient assemblies underlying behaviour through nonlinear coupling of
neural clusters generating specific conducts in the agent, and (2) the coordination between sen-
sorimotor and neurodynamic structures into a self-maintaining web of behavioural patterns
(habits). The integration of these two level of activity gives rise to a sensorimotor dynamic core
which allows the emergence of moments of coherence sustaining an agent’s identity and the
possibility of flexibly engaging and disengaging into different available sensorimotor loops.
In order to explore this hypothesis, we have presented a minimal model of autonomous
behavioural preference, in which a robot is able to create self-sustaining and transient photo-
tactic patterns when presented with an environment with two different lights. The robot’s
controller is based on a network of three Kuramoto oscillators with a plastic homeostatic
mechanisms designed to maintain constant some relations among the oscillators by trigger-
ing changes in synaptic connectivity. The result is that behavioural preferences emerge from
the interaction between oscillator cell ensembles, ensembles of synaptic weights or ‘synapsem-
bles’, and the robot’s behaviour.
The picture drawn by our agent’s behaviour, although oversimplified, provides us with in-
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teresting notions for characterizing neurocognitive autonomy. In a world with two types of
stimulus, the coupling between the neural oscillators controlling the agent is able to generate
a basic form of coherence when a cell assembly emerges maintaining a specific sensorimotor
invariance (e.g. approaching light A). This self-maintained cell assembly however, quickly
dissolves when the agent reaches the light or when another behaviour emerges. This loss of
stability provokes plastic changes modifying the organization of the agent. Nevertheless, some
cell assemblies generate behaviours that reinforce the synaptic structures sustaining them, cre-
ating a circular interaction in which a cell-synapse neurodynamic structure is self-sustained
together with the behaviour generating it. This is what we have defined above as a habit or
a self sustaining pattern of behaviour coupling neurodynamical and sensorimotor structures.
At this longer timescale, a coordination takes place among microscopic neural activity, meso-
scopic configurations of synaptic organization, and the macroscopic level of behaviour. On an
even longer timescale, sequences of self-sustained patterns of behaviour create self-reinforcing
paths through a web of habits or behavioural preferences, as depicted in Figure 3.13, charac-
terizing the long-term organization of the agent.
Our model shows how different scales of a self-organizing neural system (neural ensem-
bles, an underlying layer of mechanisms of relational homeostatic plasticity and the agent’s
behaviour) generates a web of habits regulated in a distributed manner. Our model presents
a concrete implementation of different schema of autonomous behaviour that have so far
been mostly based on theoretical elaborations. Through our conceptual robotic model, the
experiments carried out with it and the information theoretic analytic methods applied, we
are now in a position to provide a more detailed operationally explicit and empirically testable
formulation of neurocognitive autonomy. In our definition of autonomy, we defined three
necessary properties for autonomous agency: operational closure, interactional asymmetry
and precariousness. Our model allows us to examine each one of the properties.
Operational closure. As we can observe in Figure 3.17 the information flows we analysed
in our agent create a closed network between the agent’s internal processes and sensorimotor
interactive processes. This network takes the form of a double coupling loop of self-sustained
assemblies and its plastic generative structure on the one hand and behavioural sensorimotor
patterns and the neural activation structure that generates them on the other. The interaction
between the two takes the form of a double feedback loop of (1) a circular causal dependence
between the emergence of cell ensembles and synapsembles, and (2) a causal chain in which
synapsembles influence behaviour and behaviour influence the emerge of cell ensembles as in
Figure 3.17 (left). This double feedback loop is broken when we analyse an agent in a passively-
coupled condition, being fed with an input recorded from a regular agent, suggesting that the
existence of a sensorimotor loop is essential from the emergence of coherent behaviour.
Interactive asymmetry. Moreover, as we represent in Figure 3.19, the operational clo-
sure of sensorimotor interactions creates a clear asymmetry between agent and environment,
in which the directionality of interactions is reversed at different scales (Figure 3.16). This al-
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Figure 3.19: Autonomous agency. Characterization of the information asymmetry in the interaction between an au-
tonomous agent and its environment.
lows us to identify the agent as a unit which is affected by bottom-up causal flows from the
variability of in the sensorimotor loop, and at the same time is able to develop a downward
causation over its sensorimotor interaction. This multiscale nature of the interactive asym-
metry between agent and environment potentially adds a novel element in our definition of
autonomous agent. Our model suggest that the interactional asymmetry that defines an agent
against this world is one in which the agent is structured by the microscopic regularities of the
environment, and in turn is able to exert a macroscopic regulation over them. The nature of
this asymmetry will be further explored in the next chapter.
Precariousness. Also, the operational closure of the system provides a level of ‘sense-
making’ into the activity of the agent, since now actions have a meaning proper to the perspec-
tive of the self-sustaining coherence of the agent: e.g. a particular event may help to maintain
a behavioural preference or to destroy it. This meaning is not rooted in any genetic encod-
ing or the design of the agent but in the history of interactions that generates or perturbs a
particular self-sustaining web of neurodynamic and sensorimotor structures. Thus, closed
regulatory loops modulate the maintenance and dissolution of neurodynamic structures nec-
essary to imprint autonomy into neurodynamic self-regulation. The possibility for autonomy
is created precisely in these breakdowns of the stability of the agent’s behaviour. In Varela’s
words, ‘[t]he key to autonomy is that a living system finds its way into the next moment by
acting appropriately out of its own resources. And it is the breakdowns, the hinges that artic-
ulate microworlds, that are the source of the autonomous and creative side of living cognition’
(Varela, 1992). As we observed in Figure 3.18, it is the breakdowns from one trial to the next
where information about the agent’s behaviour is generated. This is when, using Varela’s ter-
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minology, microidentities and their corresponding microworlds are generated – the A-light
seeking robotic agent, or the cyclist that enjoys a sunny ride through the park in our exam-
ple at the beginning of this chapter – in the form of an operational closure that sustains the
stable, specific forms of activation of the web of habits that constitutes the macroidentity of
the agent – the autonomous preference switching agent, or the cyclist that shapes her way to
work in an autonomous manner.
Here, we have examined the behaviour of the macroscopic variables of behaviour of our
agent, characterizing the transition between states and the information loops between collec-
tive patterns of groups of variables. Still, we may ask ourselves how these variables interact
and regulate themselves at different scales of description. We know that our model adaptively
maintains the state of the phase relations between oscillators (variables i which trigger plas-
tic changes when they are not kept within a viability space), but, what is the relation between
low-level relational homeostasis and macroscopic operational closure? What kind of invari-
ances in the dynamical organization of the agent are preserved? Are the relational homeostatic
variables in our agent a proxy for more fundamental aspects of the organization of the system
or the preservation of a dynamic core? In the next chapter we will investigate some of these
aspects taking a look at some indicators of the organization of the system at different temporal
and spatial scales.
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4
Situated Autonomy: complexity and
self-organized criticality
Abstract: Using the model in previous chapter, we characterize the interactions between different spa-
tial and temporal scales of autonomous organization, using different tools from complex systems science.
We address the role of plastic mechanisms and sensorimotor coupling in the emergence of autonomous
organization.
Contributions:
• We characterize the role of different variables in the generation of information flows in the system
using TSE complexity measures under different conditions of the agent.
• We assess the emergence of long-range correlations between different temporal scales by studying
the presence of 1=f patterns of the agent under different conditions.
• Based on the results of our experimental analysis, we are able to describe how different notions of
our definitions of autonomy are met in the mechanisms of the system: interactive asymmetry and
precariousness in the system operational closure.
Related publications:
• Aguilera, M., Barandiaran, X. E., Bedia, M. G., and Seron, F. (2015). Self-Organized Criticality,
Plasticity and Sensorimotor Coupling. Explorations with a Neurorobotic Model in a Behavioural
Preference Task. PLoS ONE, 10(2):e0117465.
In the previous chapter we have described and analysed in detail the behaviour of a model
of an autonomous robotic agent. We have observed how a neural controller embedded into
an agent through a double regulatory loop combining sensorimotor interaction and systemic
homeostatic regulation is able to display autonomous behaviour as it generates the invari-
ances and equilibriums that govern its behaviour. In the previous chapter we described au-
tonomous organization in terms of the macro-variables that drive the behaviour of the agent
(phase relationship patterns and connectivity patterns), but we do not know much about how
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these patterns emerge from the individual variables of the agent’s controller and what kind of
interaction takes place between micro, meso and macro levels. According to our definition
of autonomy, a simple double feedback loop is not sufficient for autonomous behaviour. In-
stead, these loops play a quite particular role in an asymmetric organizational structure, they
are able to display high levels of differentiated activity at the micro level in interaction with
external inputs, in order to cope with the complexity of the environment, at the same time
that they generate emerging integrated patterns at the macro level, in order to effectively act
over the world surrounding the agent. In this chapter we focus on the kind of relations be-
tween different temporal and spatial scales that allow the emergence of the double regulatory
loop required for cognitive autonomy. If in the previous chapter we characterized the circular
relations between macroscopic variables of the system, treating the mechanisms generating
them as a black box, here we analyse the inner structure behind the emergent properties of
the system. First, we analyse the low level patterns arising in our system and the presence of
metastability in the switching of those patterns, finding that more complex methods are re-
quired for unveiling the temporal and spatial structures underlying the metastable patterns
displayed by the system. We use TSE complexity to understand the spatial distribution of
information flows among the different variables of the system, and 1=f fractal scaling of dif-
ferent variables to characterize the distribution and coordination of different temporal scales.
This allows us to characterize with more detail some properties of autonomy we described in
the previous chapter, such as interactive asymmetry and precarious operational closure.
4.1 Experimental Setup
In the previous chapter we have simulated our agent in a quite controlled environment, in
which the position of the agent and the lights were reset after a given time. This was use-
ful for delimiting the agent’s behaviour into different trials and analysing how behavioural
preferences evolve. However, this is far from the kind of environment that is natural for an
autonomous agent, since it does not allow our agent to explore large scale regularities of its
world that may emerge from a less constrained behaviour. For the following simulations, we
create an environment with two types of lights as before. This time, whenever the agent is
close to one of the lights (closer than 25 units), the light starts being consumed. Each light
starts with an energy of 1, and whenever the agent is near the light it consumes at a linear rate
of 0:2 units per second. When a light is consumed, it disappears and a new light of the same
type appears at a random position. When a new light appears, it starts with a value of energy
of 0, which grows progressively during its 1 first seconds of life at a linear rate of 0:2 unit per
second. The intensity perceived by the agent is now multiplied by the amount of energy of
the light. Thus, we can model the evolution and renewal of the environment without need-
ing to reset the agent and the lights’ positions. We now have a more natural environment
without abrupt transitions where the agent can explore its environments without further re-
strictions than the lights fading away when consumed by the agent. This allows us to explore
larger timescales of the behaviour of the agent (especially relevant for the analysis of the fractal
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structure of the agent’s behaviour). Agents are simulated for a period of 1:25  105 seconds, in
which agents are able to consume several hundreds of lights.
We compare different types of agents to address the effect of neural plasticity and embod-
iment in the generation of the agent’s behaviour. However, in the first part of the experiment
we want to analyse the contribution of embodied interaction in a more precise way. As we saw
in Chapter 2, we can study the contribution of embodiment without removing the structure
of the input by analysing a partially decoupled agent.
We study four types of agents:
1. A normally functioning agent with both synaptic plasticity and a normal sensorimotor
interaction (S-P).
2. A passively-coupled agent, that is fed an input generated by a situated agent, but is not
able to influence its world (PC-P).
3. An agent without synaptic plasticity, where the values of the weights are obtained ran-
domly from a simulation of a situated agent1 (S-NP).
4. A passively-coupled agent without synaptic plasticity, which is fed an input signal gen-
erated by a situated agent also without synaptic plasticity (PC-NP).
4.2 Metastable Organization
In Chapter 3 we discussed in detail the idea of cell assemblies as an organizational model sup-
porting neural autonomy. Originally, Donald (Hebb, 1952, p.xix) developed the notion as a
‘diffuse structure comprising cells [...] capable of acting briefly as a closed system, delivering
facilitation to other such systems and usually having a specific motor facilitation’. This view
is still alive in modern neuroscience in different ways. For example, it has been hypothesized
that synchrony of neural oscillations is relevant for the encoding and maintenance of rules
(Engel, 2012). The role of neural assemblies seems to be reduced to the mediation between a
learned stimulus and a response. Although it is perfectly plausible that neural assemblies gen-
erate the possibility of rule-based behaviour, we think it is unlikely that their role is reduced
to simple input-output relations in the form of logical rules.
The notion of metastability allows us to conceive of a different picture, where the emer-
gence of synchronized patterns is not the result of logical rules but the action of a network of
loose interaction between dynamic coalitions of neural areas. Karl Friston (2000b) has stated
that the ability of a system to create dynamical instabilities (i.e. metastability) is key for the
generation of the diversity necessary for adaptive behaviour in the brain. A metastable regime
is characterized by transients periods of stability, thus, the frequency composition of the time
160 combinations of weight values were extracted from the value of the weights at the midpoint of the trials
of the simulation represented in Figure 3.5
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series of the system must change with time. As a consequence, Friston proposes a simple mea-
sure of metastability in terms of the instability or entropy of the spectral density of a signal.
If we characterize the spectral density of a signal at different moments of time (for example
through a wavelet transform) as g(!; t), a measure of the level of metastability of the system
may be obtained as:
MS = H(g(!; t)) (4.1)
where H() computes the Shannon entropy of a signal. However, if many frequencies are
taken into consideration, it is costly to compute the density function of the resulting multidi-
mensional signal. Therefore, Friston proposes computing it under Gaussian assumptions in
the form H = log((2e)mdetfCovfg(!; t)gg)=2.
For Kuramoto oscillators we can use another measure of metastability based on the order
parameter of the oscillator. Typically, the order parameter in a Kuramoto network is com-
puted as:
r =
 1N
NX
j=1
eij
 (4.2)
Murray Shanahan (2010) proposes that the level of metastability can be defined by the coali-
tion entropy, in which coalitions are defined as binary variables that arise when rc(t) is bigger
than a threshold, where c is defined as a subpopulation out of all the possible subdivisions C
of the network in which the order parameter is computed. A coalition s is said to arise at time
t if c >  if for all c 2 s, where  is a synchronization threshold. We define the coalition
entropy as the joint entropy of the order parameter of the different populations as:
HC =   1log2jSj
X
s2S
p(s)log2(p(s)) (4.3)
where S is the set of distinct coalitions the system can generate and p(s) the probability of
coalition s arising in any given time point.
The diversity in the possible coalitions that emerge out of the Kuramoto network is an
indicator of the level of metastability in the system. We use this measure in this chapter as an
indicator of the level of metastability in the Kuramoto controller of a robotic agent.
4.2.1 Emergence of Metastable Patterns in Autonomous Behaviour
In Chapter 3 we analysed how certain patterns were associated with the behaviour of the agent,
and we characterized a circular regulatory relation between behaviour and high-order patterns
in a double feedback loop. We also observed how this circular regulatory organization disap-
peared when sensorimotor loops were disrupted in a passively-coupled agent. However, in
the previous chapter we explored high-order patterns of joint phase-relationships and weight
activations, which do not explain much about how these patterns are created from low-level
mechanisms and how these mechanisms are regulated.
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What patterns does our agent display and how are they organized? Are there metastable
mechanisms regulating the emergence and dissolution of these patterns? What kind of mea-
sures can unveil the underlying structure of the system? Since the main behaviour of the
agent is to develop behavioural preferences of approaching either of the two lights, we study
whether these preferences correspond to a particular neurodynamic pattern. For doing so,
we identify the moments in which the agent is approaching one light and not the other by
computing the relative velocity towards one light with respect to the other. We compute this
relative velocity as vAB = d(dA dB)dt , where dA and dB are respectively the distances to light A and
B. Then we extract the moments when vAB is positive or negative in windows of 50 seconds.
We consider that the agent is approaching light A when vAB is positive for at least 75% of the
50 seconds window interval, and that the agent is going to light B when the vAB is negative for
75% of the interval. With this index we find that 21.0% of the time the agent is going only to
light A and 24.3% of the time the agent is approaching only light B (note that there may be
a percentage of the time when the agent is approaching both lights at the same time and it is
not considered here).
We analyse what kind of patterns arise when the agents are going to either of the two lights
for a trial of duration 1:25  105 seconds. For doing so, we compute the joint density distribu-
tions of variables '13 and '23 for both the situated and passively-coupled situated agents. We
do it by computing an averaged shifted histogram (Scott, 2012) of the joint distribution with
100 bins and 8 shifts. In the case of the situated agent, we find that well defined patterns are
formed when the agent approaches one of the lights (Figure 4.1.a). When the agent approaches
light A, '13 is stabilized and '23 moves freely, and the opposite happens when the agent goes
to light B. This does not happen for the passively-coupled agent, since the patterns arising are
much more ‘blurred’ (Figure 4.1.b). This suggest that situated agents are able to coordinate
precise neurodynamic patterns when they enter in different modes of engagement, thus gen-
erating finely coordinated complex patterns that display a high degree of metastability and
complexity. On the other hand, passively-coupled agents are able to stabilize sensorimotor
patterns and thus not generate moments of transient stability.
Agents without synaptic plasticity however do not create such dramatic distinctions be-
tween dynamical signatures of situated and passively-coupled agents. Although signatures are
not identical, they present similar shape and attractor locations (Figure 4.2), suggesting that
agents with plasticity actively regulate the emergent sensorimotor patterns through modifica-
tion of their synaptic weights. In turn, for agents without plasticity, it is the structure of the
received input that determines the patterns being stabilized, and not the metastable interac-
tions between the agent’s internal and sensorimotor dynamics.
To test this hypothesis, we analyse the degree of dynamical instabilities (i.e. metastability)
in the system using the coalition entropy measure defined in Equation 4.3, using a threshold
of  = 0:95. This measure computes the joint entropy of the order parameter of the possible
coalitions that may arise in the system. We compute the values of metastability for 50 trials of
duration 1:25 105 seconds for each type of agent. As displayed in Figure 4.3, all agents present
157
a)
sin(ϕ13)
si
n
(ϕ
2
3
)
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
c)
sin(ϕ13)
si
n
(ϕ
2
3
)
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
b)
sin(ϕ13)
si
n
(ϕ
2
3
)
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
d)
sin(ϕ13)
si
n
(ϕ
23
)
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Situated agent Passively-coupled agent
L
ig
h
t
A
L
ig
h
t
B
Figure 4.1: Dynamical signatures of agents with synaptic plasticity. Averaged shifted histogram of the phase relation-
ships between oscillators for each type of behaviour for situated and passively-coupled agents with synaptic plasticity.
in some cases significant values of metastability (note that the maximum value of entropy for
four binary variables is 4). We observe that, for agents with normal synaptic plasticity, the
situated agent always displays a higher value of metastability, showing more variety in the
combination of coalitions that may arise in the system.
This is interesting since the situated agents seem to present both the ability to stabilize co-
herent patterns of phase-locking for particular behaviours, together with a more metastable
state, therefore having a higher ability to dissolve these patterns and switch between them.
For the case of the agents without synaptic plasticity, we find a broad range of metastability
values. Being the weights selected randomly from a variety of cases, it seems reasonable that
some configurations of the agent present a highly stable behaviour and others a metastable
one (as we saw in the previous chapter, some states of the agent were more open to the world
and others were ‘blind’ to the influence of certain environmental stimulus for the commit-
ment or choice towards one of the light sources). Although situated agents without plasticity
present a higher mean value of metastability, if we compare the distributions between situated
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Figure4.2: Dynamical signaturesof agentswithout synapticplasticity. Averaged shiftedhistogramof thephase relation-
shipsbetweenoscillators foreach typeofbehaviour for situatedandpassively-coupledagentswithout synapticplasticity.
and passively-coupled agents with and without plasticity using ANOVA, we find that agents
with plasticity present statistically significant different distributions [F(1; 98) = 233:13; p =
1:1710 27], while agents without plasticity do not present significantly different distributions
[F(1; 98) = 0:22; p = 0:64]. Thus, situated agents only increase their levels of metastability
when they have synaptic plasticity.
Finally, we observe that the agent with synaptic plasticity presents values of metastability
that are in the upper part of the wide range of the values presented by the agents without
synaptic plasticity. This suggests that among all possible combinations of weights, plastic
mechanisms operate in a way that maintain the agent with high levels of metastability.
From these results, we find that (1) when agents are situated, they present stable differ-
entiated patterns and a more diverse repertoire of patterns (i.e. it is highly metastable) at the
same time, and (2) plastic mechanisms modulate the dynamics of the agents to maintain a
high level of metastability among a very wide range of possible embodied behaviours, indi-
cating that plasticity might be playing a meta-regulatory role for the agent (i.e. not only reg-
ulatory behaviour but higher-order equilibriums in the system as the levels of metastability).
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Figure4.3: Metastability. Distributionsof the indicesofmetastability fordistribution for50agentsof each type: situated
(S) and passively-coupled (PC) agents, with sypaptic plasticity (P) andwithout synaptic plasticity (NP).
These findings require a finer grained analysis of how the agent’s activity is distributed and
coordinated in time and space, and what the role of the different mechanisms is. In the next
sections we make use of more sophisticated tools to gain a better understanding of the agent’s
behaviour.
4.3 Complex Systems Tools for Characterizing Autonomous Organization
Characterizing autonomous organization is not an easy task. We have depicted autonomous
organization of the nervous system in which coalitions of neural units synchronize transiently,
creating the underlying dynamical structure that allows the emergence of specific cognitive
acts. This description brings some requirements for neural organization, for example, it is re-
quired to display metastable modes of coordination in which the system is never permanently
trapped into an attractor but always switches among a set of quasi-attractors. Moreover, neu-
ronal systems must present a virtuous combination of integration (the system presents a co-
herence as a whole) and differentiation (the system displays a vast set of possible behavioural
patterns). Inspired by recent work in autonomous robotics and notions from radically em-
bodied neurodynamics we posed the question about whether different modes of neural or-
ganization are restricted to the brain or also cut across brain-body-environment boundaries.
Doing so demands the use of tools for characterizing these modes of complex organization.
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In a recent manuscript, Tognoli and Kelso analyse how information flows in the brain
must be reconciled with synchronization and mass action in the brain (Tognoli and Kelso,
2013). They suggest that metastability may be a dynamical regime where both concepts can
coexist, displaying an interplay of integrative and segregative tendencies that are expressed in
space and time during the normal course of brain and behavioural function. In particular,
the ability of the brain to create information flows must be reconciled with its propensity for
synchronization and mass action. Typically, approaches to complex systems are divided into
those that derive from information theory and those than come from deterministic nonlinear
dynamical systems (Friston, 2000b). In this chapter, we use a representative example of each
one of them to analyse the correlations between different temporal and spatial scales.
As we reviewed during chapter 1, tools and concepts of complex systems research (often
forged in the realm of physics) are increasingly permeating cognitive science and the way we
understand the mind and ourselves. Since early cybernetics (Ashby, 1954) and system’s the-
ory (Bertalanffy, 1969, 1950), what might currently be called the complex systems approach
to cognition, has put the emphasis on self-organization, the irreducible non-linearity of cog-
nitive processes and circular causality (Kugler et al., 1980; Kelso, 1995; Thelen, 1996). This
approach contrasts with some classical assumptions behind the computational theory of the
mind: modularity, functional decomposition, perception-action dichotomy or agent-envi-
ronment ‘decoupling’ (sharp analytic separation between the dynamics of the agent and the
environment). The complex systems approach to cognitive science seeks to move beyond the
formalism of computational theory and information exchange and to place cognition within
the broader formalism of dynamical systems (Van Orden et al., 2003; Dixon et al., 2012; Tog-
noli and Kelso, 2013).
Paradigmatic examples of the conceptual tools of the complex systems approach to neuro-
science and cognitive science, with applications in several domains (in particular in cognitive
science and neuroscience), are the concepts of TSE complexity (Tononi et al., 1994; Tononi
and Edelman, 1998), and self-organized criticality (SOC hereafter) and 1=f noise (also known
as scale-free or pink noise) (Bak et al., 1987; Jensen, 1998). We believe that these notions are use-
ful for characterizing our definition of autonomy, specifying the relationships among scales in
the spatial and temporal domains. The goal of this chapter is to analyse the behaviour of the
robotic agent presented in the previous chapter, and to understand the structure that sustains
the circular closed loop that we depicted to characterize autonomous organization.
4.3.1 Generative Mechanisms of Autonomous Behaviour
Sometimes, research in complex systems approaches to cognitive science has been divided be-
tween advocates of two apparently irreconcilable views. The discussion has been explicit for
research in 1=f patterns: while nomothetic perspectives on 1=f noise promote general expla-
nations of 1=f noise (Van Orden et al., 2003; Dotov et al., 2010), and mechanistic perspectives
on 1=f noise focus on modelling specific processes underlying particular phenomena or call-
ing for physiologically detailed mechanistic models (Torre and Wagenmakers, 2009; Rubinov
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et al., 2011). Some of the latter accuse the former of proceeding ‘by identifying a mysterious
phenomenon (i.e. 1=f noise) and explaining this phenomenon by verbal reference to a series
of other mysterious phenomena (e.g. SOC), without ever making contact with latent cogni-
tive processes’ (Wagenmakers et al., 2012, p.91). This debate could be extended to many other
metrics of complexity.
It is the tendency to ignore specific mechanisms that demands attention, since the alleged
lack of explanatory power of nomothetic perspectives (making verbal references to other mys-
terious phenomena) is motivated by a lack of reference to constituent components of the ex-
planation. Following Kaplan and Bechtel’s call for complementarity between nomothetic and
mechanistic explanations (Kaplan and Bechtel, 2011) we believe that much is to be learned
by attempting to connect and explore the relationship between behaviour generating mecha-
nisms (at different levels of abstraction) and the regularities displayed by such mechanisms in
operation. It is here that conceptual models (Di Paolo et al., 2000; Barandiaran and Moreno,
2006; Barandiaran and Chemero, 2009) can be useful. Conceptual models, such as the robotic
model presented here, need not model specific target systems (i.e. a natural system, its be-
haviour and its physiological processes) but might bring into the model abstract mechanisms,
general principles or generic processes, in order to study the relationship between different lev-
els of explanation (e.g. between mechanistic and nomothetic explanations), between different
types of phenomena or between different measurements and the principles or properties they
capture providing valuable insights for future empirical experimentation and modelling.
In this sense, only measuring exponents of TSE complexity or 1=f scaling is not useful for
understanding autonomous behaviour if the mechanisms generating complex behaviour are
not characterized. There are multiple examples of non-autonomous (and even trivial) systems
generating high values of TSE complexity or 1=f scaling. What is important is the role of
different mechanisms in generating the complex structures captured by these indicators. By
applying complexity and SOC indicators over a particular model (in which we can analyse in
detail internal mechanisms in normal conditions or under different modifications), we can get
a clearer picture about their origin and how they might be related to the notion of autonomy
we are proposing. Thus, it is necessary to analyse what is the relation in our model of different
complexity indicators and the mechanisms of sensorimotor coupling and synaptic plasticity
generating them.
Frequently, measures of complexity like TSE complexity or 1=f scaling have been con-
nected with notions related to neurocognitive autonomy such as intentionality (Juarrero, 1999;
Van Orden and Holden, 2002) consciousness (Tononi and Edelman, 1998). Although there
is a wide consensus about the potential of such metrics to understand complex mechanisms,
it is necessary go beyond their understanding and their dependence on specific, underlying,
generating mechanisms. In this chapter we analyse whether these indicators are present, and
what the role of internal mechanisms and sensorimotor regulation is for their generation:
• If an autonomous system has to be capable of spontaneously transiting among different
dynamic regimes without these transitions being localized at any specific module, then
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measures of simultaneous segregation and integration become valuable candidates to
identify the degree to which a system might be considered autonomous. We make use
of TSE complexity to analyse spatial segregation and integration among different vari-
ables in the agent’s controller and the environment to analyse the compromise between
integration and segregation at different scales of systemic organization.
• Similarly, an autonomous agent faces a similar challenge in the temporal domain, it
needs to coordinate particular sensorimotor contingencies at fast scales, but it also needs
to create long-range correlations in order to create coherent patterns of macroscopic be-
haviour. Measures of fractal temporal scaling are suited to understand how multiscale
correlations are generated within the agent’s controller and agent-environment interac-
tions.
4.4 Integration and Segregation among the System’s Components:
TSE complexity
Entropy-based complexity measures have been proposed to capture the balance between the
integration of different brain areas and the local preservation of information that produces a
rich variety in the patterns displayed by the brain. Specifically, TSE complexity was proposed
by Tononi, Sporns and Edelman as a measure to capture the dialectic between the preserva-
tion of regionally specific dynamic and the maintenance of a global coherence in the system
(Tononi et al., 1994). Later, Tononi and Edelman (1998) proposed that TSE complexity is a
suitable measure for characterizing the kind of neural organization of their dynamic core hy-
pothesis. There are different equivalent formulations of how TSE complexity is computed.
One of them is to define TSE complexity in terms of the average mutual information shared
between different bipartitions of the system summed over all bipartition sizes:
C(X) =
n=2X
k=1
< MI(Xkj ;X  Xkj ) > (4.4)
where X is a system composed by n elements, and Xkj is a subset of the system of size k.
Thus, C computes the ensemble average of mutual integration between subsets of a given
size and the rest of the system. Mutual information is a measure of the statistical dependence
between two subsets of neural elements, as we described it in equation 3.7. In what follows
we use TSE complexity as a measure of the joint maximization of integration and segregation
predicted by the dynamic core hypothesis2.
2 More recently, Tononi developed his information integration theory of consciousness (Tononi, 2004),
claiming that consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate information, and proposing a
novel measure for the ‘level’ of consciousness generated by a system () as the amount of causally effective in-
formation that can be integrated across the weakest link of a system. As opposed to TSE complexity,  is not a
measure of complexity but irreducibility, and is much more computationally costly.
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Generally, TSE complexity has been analysed for brain activity without taking into ac-
count bodily or environmental factors. However, there is no reason for not applying TSE or
other information measures to variables placed in the body or the environment of the agent.
Moreover, for measuring the type of sensorimotor autonomy we have defined, which does not
take place exclusively in the head, we must take into account also those variables throughout
the sensorimotor loop.
To our knowledge, there is so far no analysis of TSE complexity that explicitly takes into
consideration an agent-environment coupled system as such. There are instances in which
TSE complexity is analysed in a system as it is fed an input (Tononi et al., 1996), but they do
not feature a strongly coupled system in which agent and environment influence each other.
Nevertheless, there has been work characterizing information flows for embodied agents. In
Beer and Williams (2015), a framework is proposed combining information flow and dynam-
ical analyses, exploring how a simulated model agent in a relational categorization task inte-
grates information about a cue used for solving the task. They evolve different kinds of agent,
distinguishing between passive agents which store information about the cue in one of their
interneurons, and active agents who store the information about the cue in the variable depict-
ing the agent’s position. This is an example of how information analyses may not only take
into account the ‘brain’ of an agent but also its whole sensorimotor interaction, discovering
counterintuitive processes going on in the agent-environment interaction.
4.4.1 Information Flows Between Oscillators, Synaptic Mechanisms and Sen-
sorimotor Coupling
We know that the agent presents both phase-locking mechanisms, which reduce the informa-
tional content in favour of a coordinated behaviour, and metastable states (which increases
the information flow within the system). Above we hypothesized that the autonomous orga-
nization of the agent maximizes the compromise between integration and segregation. Here
we analyse the extent to which the neural controller of our agent combines segregation and in-
tegration in its structure and how it is generated. Moreover, we want to understand the effect
of sensorimotor and plastic regulatory loops, thus we analyse how integration and segregation
takes place between agent and environment for the four types of agents.
We analyse TSE complexity in the agent’s controller for different situations and different
variable sets. Each situation is tested for an agent in 50 different trials of duration 1:25 105 sec-
onds. To reduce computational costs and similarly to what we did in Chapter 3, we simplify
the variables of the system into binary variables. We take three binary variables CAij to char-
acterize the phase relations between oscillators, which are equal to one if i  j > 0 and zero
otherwise. Similarly, we can define 6 binary variables SAij, which are equal to one if Ki;j > 4 .
Moreover, to take into account the state of the environment, we can define four variables Si
which encode whether each of the four sensors is activated above its mean value during the
trial. Similarly, we define the variablesCAij andKi;j for the passively coupled agents (note that
Si is the same for both the situated and passively-coupled agents). For every agent, we compute
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the values of TSE complexity for different subsets of variables for both situated and passively-
coupled conditions. The result of analysing TSE complexity in the agent’s controller with
synaptic plasticity can be observed in Figure 4.4. The first thing we observe is that, for the
set containing the three variable groups (CA; SA; S) (4.4, left), values of TSE complexity are
higher for the situated agent than the passively coupled agents (note that we cannot compare
here the values for the agents without plasticity since SA does not change with time). Situ-
ated agents with synaptic plasticity have around 10% more informational complexity than the
passively coupled in similar conditions although they are being fed with the exact same signal.
Moreover, we observe that values of TSE complexity are similar for (CA; SA) for the situated
and passively-coupled agents, whereas the values of TSE complexity decrease again for vari-
able sets (CA; SA) and (SA; S), indicating that the increase of complexity is only taking place
when the synaptic weights are involved (4.4, middle). For groups of variables of the same type,
the values of TSE complexity are similar for (CA) and (S), while they decrease again for the
passively coupled agent for (SA) (4.4, right). This suggests that, although the individual com-
plexity ofCA andS are the same, there is a higher level of integration between those two groups
of variables when synaptic plasticity is involved. Also, the complexity of SA increases when the
agent is situated, suggesting that more complex patterns of weight connectivity emerge when
the loop of sensorimotor configuration is operating. If we compare numerically the increase
in value of complexity between situated and passively-coupled agents, we observe that while
the mean increase of TSE values for (SA) is of 0.11, mean TSE complexity increases more for
join sets of variables (SA;CA) (0.21), (SA; S) (0.36) and (CA; SA; S) (0.28). This means that
although individual complexity of SA augments, the main increase in complexity takes place
in the interaction between synaptic plasticity and oscillatory coupling or sensorimotor regula-
tion, being especially intense for the interaction between synaptic plasticity and sensorimotor
coupling.
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Figure 4.4: TSE complexity in agents with synaptic plasticity. Wemeasure TSE complexity for 50 trials for situated and
passively coupled agents with normal synaptic plasticity. Variables belonging to passively-coupled agents are indicated
with an asterisk ().
Moreover, if we analyse the amount of entropy of each set of variables (Figure 4.5), we
find that the levels of entropy do not decrease for the passively-coupled agents (indeed, they
even slightly increase for some cases as (CA; SA; S)). Thus, the increase of TSE complexity
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for the situated agent cannot be explained in terms of an increase of entropy (segregation) in
the system, but an increase of the integrative capacity of the situated agent. This suggests that
the enhancement of neural integration achieved through sensorimotor coupling only hap-
pens when the agent has plastic mechanism that may engage or disengage different modes of
coupling with the environment.
8.8
9
9.2
9.4
9.6
9.8
(CA,SA,S) (CA∗,SA∗,S)
E
4.5
5
5.5
6
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
(CA,SA) (CA,S) (SA,S) (CA∗,SA∗) (CA∗,S) (SA∗,S)
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
(CA) (SA) (S) (CA∗) (SA∗) (S)
Figure 4.5: Entropy in agents with synaptic plasticity. We measure Shannon's entropy complexity for 50 trials for situ-
ated and passively coupled agents with normal synaptic plasticity. Variables belonging to passively-coupled agents are
indicated with an asterisk ().
For the agent without synaptic plasticity (Figure 4.6), we observe that all the values of
TSE complexity are similar in all cases between the situated and passively coupled agent. This
suggests that synaptic plasticity has an essential role for enhancing integrated information of
the agent’s sensorimotor loop. A passively-coupled agent without synaptic plasticity has the
same levels of integration and segregation of its variables than its corresponding situated agent.
In this case, the closure of the sensorimotor loop on its own (without plasticity) does not add
any extra complexity to the behaviour of the agent.
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Figure 4.6: TSE complexity in agentswithout synaptic plasticity. We analyse themeasure of TSE complexity for 50 trials
for situatedandpassively coupledagentswithout synaptic plasticity. Variablesbelonging topassively-coupledagents are
indicated with an asterisk ().
Together, these results indicate that the combination of a sensorimotor loop and synap-
tic plasticity boost the levels of complexity (understood as combined integration-segregation
functions) of the agent-environment system. This is especially interesting since this increase
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of complexity does not only take place in the internal variables of the agent’s neural controller
(CA; SA) but in a space of interaction between internal and sensorimotor variables (SA; S)
and (CA; SA; S). Additionally, this increase of sensorimotor complexity only takes place for
agents with synaptic plasticity, suggesting that enhanced complexity depends on the coupling
between synaptic and sensorimotor regulatory loops: it is the active regulation of the sensori-
motor loop by plastic controllers what allows a higher level of integrated information.
4.5 Frequency Domain of Metastability: 1=f noise
Evidence suggests that the metastable regime of the brain is achieved by the cross-scale inter-
actions of many levels of organization through the temporal coordination of neuronal oscilla-
tions that operate at multiple frequencies and at different spatial scales (Le Van Quyen, 2011).
The existence of many spatial and temporal scales within the brain ensures that neural oscilla-
tions are never locked into a particular frequency. Instead, different oscillators are loosely cou-
pled with adjacent frequencies in a regime of perpetual fluctuation. This creates a structure
where no scale is favoured over the others. In terms of the frequency spectrum of brain activ-
ity, this is translated into a scale-free or 1=f distribution of the frequency spectrum (Buzsaki,
2006, p. 119). This regime describes dynamical system where the amount of power the signal
outputs over a certain bandwidth (its power spectral density) is inversely proportional to its
frequency. If we think about it in logarithmic terms, it means that if we integrate the amount
of power contained at each temporal scale (e.g. 1   10Hz, 10   100Hz, 100   1000Hz) the
result is the same no matter what the scale is. Thus, the system does not display a preferred
timescale of activity. This behaviour is typical of physical systems in a critical state where the
correlation length tends to infinity (Reatto, 2007). An example of this is the liquid-vapor
critical point, which is achieved under some specific conditions of temperature and pressure.
However, there are certain kinds of systems that evolve spontaneously towards a point dis-
playing critical behaviour. These systems are said to be in a state of self-organized criticality
(see Section 1.2.3). The concept of SOC was initially proposed by Bak et al. (1987) to define
certain classes of dynamical systems which have a critical point as an attractor, displaying criti-
cal behaviour without any significant ‘tuning’ of the system from the outside. Critical systems
have very interesting properties, the most characteristic of which is that they spontaneously
display a lack of a dominant scale of activity. They show complex dynamical responses and
their statistical properties have to be described by power laws. Thus, critical systems typically
display temporal and spatial scale invariance in the form of fractals and 1=fnoise, reflecting the
process of propagation of long-range interactions based on local effects. The notion of SOC
is appealing because it allows us to imagine systems that are able to self-regulate coordinated
behaviours at different scales in a distributed manner and without a central controller, which
are all properties that have been argued to be necessary for autonomy.
It has been shown that the brain is in a continuous state of SOC. Experimental evidence
and artificial neural network models support this hypothesis. Criticality in the brain is sug-
gested by power law scaling in degree distributions of functional brain networks or avalanche
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size distributions (Chialvo, 2006). Long-range correlations in the form of 1=f patterns have
been extensively found in EEG/MEG measurements of brain activity in alpha, mu, and beta
oscillations (Linkenkaer-Hansen et al., 2001). Scale-free neocortical dynamics has also been
ascertained by Freeman in EEG measurements in rabbits (Freeman, 2005). In addition, there
are many instances of critically self-organized behaviour in artificial network models, which
provide some interesting insights (Rybarsch and Bornholdt, 2012). For example, it has been
shown that a broad (robust) critical regime is favoured by the presence of strong synaptic in-
teraction and high synaptic time-dependent plasticity (Rubinov et al., 2011).
SOC has been suggested as a candidate for characterizing a state allowing the system to
remain in a self-organized state that is at the same time stable (or metastable) while also ex-
tremely sensitive to small microscopic perturbations, and with the capacity to develop long-
range correlations at all the scales of the system without requiring a costly fine tuning of local
parameters (Werner, 2007b). In turn, the presence of 1=f noise has been proposed as an in-
dicator of the long-term evolution of a dynamic core in EGG measurements (Le Van Quyen,
2003).
Self-Organized Criticality and Embodied Autonomous Behaviour
The extensive finding of 1=f noise patterns does not only apply to the brain but also extends
to behaviour. SOC and 1=f have also been extensively found in cognitive science and psy-
chology. For example, 1=f noise is present in time series showing how performance fluctuates
over time (Gilden, 2001). More recently, Van Orden et al. (2003, 2005) used 1=fnoise measure-
ments in different tasks to gather evidence to defend the idea that certain systems are not mod-
ular and decomposable but are ‘softly assembled’ systems sustained by interaction-dominant
dynamics (IDD hereafter) as opposed to component-dominant dynamics (Van Orden et al.,
2003). That is, IDD systems do not consist of additive interactions of their components,
but of multiplicative interactions that imply coordination between the different timescales
in the system. Silberstein and Chemero suggest that 1=f measurements can be an indicator of
brain-body-environment systems of nested self-organization (Silberstein and Chemero, 2012).
This hypothesis is inspired by measurements of 1=f noise in a simple human-tool interaction
with and without perturbations in the interface between human and tool (Dotov et al., 2010).
Self-organized criticality thus becomes an interesting candidate for explaining the holistic and
integrated nature of mental life; and its 1=f noise manifestation a signature or quantitative
indicator of this holistic integration (Silberstein and Chemero, 2011).
Whereas evidence for the presence of 1=f noise in neural dynamics and in certain experi-
mental psychology tasks is apparent (mostly behavioural data in the latter case), there is very
little understanding of how both neurodynamic and behavioural levels relate to each other
and to 1=f noise. Moreover, most models proposing generative mechanisms for the emer-
gence of 1=f noise are focused on either a behavioural (Torre and Wagenmakers, 2009) or a
neural level (Usher et al., 1995; Rubinov et al., 2011). Although insightful, these models fall
short of providing in-depth explanations about the nature of neural and behavioural organi-
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zation in embodied subjects in a softly assembled brain-body-environment system, because in
such models the systems are never shown to operate embedded in a specific environment.
The Controversy over the Explanatory Capacity of 1=f Noise Measurements
Despite the enthusiasm aroused by the widespread finding of 1=f noise, some authors re-
main cautious about its specific interpretation. Van Orden et al. claim that ubiquitous pink
noise is not sufficient evidence of self-organized criticality but rather a necessary consequence
(Van Orden et al., 2003, p. 343). They argue that while it is possible to interpret 1=f noise in
some contexts as a signature of a softly assembled system (self-sustained by IDD and SOC)
this is not always necessarily the case. Moreover, 1=f is not a unique and exclusive property
of SOC systems (see (Wagenmakers et al., 2004, 2012)) since it can be displayed by a linear
superposition of random components acting on multiple time scales (Hausdorff and Peng,
1996). To avoid the uncertainty about the true origin of 1=fnoise some authors have suggested
complementing it with a measure of multifractality as a quantitative indicator of interaction-
dominant dynamics, providing a means to ensure the nonlinear nature of the ongoing inter-
actions that build the self-organized process (Ihlen and Vereijken, 2010).
4.5.1 Self-Organized Criticality in Autonomous Organization
So far, we have quantified for different types of agents the dynamic creation and dissolution of
patterns through metastable mechanisms and through the integration of information loops
through the sensorimotor loop. All these analyses deal with how activity is coordinated be-
tween different variables of the system and the environment, displaying a picture of how dif-
ferent spatial scales are integrated into a complex but coherent unit. In this section we analyse
interaction between scales in the temporal domain. We analyse 1=f patterns for the three dif-
ferent agents (situated, decoupled and without synaptic plasticity) to find out if they can be
characterized as SOC systems, being especially careful to rule out false positives of 1=f-like pat-
terns that are not produced by SOC. We first use two different methods to characterize 1=f
patterns (fractal and spectral methods). Then, we measure multifractal exponents for charac-
terizing nonlinear correlations between scales .
Fractal and Spectral Methods
For the same four conditions (situated or passively-coupled, with and without plasticity) we
analyse 50 simulations during 125000s (same as above) and looked for long-range correlations
in different variables. A preliminary analysis shows that long-range correlations are found in
series of sensory data and the instantaneous frequencies of the oscillators (i.e. the derivatives
of ). For other variables such as modification of synaptic weights, long range correlations did
not appear or disappeared for longer timescales. Thus, we measure 1=f correlations in two
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different signals

 =
1
3
3X
i=1
_i (4.5)
where _i is the first derivative of the phase of oscillator i (therefore being 
 the mean instan-
taneous frequency of the oscillator ensemble), and
S = 14
X
DX
sDX (4.6)
where sDX are the four sensors of the agent (D standing for right or left sensor and X for light
A or light B sensor). Both of these signals present correlations in the form of 1=f patterns,
at least in some cases, extending up timescales of the same magnitude of the duration of the
simulation.
Simply identifying a linear slope in a logarithmic representation is not enough for charac-
terizing 1=f noise. Van Orden et al. (2005) propose the use of fractal and spectral methods
in tandem in order to avoid the mistake of taking transient correlations for scaling relations.
We therefore use two different methods for characterizing 1=f dynamics: the discrete Fourier
transform (DFT) and detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA). DFT allows us to decompose a
signal into its different frequency components. Then, we use Welch’s method (Welch, 1967)
to estimate the signal’s power spectrum. Welch’s method divides a signal into different over-
lapping sections (we choose eight sections with 50% overlap), and each section is windowed
with a Hamming window and eight modified periodograms are computed and averaged. If
the resulting power spectrum has the form of a 1=f function, we say that the signal exhibits
fractal dynamics. Usually, processes with  around 1 are considered to display SOC (Jensen,
1998).
DFA (Peng et al., 2000) is a method for determining the statistical self-affinity of a signal.
In a nutshell, the DFA algorithm removes the mean and integrates (cumulatively sums) the
analysed time series x(i) into y(k) and then divides it into segments of equal length n (i.e. of a
certain time scale). For each segment, the least squares line (the trend of the signal within that
segment) is fitted to the data obtaining a local linear approximation yn(n). The characteristic
size of the fluctuation F(n) is computed as the root mean square deviation between the inte-
grated signal and its trend in each segment. This computation is repeated for every value of
n.
y(k) =
kX
i=1
x(i) (4.7)
F(n) =
vuut 1
N
NX
k=1
[y(k)  yn(k)]2 (4.8)
where N is the total length of x(n). Typically, F(n) increases with n. A linear relationship
on a log-log plot with slope  indicates the presence of fractal scaling in the analysed signal,
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where  is a generalization of the Hurst exponent, and is related to the scaling in the Power
Spectrum of the Fourier analysis being  = 2    1.
DFA has some advantages compared to DFT analysis. While DFT is only well suited for
stationary signals, DFA has been reliably used for non-stationary signals. Moreover, results
from DFT are often noisy and sometimes not absolutely reliable for determining linear rela-
tionships in logarithmic scales (e.g. see Wagenmakers et al., 2004). We focus our analysis in a
temporal scale ranging from 102s to 104:5s3.
Detrended Fluctuation Analysis
If we take different series of the variables 
 and S from equations 4.5 and 4.6 for the situated
agent and apply the DFA algorithm to them, we find that the signal presents linear relation-
ships on a logarithmic scale from 102:0s up to around 104:5s. Note that in previous chapters
we observe that 102s was the approximate time that the agent needs to reach a light, therefore
making long-range correlations belong to the different timescales of the agent’s behaviour. If
we compute the  coefficient for each variable and agent (see representative examples at Fig-
ure 4.7) we find that it is quite close to pink noise for both variables in the case of the situated
agent. We observe that the values of the exponents are typically close to 0:8 for
 and 0:9 for
S. For the passively-coupled agent we observe that the value of  decreases with respect to the
situated agent for 
 (note that the value of S is the same in the situated and passively-coupled
agents, since the input is recorded from the former and fed into the latter). In the case of the
agents without synaptic plasticity, the coefficients of  vary widely compared to agents with
plasticity. Moreover, in most cases the correlations of 
 cut-off around 104s, not reaching
higher timescales. Further, we observe that in many cases the value of  decreases again for
passively-coupled agents. We can run the simulation several times for different initial values
and we always find quite similar results, with  around 0:77. This result suggests that the
process of the emergence of complex patterns analysed above is generated by SOC.
Discrete Fourier Transform
We have seen that sensorimotor coupling and synaptic plasticity play an important role in the
generation of SOC dynamics. To further test this result, we have computed the equivalent
DFT spectrum of the signal. For the situated signal, we find a region with a fractal scaling for
frequencies between 10 2Hz and 10 4:5Hz very close to pink noise for both variables 
 and
S, confirming the results of fractal scaling for the situated agent with synaptic plasticity. The
passively-coupled agent also presents similar results, although we observe how fractal scaling
of variable 
 is cut-off at f = 10 4Hz. We observe that the same happens for the agents
without plasticity (both situated and passively-coupled). Thus, from now on we restrict the
frequency range of analysis of variable 
 to [10 2Hz; 10 4:5Hz].
3Although the figures show a broader spectrum, calculations of log-linear relations are made within this
range or subsets of this range
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Figure 4.7: Detrended fluctuation analysis. We observe that situated agents present values of close to 1 for both vari-
ables
 and S, indicating the presence of long-range correlations. The value of decreases when the agent is passively-
coupled, removed of synaptic plasticity or both at the same time.
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Figure 4.8: Discrete Fourier transform. We observe the results from the DFA algorithm are consistent with the spectral
analysis, confirming the presence of 1=f patterns shown by Figure 4.7.
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Fractal scaling and generative mechanisms
We have shown the particular case of one agent and how long-range correlations are reduced
when strong sensorimotor coupling or synaptic plasticity are lost. In figure 4.9 we show the
distribution of fractal exponents computed with the DFA algorithm of 50 different agents for
each condition, confirming the generality of the results. As we observe, fractal exponents are
very close to 1 for situated agents with synaptic plasticity (‘S-P’) for both internal (
(t)) and
interactive (S(t)) variables.
Internal dynamics
For passively-coupled agents (‘PC-P’) the fractal exponents of
(t) are reduced and present
a different distribution from the situated case according to the results from the ANOVA
[F(1; 98) = 301:05; p = 1:22  10 31]. This indicates that long-range correlations in internal
variables of the oscillatory components are not built internally nor induced form an external
input, but built in dialectical interaction between the agent’s brain and its environment. It is
the process of agent-environment interaction where long-range dependencies are generated.
Moreover, for the agents without synaptic plasticity (‘S-NP’ and ‘PC-NP’) , we obtain
similar scaling values for 
(t), showing that agent-environment interaction generates scale-
free patterns of behaviour in our agent. Agents without plasticity also show a decrease in 
exponents when situatedness is lost, although in this case it is not clear that the difference
between the two distributions is statistically significant [F(1; 98) = 3:19; p = 0:0772].
Sensorimotor dynamics
If we analyse fractal scaling in S(t), we find a different distribution between agents with
and without synaptic plasticity [F(1; 98) = 32:56; p = 1:23  10 7]. The  coefficients
decrease for agents without synaptic plasticity. Thus, agents without plasticity present reg-
ular long-range correlations in their internal variables but not in the interactive variables of
agent-environment interaction. This supports our hypothesis that the role of plastic mech-
anisms is to regulate sensorimotor coupling, therefore generating complex correlations not
only in internal variables but cutting through brain-body-environment divisions. Although
not showed in the figure, results applying DFT analysis display a similar picture, and the
ANOVA give similar results for the comparisons of the distribution of 
(t) between ‘S-P’
and ‘PC-P’ [F(1; 98) = 115:1; p = 3:20  10 18], the distribution of 
(t) between ‘S-NP’ and
‘PC-NP’ [F(1; 98) = 2:73; p = 0:1015] and the distribution of S(t) between ‘S-P’ and ‘S-NP’
[F(1; 98) = 7:39; p = 0:0077].
Interaction-Dominant Dynamics and Multifractality
The ‘constructive’ definition of SOC coined by (Jensen, 1998, p.126) emphasizes that SOC
systems are interaction-dominated threshold systems driven by inherently nonlinear coordi-
native mechanisms. Ihlen and Vereijken have proposed that 1=f noise is neither necessary
nor sufficient evidence of interaction-dominant dynamics and that multifractal analysis is a
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Figure 4.9: Fractal exponents for variables
(t) (left) and S(t) (right) for the four types of agents. Only situated agents
with synaptic plasticity present indices of close to 1 for both variables
 and S. See the text for statistical comparisons
between the distributions.
quantitative framework suitable for the analysis of interaction-dominant behaviour (Ihlen
and Vereijken, 2010). The multifractal spectrum quantitatively defines the presence of mul-
tiplicative interactions between temporal scales that are responsible for the emergence of in-
termittent, emergent or coherent periods of large fluctuations within the response series of a
system.
We computed the multifractal spectra of the different signals analysed above using the
multifractal DFA algorithm (MFDFA), a variation of DFA in which the squared exponent of
the root mean squares deviation becomes a variable q, therefore allowing calculations outwith
the standard euclidean norm defined by the root mean square. Following this procedure, pos-
itive q values describe the scaling behaviour of the segments with large variance because the
large deviations from the corresponding fits dominate the average F(n). On the contrary, neg-
ative q values describe the scaling behaviour of the segments with small variance because the
large deviations from the corresponding fits are largely attenuated on the average F(n) (Kan-
telhardt, 2008). This decomposition allows us not only to analyse the scaling of the variance
of a signal (as with the DFA algorithm) but also the entire probability density function de-
fined by all q-order statistical moments through a series of local exponents h associated with
each q. The multifractal spectrum is represented by an arc defined as the difference between
the maximum and minimum values of the local Hurst exponent for each scale (D(h) vs. h).
Thus, the width of this spectrum is a measure of the degree of multifractality and will be zero
for a monofractal series. The higher the value of the width the more multifractal the spectrum
is. The width of the multifractal spectrumh = hmax hmin defines the amplitude difference
between the variability in the intermittent and laminar periods of the response series, quanti-
fying the influence of the multiplicative interactions between the multiple time scales of the
time series.
We have computed both the  coefficient from DFA analysis and the multifractal spec-
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Figure 4.10: With of the multifractal spectra (h) of variables
(t) (left) and S(t) (right) for the four types of agents.
Situated agents with synaptic plasticity presents the higher indices ofh for both variables
 and S. See the text for
statistical comparisons between the distributions.
trum of the variables 
 and S for 50 different runs of the four types of agents. We have
used the same temporal ranges for the MFDFA analysis than we used in the DFA analysis
(n = [102s; 104:0s] for 
 and n = [102s; 104:5s] for S). Due to computational reasons, and
since the smallest timescales are not considered in the MFDFA analysis, we have decimated
the time series by a factor of 20, although similar results were found for individual runs with-
out decimation. The multifractal spectrum was computed using a range of q of [ 15; 15]with
a step of 0:5.
The results of the multifractal analysis are shown in Figure 4.10. We can observe how
agents with plasticity present a broader multifractal spectrum than agents without plastic-
ity for both 
 and S, suggesting that interaction-dominant dynamics are more present in the
former types of agents. Also, situated agents with plasticity present a slightly higher index of
multifractal spectrum width. Also, agents with plasticity present different distributions when
they are situated or passively coupled in the multifractal spectra of 
 (ANOVA [F(1; 98) =
8:87; p = 0:0037]), being higher the width of the multifractal spectrum when the agent is sit-
uated. This difference is not clear for agents without synaptic plasticity (ANOVA [F(1; 98) =
2:00; p = 0:1603]). Also, the multifractal spectrum of S is significantly higher for agents with
plasticity than agents without plasticity (ANOVA [F(1; 98) = 326:80; p = 5:63  10 33]).
The presence of broad multifractal spectrum confirms the hypothesis that the dynamics of
the agents are generated from nonlinear threshold-driven interaction between different scales,
and are not the result of finely tuned additive interactions. Also, the increase of the levels of
metastability and TSE complexity for situated agents with synaptic plasticity is accompanied
by an increase in the width of the multifractal spectrum, supporting the relation between
these indices.
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Recapitulation
In this section we have analysed fractal and multifractal patterns in internal (
) and sensory
(S) variables for different types of agents. We have observed how situated agents with synaptic
plasticity present indices of  close to 1 and the highest levels of multifractality for both in-
ternal and sensorimotor variables. This suggests that the system is self-organized to maintain
certain temporal invariances across its different scales of operation, operating in a regime of
self-organized criticality, driven by multiplicative interaction between its components. Fur-
thermore, we observe how (1) the fractal and multifractal indices of internal oscillatory vari-
ables decrease when the agent is passively-coupled to the world, and (2) the same happens
for sensorimotor variables when synaptic plasticity is removed. Interestingly, disrupting the
sensorimotor loop weakens internal long-range correlations, and removing internal plasticity
weakens sensorimotor long-range correlations. This further supports our hypothesis about
internal regulatory plastic loops and adaptive sensorimotor loops being intimately entangled
in a co-regulatory loop. If some enabling conditions between internal and sensorimotor pro-
cess is to be disrupted, the invariances generated at higher levels fades away. The behaviour of
the agent as a whole is generated in this circular regulation and cannot be reduced to particular
components of the system.
It is worth noting that passively-coupled agents present significant differences respect to
situated agents despite a passively-coupled sensorimotor loop presents only a ‘subtle’ distor-
tion of the agent-environment interaction (since the structure of the input is maintained).
More dramatic distortions would have more visible effects. For example, in Aguilera et al.
(2015) we tested the same agent presented here decoupled from its environment and being
fed a Gaussian white noise signal, finding that 1=f patterns are not robust as in the situated
case and are not maintained for some parametric configurations. Also, multifractal exponents
decrease radically for decoupled agents.
4.6 Discussion
In Chapter 3 we characterized internal and sensorimotor regulatory loops for an agent con-
trolled by a plastic neural controller which performs a behavioural preference task, choos-
ing alternatively between two lights and generating stable but transient preferences for them.
These emergent regulatory circuits took the form of a double feedback loop, one regulating
the interaction between the coupled oscillatory neural controller and the plasticity of synaptic
weights between oscillator pairs, and the other regulating the interaction between the neural
controller and the sensorimotor loop (see Figures 3.16 and 3.19). We mapped how the internal
regulatory loop involved a bidirectional connection between oscillators and plastic mecha-
nisms, in which synaptic configurations influence the emergent synchronized pattern in fast
timescales, and synchronized patterns influence the change of synaptic connectivity patterns
in slow timescales. In the sensorimotor regulatory loop, sensory stimulation influences the os-
cillator network at slow timescales while synaptic connectivity patterns determines the agent’s
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behaviour at longer timescales. Thus, we have a nested system with the coupled oscillator
network generating emergent patterns at the top of the hierarchy (slow timescales), sensory
inputs at the bottom (fast timescales), and synaptic connectivity mediating between both.
What kind of spatial and temporal structure supports the deployment of these regulatory
loops? In the previous chapter we have analysed the regulatory activity of the autonomous
agents as a system of three macroscopic components (synchronizing oscillatory patterns, synap-
tic connectivity patterns and sensorimotor patterns), but all these are composed by groups
of variables presenting different spatial and temporal regularities. In this chapter we have
analysed how these regularities are organized and what is the role of plastic and sensorimotor
mechanisms in their emergence and coordination. As we reviewed, there is an ongoing debate
between nomothetic and mechanistic approaches respect to the validity of different method-
ological perspectives in order to reveal the origin and significance of regularities as scale free 1=f
dynamics. While the former try to find general explanations for the emergence of regularities,
the latter seek to find specific models of the particular processes underlying the emergence of
regularities. An account of autonomous behaviour should combine both approaches in or-
der to understand the relations between behaviour-generating mechanisms and the general
properties of emergent autonomous behaviour. In this chapter we have used our model as a
mediator between nomothetic and mechanistic approaches and how they can inform future
experimental research where regularities as information integration or self-organized critically
arise from a brain-body-environment system. The proposed models aim at exploring a mid-
dle point between the two approaches cited focusing on the role of the sensorimotor loop to
connect macroscopic behaviour with neural self-organized dynamics.
Emergent Patterns and Metastability
For understanding the relation between low level mechanisms and macroscopic emergent pat-
terns we compared four different types of agents: regular situated agents, passively-coupled
agents (whose sensors are fed with the recorded input of a situated agents), agents without
synaptic plasticity, and passively-coupled agents without synaptic plasticity. As a first step, we
analyse the formation of patterns in the neural oscillator network and the levels of metastabil-
ity of these patterns. We observe two important differences between situated and passively-
coupled agents (with synaptic plasticity): situated agents are able to create coherent patterns of
synchronization and they display higher levels of metastability. In contrast, passively-coupled
agents present a fuzzy set of synchronization patterns in comparison and present lower levels
of metastability. Situated agents were at the same time able to present more structured pat-
terns and display a more metastable structure facilitating switching among different patterns.
These differences between situated and passively-coupled agents did not take place for agents
without synaptic plasticity, indicating that plastic mechanisms are which allow the agent to
present higher degrees of metastability while maintaining internal coherence of its synchro-
nizing patterns.
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TSE Complexity
The next step was to analyse information integration and complexity among the different low
level variables of the agent. For agents with synaptic plasticity, we find that measures of TSE
complexity increase in situated agents for all sets of variables incorporating the agent’s plastic
weights compared to passively-coupled agents. Moreover, we find that this increase of TSE
complexity is not due to an increase of the entropy of the variables, indicating that changes
are due to level of integration between variables. Also, increases of TSE complexity cannot
be explained only in terms of an increase of complexity of synaptic connectivity, since the
greatest increases of complexity take place in the coordination of synaptic connectivity with
other variables of oscillatory coupling and sensorimotor coordination. This increase of plas-
ticity does not take place for agents without synaptic plasticity. All this indicates that plasticity
in the neural controller mediates for an increase in the dynamic integration among different
variables of the oscillatory controllers and sensorimotor coordination. This mediation allows
the creation of macroscopic brain-body-environment synchronized loops enhancing a bidi-
rectional flow of information between sensory streams across the environment and particular
neural ensembles.
Self-Organized Criticality
Finally, we have analysed the temporal macroscopic behaviour of different variables, analysing
the presence of self-organized criticality (SOC) in the dynamics of the system. SOC refers to
the phenomenon whereby a dissipative dynamical system with many degrees of freedom oper-
ates near a configuration of minimal stability, i.e. a critical configuration, and does so without
any fine tuning by an external driving influence. For SOC to emerge, the dynamics of a sys-
tem must be dominated by mutual interaction of the many degrees of freedom comprising
the system, interaction-dominant dynamics being a necessary condition for the emergence of
SOC. Also, SOC systems usually display robust 1=f patterns without fine parameter tuning,
being resistant to alterations in the system’s parameters. In this chapter we have used scale-free
exponents (fractal and spectral) and multifractal exponents as indicators of SOC, finding that
robust 1=f noise and high values of multifractality are only present in variables of the oscilla-
tory controller and sensorimotor activation when the agent is situated in its world and plastic
mechanisms are active. 1=f patterns arise in the mean instantaneous frequency of the neural
controller oscillators and in the mean activation of the sensors. In the case of the oscillators
mean instantaneous frequency the exponents of 1=f noise and the width of the multifractal
spectrum decrease when the agent is passively-coupled. Also, the exponents of 1=f noise for
the mean sensor activation level decreases when the agent loses its plasticity. Interestingly,
SOC in internal neural coordination patterns is only maintained when the agent is actively
coupled to its environment and, in turn, SOC in sensorimotor activation patterns only arises
when the agent has internal plastic regulatory loops. Interestingly, SOC appears to emerge
only when a subsystem is regulated by other parts of the system (oscillatory patterns by senso-
rimotor coordination, and sensorimotor activity by plastic adaptive mechanisms). This adds
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an interesting picture to our characterization of a double regulatory loop, in which both loops
are entangled with other elements outside of the loop, generated a unified system in which the
interaction between different parts of the system enables the processes sustaining the system’s
activity.
4.6.1 A Minimal Model of Neurodynamic Autonomy
Note that the model presented here, being abstract and not empirically driven, does not prove
that the properties just mentioned apply to natural behaving organisms, but rather shows that
it could be the case, how it could occur, the measurement tools and analytic procedures that
might capture it and which are the levels of observation that should be considered. In this
sense the model works as a proof of concept that can inform and drive future experiments
operating as what Chemero calls ‘a guide to discovery’ (Chemero, 2009; Barandiaran and
Chemero, 2009). Thanks to our model we can hypothesize that, at least for some cases, TSE
complexity and 1=f patterns in behaving systemsmight be the result of: (1) non-linear interac-
tion dynamics capable of generating stable collective patterns, (2) internal plastic mechanisms
that allow self-sustained criticality through a continuous modulation of sensorimotor flows,
(3) strong sensorimotor coupling with the environment that induces transient metastable
regimes and, (4) a small number of behaviour generating components or variables. The last
three elements are relatively novel, in relation to previous models, and deserve detailed discus-
sion.
So far, complex systems approaches to cognitive science face the problem that they are
not able to cope with the definition of a cognitive system as such. Perfectly homogeneous
systems for example rice piles are able to display SOC, thus the finding of SOC in the brain
might provide us some insights into the way in which the brain operates, but without concrete
mechanistical models it tells us little about the mechanisms that are operating behind it and
how these construct a cognitive subject (Wagenmakers et al., 2012). Similar concerns have been
expressed about integrated information approaches like TSE complexity, since many non-
agential systems like low-density parity-check algorithms are able to produce high values of
integrated information (potentially higher than human brains; Aaronson, 2014).
In Chapter 3 we proposed a definition of neurocognitive interactive autonomy stating that
the nervous system, body and environment are organized in an operationally closed network
in which:
1. Operational closure among a set of processes a system S can be distinguished as a
network of interdependent processes whereby every process belonging to the network
depends on at least another process of the network and enables at least another one.
2. Causal asymmetry in the interaction between S and E, which modulates the cou-
pling C between S and E in an adaptive way. Modulation indicates an alteration in the
set of constraints that determine the coupling between A and E, and adaptive means
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that change in the coupling C contributes to the maintenance of some process that
constitute S.
3. Precariousness. By virtue of the two properties above, the processes that constitute
S are actively created and maintained by the system as a whole, so that if we were to
isolate from the system any process of S it would tend to run down or extinguish.
In the previous chapter we provided a conceptual model of a robotic agent with a plastic neu-
rodynamical controller in a behavioural preference task. Our results illustrate how these three
conditions are accounted for in the model, serving as a minimal example of how different
properties of autonomous organization can be analyzed and quantified.
Operational Closure
In the previous chapter, we characterized the operational closure of the system, i.e. the ability
of an agent to appear as a unified system in itself, without the need of an arbitrary division be-
tween agent and environment by an external observer (Figure 3.19). Describing the behaviour
of the model using three mesoscopic groups of variables, we area able to define circular depen-
dencies between the different variables of the system delimiting its closure (Virgo et al., 2011).
Importantly, this closure is not restricted to the internal dynamics of the agent, but it extends
to interactive variables defining the engagement of the agent in different sensorimotor loops.
The specific constitution of this closure, involving interactions at different timescales of
the system, has important implications for the other two conditions for autonomy. The re-
sults presented in this chapter provide a characterization of agent-environment asymmetrical
interaction and the constitution of the agent as a distinct entity from its environment.
Causal Asymmetry
An autonomous agent, to be considered as such, requires the ability to act over its environ-
ment by itself. This has been described as the causal asymmetry condition for autonomous
agency (Barandiaran, 2008, p.85-85). As we represented in Figure 3.16, regulation loops in our
agent present such causal asymmetry, in which interaction is directional at different scales,
and while agent is influenced by the environment at small timescales, at larger timescale the
directionality is inverted and it is the agent which causally acts on the environment.
Some information theoretical approaches have been recently proposed to measure auton-
omy as the causal asymmetry between a system and its environment (Bertschinger et al., 2008;
Seth, 2007) defined in terms of two properties: (1) self-determination, i.e. the system is de-
pendent on its own history (2) non-heteronomy, i.e. the system is not completely determined
by external factors. Nevertheless, although these measures try to compute the asymmetry
between agent-environment dynamics, they do not take into account a self-referential op-
erational closure of the system (Bertschinger et al., 2008, p.14). Instead, only the degree of
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self-determination of the system is quantified. For example, Bertschinger depicts a simple au-
tomata with two states fA;Bg that change its state if the state of the environment is 0, or
keep it if it is equal to 1. This simple automata is self-determined and therefore would be
autonomous according to this measure, although it is not able in any sense to act on its envi-
ronment.
A different perspective on causal asymmetry has been depicted by Tononi et al. (1996)
as the matching complexity of a system, defined as the increase of TSE complexity of a sys-
tem receiving an input above the sum of the complexity values of the decoupled agent and
the input. Although the system depicted by Tononi et al. was only passively fed an input,
without the existence of any sensorimotor loop, the presence of matching complexity reveals
and increase in the intrinsic flows of mutual information between subsets of different sizes
in the system, by which different units correlate their responses in correlation with incoming
stimulus, reflecting an increase of both integration of the system and functional specialization
as a response to the external input. Each of the subsets responding to a given stimulus has a
specialized relation to the rest of the brain, so that redundant inputs from the stimulus can
lead to different functional consequences. In this sense, the response to an external input is
not strictly passive, but it has the ability to literally go ‘beyond the information given’ by the
external input.
In our model we extend this idea to sensorimotor coupled interactions. With the idea of a
passively-coupled agent that is fed a copy of the input generated by a situated agent, we anal-
ysed how TSE complexity increases for different sets of variables of our system. We found that
agents with synaptic plasticity increase the flows of mutual information coordinating differ-
ent subsets and increasing the complexity of the agent when coupled to the world. This does
not happen for agents without plasticity. According to the measure proposed by Tononi et al.,
both agents with and without synaptic plasticity present more complexity and information
when you add together sensory and neurodynamic variables (we can extract this information
by comparing the sum of TSE complexity of sets (CA; SA) plus (S) with that of (CA; SA; S)
in Figures 4.4 and 4.6). It is probably not hard for nonlinear coupled systems to generate
synergistic flows of information when two systems are in interaction. What is interesting is
that the exact same input coupled to the same system produces less complexity when the di-
rectionality of the sensorimotor loop is disrupted (inputs are received but actions over the
input are not performed). The issue here is not whether the response to an input is ‘passive’
or ‘active’ (as in Tononi et al.’s case), but whether the response is merely reactive or proactive.
Not only going beyond the information of the external input, but overstep the agent-input
interplay through an active coupling. We consider that this fundamental asymmetry of the
system represents one key requirement for autonomous behaviour.
Precariousness
Another fundamental aspect of autonomy is that of the precariousness of the system. Di Paolo
and Thompson (2014) characterize an autonomous system as an operationally-closed and pre-
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carious system. For them, operational closure is a property by which the enabling conditions
of network of processes is woven in a way that all the processes in the operationally closed sys-
tems are enabled by other processes in the system. The precariousness of the system implies
that in the absence of the enabling relations established by the operationally closed network,
a process belonging to the network would stop or run down.
We find that the situated agent presents a form of coherence in the coordination of its
scales in the form of a 1=f dynamics in its neurodynamic and sensory variables. In Aguil-
era et al. (2015) we also observed that 1=f patterns are robust to parametrical changes and ac-
tively maintained when the agent is coupled to the world. Interestingly, the span of the scale
free spectrum coincides with the ranges of information transfer in Figure 3.16, where sensory
patterns transfer information at fast timescales, neurodynamic patterns at slow timescales,
and synaptic plastic mechanisms seem to transfer information at intermediate scales. Inter-
estingly, 1=f correlations spreads from fast to slow timescales for both sensory patterns and
neurodynamical patterns, but do not appear for synaptic plasticity. It may be that synaptic
plasticity mediates between fast changes of environmental inputs and higher order neurody-
namic assemblies, allowing a temporal coherence in the structures of both of them displaying
long-range correlations in multiple scales. In any case, our analysis suggest that 1=f processes
at sensory and neurodynamic variables are being maintained by a network of enabling rela-
tions of information transfer at different scales, in which a prominent role is being played by
mechanisms of synaptic plasticity. As we depicted in Figure 3.17, some information transfer
regulatory loops are removed or disrupted when the agent is passively-coupled to the world.
In this case, we observe that 1=f scaling and the width of the multifractal spectrum in the
neurodynamic patterns of the agent is reduced and its temporal coherence decays. Similarly,
if we directly remove the plasticity of the agent, fractal scaling of sensory patterns and the
multifractal spectrum of both sensory and neurodynamic patterns are reduced. The coordi-
nated processes of fractal scaling in the agent’s components are precarious in the sense that
they are maintained by a continuous sensorimotor interaction. Just feeding the right input
is not enough to sustain them but the agent needs to maintain a delicate equilibrium in its
interaction with its world. In the absence of the mechanisms that allow the agent an active
regulation of its interaction with the environment (an agent without plastic mechanisms) or
the normal functioning of the channels that allow the agent to create an asymmetrical agent-
environment interaction with the world (a passively-coupled agent) the temporal structures
generated in the autonomous sensorimotor regulation of the agent run down.
4.6.2 A Situated Dynamic Core
Our model not only provides a generative illustration of the generic intuition outlined by Sil-
berstein and Chemero in which strongly nonlinear and softly assembled interactions allow
the emergence of a brain-body-environment system of nested self-organization (Silberstein
and Chemero, 2012). The results shown in this chapter provide interesting insights into the
notion of a dynamic core as a necessary hub for agencial autonomous processes. Usually a dy-
183
namic core is circumscribed to distributed clusters of neurons intensely interacting with each
other within the brain. We find appealing the notion of a dynamic core composed not only
of coupled neural dynamics, but extended to coupled neural and environmental reentrant
processes: a sensorimotor dynamic core. Edelman and Tononi stress that a dynamic core is a
process, not a thing or a place, and is defined in terms of neural interactions, rather than in
terms of specific neural locations, connectivity or activity (Edelman and Tononi, 2001). Thus,
there is no apparent reason to limit the definition of a dynamic core to brain-bound events.
Our model shows instead, that the dynamic core might well be situated, cutting across brain-
body-world divisions.
Moreover, our results point in the direction of two critical aspects of a situated dynamic
core:
1. The situated nature of the operational closure of the system, which covers both internal
dynamics and sensorimotor dynamics of agent-environment interaction.
2. The multiscale causal asymmetry of the agent-environment system, in which the infor-
mational complexity in the sensorimotor loop is enhanced respect a passively-coupled
situation, generating a structure of enhanced information flows distributed among dif-
ferent spatial scales of the system.
3. A precarious operationally closed network of processes displaying long-range correla-
tions sustained by a circular network of enabling processes, which runs down if this
network is disrupted.
This portraits a ‘radically embodied’ (Thompson and Varela, 2001) view of the dynamic core
hypothesis of cognition, in which specific neuronal assemblies underlay the operation of cog-
nitive acts, depending crucially on the manner in which brain dynamics are embedded in the
somatic and environmental context of the agent’s life, bringing forth the constitution of a
sensorimotor cognitive subject which actively constitutes itself as a subject and acts over its
world.
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Part III
Interactive Autonomy in Social Processes
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5
Social Agency: interaction-dominant
dynamics in social reciprocity
Abstract: We argue that interactive sensorimotor constitution of identity can be extended to the social
realm. We propose a minimal experimental framework to analyse the dynamics of a shared interactive space
between two subjects. Experimental analysis shows that long-range correlations arise in the interactive space
only in the case of genuine social interaction.
Contributions:
• We perform an experimental analysis of a modified version of the Perceptual Crossing experiment
mixing human players and programmed bots.
• We analyse long time correlations in individual and interactive variables, showing that 1=f patterns
only arise in the latter in the case of human-human interaction.
Related publications:
• Bedia, M. G., Aguilera, M., Gómez, T., Larrode, D. G., and Seron, F. (2014). Quantifying long-
range correlations and 1/f patterns in a minimal experiment of social interaction. Frontiers in Psy-
chology, 5:1281.
In Chapter 1 we identified two forms of autonomous organization, one based in the ma-
terial self-production of an organism, and other based in the maintenance of a domain of in-
teraction of an agent and its surroundings. For the latter, we explored two domains in which
interactive forms of autonomy appear: sensorimotor neurocognitive agency and collective
agency in the social domain. In this chapter and the next we move into the realm of social
cognition with the tools from previous chapters exploring the relation between theoretical
and analytical tools used to define autonomy at the level of cells or individual agents and col-
lective entities composed of mutually interacting agents. In Chapter 6 we will analyse in detail
a particular case of social autonomy, whereas in this chapter we want to explore the role of so-
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cial interaction as a constitutive element of social cognition. What does this claim imply? Can
something like a ‘social autonomy’ emerge from the sensorimotor interaction between social
subjects? To explore this question we first analyse different psychological perspectives that
bring interaction as an essential aspect for social processes in contrast with previous domi-
nant frameworks. Then we propose a minimal experimental setup for studying the constitu-
tive nature of interaction in social cognition in a particular case of social engagement based
on the ‘perceptual crossing’ paradigm. We analyse the patterns of individual and shared vari-
ables searching for the emergence of multiscale correlations, showing that the space for social
cognition emerges in a collective space of interaction instead of a purely individual one. We
finish by proposing some ideas to tackle the problem of autonomy in large-scale networks of
social interaction.
5.1 Direct Perception and Social Interaction
Traditionally, much work on social cognition research has been guided by the idea that minds
are composed of exclusively intracranial phenomena, and therefore perceptually inaccessible
to others. Similarly to early computational approaches, in which researchers assumed that we
have a poor perceptual access to the world (see section 2.1.2), dominant theories on social cog-
nition assume that we have impoverished access to other people’s minds, and therefore social
cognition must be built over some kind of cognitive machinery that supplements perception
with inferences about the intentions behind our perception of what others are doing. To-
day, the two dominant theories in social cognition, ‘theory theory’ and ‘simulation theory’,
state that something other than perception is necessary for our ability to understand others.
Theory theory (Carruthers, 1996; Ratcliffe, 2006) proposes that our understanding of other
persons depends on the practice ofmentalizing, that is, employing folk psychology (i.e. a basic
or ‘naïve’ theory of psychology) to infer the mental states of others. The ability to mentalize
may be innate, but it depends on our observation and inference abilities. By observing oth-
ers, we can gather data allowing us to revise our naïve theories. In contrast, simulation theory
(Gallese and Goldman, 1998) posits that we do not need such theories about other’s minds,
since we have a model that can be used to simulate other person’s mental states: our own
brain. Observing others and their behaviour allows us to model and test their mental states as
if we were in their situation.
Shaun Gallagher (Gallagher, 2008) has criticized both theory theory and simulation the-
ory arguing that they assume that, when understanding others, (1) perception is playing a
merely observational role, not taking into account the possibility of interaction or the effects
of the subject actions, and (2) the perception involved seems to be greatly impoverished or ill-
informed about other’s mental states, hence needing to be supplemented by some extra cogni-
tive tools. In contrast, Gallagher proposes the notion of direct perception in social engagement
to support the idea that we have direct perceptual access to others’ intentions, feelings, etc. For
him,
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in most of our encounters of our everyday life, direct perception delivers suffi-
cient information for understanding others [...] In the broad range of normal
circumstances there is already so much available in the person’s movements, ges-
tures, facial expressions, and so on, as well as in the pragmatic or social context,
that I can grasp everything I need for understanding in what is perceptually avail-
able (Gallagher, 2008, p .540).
This idea is supported by much experimental evidence showing that cognitive and emotional
processes span across body and behaviour, thus making parts of some mental processes vis-
ible via their distribution across the visible body (Krueger, 2012). If mental states cut across
brain, body and environment, as we saw in previous chapters, this implies that some cogni-
tive and affective states can be accessed just perceiving behaviour. Gallagher also proposes a
new interpretation for the role of mirror neurons in social perception. Mirror neurons (Riz-
zolatti and Craighero, 2004) are neurons in the pre-motor cortex, in Broca’s area, and in the
parietal cortex of the human brain that are activated both when a subject engages in specific in-
strumental actions and when she observes someone else engaging in those actions. Typically,
mirror neurons are considered as evidence supporting simulation theory and considered to be
explicit acts of simulation of others behaviours. In contrast, Gallagher argues that mirror neu-
rons constitute sub-personal mirror resonance processes of which we are not explicitly aware.
Thus, mirror neurons’ motor resonance processes are important enactive processes that con-
tribute to the constitution of the perceptual access that we have to the intentions of others
(Gallagher, 2007).
Hanne De Jaegher et al expand these ideas and argue that perception does not directly de-
liver what we need for social interaction. Instead, they propose that we can experience directly
other’s feelings and intentions through skilful interaction with others. For them, interaction
is constitutive of social understanding and direct perception (De Jaegher et al., 2010). They
claim that social interaction processes produce a ‘transparency’ that makes perception in the
social realm feel direct in the same way that the interaction of a blind person and her cane:
when she is interacting with the cane and the environment, she does not perceive the cane,
but directly the environment. Nevertheless, the key is that perception is not always direct,
since the other’s intentions are not always transparent to me. Instead, misunderstandings are
a key ingredient of social processes. Loss and recovery of coordination in social interaction is
what construct social understanding. Breakdowns and recoveries of transparency are where
social perception can be ‘enriched’ the most and when a skillful social interaction can be devel-
oped. Thus, moments of transparency are constructed through a history of interaction and
coordination. The faculty to mirror each others’ movements, anticipate them and temporally
synchronize or desynchronize, can create patterns of coordination that can influence the dis-
position of the individuals involved in the encounter to sustain, modify, or end it (Jaegher
and Paolo, 2007). We can find examples of this in situations when an interaction continues
despite the fact that none of the participants want it to continue. A familiar case would be
when you encounter someone coming from the opposite direction on a narrow footpath and,
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attempting to walk past each other, you repeatedly step towards the same side. This suggests
that interpersonal coordination of movements can provide the interaction process a form of
autonomy that transcends the individual level. Nevertheless this does not mean that individ-
uals are subsumed passively into the interaction process. On the contrary, there is an interplay
between individual autonomy and the autonomy of the interaction process itself. The same
as sensorimotor interaction, direct or transparent perception of the world it is only achieved
when there is a coordinated interaction within a coupled dynamical system.
Following advances in coordination dynamics, coordination of rhythmically moving limbs
between two individuals exhibits the same phenomena predicted by the HKB model in the
behaviour of individuals (Haken et al., 1985), such as the existence of two spontaneously sta-
ble modes of coordination (in-phase and anti-phase), transitions from anti-phase to in-phase
at a critical movement frequency, critical fluctuations (i.e. an increase in coordination vari-
ability) preceding the transition, and hysteresis (i.e. a sensitivity to the history of the system)
(Schmidt et al., 1990). The same coordination phenomena found in a person’s mind and
body can be extended to social interactions. Furthermore, synchronization between people
has been found to arise spontaneously just as a result of visual information exchange (Oullier
and Kelso, 2009b). Are these forms of coordinated interaction a constituent element of social
cognition?
Although synchronization between subjects is a product of many forms of social interac-
tion, interpersonal coordination may produce many higher order patterns (Riley et al., 2011).
In this chapter we propose that fractal scaling may be one of such patterns indicating that in-
teraction is constitutive of a social cognitive process and propose an experimental framework,
in the form of a minimal social setting, to explore this issue. In order to compare genuine
and decoupled social interaction, we consider how scaling of behaviour and interactions are
distributed for the case of mutual interaction between two humans and disrupted interaction
between a human and a software agent.
5.2 Constitutive Interaction in a Minimal Social Setting
In Chapter 2 we analysed the role of interaction in cognitive activity using a simulation model.
Here we analyse the role on interaction in a social process by analysing a popular minimal so-
cial setup: the perceptual crossing paradigm. Furthermore, in this chapter and the next we
shift from modelling to experimental approaches in order to explore the possibilities of un-
derstanding social processes from the perspective of systemic autonomy. Although an experi-
mental setting gives us less access to the variables of the system than a simulated one, we think
that the study of social autonomy still requires experimental research in order to facilitate the
design of good models. While in neuroscience there is a vast amount of experimental work
from systemic perspectives and much of it addresses aspects related to autonomy (e.g. embod-
iment, intentionality, consciousness), as well as related models based in experimental evidence
(e.g. neural ensembles, the dynamic core hypothesis, integrated information theory), in the
social domain there is less consensus about the possibility of a systemic autonomy of groups
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of individuals as a collective, and consequently there is less experimental evidence and related
models exploring this issue.
Instead of a minimal robotic simulation, in this chapter we use a minimal experimental
social setting involving the interaction of two subjects. In previous chapters we compared
‘genuine’ interaction with perturbed configuration as ‘passively-coupled agents’. Compara-
tively, here we have situations where two humans interact together, and situations where a
human interacts with a software robot which does not establish a sensorimotor interaction
with its partner.
5.2.1 Double Monitor Experiment
Evidence of the constitutive role of interaction in social cognition has been greatly inspired
by Lynne Murray and Colwyn Trevarthen’s double-monitor experiment (Murray and Tre-
varthen, 1985), which showed the role of interaction in social exchange of a mother and her
baby through closed circuit TV. In the experiment a 6- to 12-week-olds baby interacted nor-
mally with her mother, but at some point the video of the mother was replaced by a replay of
the mother’s behaviour during a previous period of live interaction, making the baby upset.
The experiment showed that a baby can detect that the mother is not interacting with him
when mother’s recorded motions are displayed, and thus does not experience a process of so-
cial engagement. The double monitor experiment and its successors (e.g. Nadel et al., 1999;
Trevarthen, 1994) suggest that individuals do not become involved in a social process just by
receiving an external input from another subject, but this input needs to be coordinated with
the individual for it to make sense. In the experiment, it is not enough to perceive the mother’s
face and its expressiveness to become socially engaged. Instead, it seems that the ongoingness
and contingency of the interaction is a key factor for the infant to recognize a ‘genuine’ in-
teraction. Nevertheless, the experiments should not be necessarily interpreted as indicating
the constitutive role of the social process. It may be just an enabling process if ‘recognition’ is
performed at a purely individual level. For investigating this, we need a different framework
where we can easily analyse processes happening not only at the individual level but also in
the collective interactive domain.
5.2.2 The Perceptual Crossing Paradigm
In recent years, researchers in social cognition have found the ‘perceptual crossing paradigm’
to be both a theoretical and practical advance towards meeting particular challenges. This
paradigm has been used to analyse the type of interactive processes that emerge in minimal
interactions and it has allowed progress towards understanding of the principles of social cog-
nition processes and the mechanisms that give support to minimal social capabilities (Auvray
et al., 2009). This experimental framework is a way to study dyadic interactions and to anal-
yse the perception of someone else’s agency in different situations implemented in a minimal
virtual world. Through the self-organized collective patterns that emerge from the interac-
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tions (like emergent coordination, turn-taking, etc.), hypotheses about the human capacity
for social cognition can be extracted.
Perceptual crossing paradigm constitutes a simple framework for studying social interac-
tions in its simpler form. It consists of a minimal scenario in which two participants, sitting
in different rooms, interact with each other by moving a sensor along a shared virtual one-
dimensional space using a computer mouse 5.1. The subjects are only allowed to move laterally
in a one-dimensional world and perceive the collisions with other human subjects or artificial
agents. In the last few years, the perceptual crossing paradigm has become a promising ex-
perimental tool for the analysis of dynamic interactions of human social processes. A more
detailed analysis leads to two types of experiments: (1) behavioural experimental research and
(2) simulated agent modelling. Relating to the former, numerous experiments where real sub-
jects try to identify each other in a virtual world have been carried out, and researchers have
analysed the type of behaviours that seem to offer support for social coordination patterns;
both in one-dimensional experiments (Auvray et al., 2009) and also in their extensions to two
dimensions (Lenay et al., 2011). In some cases, real experiments and phenomena previously
tested in simulations were combined, for example in (Iizuka et al., 2009; Iizuka and Ando,
2012), where the authors explored how participants modulated their interaction dynamics to
figure out if an interaction was genuine or not. Regarding the latter, i.e. focusing now on
computational modelling context, virtual agents have been evolved to locate others in an ex-
perimental setup analogous to that used in Auvray’s version (Auvray et al., 2009), providing a
mathematical analysis that explained how virtual agents managed their own variables, such as
size or velocity, to coordinate with others in an extremely robust way (Iizuka and Ando, 2012;
Iizuka and Paolo, 2007). Simulation models to build ‘social software agents’ have demon-
strated that this kind of behaviour can emerge from very simple structures without explicit
social reasoning capabilities (Froese et al., 2014a). In general, the studies on simulation models
complimented the experimental work with humans, sometimes providing proofs of concept,
making empirical hypothesis more precise or simply understanding in more detail the possible
complex patterns and the dynamical properties of the task.
In this chapter, we analyse whether some critical aspects of these interactions could not
have been observed by previous studies. We consider alternative indicators that could com-
plete, or even lead us to rethink, the current interpretation of the results obtained from both
experimental and simulated modelling approaches in the fields of social interactions and min-
imal perceptual crossing. We aim to characterize the individual and interactive domains of
interaction for different conditions, trying to depict how a space of social engagement is con-
stituted. In particular, we discuss the possibility that previous experiments have been analyt-
ically constrained to a short-term dynamic type of player response. Additionally, we propose
the possibility of considering these experiments from a more suitable framework based on
the use and analysis of long-range correlations and fractal dynamics. If social interaction is
to display autonomous properties it is tempting to explore whether measurement techniques
that turned out relevant in the domain of sensorimotor autonomy can also be applied suc-
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Figure 5.1: Perceptual crossing framework. Schematic illustration ofAuvray et al. (2009) experimental set-up. Extracted
fromAuvray and Rohde (2012).
cessfully to measure social autonomy. We also reveal evidence supporting the idea that social
interactions are deployed along many scales of activity. Specifically, we propose that the frac-
tal structure of the interactions could be a more adequate framework to understand the type
of social interaction patterns generated in a social engagement.
5.3 Theoretical Framework
Studies of the perceptual crossing experiment have provided insightful evidence about the
importance of inter-individual coordination for the emergence of social cognition and agency
detection. However, we think that still more advances are needed in order to characterize and
better understand how coordinated interactions may give rise to collective social processes.
Recently, some authors have emphasized the importance of understanding how distinct time
scales and organizational levels are intertwined for the emergence of social cognition (Dumas
et al., 2014). At the neural level, there is experimental evidence of the importance of non-
linear cross-scale interactions for brain organization (Le Van Quyen, 2011), and in social neu-
roscience, inter-brain synchronization in multiple frequency bands has been found during
imitation of hand movements (Dumas et al., 2010) or synchronization patterns are found dur-
ing guitar improvisation showing a complex interplay of different frequencies (Müller et al.,
2013). It is still missing, to our knowledge, a detailed analysis of this kind of phenomena at a
behavioural level. These examples show the potential of a multi-scale account of social cogni-
tion and lead us to think that sometimes the analyses developed so far to understand percep-
tual crossing dynamics may fall short in their ability to characterize the emergent multi-scale
nature of social interaction.
A common feature exists in the way in which we deal with the experimental results ob-
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tained in previous analyses of behaviour in the perceptual crossing experiment (considering
behavioural modelling experiments and simulated agents): the participants’ behaviour is anal-
ysed only in a short-time scale (this point is explained in detail in the next section). For exam-
ple, Auvray et al. (2009) analyse the probability of clicking in a two second window after the
subject encounters another subject or object, together with standard statistical variables of
some system variables (frequency of crossings, correlation between velocity and acceleration,
etc.). This type of analysis is implicitly assuming that the emergence of social engagement
can be reduced to a scale of short-term activity and that there is no influence of other scales or
any inter-scale correlations that are relevant for the subject’s behaviour (for example, assuming
that there is no interference between the previous collisions of the subject with different kinds
of agents and the decision of clicking or not clicking). A similar assumption is also found in
the agent modelling field, for example, Di Paolo et al. (2008) focus on finding what kind of
short term dynamics in their simulated model (modelled in terms of delays between the per-
ceptual stimulation of the agent and its motor response) is able to create the stable pattern
of social interaction that allows the emergence of a dynamic co-regulation. Again, inter-scale
correlations in the social interaction process are left out of the analysis and modelling.
In this chapter we propose a quantitative indicator that works as a complementary mea-
sure of the analysis addressed in previous perceptual crossing experiments; an indicator that
consists of characterizing the cross-scale nature of the interaction through fractal and multi-
fractal analysis (Van Orden et al., 2003) of the collective dynamics. Despite its apparent sim-
plicity, we propose that the perceptual crossing paradigm could comprise several embedded
levels of dynamic interaction, resulting in correlations of the signals over different time scales.
In section 1.2.3 we explained the concept of self-organized criticality, used to understand the
behaviour of a robotic agent in Chapter 4. For a multi-scale approach to social cognition,
SOC is appealing because it allows us to imagine systems that are able to self-regulate coordi-
nated behaviour at different scales in a distributed manner and without a central controller.
We analyse whether coupling between the players of the perceptual crossing experiment may
be operating under a regime of SOC and display 1=f scaling patterns.
5.3.1 Outline
In this chapter we try to explore the presence and relevance of multiple scale and inter-scale
or long-range correlations in the perceptual crossing experiment. If social interaction is gen-
uinely constituted by the interaction process itself (and not by the inferential capacity of the
interacting subjects) social interaction should display long-range correlations and coordinated
intermittency in the form of 1=f scaling and a multifractal spectrum. Moreover, multi-scale
interactions should be present in collective variables and not only in individual variables, as
an indicator of an emergence of a social domain of interaction.
We propose a modified version of the original perceptual crossing experiment, in which
the player only faces one opponent, which may be another human player or a programmed
agent with two possible kinds of behaviour: a simple oscillatory behaviour or a ‘shadow’
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behaviour that repeats the movement of the player. More information is given in the next
section. The comparison between genuine social human-human interaction and disrupted
human-bot interaction is used to test the analysis performed. Thus, in our experimental setup
we have different kinds of social interaction: humans recognizing each other as such, humans
interacting with programmed agents with artificial behaviour, humans failing to recognize
other humans or bots tricking humans. Can we characterize when genuine social interaction
emerges? And if so, where does it lie?
Auvray et al. (2009) propose that the sensitivity for recognizing other intentional subjects,
instead of being perceived by each of the participants, arises from the dynamics of the inter-
action itself. In their experiment, the distribution of clicks suggested that social recognition
arose from a combination of (1) the ability to discriminate between mobile (human player,
shadow) and immobile objects and (2) the stability of mutual interaction patterns between
two human partners or between human and an immobile object. This interpretation was
inspired by the results in a simulated model which showed the importance of the stability
of coordinated behaviour (Di Paolo et al., 2008). However, we think that further evidence
supporting the claim that social recognition emerges from interaction dynamics instead of in-
dividual sensitivity is necessary. In fact, the model presented by Di Paolo et al. (2008) could
be interpreted as showing that relatively simple reactive behaviours could account for a click
distribution in which agents appear to ‘recognize’ each other, without a genuine, underlying
process of social recognition. We propose that genuine social interaction should arise from the
emergence of a complex web of interactions across different timescales between the activity of
different agents. For a first approach to support this claim we propose the following schema:
1. Since we consider that inter-scale dynamics might be relevant to characterize perceptual
crossing dynamics, we perform similar measures to previous works in perceptual cross-
ing experiments, and explore the existence of a link between ours and previous results,
and cross-scale interaction dynamics (section 5.5).
2. We propose that if genuine social interaction is based on cross-scale interactions, a frac-
tal distribution should be present in collective variables of the social process. We pro-
pose the difference in the movement of the two players (using the difference between
their speeds) as a candidate variable and perform fractal and multifractal analysis of the
distribution in the individual rounds of the game, finding a clear 1=f and multifractal
spectrum only when two human players interact (section 5.6).
3. Finally, we suggest that as opposed to collective variables, the fractal structure of the in-
dividual dynamics of the player or their opponent alone should not be discriminative
for the type of ongoing interaction. We analyse this issue repeating fractal and multi-
fractal measures on the movement of the player and the movement of the opponent
(using their individual speeds) and conducting linear mixed effects models to assess if
the different variables analysed (difference of speeds, speed of the player and speed of
the opponent) can discriminate between the type of interaction, finding that only the
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collective variable of the relative speeds can discriminate the two types of programmed
agents from genuine human interaction (section 5.6.1).
5.4 Experimental Setup and Methods of Analysis
In this experiment, human participants were assigned to computers for them to interact in
pairs, within a shared perceptual space, where some opponents were other human partici-
pants and some opponents were computerized agents (bots). Participants were unaware of
the nature of their opponents.
Our intention was not to replicate Auvray’s experiment, where each participant simulta-
neously encounters a human partner, a mobile agent (which acts as a shadow of the human
partner, repeating the same movements but shifted in space) and a static one (Auvray et al.,
2009). In our case, each participant received only a single stimulus in one of the following
scenarios: human vs. human, human vs. ‘oscillatory agent’ and human vs. ‘shadow agent’.
The ‘oscillatory agent’ was programmed to deploy an oscillatory behaviour (describing a sinu-
soidal trajectory of 0:5Hz and 200 pixels of amplitude), predictable and deterministic. The
‘shadow agent’ was able to show an irregular pattern because it consists of a ‘shadow image’
of the participant’s movement, i.e, a bot that generates a movement strictly identical to the
participant trajectory but delayed 400 ms. in time and 125 pixels in space. Participants were
instructed to try to detect whether their opponent was human or not.
When participants arrived at the laboratory they were randomly assigned to a worksta-
tion and were provided with headphones. They were informed that the study involved two
parts, each independent from the other and that the first one -training stage- would take ap-
proximately 3 minutes and the second one -evaluation stage- a further 10 minutes. In order
to guarantee confidentiality during the study, identification codes/nicknames were chosen by
the participants. Throughout the experiment, participants were provided with verbal instruc-
tions regarding the structure of the experiment and their sections.
In the training stage, the participants were informed that it was a simple ‘proof of concept’
stage and that the purpose was only to learn how the platform worked. Participants were free
to move the mouse as they pleased during three sessions of 1 minute each with a short break
between them. They played consecutively against three bots of increasing difficulty in the
interaction: a static bot, a bot moving at a constant low speed and a bot moving at a constant
medium speed.
After that, they were informed of the aim and rules of the evaluation part of the experi-
ment. The experiment consisted of 10 sessions of 40 seconds each. In each session: (1) partic-
ipants were randomly assigned an opponent (human-human or human-bot) to explore the
virtual space; (2) participants were asked to move their mouses in order to detect the move-
ment of their assigned opponents, (3) after each session, participants were asked to make a
choice between the two options displayed on the screen in order to guess whether their oppo-
nent was a human or a bot, and (4), finally, participants were informed on the screen whether
they had guessed successfully or not. After the 10 sessions were completed, the experiment
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Figure 5.2: Experimental setup. Extracted fromBedia et al. (2014).
was declared finished.
A total of 13 participants (8 females and 5 males) took part in this experiment. Their ages
ranged from 16 to 19 years. The final dataset used in the analysis comprises a total of 106
samples of the cursor positions over time of each participant recorded with a sampling period
of 1ms.
In order to quantify the fractal-like autocorrelation properties of each of the time series
generated, a detrended fluctuation analysis (DFA) algorithm (Peng et al., 2000) was used to
estimate the scaling exponent in every fractal series, characterizing long memory dependence
phenomena. As we did not assume that the processes were normally distributed, calcula-
tions were completed through multifractal detrended fluctuation analysis (MFDFA) (Ihlen
and Vereijken, 2010). Both methods are described in section 4.5.1.
DFA bins for parameter n have been defined logarithmically from 64ms to 10s with an
interval of 20:01s. For the MFDFA we have used the same values for the n bins and we have
taken a value of q with values from  3 to 3 with intervals of 0:25.
Statistical approach
The design of this experiment involved repeated measures per subject and, in order to account
for this characteristic, linear mixed effect models were computed. Analysis of the fractal study
data included descriptive statistics and mixed effects models of the relationships between dif-
ferent measurements. These models allowed us to account for the variation between players
and the residual variation between the different games played by each respondent. Models
were developed using the nlme package in the open-source statistical software R1. In a nut-
shell, mixed effect models are regression models that incorporate both fixed and random ef-
1http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/nlme/index.html
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fects. Fixed effects are the independent variables of interest while random effects replicate
the structure of the data (i.e. games within player in this case). As a consequence, the un-
explained variation can be split into the variation between players and the residual variation
between games within players. In this experimental design, the variable ‘type of opponent’
(‘human’, ‘shadow agent’ or ‘oscillatory agent’) acts as the only fixed effect. Each player per-
forms the experiment several times, so we include the variable ‘player’ in order to account for
the potential lack of independence of the repeated measures for each participant.
5.5 Preliminary Analysis: short-scale vs. multiscale descriptions
Above, we proposed that analysis in the perceptual crossing experiments should not be re-
stricted to events with a short temporal span. Can we sustain this claim? Does the distribu-
tion of social interaction present a multiscale structure? Before characterizing different forms
of engagement in our experimental setup, in this section we perform different tests to explore
the possibility of multi-scale interactions shaping the dynamics within the perceptual cross-
ing experiment. We start by analysing our results with similar measures to the ones used in
previous analysis and propose the necessity of complementing them with other measures that
are not constrained to one particular scale of behaviour.
First Results
As an example the of use of short span variables of analysis, in (Auvray et al., 2009) the two
variables used in order to explain the detection of another human player are the frequency of
stimulation (the number of times a player receives an input from its opponent) and the prob-
ability of clicking (the probability of the player clicking their mouse in a two second interval
after a stimulation). The setup in our task differs in that the players are not asked to click when
they recognize a human player. Thus, in order to test a similar measure (note that participants
were not asked to click in our experiment) we substitute the probability of clicking with the
probability of having a new stimulation in an interval defined as a given window after a pre-
vious stimulation. This measure is intended to capture the probability of engagement in an
ongoing interaction between the two players.
Unlike Auvray et al. (2009), we do not use a single value for the window length and in-
stead test the values 0:25, 0:5, 1 and 2 seconds (around 95% of stimulations happen within a
window of 2 s after the previous stimulation). We refer to the frequency of stimulation as Fs
and the probability of consecutive stimulations in a window of length L seconds as PLs .
We conduct linear mixed effects modelling of the series corresponding to each measure
and we obtain the results shown in Table 5.1. Here we show the p-value resulting from the
comparison of the distributions corresponding to players when playing against another hu-
man player and when playing against each type of bot .
We can observe in the table how the frequency of stimulation Fs does not discriminate
against different types of players. This result is different from the classical perceptual crossing
results, and may be caused by the fact that the participants play individually against each type
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p-value
Groups Fs P0:25s P0:5s P1s P2s
human-human vs. human-oscillatory 0.2381 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0496
human-human vs. human-shadow 0.6591 0.6159 0.0000 0.2455 0.0519
Table 5.1: Statistical analysis of short-scale variables. Results of the linear mixed-model effects for comparing stimula-
tion frequency Fs and probability of consecutive stimulations PLs between the rounds where the player was facing other
human player and the two cases of programmed agents (oscillatory and shadow agents). Only some particular windows
allow us to statistically discriminate human versus bot opponents.
of opponent. For the probability of consecutive stimulations PLs we observe that the result
depends largely on the chosen value of L. For example, for the extreme values of 0:25 s and 2 s
the p-value is quite high and we cannot discriminate human opponents from either of the two
bots (e.g. setting the statistical significance level at 5%). Oscillator opponents however can be
discriminated for windows of 0:5 s and 1 s, and shadow opponents can only be discriminated
from humans for windows of 0:5 s. Then, choosing a value of 0:5 s would give us a variable
that allows us to statistically differentiate the different players, showing that at this particular
scale some opponents have more consecutive stimulations with the player than others (in this
case, the shadow agent presents a higher probability of consecutive stimulations).
To assess the significance of the statistical results without the bias of choosing particular
windows of analysis, we proceed to compute the distribution of inter-stimulation intervals
t , that is, the time between one stimulation and the next. However, since the data for each
player and round are scarce (around 40 mean stimulations by game, depending on the type
of agent), we aggregate the data of different players and rounds (although this could entail
losing some information about the data structure). The result of the cumulative probability
can be observed in Figure 5.3, where we observe that the windows of discrimination in Table 5.1
roughly coincide with the intervals in which the cumulative density functions overlap. This
may indicate that what we are doing when we just take the probability of stimulation (or
clicking) is integrating the density distribution of a process that unfolds over different scales
(in our case ranging from 0:1 s to 10 s).
Our hypothesis is that genuine social engagement displays a scale free structure of senso-
rimotor interactions. Thus, difference between human-human interaction and other modes
of disrupted interaction should be reflected in the distribution between scales, and not in any
specific scales. So, although we might find that events at a particular scale allow us to statisti-
cally differentiate between different behaviours, this would be an epiphenomenon of a deeper
change of the inter-scale structure of the interaction process.
5.5.1 Characterizing a Multiscale Structure of Social Interaction
To test this idea, we should test whether the results for a particular window are discriminative
between agents are either the consequence of something relevant happening at that timescale,
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Figure 5.3: Cumulative probability density function of the time between collisions for different types of opponents ag-
gregated among participants and trials. Values for the regions illustrated are: (dotted line) human vs. oscillatory agent,
(dashed line) human vs. shadow agent, (solid line) both participants are human players.
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Figure 5.4: Probability density function of the time between stimulations for different types of opponents aggregated
among participants and trials. Values for the regions illustrated are: (left) human vs. oscillatory agent ('vs. oscillator'),
(middle) human vs. shadow agent ('vs. shadow'), (right) both participants are human players ('vs. human').
or are instead caused by the different underlying structures of the temporal density distribu-
tions. In order to shed some light on this question we have represented the aggregated density
distribution functions of the time between stimulations t for the three types of opponents
(Figure 5.4). In the figure we can observe the presence of long tails that start around 0:5 s in
the case of the shadow and human opponents, and that these long tails have different slopes
in a logarithmic plot. This might be indicating that the statistically significant differences in
the activity between the different 0:5 s windows are not the result of something happening at
that scale, but the product of a deeper change in the temporal structure of the interaction. In
that case the statistical difference at windows of 0:5 s may appear because we are integrating
along all the smaller timescales.
To illustrate this point we offer the following example (Figure 5.5): imagine that we have
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a system in which we can access two components x1 and x2, each one being active at a different
timescale. The same system may display different behaviours. We can imagine that stimu-
lating x2 the system switches from behaviour 1 to behaviour 2a. As a result of the behaviour
change, we can find statistical differences between the distributions of x2 in behaviour 1 and
2a respectively. Also, we can consider a different condition in which we enhance the influ-
ence of variable x1 over x2 (in a process of phase modulation), making the system switch from
behaviour 1 to behaviour 2b. Again, we find statistical differences between the distributions
of x2 in behaviour 1 and 2b. The important point is that, while in the first case the statisti-
cal distribution of x2 is provoked by a direct change in the activity of this variable (directly
stimulating the component that produces it), in the second case the statistical difference in x2
can only be explained by a change in the interaction between variables x1 and x2. Similarly,
significant statistical changes in a timescale of 0:5 s, might be the result of something relevant
happening at that scale, or it may be the result of a reconfiguration of the whole temporal
structure relating to different scales of behaviour.
The example in Figure 5.5 indicates that by analysing just one particular scale of the sys-
tem we may be failing to capture the causes of a change in the system’s behaviour even in the
case that we were able to find a statistical discrimination of the distribution of a variable. In
the case of the perceptual crossing, we propose that previous analysis may be extended with
assessment of the activity at different scales and the relation between these scales. We contend
that taking into account the changes in the temporal structure of inter-stimulation times al-
lows a fuller explanation of the statistical discrimination offered by simple indices such as the
number of clicks or consecutive stimulations within a given window (used by Auvray et al.,
2009). Nevertheless, the analysis of the density distribution of aggregated data is too coarse to
test this claim. We need to perform a more detailed analysis of the temporal structure within
the individual interaction dynamics in each round to provide more conclusive results. We
propose that statistical analysis of fractal and multifractal time series may be a better suited
tool for this problem.
5.6 Fractal Dynamics in the Structure of Social Interaction
So far, we have observed that the interaction process in our perceptual crossing experiment
presents a multiscale structure that appears to change for different types of opponents. Is
this multiscale structure just the result of individual sensorimotor behaviour? Or is it the
result of the dynamics of a shared interactive space constructed between the two participants?
In this section we seek a more detailed analysis of the temporal structure of the interaction
between the two players for the three kinds of opponent. In doing so, we need to extract the
movements of the two players. In order to analyse the interaction between the subjects, we
take the time series of the distance between the two players (or the player and the bot agent): (1)
the first derivative of the distance is computed in order to obtain the variations in the distance
(whether the players are approaching or distancing themselves at each moment of time given
that we are interested in the coordinated movements of the players, not their positions); (2) we
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Figure 5.5: Example of statistical comparison between twomultiscale systems. In case 2a the behaviour is statistically
different from 1 at scale s2 because the intrinsic levels of activity at this scale have been increased. However, in case 2b
the statistical differences in respect to 1 at scale x2 is not due to any intrinsic change in x2 but instead to a change in the
relation between x2 and x1, that now presents a phasemodulation from slow to fast frequencies.
use the DFA and MDDFA algorithms to compute the structure of correlations across scales
in the data series and (3) we perform a linear mixed-effects modelling in order to observe if the
DFA and MDFA exponents are capable of differentiating between the interaction dynamics
depending on the type of opponent the player is facing (oscillatory, shadow or human).
a) b) c)
10−1 100
104
105 β = 1.4
F (n)
n
vs. oscillator
10−1 100
104
β = 0.29
F (n)
n
vs. shadow
10−1 100
104
105
β = 0.86
F (n)
n
vs. human
Figure 5.6: Fractal analysis calculated on interactive patterns between two participants. Values for the regions illus-
trated are: (left) human vs. oscillatory agent ('vs. oscillator'), (middle) human vs. shadow agent ('vs. shadow'), (right) both
participants are human players ('vs. human'). Log-linear slopes are computed in the interval of one decade to the left of
the higher scale cut-off point. If there is not cut-off point, the slope is computed in the interval n 2 [10 0:5; 100:5]. The
examples are representative cases of the three kinds of populations in the experiment.
As a first step in the analysis, we observe the results of individual DFAs in different rounds.
In Figure 5.6 we show some representative examples of the types of temporal structures dis-
played by the interactions with each type of agent. Since the slope of the fluctuations in a log-
arithmic plot is not always linear for all scales, we check if there is any cut-off value in which
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Figure 5.7: Fractal and multifractal exponents of relative velocity between participants time series. a) Boxplots distri-
bution of and, b) width of themultifractal spectrumh in the time series of the relative velocity between participants.
Values illustrated refer to interactions between: a human and anoscillatory agent ('vs. oscillator'), a human and a shadow
agent ('vs. shadow') and two human participants ('vs. human').
the linear relationship is truncated. We do this by searching for negative peaks in the second
derivative of F(n). The search of cut-off values is only performed in the right half of the n axis,
in order to find only the cut-offs at larger scales. Once the cut-off value is found, we analyse the
slope F(n) for the values of n in the decade just below the cut-off value (e.g. Figure 5.6.a and
5.6.b) . In the cases where there is no cut-off value (as in Figure 5.6.c) we analyse the interval
n 2 [10 0:5; 100:5].
For the oscillatory agent, we can observe in Figure 5.6.a a flatland at higher values of n,
followed by a steep linear slope with a  parameter around 1.5. For lower values of n the linear
slope disappears. This kind of fluctuation is characteristic of oscillatory dynamics, with the
transition from flat to slope being equal to the period of the oscillations. In the other case,
for the shadow agent, Figure 5.6.b presents something similar to a linear slope in the middle
of the fluctuation spectrum, although the slope linearity breaks at the extremes. The slope
of the fluctuation gives an exponent somewhat higher than  = 0. This suggests that weak
short-range correlations exist (close to a white noise structure), but they do not hold for longer
timescales. Finally, in Figure 5.6.c, when a player faces another human player, the fluctuation
spectrum displays a linear slope with a  exponent close to a pink noise spectrum ( = 1).
In a large part of the series, the fractal slope reaches the largest timescales, showing that the
correlations of the interaction dynamics cover a wide range of the spectrum. In Figure 5.6.c,
fractal relations covering the hole spectrum are illustrated, although there are many other cases
which present a cut-off point at large scales breaking the linear relation. We propose that the
existence of fractal 1=f patterns covering the whole analysed spectrum just in some cases of
human-human interaction may be related to the fact that sometimes interaction is successful
during a specific round but at other moments it experiences a breakdown in the interaction,
leading to disruption in correlation at longer timescales.
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Figure 5.6 shows three particularly representative examples of the three kinds of popula-
tions in the experiment. Particularly, in Figure 5.7.a we can observe the boxplots of  for the
different types of interaction. When the opponent is the oscillatory agent, we find that the
values of  in the time series are around 1.5. This means that the interactions are closer to a
brown noise structure, signifying that the interaction is more rigid and structured than in the
other cases. This makes sense since the movement of the oscillatory agent is constraining the
interactions into its cyclic movement structure. On the other hand, when the opponent is the
shadow agent, we have the opposite situation in which the interaction dynamics tend to dis-
play values of greater but close to 0. This means that the history of interaction is more uncor-
related. Using a linear mixed-effects model we asses that indeed the three distributions of are
different from each other. We tested this idea appropriately using linear mixed-effects mod-
els of the three types of opponents (oscillatory agent, shadow agent and human) to assess the
presence of statistically significant differences between the density distributions of . Using
a linear mixed-effects model we can test that beta is a significant parameter for distinguishing
the different kinds of interactions depending on the type of opponent [F(2; 93) = 258:350,
p < 0:0001].
As we have mentioned in section 4.5.1, fractal analysis is a mathematical procedure to de-
termine scale invariant structures in a dataset. Monofractal signals have the same scaling prop-
erties throughout the entire signal, therefore, it can be indexed by a single global exponent
(that is known as the Hurst exponent, see section 3.2). Alternatively, when spatial and tem-
poral variations in a scale invariant structure appear, we get a multifractal structure that can be
decomposed into different subsets characterized by different local Hurst exponents (denoted
as h) which quantify the local scaling of the time series. With this collection of exponents,
we characterize their scaling properties: any deviation from the average fractal structure for
segments with large and small fluctuations is captured by the multifractal spectrum width,
denoted by D(h).
In order to verify the nonlinear intermittent structure of the processes behind the patterns
analysed above, we also analyse the width of the multifractal spectrum of the derivative of the
distance between players. For each case, we calculate the width of the multifractal spectrum
using the MFDFA algorithm and plot the distributions of the obtained values depending on
the type of opponent (Figure 5.6.b). The probability distribution of the multifractal spectrum
width h on the oscillatory agent is more concentrated around small widths, indicating little
interaction between the time-scale of the oscillation frequency of the agent and the time-scales
of the movement of its human opponent. Larger values on the distribution of the shadow
agent indicate stronger interaction between its time-scales. Finally, the distribution of the
human agent reaches the largest values of the multifractal spectrum width, suggesting a rich
time-scale dynamics prompted by the interactivity between the time-scales of the movements
of a pair of human opponents. Again, a linear mixed-effects models shows us that the distri-
butions of values ofh are different depending on the type of opponentF(2; 93) = 258:350,
p < 0:0001.
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The fractal and multifractal spectrum results show that the relative velocity of the player
with respect to their opponent in the interaction process displays different distributions de-
pending on whether a genuine social interaction is happening or whether the player is inter-
acting with an artificial agent with trivial (oscillatory) or complex (shadow) patterns of move-
ment. It is interesting that 1=f noise emerges for a collective variable (the derivative of the dis-
tance) only in the case of human-human interaction, suggesting that long-range correlations
emerge in the shared space of social interactions and genuine social interaction is character-
ized by the collective evolution of the dyadic exchange. In those cases where the interaction
between the players is too rigid or too weak, the emergent multiscale phenomenon disap-
pears. The multifractal analysis seems to support this claim. To further test this proposal and
determine if the same results can be obtained from non-collective variables, we compare these
results with the behaviour of individual variables of the player and their opponents.
5.6.1 Comparing Fractal Exponents of Individual and Collective Variables
One of the ideas behind much of the work in the perceptual crossing paradigm is that the in-
teraction between subjects is a constitutive element of social cognition (Auvray et al., 2009). If
that is true, the characteristics of a genuine social interaction should appear only in dyadic vari-
ables such as the relative velocity between subjects and should be absent in individual variables
such as the individual movement of the player or their opponent. In order to test this hypoth-
esis, we repeat the fractal and multifractal analysis above using the velocity of the player and
the velocity of their opponent, instead of the relative velocity between the two. Thus, we can
test if the differences in the fractal emergent structure takes place in the shared space of social
interaction or are instead phenomena that may be accounted for by the changes in individual
dynamics alone.
In Figure 5.8 we can see how in this case the boxplots of  and the multifractal spectrum
width h show more overlapping among the distributions corresponding to the different
opponents. We tested our hypothesis using linear mixed-effects models of the three types of
opponents (oscillatory agent, shadow agent and human) to assess the presence of statistically
significant differences between the density distributions of (Table 5.2) andh (Table 5.3) for
three different cases: (1) the relative velocity between the player and its opponent (labelled in
the tables as the ‘interaction’ case), (2) the individual velocity of the player (labelled as ‘player’)
and (3) the individual velocity of the opponent (labelled as ‘opponent’). Both tables include
the corresponding p-values resulting from the modelling.
Given the results shown in both tables and setting the significance level at 5%, we can con-
clude that only in the case of the relative velocity between the agents (‘interaction’ columns)
are all three distributions statistically significantly different for both  and h.
For the case of the velocity of the player, we cannot confirm a statistically significant dif-
ference between the distributions of  and h. In the case of the velocity of the opponent,
we could only find evidence of statistically significant differences between the oscillatory agent
and the other two kinds of opponents, but not between the human opponent and the shadow
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Figure 5.8: Fractal and multifractal exponents of player and opponent's velocity time series. Boxplot distributions of
 (left side) and width of the multifractal spectrumh (right side) in the velocity of the players. The top figures (a and
b) represent the fractal and multifractal exponents of the velocity of the player. The bottom figures (c and d) represent
fractal and multifractal indices of the time series of the velocity of the opponent. Values illustrated refer to interactions
between: a human and an oscillatory agent ('vs. oscillator'), a human and a shadow agent ('vs. shadow') and two human
participants ('vs. human').
 p-value
Groups Interaction Player Opponent
human-human vs. human-oscillatory 0.0000 0.1106 0.0000
human-human vs. human-shadow 0.0017 0.6831 0.0850
Table 5.2: Results of the linear mixed-model effects for comparing the fractal  exponent from DFA results between
the rounds where the player was facing other human player and the two cases of programmed agents (oscillatory and
shadow agents). The left column (interaction) reflects the results when the relative velocity between the players is anal-
ysed, central column(player) showstheresultswhenthevelocityof theplayer isanalysedandtherightcolumn(opponent)
the velocity the opponent.
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h p-value
Groups Interaction Player Opponent
human-human vs. human-oscillatory 0.0000 0.1405 0.0000
human-human vs. human-shadow 0.0002 0.8594 0.4601
Table 5.3: Results of the linear mixed-model effects for comparing the fractalh exponents fromMFDFA results be-
tween the roundswhere the playerwas facing other humanplayer and the two cases of programmedagents (oscillatory
and shadow agents). The left column (interaction) reflects the results when the relative velocity between the players is
analysed. Central column (player) shows the results when the velocity of the player is analysed and right column (oppo-
nent) the velocity of the opponent.
agent.
Results show that individual variables are not suitable for discriminating between the kind
of interaction going on in the case of the shadow agent. This reveals that when the individ-
ual behaviours have some kind of complexity, what it is relevant in terms of the emergence
of social interaction is what is going on in the interaction between the two subjects and not
the complexity of their individual behaviours. As we hypothesized at the beginning of the
chapter, the invariances that constitute social engagement (in this case a scale-free dynamic
structure) are built over a shared space of mutual interaction, and cannot be explained in in-
dividual terms.
5.7 Discussion
In previous chapters we developed a notion of sensorimotor autonomy for neurocognitive
agents based in the constitutive nature of brain-body-environment interaction and a multi-
scale double loop of neurodynamic and sensorimotor regulation. During this chapter we have
tried to extend our insights about neurocognitive autonomy to the social realm, analysing the
constitutive nature of interaction between engaged agents and correlation at different scales
in a minimal social experimental setting. In this setting, the perceptual crossing paradigm, we
have questioned the limitations of previous approaches for capturing the complex unfolding
of the different levels of cognitive and social interaction. This interpretation offers a new con-
ceptualization of the directions in which we should focus attention: given the results shown in
this chapter, it is possible that the emergence of social engagement might not depend solely on
either the stability of co-regulative dynamics between two participants as suggested in previ-
ous perceptual crossing experiments and simulations (e.g. Di Paolo et al., 2008; Auvray et al.,
2009). Instead, the results obtained indicate that genuine social engagement might be better
characterized by a structure of cross-scale interactions that we have characterizing analysing
fractal 1=f scaling and the multifractal spectrum in relational variables of the process of social
engagement. Fractal and multifractal exponents showed no statistically significant differences
between different types of opponents when we analysed the velocity of the player or the oppo-
nent. In contrast, we did find these differences analysing the relative velocity between them,
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leading us to conclude that the emergence of a 1=f structure for genuine social interaction
is something that happens only in the shared space between the two subjects, and the pro-
cess cannot be reduced to their individual dynamics. This suggests that the process of social
engagement may have in some cases an autonomy of its own, and it cannot be reduced to
autonomy of individuals.
However, this work leaves several questions unanswered. The first concerns what an ad-
equate framework of analysis might be and how previous and new insights can be integrated
in a larger framework. The framework presented here still needs to be extended, since 1=f
scaling and the multifractal spectrum reduce the complexity of multiscale dynamics to a sin-
gle exponent that, although detecting the presence of activity at different scales, falls short
of characterizing the mechanisms sustaining of cross-scale interactions in social engagement
in detail. Multi-scale synchronization analysis employed for measuring inter-brain synchro-
nization in social tasks appears to be a suitable candidate for extending the analysis presented
here with multiscale synchronization analysis of behavioural dynamics (Dumas et al., 2010;
Müller et al., 2013). Further work should inquire into the mechanisms that make possible
the emergence of an interactive space of long-range correlations. More detailed analysis may
also offer new points of connection with previous work and alternative explanations for the
phenomena observed in the perceptual crossing experiment.
Another way forward may lie in modifications of the perceptual crossing experiment which
may prove helpful in better understanding the cross-scale interactions in minimal social inter-
action. Interesting advances following this approach include the work of (Iizuka et al., 2013),
which studies the emergence of a communication system between two participants, using the
perceptual crossing set up to collectively categorize different symbols. Also, (Froese et al.,
2014b) explore the evolution of interaction of fixed pairs of players during several rounds with
the objective of establishing a team for finding each other, observing that at some point the
players simultaneously become aware of each other. This kind of extended experiment may
allow the study of correlations at larger scales than just instantaneous mutual recognition, al-
lowing us to analyse interesting dynamics such as learning, development of shared patterns
and joint development of the player’s mutual dynamical entanglement.
We also should take into account that the perceptual crossing experiment is a minimal
framework for analysing dyadic social engagement. As in the case of sensorimotor interac-
tion, the emergence of a sensorimotor engagement is not enough for addressing autonomous
behaviour. Instead, an autonomous agent constitutes itself as such when it has the ability
to engage and disengage different dynamical fields as result of own processes of regulation.
Similarly, in social life, meaning and autonomy are constructed when social subjects can get
involved sequentially in different social processes at different times. An autonomous social
subject should be one that is able to recombine itself to engage and disengage different social
actors or processes, regulating some organizational invariants by doing so.
In the next chapter we tackle the question we posed at the beginning of this chapter: is
it possible the emergence of forms of autonomy in the social realm? What kind of organi-
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zational structure may sustains these forms of autonomy? In our everyday life, dyadic so-
cial interactions are pervasive but also transient and intermixed. Social processes are generally
not limited to sequential dyadic encounters but composed of one-to-one, one-to-many and
many-to-many interactions at several scales. From face to face encounters to more diffuse so-
cial exchanges through different communicational and cultural artifacts. We shall move to a
particular case of large-scale social autonomous behaviour for illustrating this point: massive
collective organizations mediated through digital communication tools.
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6
The Collective Mind: large-scale
self-organization in social systems
Abstract: We assess the possibility of a social autonomy by exploring a particular case of self-organization
in a ‘networked social movement’: the 15M movement in Spain. We review the notion of autonomy as
applied to social and political systems finding the tools and concepts developed for neurodynamic and
behavioural autonomy useful to characterize self-organized forms of construction of collective identity.
Contributions:
• We analyse the impact of ICTs in social organization in modern societies, proposing the notion of
‘multitudinous identity’ for describing a recurrent pattern of social organization during the last
years. We propose the 15M movement as a relevant case study of a multitudinous identity.
• We describe the operational closure of a network of geographical nodes the 15M movement based
in transfer entropy measures of its Twitter activity.
• We find geographical synchronization patterns at multiple scales in the activity of the 15M move-
ment in Twitter, frequently corresponding to moments of strong embodiment of protests.
• We analyse the relation between embodiment and synchronization of the 15M movement with
indicators of multiscale complexity of its organizational structure (TSE complexity and 1=f scaling).
Related publications1:
• Monterde, A., Calleja-López, A., Aguilera, M., Barandiaran, X. E., and Postill, J. (2015). Multi-
tudinous identities: a qualitative and network analysis of the 15M collective identity. Information,
Communication & Society, 18(8):930–950.
• Aguilera, M., Morer, I., Barandiaran, X. E., and Bedia, M. G. (2013b). Quantifying political self-
organization in social media. fractal patterns in the Spanish 15m movement on twitter. InAdvances
in Artificial Life, ECAL, volume 12:395–402.
1Although part of the conceptual framework and tools in this chapter were used in related publications, the
experimental data, analysis and elaboration of this chapter is original.
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In Chapters 3 and 4, we characterized in the cognitive domain a form of interactive auton-
omy which is constructed over the engagement of regulatory loops of neural self-organized
patterns and sensorimotor loops of the behavioural patterns that exist in an interactive space
of agent-environment coordination, producing a symmetry breaking where the agent is capa-
ble of coping with the complexity of environmental features as it acts as a coherent unit over its
environment. We then shifted our attention from sensorimotor autonomy to inter-subjective
social interaction. In Chapter 5 we have characterized the interactive nature of certain pro-
cesses of social engagement, as a requirement for the constitution of a social subject that goes
beyond the individual subjects participating in it. In this chapter we analyse the possibility of
this form of collective social subject to display a form of autonomy on its own. We propose
that the model of interactive cognitive autonomy that we have explored in previous chapters
may share some characteristics with modes of social interactive autonomy.
Intuitively, we frequently attribute unitary qualities to large-scale social processes. We
talk of ‘social consciousness’, ‘popular indignation’, ‘collective memory’, ‘general will’ and so
forth. Often, we find it useful to ascribe psychological states to social entities as if they were
autonomous subjects. Is this a mere metaphor and are social states are just a statistical average
of the individual participant psychological states? Or do groups of people have the ability of
acting as a unitary subject with ‘mental’ properties that emerge at scales other than that of the
individual? In this chapter we analyse what kind of collective identity would allow a com-
munity and its participants to constitute themselves as an autonomous entity with emergent
properties of its own. We argue that, in certain cases, social agents can emerge and exhibit a
form of collective autonomy. We describe a particular mode of collective autonomy that we
name ‘multitudinous identity’, and we explore its internal mechanisms and organization and
the particularities and the resemblances with other modes of autonomy.
6.1 Social Agency
During the last centuries, two starkly opposed traditions have dominated thinking about
group agency (List and Pettit, 2011). On one hand, it is the ‘emergentist’ tradition or the ‘ani-
mation theory’ of society, that prospered in the late nineteenth century in history, sociology
and political theory. Emergentist approaches appeared in the final decades of the nineteenth
century and the early decades of the twentieth, influenced by the work of legal historians like
Otto von Gierke and Frederick Maitland (Runciman, 1997). Inspired by medieval and later
legal theory, they argued that group agents are emergent entities over and above the individ-
uals who compose them. Using metaphors similar to those of biological vitalists and treating
life as a mysterious, organicist force, they proposed that for a collective agent to exist, there
must be something present apart from the individuals composing the group. This force takes
the form of ‘the pulsation of a common purpose which surges, as it were, from above, into
the mind and behaviour of members’ (Barker, 1950, p.61).
This perspective opposed individualistic atomistic views of society, defending the exis-
tence of a different level of description which serves as a centre of reference for the action of
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the social agent. The emergentist tradition became fashionable in the early twentieth century
and was associated with a wide range of political perspectives, often related to socialist per-
spectives enthusiastically highlighting the independent reality of associations, organizations
and states. Nevertheless, as fascism took over in Europe, it also became associated with a to-
talitarian image of society (List and Pettit, 2011, p.9).
On the other hand, the ‘eliminativist’ tradition, associated with analytical philosophy and
economics, arose in the 19th century and became mainstream since the middle of the 20th.
This tradition is based on the methodological individualism, which was generalized in much
of the economics and social sciences for the second half of the 20th century represented by
Karl Popper or Friedrich Hayek (Arrow, 1994). This methodology states that explanations
of social phenomena should be based on the agency of individuals and their actions and deci-
sions. Inspired by this methodological approach, eliminativists state that agency only applies
to individuals. When such individuals cooperate in groups, they do not bring novel agents
into existence. Following Jeremy Bentham claim ‘[t]he community is a fictitious body’ (Ben-
tham, 1789, p.3), eliminativists claim that collective agency is not an appropriate subject of
analysis:
Groups are said to have beliefs, emotions, and attitudes and to take decisions and
make promises. But these ways of speaking are plainly metaphorical. To ascribe
mental predicates to a group is always an indirect way of ascribing such predicates
to its members (Quinton, 1975, p.17).
At much, eliminativists defend we can speak of social states as a form of statistical reduction
of its participants, but not as an entity that can be governed by a different logic than the indi-
viduals that compose it.
As in the cognitive domain, a tension arises between the intuition about a unitary subject
that arises from a network of distributed entities, and the absence of mechanistic explana-
tions of how that may happen, leading to the conclusion that it may be a phenomenon of the
sum of individual dynamics (see Chapter 2 for a review of reductionist and holistic tensions
in cognitive sciences). As in the cognitive domain, new scientific tools developed during the
last half century allow the possibility to find a third way for characterizing social agency. Nei-
ther a ‘fictitious body’ nor a collective body existing over individuals ‘from above, into the
mind and behaviour of members’, an autonomous body constructed through the interaction
of different scales of description of the social system may overcome the reductionistm-holism
dichotomy. We think that a systemic definition of collective embodiment is possible for defin-
ing interactive autonomy using the conceptual tools of nonlinear dynamics and complex sys-
tems science.
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6.1.1 The Cybernetic View of Group Agency
As in cognitive science, the rise of cybernetics also brought a refreshing perspective about col-
lective agency. In his seminal book ‘Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the An-
imal and the Machine’, Norbert Wiener included a last chapter discussing the application of
the cybernetic method to social science (Wiener, 1965, p.155-165). For Wiener, communities
exist only in terms of the effective transmission of information among its members. For him,
agency of a group of animals (or a ‘race’, using his words) can be measured in terms of the
communal information shared among them:
Whatever means of communication the race may have, it is possible to define and
to measure the amount of information available to the race and to distinguish it
from the amount of information available to the individual. Certainly no infor-
mation available to the individual is also available to the race unless it modifies
the behavior of one individual to another, nor is even that behavior of racial sig-
nificance unless it is distinguishable by other individuals from other forms of
behavior (Wiener, 1965, p.160).
For Wiener, social agency exists as long as there is a new level of description, that of commu-
nal information, which cannot be reduced to the information of individual agents alone, but
instead is generated in the process of interaction between agents. This new level of descrip-
tion cannot be reduced to the behaviour of individuals but is described in terms of how the
behaviour of one individual influences others. Wiener speculates that certain animal species
might act as communities at some levels. For example, ant colonies are constituted by chemi-
cal communication which allows ants to recognize whether others are members of their own
or other colonies. Also, hormones triggering sexual attraction in certain solitary mammals
might have a communal role driving the continuation of the species. The emergence of an
interactive communicational domain allows a new level of description where a social level of
agency can be characterized.
Unfortunately for the objective of this work, with the end of the first cybernetic wave
and the rise of computationalist approaches to artificial intelligence (see Chapter 2 for a re-
view), these views were pushed out of the mainstream scientific research program. Instead,
the artificial intelligence community shifted its interest to multi-agent systems approaches. In
this approach agents are typically designed as having a set of explicitly represented beliefs in
terms of some internal logical language, and are able to derive some of the logical consequences
of their beliefs and communicate them to others (Wooldridge, 1992; Panzarasa and Jennings,
2001). For behaving collectively, agents must be able to determine which goals they share with
other agents through communication protocols (Finin et al., 1994). So, multiagent systems are
the natural extension of typical AI knowledge-based systems. Although emergent phenom-
ena are possible in these systems, in general the objective of the designer is to avoid them and
reduce the system to the scenarios designed to provide predictable solutions to an engineering
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problem in a rigid and controlled structure. Despite multiagent systems approaches are some-
times considered similar to self-organized distributed systems (like artificial neural networks
or ant colonies) or game theory models2 the logic behind the modelling of multiagent systems
is quite different and typically dismisses the possibility of emergent phenomena as a funda-
mental aspect of the system. In a way, by reducing the system to a set of representational goals
and interactions between agents mediated by logical communication protocols, the complex-
ity of social interaction is collapsed into a rule-based system, where the behavioural rules of the
whole are described using the same language as the description of an individual’s behaviour.
As in computationalist artificial intelligence, the reduction of the system to only those aspects
that can be captured as explicit representations of knowledge forsakes the emergence of differ-
ent levels of description of the system’s activity, falling into an equivalent of an eliminativist
perspective of social agency.
However, in the periphery of mainstream computationalist perspectives, the second cy-
bernetic wave and the incipient network and complex systems perspectives brought some in-
terest to different perspectives on social agency. In social science, the term ‘social autopoiesis’
was coined, impulsed by the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (Luhmann, 1986). For
Luhmann, there are not individuals but communications themselves that constitute the (self-
reproducing) elements of the autopoietic social system:
Social systems use communications as their particular mode of autopoietic re-
production. Their elements are communication which are recursively produced
and reproduced by a network of communications and which cannot exist out-
side such a network (Luhmann, 1986, p.174).
Thus, social systems would constitute self-referential systems with communications as its
elements. Somehow, humans are not the components of the system but the sensors in the
environment of the system. Other views suggest that humans are indeed the components
of social autopoiesis, and what it is self-produced (by humans) is the permanent creation of
the ‘unity of human actors and social structures, i.e. human sociality, in society’ (Fuchs and
Hofkirchner, 2010).
However, Maturana and Varela have argued at different moments that autopoiesis is not
directly applicable to the biological realm (Mingers, 1992). Varela showed his scepticism about
this arguing that:
2 In parallel with the development of cybernetics and artificial intelligence, research in economics popular-
ized game theory and the idea of Nash equilibrium, where emergent phenomena are considered but typically
behaviour is modelled in purely individualistic terms, where agents only seek to maximize is own utility func-
tion (Mirowski, 2001). Nevertheless, modern research has discovered a number of important complex properties
of the Nash Equilibrium (Fellman, 2011) which may be used to address complex forms of organization.
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These ideas are based, in my opinion, on an abuse of language. In autopoiesis,
the notion of boundary has a more or less precise meaning. When, however,
the net of processes is transformed into one ‘interaction among people’, and the
cellular membrane is transformed into the limit of a human group, one falls into
an abuse (Varela, 2000).
Moreover, the application of the concept of autopoiesis to the social realm, often not in a very
rigorous way, has negatively affected the concept, which has sometimes been seen unscientific
and ‘new-agey’ (Luisi, 2003, p.50). Although these first attempts to apply autopoietic ideas to
society encountered some problems, it is convenient to remember that autopoiesis is a specific
materialization of autonomy in the biological realm. As in the case of cognitive autonomy,
we can think that a different materialization of autonomous organizations might be taking
place in the social realm, one that demands a different conception of closure and self-nonself
distinction while encompassing the multiscale and modulatory aspects we have contributed
in previous chapters.
Regarding this materialization, we might ask whether large human societies have the mech-
anisms that may allow the emergence of forms of social autonomy. For Wiener, communities
(i.e. social agency) emerge in closely knit groups of humans, in which different homeostatic
mechanisms play a role in creating respectable standards of care for members of the commu-
nity and maintaining communal information (Wiener, 1965, p.157). However, he claimed that
this cannot happen at a larger scale, in societies that remain too large to ensure direct contact
between all its members. According to Wiener, vertical structures in large societies introduce
a series of anti-homeostatic factors, the most important of which are mass communication
media, since they operate by rules of accumulation of power and wealth rather than creating
communal information (Wiener, 1965, p.161). It is by means of those anti-homeostatic mecha-
nisms that ‘the Lords of Things as They Are protect themselves from hunger by wealth, from
public opinion by privacy and anonymity, from private criticism by the laws of libel and the
possession of the means of communication, that ruthlessness can reach its most sublime levels’
(Wiener, 1965, p.160).
An interesting perspective about the possibilities of social autonomy was soon to be ma-
terialized by the ground-breaking management experiment performed on the earliest seven-
ties in Allende’s Chile (Medina, 2006). Project Cybersyn was a decentralized decision sup-
port system to aid in the management of the national economy, a kind of proto-Internet buit
from telex machine and a computer operating at a national scale. The director of the project
was Stafford Beer, christened by Wiener as the ‘father of management cybernetics’, which de-
signed the architecture of the project based on his viable system model theory (Beer, 1995b)
and a neural network approach to organizational design. The system was based on a net-
work of telex machines in state-run enterprises transmitting and receiving information with
the Chilean’s government, in what Beer conceived as a ‘decentralizing, worker-participative,
and anti-bureaucratic manner’ (Medina, 2006, p.572). Although the project was dismantled
after the coup that overthrew Allende, the parts that became functional provided a coordi-
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nating network structure of increasing importance for the Chilean Government. (Medina,
2006, p.593-594). Moreover, for Beer, factory management was an initial step, and envisioned
numerous cybernetic applications to the Chilean social system, including the installation of
‘algedonic’ meters in a representative sample of Chilean homes that would allow citizens to
transmit their pleasure or displeasure with political decisions enabling the government to re-
spond rapidly to public demands, rather than repress opposing views (Medina, 2006, p.599).
Interestingly, Project Cybersyn conceived social autonomy as something to be built through
communication technologies, and the application of new networked technological tools was
a key aspect for overtaking some of the communicational limits observed by Wiener in our
present societies in the form of centralized monopolies over media.
6.1.2 Mass Self-Communication
At the time when Wiener wrote his book (and still today in most cases), communication media
had a hierarchical structure in which information and control fluxes were unidirectional (e.g.
television, radio). There is one centralized sender and a mass of receivers with a very limited
capacity of interaction at large scales. More complex and distributed channels of communi-
cation could be created at small levels, but it was difficult for these forms of communication
to scale-up to large social segments. Nevertheless, there may be some interesting cases at some
particular moments and timescales, as postal networks during the Republic of Letters in the
17th and 18th centuries (Chang et al., 2009), or the widespread print-shop networks of radi-
cal reforming movements as a fundamental part of the 16th German Reformation with the
generalization of the printing press (Hill, 2015). Interestingly, the rise of new digital communi-
cation tools and network technologies is pushing forward forms of fast bidirectional commu-
nication, generating what Manuel Castells has defined as mass self-communication (Castells,
2007). According to Castells, these new forms of communication increase the autonomy and
influence of the social groups that use them.
Others have stressed the role of information and communication technologies (ICTs) in
the emergence of collective intelligence based in distributed, enhanced, real time coordina-
tion resulting in effective mobilization of skills (Levy, 1999), and by creating a collective pool
of social knowledge by expanding the domain of human interactions (Flew, 2011). Similarly,
Howard Rheingold has coined the term smart mobs, to characterize large groups that coop-
erate in novel ways taking advantage of the communication and computing capabilities of
widespread technological devices (Rheingold, 2007).
In general, new digital tools seem to make the idea of large-scale autonomous social or-
ganization more plausible (although this claim is not without criticism, e.g. Morozov, 2012).
Moreover, Castells argues that a product of the creation of horizontal and interactive commu-
nication networks is creating a wave of self-organized ‘networked social movements’ aiming
to redefine the rules of our social and political life and exploring new forms of being and acting
together (Castells, 2012). For him, the Icelandic ‘Kitchenware Revolution’, Wikileaks ‘Cable-
gate’ and Anonymous’ network defence, the 2011 Arab Spring, the Spanish 15M movement
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and the Occupy Movement are but a few among the many examples of the increasing role
played by social media in grassroots political organizing. While these and similar social move-
ments differ in many important ways and they are grounded in specific social contexts, there
is one thing they share in common: they are all interwoven through ‘autonomous’ commu-
nication networks supported by the Internet and wireless communication (Castells, 2012).
Social media has provided the tools for creating horizontal and interactive communication
networks, boosting enormously the possibilities for self-organized political processes. Partic-
ular forms of collective action operating at different scales reached the public arena with an
intensive use of digital networks, amplifying their events around the world, engaging thou-
sands of people within shifting political scenarios, singular forms of political subjectivity and
collective agency, and generating emergent forms of identity (e.g. Anonymous, 15M or Oc-
cupy). The presence of Internet and other digital media and the increasing use of multidirec-
tional and interactive mass communication networks is starting to change radically the way
societies organize themselves to constitute counter power or change power relationships with
dominant institutions (Castells, 2007).
Moreover, intensive use of digital communication tools also provides an opportunity for
new research methods in social sciences. In his book, Wiener was sceptical about the possibil-
ity of applying the cybernetic method to social sciences. For him, the difficulty of minimiz-
ing the coupling between observer and the observed phenomena was a prohibitive obstacle
(Wiener, 1965, p.163). Fortunately, the rise of social media and digital data-mining opens a
new door for a genuine analysis and synthesis of human social life (Lazer et al., 2009).
What kind of organizational structures can arise in these social media-based mobiliza-
tions? Are we witnessing the emergence of new modes of social agency? Do new forms of
communication facilitate the constitution of a communal body that sustains modes of interac-
tive autonomy? What is the degree of collective ‘political consciousness’ in social media-based
mobilizations? We provide some answers to these questions analysing one particular case of
social agency: the collective identity generated in the Spanish 15M movement as a particular
example of networked social movements.
6.1.3 Multitudinous Identities in Recent Networked Movements
During the last few years, recent movements as the Arab Springs, the Occupy movement or
the 15M movement have triggered an active debate in communication and political sciences
about the nature of collective identity in these movements, although sometimes they are faced
with the limits of previous dichotomies between holistic and individualist approaches. For ex-
ample, Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg have proposed that new forms of communi-
cation promote a ‘logic of connective action’ based on sharing personalized contents through
social media, which is different to earlier forms of collective action linked to ‘high levels of
organizational resources and the formation of collective identities’ (Bennett and Segerberg,
2012). Along the same line Kevin McDonald proposes to shift the focus ‘from collective iden-
tity’ to ‘the public experience of self’ (Mcdonald, 2002, p.109) and the concept of ‘fluidarity’
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for understanding new forms of political organization. However, Paolo Gerbaudo (2014) is
critical of these views as they downplay collective and cultural dimensions of protest through
its methodological individualism. Instead, Gerbaudo suggests that an emerging culture of
digitally mediated activism brings about the primacy of processes of aggregation, ‘a process of
reductio ad unum – a reduction of the complexity of the social’, as he characterizes it, quoting
Ernesto Laclau (Gerbaudo, 2013). Furthermore, he points out that aggregation implies ‘an
emphasis on unity, collectivity and uniformity’ distant from what he sees as the familiar, in-
dividualistic discourse on networks. Along similar lines, Juris (2012) argues that social media
contributed ‘a “logic of aggregation”, which entails the assembling of masses of individuals
from diverse backgrounds within physical space’ (Juris, 2012, p.260). This logic ‘generates
particular patterns of social and political interaction that involve the viral flow of informa-
tion and subsequent aggregations of large numbers of individuals in concrete physical spaces’
(Juris, 2012, p.266).
Although these analyses bring into the picture different interesting aspects of the new
forms of organization, a tension arises between approaches prioritizing informational and or-
ganization dimensions and those calling for a culture-centred analysis (Gerbaudo and Treré,
2015), which reminds us of the old dispute between emergentism and eliminativism opposing
a microscale personal level and macroscopic notions of aggregation. In order to go beyond
this tension (Monterde et al., 2015), we have proposed a different approach based on the no-
tion of amultitudinous identity, a collective identity based on a statistically irreducible internal
complexity based on Hardt and Negri’s notion of ‘multitude’:
The components of the masses, the mob, and the crowd are not singularities -
and this is obvious from the fact that their differences so easily collapse into the
indifference of the whole [...] The multitude, designates an active social subject
[...] an internally different, multiple social subject (Hardt and Negri, 2005, p.99-
100).
Rather than by direct, upwards identification with a symbol, person or cause, multitudi-
nous identities emerge from large-scale processes of self-organized, continuous, interaction,
where relationships of various kinds (including relations some-to-many, and many-to-many,
distributed and transient), are the norm rather than the exception. We do not deny the im-
portance of the personal dimension and singular actors, neither the role of mechanisms of
aggregation of large masses of individuals. Nevertheless, the notion of multitudinous iden-
tity emphasizes the role of mesoscale levels of activity, actors and interactions, emphasizing
the multiplicity, changing nature and diversity of the interactions between singular actors,
groups and collective initiatives.
We contend that the idea of the ‘multitudinous identity’ helps to understand some fea-
tures of the internally complex macroscopic identity of the forms of organization of new net-
worked movements, describing it as the interrelation between irreducible scales – from micro-
personal exchanges to transiently coordinated activity of large groups of synchronized actors,
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up to the evolution of the organization of the macroscopic network as a whole – through dis-
tributed interaction and transient leadership among the different participants in the network
(Monterde et al., 2015, p.17). Challenging more traditional forms of centralized and hierarchi-
cal political organization, the idea of multitude is irreducible to particular individuals in the
network or to a fixed organizational structure.
This approach, on top of getting us beyond previous tensions between reductionist and
holistic approaches, provides us with an entry point to apply notions we used to describe
interactive autonomy into the social realm. Particularly, the notion of multitude resonates
with one of the characteristics that we have highlighted for neurocognitive autonomy: the
ability of presenting at the same time an integrated nature and a high level of differentiation
of its components.
The objective of this chapter is to deepen into the notion of multitudinous identity and
to characterize whether a particular example of one of the most prominent networked move-
ments – the Spanish 15M movement – presents an autonomous organization in the terms we
presented in previous chapters. As we will see below, the 15M movement is composed of a
rich network structure of heterogeneous, internally multiple actors, composed of a myriad of
collective initiatives, with collective goals and messages (even if frequently transient and pri-
oritizing participation over delegation or representation), and recursivity. Our objective is to
analyse what kind of mechanisms may be sustaining the multitudinous identity of the 15M
movement.
6.2 The 15M Movement and its Evolution
We take the Spanish 15M movement as a case study to depict some fundamental characteris-
tics of the forms of collective identity arising around the wave of network-movements since
2011 (Castells, 2012). The 15M movement displays a rich, ongoing history of evolution and
maturation (Monterde et al., 2015). Nevertheless, in this chapter we focus only on the first
wave of massive mobilization that started the movement around May 15, 2011. In March 2011
a citizen platform was created around a manifesto calling for mass demonstrations on May 15
asking for a ‘real democracy’ in Spain. The name adopted by the platform, ‘Democracia Real
Ya’ (Real Democracy Now, DRY hereafter), was soon taken-up by citizens around Spain who
were encouraged to create their local nodes, without requiring any central authorization or
supervision (Toret et al., 2015, p.75-77). This platform was coordinated mostly through a web
forum and Facebook groups, plus a myriad of small local groups that emerged in over 60 cities
during its first days of existence.
On May 15th 2011, simultaneous demonstrations took place in 60 cities up and down the
country. Despite the silence of mainstream media, about 130,000 people joined the demon-
strations (Serrano, 2012). Between May 16th and 22nd, a small sit-in in Madrid’s Puerta del
Sol (Acampada Sol), evolved into a camp that became the first node of a network of camps
that soon reached over 130 cities across Spain and another 60 more around the world. Camps
spread throughout the Spanish territory through socio-technologically structured processes of
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replication (Toret et al., 2015, p.88). This replication process (characteristic of different phases
of the 15M movement, the Occupy movement and others) was based on the proliferation
of ‘prototypes’ that served in the construction of new networked nodes (Gutiérrez, 2013b,a);
those prototypes were easily replicable and highly adaptive to different local contexts. Thus, a
myriad of mesoscale initiatives (contained within the 15M macro-identity) replicated quickly,
creating the backbone of the camp network. A vast network of connected camps and squares
emerged for the duration of the protests allowing information, calls and actions to circulate
and reverberate engaging an estimated 6 to 8 million people in the protests (RTVE, 2011).
When compared with forerunners such as the alter-globalization movement (Juris, 2008),
the 15M movement exhibits an increase in the range and variety of the networked practices of
its participants, e.g. viral campaigns on Facebook, activity coordination on Twitter or protest
live-streaming (Pérez and Gil, 2014). Unsurprisingly, Internet traffic in Spain increased by 17%
from April to May 2011, indicating an intense use of Internet-related technologies (Monterde
and Postill, 2014).
During the following years, the movement evolved through a continuous renewal of its
repertoire of practices, combining moments of latency with periodical outbreaks of massive
mobilizations, displacing the centre of gravity from the initial claims and the camps to new
initiatives. These new initiatives included global joint mobilizations with other movements as
the Occupy movement and anti-austerity protests in Greece and Portugal (such as the October
15, 2011, global demonstration), legal actions such as the crowdsourced campaign 15MpaRato
against a prominent banker accused of fraud and corruption, massive acts of civil disobedi-
ence such as the surrounding of the Spanish Congress by 60.000 people (Rodea el Congreso) in
September 2012, or popular legislative initiatives for example, the one impulsed by the Mort-
gage Victims Platform (PAH) to stem the flood of foreclosures and evictions, which garnered
1.5 million signatures in favor of the initiative. Some of these initiatives acquired special im-
portance within the ecosystem of the 15M movement, and became regular spaces for action
(e.g. the teachers and public health workers’ mobilizations under the label mareas (tides), or
the fight against housing evictions). These practices entailed intensive use of social media and
digital tools, open prototypes that can be easily appropriated, and transversal calls to actions
that did not appeal to a shared identity or ideology (Candón Mena, 2013; Monterde and Pos-
till, 2014; Toret et al., 2015). As these lines are being written, 15M-derived political initiatives
are irrupting in the electoral arena. In 2014, a political party labelled ‘Podemos’ (We can) ob-
tained 1.2 million votes in May 2014 European elections. In May 2015, Podemos was the third
force in Spanish regional elections. Furthermore, several 15M-inspired independent citizen
platforms concurred to May 2015 municipal elections in many Spanish cities, winning the city
councils of three of the five largest Spanish cities (Madrid, Barcelona and Zaragoza). In all
these elections the two main political parties in Spain both obtained the worse result in their
history, indicating a renewal of political organization and real electoral effects of the claims
and communication structures of the 15M movement.
221
6.3 The 15M as a Coordinative Structure
Undoubtedly, the 15M movement has put into practice new forms of organization, knitting
a powerful network of distributed mobilization. But, what kind of processes allow the con-
struction and maintenance of this network?
It has been found that the activity of the 15M movement in social media displays struc-
tural scale-free topologies at their mesoscale, and that its dynamics exhibits typical features
of critical systems such as robustness and power-law distributions (Borge-Holthoefer et al.,
2011). Also, it has been shown that participants are recruited into the network in a distributed
manner, through the combination of local network and global bridges percolating a coherent
whole (González-Bailón et al., 2011). Furthermore, Borge-Holthoefer et al. (2015) have anal-
ysed the emergence of the 15M movement, showing that after the 15M demonstration the sys-
tem undergoes a transition from a structure of geographically centralized information flows
to a distributed scenario of symmetric information flows coupling together the different parts
of the network. Many of these properties – criticality, compromise between local and global
dynamics, emergent coordination – suggest that the system is organized through principles
of distributed coordination. As we saw, the extrapolation of biological autonomy as material
self-production of the system to social systems is problematic in various senses. Instead, we
consider that it is more plausible that, as in neurocogitive autonomous systems, coordinative
activity may be playing the role of building an operationally closed structure supporting the
emergence of mesoscopic levels of regulation sustaining the autonomy at a macroscopic scale.
Coordinated activity is a powerful force in creating and sustaining human communities.
William McNeill (2008) has reviewed how coordinated rhythmic movement has been a mech-
anism for holding human groups together for diverse historical phenomena such as warfare,
plague or the pursuit of power. For McNeill, visceral and emotional sensations of shared
movement, what he calls ‘muscular bonding’ is what creates the sense of community, in-
dependently of it taking the form of dances expressing revolutionary self-consciousness, the
goose-stepping Nazi formations, or the morning exercises of factory workers in Japan. For ex-
ample, ‘French revolutionaries experimented with Liberty tree dances and civic festivals that
gave muscular public expression to the revolutionary principles of liberty, equality, and fra-
ternity’ (McNeill, 2008, p.136). No wonder that a few years after the storming of the Bastille,
when revolutionary ardour was at its peak, commemorative speeches devoted to July 14 pre-
sented it, in the words of a modern scholar, as ‘a dance, a masterpiece of pure activity in which
the movements of a unanimous people were miraculously ordered in the figure of a gracious,
gratuitous ballet’ (Ozouf and Sheridan, 1991, p.172).
In the case of the 15M movement, activists have described the activity of the movement as
the cyclic dynamic of a collective heart, in which the activity of the system is governed by or-
ganismic cycles (Malo and Pérez, 2012) or as a ‘self-organizing climate’ which envelopes society
like waves of wind (Fernández-Savater, 2012). Do networked movements present new forms
of coordinated activity boosted by digital technology? Monterde and Postill (2014) argue that
the recent proliferation of mobile Internet lines in 2011 allowed the use of smartphones as ar-
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ticulators of coordinated online spaces and occupied physical spaces. Using social media like
Twitter or live streaming, demonstrators were able to create ‘mobile ensembles’ generating
specific collective actions (e.g. occupying a square, preventing an eviction, or holding a gen-
eral assembly). This hypothesis seems supported by the fact that, from the 16th to the 18th of
May 2011, there was a 20% increase in mobile data traffic in Spain, with the number of requests
being even higher, which at one point resulted in collapsed services atPuerta del Sol in Madrid
(Monterde and Postill, 2014, p.9). In the case of other networked movements like the Occupy
movement, Bennett et al. (2014) argue that an essential aspect of its network organization is
the ‘dynamic integration’ which allow the network to partially integrate its participating sub-
networks, depending on the ability of its users to create and recreate multiple connections
between them.
Nonetheless, the mechanisms creating ‘mobile ensembles’ or ‘dynamical integration’ in
mass participation in networked movements are far from clear. We consider that method-
ological advances are required in order to unveil the underlying dynamic and organizational
structures of networked movements. In a recent book chapter, we proposed as a hypothesis
that the organization of the 15M movement might be sustained by something similar to the
dynamic core hypothesis in neuroscience (Barandiaran and Aguilera, 2015, p.204-207), and
that it may allow an integrated and coordinated interactive assemblage, which was also dis-
tributed and reconfigurable in its structure and composition. This is supported by the fact
that, during the evolution of the movement, different collective initiatives have transiently
assumed roles of leadership reconfiguring the organization of the rest of the network, in what
has been described as a model of ‘distributed transient leadership’ (Toret et al., 2015, p.72). In
the following sections we analyse if a dynamic core organizational model is suitable to explain
and characterize the behaviour of the 15M movement and what processes may be sustaining
it.
Specifically, our hypothesis is that self-organized mass synchronization might be operat-
ing for the maintenance of a coherent identity, in a somewhat analogous manner to the way
in which neurodynamic identities are formed. We agree with authors that see autopoietic au-
tonomy as unfit for social processes. Instead, we consider that the model of interactive auton-
omy depicted in previous chapters, based on regulatory loops of coordinated activity bringing
forth the operational closure of the system, might be more adequate to describe modes of so-
cial agency than those based on the material constitution of an agent. In order to explore this
hypothesis, during the rest of the chapter we analyse the delimitation, underlying coordina-
tion principles and the multiscale organizational structure of the 15M identity.
6.4 Delimitation and Characterization of the 15M Collective Identity
In what follows we depict the identity of the 15M movement as a specific form of collective
identity that we call ‘multitudinous identity’. This is a form of systemic identity that emerges
from the networked interactions of heterogeneous actors (bloggers, activist reporters, alter-
native and independent media, etc.) including collective ones. Our interest lies in 15M´s sys-
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temic, macro-identity, its emergence and its evolution over time. Interestingly, the 15M iden-
tity arises at a national level as a bottom-up, grassroots process. How does this identity emerge
encompassing large groups of geographically distant people? In the following sections, we
analyse the relation between the main geographical nodes of activity in social-media.
In this section, and during the rest of this chapter, we analyse a dataset of 1,444,051 tweets
from 181,146 users, collected between 13 May 2011 and 31 May 2011. This dataset (Peña-López
et al., 2014) was extracted from the Twitter streaming API, which provides information on the
time and content of the tweet, as well as information on the sender, including location. Mes-
sages were captured when they contained one of the following hashtags or keywords (which
were selected as some of the most relevant during the emergence of the 15M movement):
#15M, 15-M, #democraciarealya, #tomalacalle, #Nolesvotes, #spanishrevolution, #acampada-
sol, #acampadabcn, #indignados, #notenemosmiedo, #nonosvamos, #yeswecamp. Since the
location is a field of the description of the user, it does not necessarily correspond to the real
location. We thus ran a test on geolocalized Twitter data from Spain, observing that for a set
of 20.000 random tweets in a 80.25% the profile location corresponds with the actual location.
Since the 15M was (at least during the first days) mainly an urban phenomena, we analyse ge-
ographical interactions between the 15 cities with more activity in Twitter during 17 days of
the protests.
As stated above, we focus on the systemic dimension of collective identity formation and
evolution. This aspect of ‘operational identity’ does not exclude, but should not be confused
with, mutual identification or solidarity at a personal or collective level, or as a social or psy-
chological state of symbolic subsumption ‘I/we am/feel part ofX’, beingX the collective iden-
tity. In this sense, we leave aside the cognitive and cultural aspects of how a collective identity
is formed. We focus instead on the communicative interaction processes that make a diffuse
social entity such as 15M emerge and autonomously maintain itself over time, that is, inde-
pendent from an external agent (e.g. the State or the media) that identifies or circumvents
that collective entity.
6.4.1 Interactive Delimitation of the 15M identity
We defined an operationally closed system as one in which all the processes that form part
of the system condition and are conditioned by other of the processes that form part of the
system. In the case of a directed graph (a network whose links have a defined direction) of the
influences between the nodes of the network, we may identify an operationally closed unity
as a strongly connected component structure in the network (Virgo et al., 2011). A strongly
connected component consists of a set of nodes of a directed graph in which, for any pair
of nodes of the set, there is a path linking them. That is, information can circulate within
a strongly connected component, potentially departing from and reaching any node of the
component. If a node can either send information to or receive information from a set of
nodes, but not the opposite, it is not part of the strongly connected component, and therefore
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cannot be part of its systemic identity3. Yet, depending on what kind of data we are looking at
(the time-span, the level of detail of an interaction network, or the thresholds used to define
the network graph), almost any social system can be pictured as a strongly connected network.
For this reason, we should think carefully what we define as processes in the system and the
condition for assuming that one process ‘conditions’ another.
Using geographical information of the tweets, we compute the time-series of geographical
activity at 15 cities4. Time series are defined summing the number of tweets for a step of 60
seconds. We make use of transfer entropy measures (see Section 3.6) to test whether activity
at one location influences another. Transfer entropy is a good candidate to statistically anal-
yse the causal relationships between the nodes of the network. Transfer entropy between two
cities x and y TE()xy is computed for a sliding window of 86:400 s (i.e. 24 hours). The win-
dow is shifted for intervals of 10:800 s (i.e. 3 hours). For each window, we simplify the signal
into discrete symbols by computing the presence of bursts of activity. In order to reduce the
computational cost of calculations (especially for the generation of surrogates and calculating
TSE complexity, which we will describe in a subsequent section), we reduce each signal into a
binary time series which represents if the signal is bursting higher than its logarithmic mean.
For each city c, we define a variable Bc, which represents when the activity at city ac(t) burst
to levels higher than the logarithmic mean of the activity of the window in which the signal
is defined. For computing Bc, we compute the mean of the activity in a particular window,
defining the activation of bursts as:
Bc(t) =
 1 if log(ac(t)) > hlog(ac(t)i
0 otherwise (6.1)
where ac(t) is the activity of city c in a particular window. Finally, the values of  represent
the length of the temporal correlations analysed for computing transfer entropy. We analyse
values between 60 s and 10 800 s (3 hours), logarithmically distributed using 20 representative
values.
In order to statistically validate that one location’s activity is influencing other, we used
data random surrogates using amplitude adjusted Fourier transform using the TISEAN soft-
ware5. Amplitude adjusted Fourier transform surrogates (Schreiber and Schmitz, 1996) are
time series that preserve the power spectrum of a distribution and a distribution of values,
but remove the temporal correlations present in the original signal. For each city and window
3Although the semantical content of the messages may provide valuable information about the identity and
closure of the network, here we only consider information from the point of view of the dynamical influence of
one node to another
4The list of cities analysed is (sorted by volume of activity): Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Valencia, Málaga,
Zaragoza, Granada, Murcia, Bilbao, Alicante, Valladolid, London, Salamanca, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, A
Coruña. London is not a Spanish city, but it presented a high volume of activity due to the large number of
Spanish young people who have emigrated there.
5TISEAN 3.0.1. Nonlinear Time Series Routines http://www.mpipks-dresden.mpg.de/~tisean/
Tisean_3.0.1/
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location, we generate 200 surrogate time series of the original data and compute the values of
transfer entropy between each pair of cities for comparing them to the original data.
For testing if one process influences another, we compute the value of  in which transfer
entropy is maximum, and check whether this value is higher than a threshold equal to 99% of
the surrogate data series (we tested other percentages with similar results). This means that the
values of transfer entropy presented in the original data are unlikely to be obtained by chance.
Whenever a value of transfer entropy is higher than the threshold established, we consider that
there is a directed causal link between two geographical nodes of the network. The intensity
of the link depends of the peak value of transfer entropy between the two nodes.
In Figure 6.1 (centre) we can see the mean value of Transfer Entropy of the links in the
network at different moments. As we can see, the threshold used allows us to determine mo-
ments of statistically significant causal links between nodes and moments in which this causal
influence is not significant. We can observe how the periods presenting significant causal links
are May 15 (the day of the demonstration that triggered the movement) the period between
May 17 and May 22 (the period of most intensity of protests in the form of camps) and day
27 (a violent eviction attempt of the camp in Barcelona provokes a massive peaceful protest).
As well, we can observe for some windows the shape of the resulting networks of interac-
tions and the nodes that are within a strongly connected component. We represented each
city as a node of the network and the links represent values of transfer entropy that are higher
than the threshold. Madrid corresponds to the node at the right of the network (0°in po-
lar coordinates). The rest of the cities follow counter-clockwise with steps of 23°sorted by
decreasing volume of activity (Madrid, Barcelona, Seville, Valencia, Zaragoza, etc.). The size
of each node is proportional to the average transfer entropy from that node to others. The
width of the links is proportional to the value of information transfer. Moreover, for each
network we have computed the largest strongly connected component. This is represented
by the colour of the nodes. Nodes that are outside the strongly connected component are
coloured in gray, whereas nodes that belong to the strongly connected components are either
red or blue. Nodes are red when they have more transfer entropy in their outgoing links than
in their ingoing links, and blue otherwise.
In 6.1 (top left), we can observe the emergence of the operationally closed network dur-
ing May 15, in which the structure of information flows keeps changing while maintaning its
closure. Then, the network slowly fades out. In 6.1 (bottom), we can observe how an opera-
tionally closed network arises again when the network of camps emerges. After the eviction
of around 200 people camped in Madrid, every major city witnesses the creation of protest
camps. We can see that during the first moments Madrid is the greatest information source,
and then the network grows to be almost fully connected for several days, shifting which nodes
act as information sources. Finally, the operationally closed network vanishes after May 22 (in
which the country held its local and regional elections) and arises again on May 27 when po-
lice tried to evict the camp in Barcelona. In 6.1 (top right) we can see how the Barcelona node
is the one that provides more information to the rest of the network for the first moments.
226
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
day
0.000
0.005
0.010
0.015
0.020
0.025
0.030
0.035
0.040
TExy
MálagaZaragoza
Granada
Murcia
Bilbao
Alicante
Valladolid
London
Barcelona
Madrid
Sevilla
Valencia
Salamanca
Las Palmas
A Coruña
Figure 6.1: Operational closure of the network. In the middle, we display the mean transfer entropy links of the links
higher thana thresholdgenerated fromsurrogatedata forwindowsof24hours. In the topandbottomfiguresweobserve
the network of links of causal influences between nodes and their operational closure. The distribution of cities in the
network is shown in the right plot. The size of each node is proportional to the average transfer entropy from that node
to others. The width of the links is proportional to the value of information transfer. Red and blue nodes belong to the
largest strongly connected component of the network. Nodes are red when they have more transfer entropy in their
outgoing links than in their ingoing links, and blue otherwise.
Towards the end of the day, the eviction is stopped and solidarity rallies are held in every city,
changing the distribution of the network and the sources of information flows.
Recapitulating, we observe that the network of the 15M identity emerges as an opera-
tionally closed network with a shifting structure. The network continuously changes its con-
figuration and the direction of information flows but it is able to maintain its operationally
closed structure for several days. In the next section we analyse the mechanisms that may be
maintaining this operationally closed network. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that syn-
chronization mechanisms are behind the coherence of the network.
6.5 Self-Synchronizing Agency
One of the most prominent features of the 15M movement was its fast territorial develop-
ment. Without any coordination centre or any formal organization, the movement was able
to reproduce a network of camps across Spanish in a period of a few days. In this section we
analyse the coordination activity between the population of the main Spanish cities. Our hy-
pothesis is that, in parallel to what we observed in neural activity, ‘coalitions’ or transiently
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synchronized masses of users may be one of the basic building blocks of emergent distributed
autonomous organizations. Moreover, we hypothesize that coordination phenomena is not a
merely internal process, but if it is sustaining the organization of a collective agency it should
be grounded in the embodied activity of the social body of the multitude that conforms the
movement. We predict that if phase-locking mechanisms are playing a role in constituting a so-
cial agent in the 15M movement, metastable geographical coalitions should arise as it emerges
in different modes of interaction with its environment.
We analyse moments of synchronization between different cities using phase locking statis-
tics (Lachaux et al., 2000) and wavelet filtering. Wavelet filtering is used to quantify phase-
locking at different moments and timescales. The span of the analysis is the 17 day period
and a frequency span between [1:67  10 3Hz,9:26  10 5Hz] (from 10 minutes to 3 hours)
mapped into a logarithmic sequence with intervals of 100:01. Following Lachaux et al. (2000),
we define phase locking values PLV between two cities x and y as:
PLVxy(f; t) =
 1
=2X
= =2
exp(i(y;d(f; t+ )  x;d(f; t+ )))
  Axy(t) (6.2)
where  is the size of the window of temporal integration:  = ncof , being nco the number
of cycles in which we analyse phase-locking. Throughout the chapter, all calculations are per-
formed taking a value of nco = 8. A window of integration of 8 cycles is similar to the values
typically used in neuroscience, and ensures that we are detecting sustained synchronization.
Axy(t) is a corrector factor which is zero when the mean activity of nodes x or y for a moving
window of 30 minutes is below a threshold of 0:25 times its mean activation. The function
of this corrector factor is to remove spurious synchronization when the network is inactive
during sleeping hours.
The degree of statistical significance of each phase locking value is determined by compar-
ing it to the phase locking values of surrogate time series obtained using amplitude adjusted
Fourier transform as in the previous section.
We created 200 surrogate time series. For each value of t and f these time series were used
to estimate a significance threshold for the values of PLV. For each frequency f, we compute
the mean average phase locking value, and we use them to compute a threshold PLVth(f),
indicating a value higher than 99% of surrogate data. Thus, we define a variable defining the
presence of statistically relevant phase locking links as:
PLLxy(f; t) =
 1 if PLVxy(f; t)  PLVth(f)
0 otherwise
Moreover, we compute the total number of phase locking links and values of f and t, as
PLL(f; t) = Px;y PLLxy(f; t). In Figure 6.2 we observe the resulting number of statistically
significant phase locking links for a particular day (May 27). We clearly observe some moments
of significant phase locking, especially at larger timescales, indicating that a particular coalition
is active.
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Figure 6.2: Phase locking statistics. Sum of the number of phase locking links between all cities for day May 27. The x
axis represents the different moments during the day, and the y axis represents the periodT of the different wavelets
using in the filtering. The colour represents the intensity of phase locking values.
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Figure6.3: Phase-lockedcoalitions. Detectedphase-lockedcoalitions fordayMay27applyinga thresholdover thephase
locking statistics being higher than 99% of those of surrogate data. The x axis represents the different moments during
theday, and theyaxis represents theperiodTof thedifferentwaveletsusing in thefiltering. White regions representval-
uesunder established thresholddetermined fromsurrogatedataPLVth(f), and coloured regions valuesover the thresh-
old.
From the function PLL(f; t), we extract the activation of coalitions when many nodes are
phase-locked around a particular frequency for a prolonged span of time. For doing so, we
use a Gaussian bidimensional filter with variance 0.25 for reducing noise in the function, and
extract connected regions in which the value of PLL(f; t)  4 that spans for a time interval
of at least 2 time cycles ( 2f ). We will separate the function PLL(f; t) into different functions
PLLi(f; t), which will be equal to PLL(f; t) in the region of the detected coalition and 0 oth-
erwise. We observe the result in Figure 6.3.
Once the activation of coalitions is detected, we define the activation level of each coali-
tion i as CAi(t) = maxf(PLLi(f; t)). Also, the frequency carrier of each coalition is defined
as fi(t) = argmaxf(
P
t PLLi(f; t)). In Figure 6.4 we represent the activation of the different
coalitions CAi(t). To smooth the variations in CAi(t) (which are abrupt since it changes in
discrete steps) we filter each functionCAi(t)with a Gaussian kernel with a standard deviation
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Figure 6.4: Phase-locked coalitions. Number of phase-locked links for the different coalitions activated above the se-
lected duration and activation threshold. For facilitating visualization, we have separated assemblies in the lower and
upper half of the logarithmic frequency spectrum, where f0 is the middle frequency. We observe that there is a corre-
spondence between days with more intensity in coalition activation and days in which relevant events take place (e.g.
days 15, 17-20, 27).
of 600S (10 minutes). Since mixing coalitions at different timescales in the same graph makes
it hard to read, for facilitating their visualization we have separated the coalitions with fre-
quency carriers in the lower and upper part of the analysed logarithmic frequency spectrum.
As we show, most of the coalitions arise at relevant moments of time. Roughly, we see that
concentrations of coalitions take place around significant moments of the protests (e.g. days
15, 17-20, 27).
Now, we proceed to a more detailed analysis of the relation between emergent phase-
locked coalitions and moments of embodiment of the protests.
The emergence of a collective body: first days of the 15M movement and the
camps
As we described, the 15M movement started by a simultaneous demonstration in several Span-
ish cities, followed by camps in the main squares of each city, where thousands of people
demonstrated every day. What is the role of phase locking and coalitions during the emer-
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gence of the 15M movement? Phase locking analysis segmented into different days (Figure
6.5) allows us to observe which coalitions were active at each moment:
• Day 14: day previous to the initial demonstration. Only small coalitions take place at
short frequencies.
• Day 15: initial demonstration in more than 50 cities. We observe medium size coalitions
at different timescales. Intermediate scale cycle arises around the beginning demon-
stration (which started at 18:00). A slow-scale coalition arises around 20:00 when the
demonstration is about to end, which is the moment of the highest rate of tweets per
second. Around 01:00, a group of 40 people camp in Madrid (acampada Sol).
• Day 16: groups of people start camps in cities such as Barcelona, Valencia or Granada
and call for the creation of camps in other cities in the following days. Short moments of
fast-scale and medium-scale coalitions appear distributed along the day. Participation
peaks around 1000 people in Madrid and 200 in Barcelona.
• Day 17: Police evicts acampada Sol (Madrid) before dawn. The 300 people present
there resist peacefully and record the incident with their mobile phones, triggering a
huge reaction of indignation boosting participation. New camps are created in most
major Spanish cities since the beginning of the day (Zaragoza, Málaga, Seville, etc.)6,
and a demonstration of 20.000 people peacefully retake Sol square and rebuilds the
camp (Toret et al., 2015, p.51). We observe how fast and medium scale coalitions start
arising during the morning, triggering a large slow-scale coalition which is active for
most of the day.
• Days 18, 19, 20: the highest levels of participation in the camps take place during these
days. Every day, every major city in Spain witnesses major mobilizations with rallies in
their main squares 7. In most places, synchronized protest actions take place in many
cities at the same time like ‘caceroladas’ (pots and pans demonstrations) which were
repeated every day in many cities or a ‘silent scream’ which takes place on day 20 at
midnight, during the last minutes before the beginning of the electoral silence day. We
observe that during these days there is high presence of phase-locked coalitions, both at
6Source:
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Protestas_en_Espa%C3%B1a_de_2011-2014_%28mayo_
de_2011%29#Martes_17_-_Comienzo_de_las_acampadas
7Sources:
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Protestas_en_Espa%C3%B1a_de_2011-2014_%28mayo_
de_2011%29#Mi.C3.A9rcoles_18
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Protestas_en_Espa%C3%B1a_de_2011-2014_%28mayo_
de_2011%29#Jueves_19
https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anexo:Protestas_en_Espa%C3%B1a_de_2011-2014_%28mayo_
de_2011%29#Viernes_20_-_Formulaci.C3.B3n_de_propuestas
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slow and fast timescales. Also, the rate of tweets per second and the level of activation of
the coalitions (the number of cities synchronized) is higher than any other day (except
for day 27 in which, as we analyse below, another mayor mobilization takes place).
We observe that for some days massive mobilizations are accompanied with episodes of
strong synchronization in social media. In Figure 6.4 we observe that during days 21 and 22
both activity and phase-locked coalitions decrease. This is probably due to the fact that day 21
was ‘reflection day’ in Spain, in which 24 hours of election silence are mandated, and day 22
was election day. After the election, on day 23, a widespread debate emerged about the need
to create a minimum consensus about the goals of the movement, but in general, the level of
activity and synchrony decreased until day 27 (see Figure 6.4).
In general, we observe that the emergence of the movement is connected with moments
of synchronization. Moreover, it is interesting to observe the correspondence between mo-
ments in which the protest is embodied in the streets (camps, rallies, etc.) and moments of
intense phase locking in social media, suggesting that the communication circuitry in social
media is strongly coupled with physical events taking place in the streets. Similarly, when the
activity in the camps and the streets decreases, phase-locked coalitions are reduced as well. As
we hypothesized at the beginning of the section, processes of coordination between geograph-
ical parts of the network seem to be grounded in the embodiment of the participants of the
network.
Adaptive Agential Reconfiguration: resisting eviction
Given only the analysis above, we might think that what we are witnessing are just waves of
synchronized activity as the system responds to protest events. Does the synchronization of
the network have a role in the organization and reconfiguration of the movement’s activity?
That is, is transient synchronization playing a constitutive role in the organization of a collec-
tive agent or is it just an epiphenomenon of other processes? We analyse this using a particular
case. We have shown that after some days of lower levels of activity, on May 27 we observe the
emergence of a new episode of high rates of activity and large phase-locked coalitions. This
day, the camp at Plaza Catalunya in Barcelona (one of the most representative) is evicted by
the police. If we analyse the sequence of events during this day (Toret et al., 2015, p.139-142)
and our phase locking analysis (Figure 6.6), we observe that there is a strong relation between
the reconfiguration of phase-locked coalitions between different cities and the course of em-
bodied events in the protest camps. As we saw in Figure 6.3, during this day there are several
fast-scale coalitions (Figure 6.6.a) and two main slow-scale coalitions CAA and CAB that last
for several hours (Figures 6.6.b and 6.6.c).
Events start around 6:30, when the police arrive to the camp with the intention of start-
ing an eviction and demonstrators start peacefully resisting and recording everything with
their mobile phones. By 7:20 the hashtag #BarcelonaSinMiedo (Barcelona without fear) be-
comes a ‘trending topic’ in Spain. At the same time, coalition CAA emerges (Figure 6.6.b).
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Figure 6.5: Phase-locked coalitions activated for particular days. Number of phase-locked links for the different coali-
tions activated above the selected duration and activation threshold for windows compressing specific days. As we
review in the tests, moments with the highest synchronization correspond with moment of strong embodiment of the
protests in particular events taking place in the street (during days, 15, 17, 18 and 19)
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This activity starts raising attention and people start to flock to Plaza Catalunya, while fast-
scale coalitions emerge (Figure 6.6.a). Around 10:00 a thousand people are present at Plaza
Catalunya, blocking the police from evicting the camp. While more and more people arrive,
police start beating people with batons, generating images depicting violence from the police
towards peaceful demonstrators, which became viral in social media, multiplying activity in
Twitter where sympathizers, press and other media covered the events. At 11:30, in a moment
of most intense police violence, a national TV channel airs live coverage of the event showing
live police brutality. At 12:00, thousands of people follow the images of what is happening in
Plaza Catalunya. At this moment, every trending topic in Spain is related to the eviction of
the square. Simultaneously, a new medium-scale coalition arises between 12:00 and 14:00.
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Figure 6.6: Phase-locked coalitions activated onMay 27. Number of phase-locked links for the different coalitions acti-
vated above the selectedduration and activation threshold for dayMay27. a)Mediumand fast-scale coalitions activated
during dayMay 27. b) First slow-scale coalitionCAA. c) Second slow-scale coalitionCAB .
While more and more people arrive, peaceful resistance to police violence gets stronger and
demonstrators become more determined, finally making police desist from their attempts of
evicting the square and around at around 14:00 a wave of people reconquer the square and
start rebuilding the camp in a state of shock from police violence (Toret et al., 2015, p.140).
The slow-scale coalition CAA starts decreasing when the square is reconquered and fades out
a couple of hours later.
In parallel with the events in Barcelona, a call for a mobilization in solidarity with the
eviction attempt of Plaza Catalunya was emerging. This call was soon materialized in the
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Figure6.7: Hashtagevolution. Evolutionof tweet rate for tweets containing thehashtags a)#AcampadaBcnandb)#Con-
FloresALas7.
hashtag ‘#ConFloresALas7’, proposing a rally in every Spanish city at 19:00 bringing flowers
to protest against police brutality (Figure 6.7). Interestingly, a slow-scale coalition CAB arises
around a couple of hours earlier than the hashtag (Figure 6.6.b). This coalition lasts the whole
day and has its peak in the afternoon.
The results so far suggest that two macroscopic processes are taking place. First, the re-
action to the eviction, which is correlated with the emergence of a long-lasting coalition CAA
(Figure 6.6.b), and at least a related hashtag ‘#AcampadaBcn’8 (Figure 6.7.a). Another pro-
cess is the organization of solidarity demonstrations, which is correlated with the emergence of
another long-lasting coalition CAB (Figure 6.6.c) and the hashtag ‘#ConFloresALas7’ (6.7.b).
We analyse some aspects of their structure by analysing the information flows in each of
them. In order to filter the activity related to each one, we compute the carrier frequency for
each coalition (the frequency in which significant phase-locking last longer) and we filter the
activity at each city using wavelets scaled to the carrier frequencies of coalitions CAA and CAB.
Convolving the wavelets with the series of each city c, we obtain the complex signals wA;c(t)
and wB;c(t). To extract the information contained in the phase of each signal, we extract the
relative phase of each signal in respect to the mean phase of the coalition CAA for a particular
city ci as:
A;ci(t) = \(wA;ci(t))  \(
1
C
CX
j=1
wA;j(t)) (6.3)
8Although the hashtag #BarcelonaSinMiedo was the first one about the eviction to become Trending Topic,
in our dataset it was not gathered until a few hours after it was first used. Thus, we chose to use the hashtag
#AcampadaBcn which was also used to talk about what was happening in the camp.
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where C is the number of cities. Similarly, we can obtain the relative phase of signals in coali-
tion CAB.
Having computed the phase information, we use transfer entropy to compute flows of
information in the network of each coalition. For doing so, we discretize the values of A;c
simply by defining a signal A;c which is equal to one when A;c > 0 and zero otherwise. For
each pair of nodes ci and cj, we compute the transfer entropy TE()A;ci!A;cj using values of
 logarithmically distributed between 60 s and 10 800 s (3 hours), using 20 representative val-
ues. Then we take the peak value ofTE()A;cj!A;cj , and assign this value for the link between
nodes TEA;ij = max (TE()A;cj!A;cj ). Since we are interested in analysing which nodes act
as information sources or sinks, for every pair of nodes we compute the differential informa-
tionTEA;i;j = TEA;ij TEA;ji. In Figure 6.8 we can observe the differential information flows
in the network of coalitions CAA and CAB. The width of the edges represent the differential
transfer entropy between each pair of nodes TEA;i;j. The size of the node represents the ab-
solute mean differential transfer entropy between one node and the others 1C 1
PC
j=1TEA;i;j,
and the colour of the node represents the sign of the mean differential transfer entropy. Red
nodes characterize information sources, and blue nodes represent information sinks.
We can observe in Figure 6.8.a that in coalition CAA, the node of Barcelona (marked with
an asterisk) is the main information source in the network. In contrast, we observe in Figure
6.8.b that in coalition CAB, the node of Barcelona is no longer the main source of informa-
tion and information flows are distributed among other nodes of the network. This suggests
that coalitions not only serve to bind together the activity of different geographical nodes,
but they also serve to allow the distribution of information flows between them. We see here
how at the phase-locking frequency of CAA information flows from the node of Barcelona
to the rest, distributing information about the eviction and leading a synchronized wave of
activity to counteract the eviction attempt in the city of Barcelona. At a slower frequency car-
rier, coalition CAB distributes information about the organization of a network of solidarity
demonstrations that take place in the afternoon. Here, the lead of the coalition is not assigned
to the node of Barcelona but is distributed among different cities. Interestingly, as we can see
in Figures 6.6.b and 6.6.c, both coalitions overlap for some time. Although it is not shown in
the figure, some nodes are synchronized to both coalitions at the same time. We hypothesize
that the different frequencies of the coalition may serve to filter the content related to differ-
ent events: the local response to the eviction attempt, and the global response of the whole
system as a solidarity demonstration protesting against the eviction.
6.6 Multiscale Organization and Embodied Action
Our hypothesis in this chapter is that the collective agent behind the 15M is organized in the
form of a multitudionous identity, generated by the operational closure of the system through
transient synchronizing links at different scales. One of the properties of multitudinous iden-
tities is its multiplicity of scales of description. Multitudinous identities conform unitary sub-
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Figure 6.8: Integration flows in phase-locked coalitions forMay 27. The networks represent the transfer entropy infor-
mation flows between the phase of the activity at each node for coalitionsCAA (a) andCAb (b). The width of the edges
represent the differential transfer entropy between each pair of nodesTEA;i;j. The size of the node represents the
absolute mean differential transfer entropy between one node and the others 1C 1
PC
j=1TEA;i;j, and the colour rep-
resents the sign of the mean differential transfer entropy. Red nodes characterize information sources, and blue nodes
represent information sinks. While coalitionCAA distributes information preferentially from Barcelona to other nodes,
coalitionCAB information flows are distributedmore homogeneously.
jects which at the same time are internally heterogeneous and singular actors. We have studied
the inter-city heterogeneity and coordinative activity but other investigations have highlighted
and studied in detail the non-localized diversity of the 15M networks (Monterde et al., 2015).
In Chapter 4, we described how the forms of closure emerging in an autonomous neurocog-
nitive agent displayed temporal and spatial multiscale structures. These organizational struc-
tures allow a neurocognitive agent to flexibly adapt to the complexity of their environment
by generating internal complex patterns and, at the same time, they are able to integrate those
patterns at particular moments in order to act as a coherent entity over their environment,
sustaining internal organizational invariances. Thus, sensorimotor neurodynamic structures
of an autonomous agent are internally multiple and differentiated amongst a rich repertoire
of behavioural modes, and at the same times it exhibits a unitary and coherent structure. We
suggest that a similar mode of organization may be taking place in multitudinous identitites.
Above we have analysed how moments of statistically significant phase-locking emerge
at different moments and timescales. Moreover, we have analysed how, in many cases, the
emergence of phase-locked coalitions coincides temporally with significant events in which
the activity of the network is physically embodied in the activity of crowds occupying camps
and squares. We may ask ourselves what kind of organizative structure produces these phase-
locking moments. Are they the product of social media activity just reactively activating waves
of synchronization in response to protest events? Or are they the product of a multiscale in-
ternal regulatory structure organizing a heterogeneous and internally multiple social agency?
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In the previous section we observed how phase-locked coalitions arise at multiple scales, and
how the system switches from one to the other as it engages in different modes of interac-
tion with its environment. Moreover, information flows seem to go back and forth between
the embodied activity and the self-organized emergent coalitions, suggesting that complex
mechanisms are involved in the interaction between of phase-locked coalitions and embodied
protests events. In order to explore what the organizational structure of the 15M collective
agent is, we analyse the appearance of significant indices of TSE complexity and 1=f scaling,
and their correlation with the emergence of waves of synchronization and embodied protest
events.
Embodiment of Protests and Synchronized activity
In previous sections, we have described specific moments in which we can observe an inter-
action between the emergence of phase-locked coalitions and events of embodied protests.
We argued that both of them are intertwined in the organization of the 15M multitudinous
identity. So far, we have described the embodiment of protests in physical demonstrations
using only qualitative descriptions extracted from the literature. Here, we want to compare
a quantitative description of protest events with indices of synchronization and complexity.
For doing so, we made use of the GDELT Event Database, which records over 300 categories
of physical activities around the world each day extracted from news reports from a variety
of international sources 9. We extracted events that happened in Spain between May 14 and
May 30 2011 labelled with the codes 140 to 149 (representing protest events). For each event,
we extracted the number of mentions which we added to the number of events on each day.
In Figure 6.9 we can observe the number of mentions from news sources about protest events
in Spain, which we will use as a proxy for the intensity of protest events during each day. We
observe how protest intensity rises for day 18 until day 22, presenting a peak for day 27. How-
ever, the absence of protests during days 15 to 17 has to be taken carefully, since it has been
indicated that during those days mainstream media blacked out the protest from their news
bulletins (Toret et al., 2015, p.95).
In order to compare embodied protest activity with synchronization between the net-
work’s nodes, we computed the mean activation of the sum of coalitions for a sliding window
of 86:400 s (i.e. 24 hours) as S = hPi CAi(t)i. The window is shifted for intervals of 10:800 s
(i.e. 3 hours). As we can observe in Figure 6.10, peaks in synchronization arise around days
17-19, 23 and 27. As we saw above, some of these peaks coincide with particular events like
the mobilization of camps (days 17-19) and the eviction attempt of Plaza Catalunya (day 27).
The only peak that does not correspond with a major event of physical mobilization is days
23, which correspond to the day after electoral result, in which the movement was intensively
debating the results and the strategy to be followed around the hashtag #ConsensoDeMíni-
mos. Although some of these debates took place physically in assemblies in the squares, much
of the debate took part in social media. We can say that there is a rough correlation between
9http://gdeltproject.org/
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Figure 6.9: Embodied protest activity. Sum of mentions to protest events in Spain for different days of May extracted
from the GDELT Event Database.
synchronization indices and protest events, although some synchronized coalitions emerged
without the presence of protest events (day 23) and some protest events did not show signifi-
cant synchronized structures (the continuation of camp protests during days 20 to 22).
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Figure 6.10: Sum of active coalitions. The mean of the sum of active coalitions computed for a sliding window with a
length of 24h.
TSE Complexity
As we saw in chapter 4, TSE complexity is a measure of information complexity in the spatial
domain, allowing us to identify the simultaneous presence of high global integration between
the components of a system and high differentiation of their local activity. We analyse TSE
complexity of the system by measuring the levels of integration and segregation amongst the
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different analysed cities. High levels of TSE would suggest that while the activity at each city
is differentiated and adapted to its local context, the different cities are at the same time inte-
grated into a coherent pattern of activity. This is precisely what the notion of multitudinous
identity tries to capture; an identity that is not built on the homogeneity but on the diver-
sity of its participants coordinated in a shared common domain. Again we have focused on
inter-city diversity and multiplicity but a more distributed analysis is possible (where diver-
sity of nodes are depicted in terms of types of users, types of political organization, etc.). In
order to avoid the high computational costs of computing joint density functions in our 15-
dimensional system, we compute TSE complexity over the binary variables Bc(t) computed
form Equation 6.1.
We proceed to compute TSE complexity according to Equation 4.4. In Figure 6.11 we can
observe the resulting values of TSE complexity C for a sliding window of 86:400 s (i.e. 24
hours). The window is shifted for intervals of 10:800 s (i.e. 3 hours). Furthermore, we com-
pare the results to that of surrogate data using the amplitude adjusted Fourier transform as in
previous sections removing the correlations in the signal. We computed TSE complexity for
200 series of surrogate data, and extracted a threshold of the valueC being higher than 99% of
surrogate data series (dashed line in Figure 6.11). As shown, we find values of high complexity
(above threshold) during days 17-23, and day 27. Also, on day 15 we find values higher than
the surrounding days, being close to the threshold. A first difference we observe between the
values of TSE complexity and the activation of coalitions is that the former changes more grad-
ually. A possible interpretation is that apart from phase-locking dynamics, there is a complex
structure of integrated and differentiated activity that is self-sustained in a longer timescale.
For example, during days 21 and 22 the strong embodiment of the protests disappears (prob-
ably because it was election day on day 22 and mandated election silence on day 21, so massive
protests did not take place), but the levels of integration and segregation of the network are
maintained.
Fractal Analysis
Finally, we analyse the presence of long-range correlations in the activity of the system. For
this, we use the DFA algorithm defined in Equation 4.8 to analyse scale-free dynamics in win-
dows of 12 hours of activity (we did not use longer windows because daily cycles can introduce
periodicities that change the spectral distribution of the series) for time series of the activity
rate at every moment (measured as the total number of tweets per second computed for every
value of the time series). In most cases, the shape of the function F(n) had a good log-linear
fit, thus we only extracted the exponent of the slope  and transform it into  ( = 2   1,
see section 4) to directly compare the fractal scaling of the system to that of a 1=f spectrum.
In Figure 6.12 we observe how long-range correlations are present at different moments. For
example, if we set an arbitrary threshold of  2 [0:8; 1:2], we find values around scale-free
distributions ( = 1) for days 15, 17-21, 23 and 27.
These results show that scale-free dynamics emerge when there are many coalitions present
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Figure 6.11: TSE Complexity. Values TSE complexity for the activity each day. The dashed line represents a threshold
value for the value of TSE complexity being higher than 99% of surrogate data series. The dotted line represents the
mean value of TSE complexity for surrogate data.
in the system. This makes sense since coalitions arise at many temporal scales. Also, it suggests
nested dynamical structures with several bottom-up and top-down regulatory loops.
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Figure 6.12: Fractal scaling.  coefficient from the DFA algorithm for different windowswith a span of 12 hours.
Recapitulation
In general, we observe that the moments with the most intense embodied activity (days 17-20
and day 27) present many coalitions arising at different scales, as well as both high TSE com-
plexity and long-range correlations in the form of 1=f patterns. In Figure 6.13 we compare
different indices to observe the correlations between the different indices we have measured.
First, we have the indices of embodied protest activity and the mean active synchronization
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coalitions. Embodied activity and synchronization are computed as the number for mentions
to protest (Figure 6.9) and the sum of active coalitions (Figure 6.10) being higher than their
mean value. We also show the emergence of the operational closure of the system (Figure 6.1),
measured as the moments in which the strongly connected component of the networks in
Figure 6.1 covers the whole network of 15 cities. These three indices are indicators of how the
network emerges as a coherent, agencial, entity, i.e. as a network that is operationally closed,
coordinated at different scales and strongly embodied in the physical world. Finally, we show
the indices of temporal and spatial multiscale complexity. The index for TSE complexity is
computed as the moments in which values of TSE complexity (Figure 6.11) is higher than 99%
of the values of surrogate data. Finally, the index for 1=f scaling is computed as the moments
in which the  exponent (Figure 6.12) is between 0:8 and 1:2. These indices account for the
temporal and spatial structure of the network’s organization, representing the internal multi-
plicity in their activity.
We find a correlation between the indices of embodiment, synchronization and opera-
tional closure and the indices of spatial and temporal multiscale complexity. This suggests
that agency in mass mobilizations is facilitated by coordination between different spatial and
temporal scales of the system, based on distributed phase-locking mechanisms allowing an in-
crease in both informational complexity and long-range correlations. The system emerges as
a unitary subject acting in space observing the increase of protest activity and synchronized
activity in the system. We can confirm that the constitution of the system as a collective agent
(with strong internal and external cohesion) is accompanied with the configuration of a mul-
tiscale structure at different moments in both the temporal and spatial domain. This suggest
that the form of agency that is being constituted is indeed a form of multitudinous identity,
where the creation of a unitary subject is based in the increase of the internal multiplicity in
an interactive network structure both at the level of distributed locations (analyzed here) and
at the level of different initiatives, users and types of collectives (as we analyzed in Monterde
et al., 2015).
6.7 Discussion
In this chapter we have applied analytical tools used for characterizing autonomous behaviour
in neurocognitive agents to massive collective agents. We first reviewed the ontological tension
in sociological literature between microscale personal networking and macroscopic notions of
aggregation. We have proposed that some forms of social coordination might go beyond this
dichotomy, allowing the emergence of statistically irreducible networks of communicative
interaction at a mesoscopic level (between multiple singularities, groups, collective initiatives
and spatial locations). Moreover, we have proposed that the intensive use of digital technolo-
gies might be boosting these forms of collective organization.
Our hypothesis is that mechanisms allowing massive distributed communication between
human groups makes possible the emergence of collective forms of autonomous agency, that
we labelled multitudinous identities, that differ from traditional views of collective groups
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Figure 6.13: Comparison between indicators of agency and indices of multiscale complexity. Comparison from indices
from Figures 6.9, 6.10, 6.1, 6.11 and 6.12. Embodied activity and synchronization are computed as the number for men-
tions toprotest (Figure6.9) and the sumof active coalitions (Figure6.10) beinghigher than theirmeanvalue. Operational
closure ismeasured as themoments inwhich the strongly connected component of the networks in Figure 6.1 covers the
whole network of 15 cities. The index for TSE complexity is computed as the moments in which values of TSE complex-
ity (Figure 6.11) is higher than 99% of the values of surrogate data. Finally, the index for 1=f scaling is computed as the
moments in which the exponent (Figure 6.12) is between 0:8 and 1:2.
based on hierarchical entities or representative delegation of decision-making. Rather than
by direct, upwards identification with a symbol, person or cause, multitudinous identities
emerge from large-scale processes of self-organized continuous interaction. This interaction
compress relationships of various kinds (including relations some-to-many, and many-to-many,
distributed and transient) at different scales. In other words, the intensive use of social media
and related sociotechnical practices boost a specific form of collective identity from the micro
to macro-level perspective: multitudinous identities.
We propose that the Spanish 15M movement is a prominent example of multitudinous
identities found in the myriad of ‘networked social movements’ that have emerged during
the last few years (also including others as the Arab Spring or the Occupy movement), and
we have focused our analysis on this exemplar. Previous qualitative and quantitative analyses
have described how the most innovative 15M ‘patterns’ take the form of a complex organiza-
tion of interactions which are internally multiple, exhibiting multi-scale recursivity –and still
generate an emerging 15M systemic, albeit diffuse and fluid, identity–(Aguilera et al., 2013b;
Monterde et al., 2015; Toret et al., 2015).
We propose that multitudinous identitites are irreducible to individuals’ aggregated ac-
tivity, viral flows, or simple online-offline ‘sub-sequence’ schemes. This irreducibility stems
from the interrelation of the singularities that compose it. The system cannot be reduced to
one-to-one relations among individuals. Instead, interactions should be present and coordi-
nated at different scales: from micro-personal exchanges to transiently coordinated activity
of large groups of synchronized actors, up to the evolution of the organization of the macro-
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scopic network as a whole. We aim to contribute to explanations about mechanisms that are
be behind the constitution of multitudinous identities. To do so, we have analysed a large
dataset of Twitter activity during the first weeks of the 15M movement in Spain.
First, we have characterized the operational closure of the network of geographically dis-
tributed activity using transfer entropy measures, finding that the network arises as a web
of distributed dependencies, which continuously changes its structure of information flows
while maintaining its operational closure for long periods. This suggest that the operational
closure is not being maintained by the conservation of a particular structural configuration,
but rather by the maintenance of higher order invariances on top of a highly plastic underlying
network.
Second, we analysed statistically salient phase locking values in the coordination between
activity at different cities during the emergence and consolidation of the 15M movement, find-
ing that episodes of transient phase locking emerge at different scales and moments, appar-
ently coinciding with important episodes of massive mobilization of activists in the camps and
the squares. As we observed, particular phenomena like settling camps, organizing massive
spontaneous rallies, or creating large scale peaceful response to police attacks, were triggered
by complex sequences of phase-locked coalitions at different timescales. Moreover, we find
that phase-locked coalitions are transient, and frequently one coalition is dissolved so others
can emerge at a new carrier frequency. This suggests that the activity of the different nodes
is coordinated through metastable synchronizing tendencies in a manner that resembles the
formation of conscious activity in the brain (Rodriguez et al., 1999; Lutz et al., 2002). Also,
we find that the formation of metastable phase-locked coalitions allows transient modes of
leadership (which we also analysed for a different case in Monterde et al., 2015) in which dif-
ferent nodes alternate the lead of the coalition at different moments depending on the process
of interaction.
These results suggest that synchronization through social media cannot be seen just as a
homogeneous reaction to, or amplification, of external events. Instead, global synchroniza-
tion is triggered by different parts of the network and is tightly related to specific actions and
action contexts, while synchronization links change through time displaying a great plasticity.
This suggests that synchronization is not the product of a homogeneous resonant media or a
simple and sudden aggregation activity, but a manner of choreography resulting from a net-
work of distributed online interactions, where complex resonances emerge and vary depend-
ing on the specific action context and articulation of the network. Phase locking episodes at
different scales take place interleaved and in coordination with external events creating com-
plex self-regulation loops through the divisions between communal digital communication
tools, collective bodies and the environment. We suggest that regulatory mechanisms trigger-
ing coalitions at different scales may operate as a ‘metastable circuit breaker’ (see section 3.2.2),
capable of disrupting a particular mode of engagement of the work to trigger a new one. For
example, this could take the form of organizing particular mobilization, or shifting the focus
of collective attention to a new event of interest. This ‘metastable circuit breaker’ is being not
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the mechanism that controls the behaviour of the collective body (which is constrained by
many external factors) but a mechanism which is able to engage and disengage the collective
body in different dynamical fields of interaction.
The analysis of values of TSE complexity (the simultaneous presence of high levels of in-
tegration and segregation in the system) for the bursting activity of the different cities shows
that the days with more activity and more presence of phase-locked coalitions also present
high values of TSE complexity, although the latter seems to change at a slower pace, suggest-
ing a slower transformation of the interactive architecture of the system. Also, analysing tem-
poral long-range correlations revealed how 1=f scale-free dynamics emerge in the moments
with more presence of coalitions at all timescales, suggesting that coalitions are organized in a
metastable mode. In previous work, analysing the activity of the 15M movement a year from
its inception, we found that the most innovative and participatory initiatives also displayed
1=f patterns in their dynamics (Toret et al., 2015; Monterde et al., 2015; Aguilera et al., 2013b),
whereas 1=f scaling was lost for similar initiatives when they were organized as more traditional
hierarchical organizations as labour unions.
More importantly, we found clear correlations between episodes of strong embodied ac-
tivity, high synchronization and internal operational closure and the presence of indicators
of complex multiscale activity in the spatial and temporal domain in the form of TSE com-
plexity and 1=f scaling. This supports our hypothesis about multitudionous identity, since
the constitution of the 15M as an agencial autonomous entity seems to be constucted over
the organization of its multiplicity emerging from systemic interactions within and between
irreducible scales.
Due to the nature of the system analysed – its huge number of dimensions and the fact
that we do not have access to variables pertaining to the network structure (e.g. which users are
connected or ‘follow’ others) – our analysis cannot characterize the constitution of the system
as an autonomous system with the same level of detail we did in Chapter 3 for our homeostatic
agent. Nevertheless, the analysis performed suggest that the model of neurodynamic auton-
omy we proposed there might be extended to cases of large-scale collective autonomy, at least
in some cases with intensive use of decentralized communication tools and strong physical
embodiment.
In a late interview, Autopoïese et émergence, Varela argues that an extension of autopoietic
concepts to the social domain might imply negative social and political consequences:
I refuse to apply autopoiesis to the social plane. That might surprise you, but I
do so for political reasons. History has shown that biological holism is very inter-
esting and has produced great things, but it has always had its dark side, a black
side, each time it’s allowed itself to be applied to a social model. There’s always
slippages toward fascism, toward authoritarian impositions, eugenics, and so on
(English translation extracted from Protevi, 2009).
246
Protevi (2009) connects this authoritarian logic with Varela’s experience of the Chilean Civil
War, in which during the 3 years of government of Allende a ‘polarity created a continual
exaggeration of the sense of boundary and territoriality’ [min.24-25](Varela, 1978) between
the supporters and detractors of Chileans popular front. Varela uses the example of lack of
consensus of print media such as newspapers – that portrayed two incompatible realities – as
an example of how everyday life had been polarized into two enclosed communities imbued
with the effects of politics [min.26](Varela, 1978). From what we have seen here, autonomy
in large social systems facilitated by digital communication tools might be more analogous to
autonomy in the brain than to autopoietic cellular autonomy, meaning that the emergence of
an autonomous system does not have that much to do with the enclosure of material compo-
nents of the system, i.e. the creation of a physical border, but with the coherence of informa-
tion flows through the system using mechanisms of transient synchronization. Thus, social
autonomy is not constrained by clear boundaries encapsulating the members of a community,
but is built through flexible synchronizing and desynchronizing tendencies. The community
is not based in an enclosed ideological structure or a particular social segment, but it is built
on continuous interactions, allowing different social groups to fluidly engage and disengage
in the movement at different moments of time. This form of metastable aggregation can po-
tentially sustain more democratic and participatory forms of coordination as opposed to the
authoritarian connotations that Varela connects with an autopoietic organization of society.
Different studies and polls show that the 15M movement exhibited wide consensus between
the Spanish population (around 75% about its objectives and 50% about its strategy). (Sampe-
dro, 2014) shows that this consensus is transversal among different segments of the population
(age, sex, economic status, location) and this consensus has been maintained for various years.
We may argue that it is precisely the use of networked digital communication tool that al-
lows bypassing local material limitations of short range human communication and large-scale
unidirectional mass media and break dynamics of polarization and atomization, and instead
allow fluid modes of autonomous composition at the larger scale. This hypothesis needs to
be further tested. Comparative analysis is to be developed over the different movements that
have arisen from starkly different cultural and social substrates as the Occupy Movement in
the US, the ‘Yo soy 132’ movement in Mexico, 2014 protests in Brazil and Turkey, or the Um-
brella Movement in Hong Kong. Since most instances of networked movements have just
arisen in the last few years, it is too soon to tell if new forms of organization boosted by social
media are the patterns of social mobilization to come in the 21st century. Nevertheless, the
possibilities of social and political change seem enormous. In short, distributed networked
architectures of communication make possible the emergence of forms of social autonomy
that need not fall under the uniformity and mass control structured that Varela feared but
make possible a multitudinous, complex and diverse identity in continuous collective nego-
tiation. While these lines are being written, in Spain the 15M evolution has displayed a long
and dynamic trajectory, facing many challenges and structural mutations and maintaining an
immense popular support. The latest of these has promoted the emergence of several citizen
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platforms running to and winning the city hall elections in many of the largest Spanish cities in
May 2015, all while maintaining a distributed organizational structure closer to the 15M move-
ment than to traditional political parties (Aragón et al., 2015). A systemic understanding and
operational treatment of the complex structure and dynamics displayed by networked move-
ments is slowly emerging, potentially enriching our understanding of collective identities in
the social media era. We hope to have contributed to this endeavour.
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Part IV
Conclusion
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7
Summary and Conclusion
7.1 Recapitulation
During this thesis, we have explored autonomous agency as a form of organization built over
a network of sensorimotor interactions between a self-constituted agent and its surround-
ings. Furthermore, we have explored the extension of this form of autonomy into collective
social agency. This has been accomplished through the combination of conceptual, mod-
elling and experimental contributions to characterize and demarcate the constitution of the
autonomous agent and the sensorimotor interactive domain that delimits it in front of its
environment.
To conclude the work presented in previous chapters, we would like to present a schematic
summary of the main conclusions drawn from each chapter. The models and analytical meth-
ods presented along the thesis require deepening in complex and technical details, and it is not
always easy to follow the thread from the conclusions of one chapter to the next. In this sec-
tion we want to recapitulate the obtained results and take a step back to gain a unified view and
articulate the relationships between models, results and relevant conclusions. This synthesis
will allow us to grasp the significance of our contribution in the current scientific context and
in the study of autonomy.
Part I. Conceptual and Methodological Review
Chapter 1. Interactive Autonomy. Chapter 1 articulated the need to ground an opera-
tional theory of the autonomy of living beings as a point of reference for further chapters.
1. We reviewed the thread of historical conceptual notions that have led to modern views
of living autonomy, highlighting three main ideas:
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(a) Persistence: a property of some systems that can maintain their behaviour despite
the effect of external perturbations.
(b) Adaptive self-regulation: systems with this property can maintain certain internal
invariants within some viability region, triggering adaptive responses for avoiding
the loss of viability.
(c) Autonomy: autonomous systems are adaptive systems which self-regulate their
own organization as the invariant they maintain constant (i.e. certain relations
between its components).
2. We reviewed models proposed during the last few decades to address the theoretical
notions summarized above, exploring a parallel historical thread of mechanistic explo-
rations from cybernetics to complex systems science;
(a) We analysed the potential of models of distributed self-synchronization as a more
suited mode of persistence than mere homeostatic self-regulation of individual
components.
(b) We described metastable systems as systems able to maintain homeodynamic states,
in which certain invariances are kept within the system while allowing them to
flexibly switch from one state to another.
(c) We reviewed the notion of self-organized criticality as a state of generalized metasta-
bility at all scales of the system, allowing regulation between different levels of
description of the system without collapsing the dynamics of the system into any
of them.
3. We analysed the application of autonomy at different scales of living: cellular auton-
omy, organismic autonomy, neurocognitive autonomy and social autonomy, focusing
on the last two of them.
4. We provided a first guiding definition of autonomy expressed in three conditions that
a system must meet: individuality through operational closure; interactive asymmetry;
and precariousness.
Part II. Sensorimotor Constitution of Neurocognitive Autonomy
Chapter 2. Constitutive Interaction: the Situated-HKB model. Here, we ex-
plored sensorimotor interaction as a constitutive element of neurocognitive autonomy. We
argued that much modern neuroscience is focused in the study of the brain in isolation from
its environment, while we hypothesized that it is the shared space of sensorimotor interaction
where neurocognitive autonomy is constituted.
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1. We took a popular minimal model of coordination dynamics, the HKB model, embed-
ding it into a simple robotic model in a gradient-climbing task. In order to address the
importance of sensorimotor coupling we analysed two different models: the ‘situated
HKB’, which normally performs a gradient-climbing task, and the ‘passively-coupled
HKB’, an identical replica of the ‘situated HKB’ controller (with different initial con-
ditions), which instead of being placed into a gradient environment, it is simply fed
with an input recorded from the ‘situated HKB’. The comparison of these two condi-
tions allowed us to analyse how real-time coupling affects the case of two similar agents
receiving an input with the exact same structure.
2. Due to the minimality of the system, it could be reduced to three differential equations.
We solved the system of differential equations and found that the system is controlled
by one attractor and one repeller. We discovered that modifying a sensitivity parameter
of the agents revealed phase transitions between different behaviours which could only
be explained by taking into account the coupling between the neural controller and its
environment.
3. We found that when adding perturbations to the system, only the situated agent was
able to compensate for these perturbations, while in the passively-coupled agent per-
turbations were amplified provoking strong fluctuations in the system.
4. Analysing the response of the two agents to a series of different stimulus, we computed
a ‘dynamic signature’ of the neural controller of the agent, showing a simplified repre-
sentation of its phase space. We found that the type of coupling (passive or situated)
severely transformed the phase space of the HKB system, and the specificity of func-
tional neural signatures is lost when the agent is passively-coupled.
Chapter 3. Situated autonomy: organizational homeostasis in the sensori-
motor loop. In this chapter, we explored how the constitution of the agent as an adaptive
entity that regulates its sensorimotor flows to maintain its own organization. We proposed a
specific model of an agent in a behavioural preference task, controlled by a network of oscilla-
tors with relational homeostasis. The analysis of the interaction between the macro-variables
of the system shows how agency is built from the interaction between emergent patterns at
different scales:
1. The system presented a circular operational closure of its processes at three different
levels: patterns of sensorimotor interaction (L), oscillatory patterns (CA) and patterns
of synaptic connectivity generated by synaptic plasticity (SA). As we observed in Fig-
ure 3.17, the autonomous organization of the agent is reflected on a circular closure of
information flows between different patterns that constitutes the sensorimotor agent
as a coherent unity.
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Figure 3.17: Organizational Closure. Simplified information flows for the situated (left) and passively-coupled (right)
agents.
2. Moreover, the operational closure of the agent created an interactional asymmetry be-
tween the agent and environment, being the agent an entity which is affected by bottom-
up causal flows from the variability of sensorimotor interactions, and at the same time
is able to develop a downward top-down causation over its sensorimotor interaction.
3. The operationally closed loop is broken when the agent is passively-coupled to the envi-
ronment, showing that the processes of agency are fundamentally interactive and con-
structed in a sensorimotor space.
Chapter 4. Situated autonomy: complexity, metastability and self-organized
criticality. After characterizing the macroscopic regulatory loops that constitute the op-
erational closure of the agent in the previous chapter, we continued exploring the mesoscale
patterns that arise in the agent. Specifically, we analysed the presence of spatial and temporal
multiscale patterns in the processes that compose the agent:
1. We analysed the oscillatory patterns that emerge under certain behaviours of the agent.
We observed that these patterns only arise when the agent is situated in the environment
and it is not passively-coupled. We found that situated agents were able to generate co-
herent internal oscillatory patterns for different behavioural modes, and concurrently
they present a high degree of metastability, allowing flexible switching between pat-
terns.
2. We analysed the interaction at different scales of subsets of variables of the system mak-
ing use of TSE-complexity. We observed that high levels of complexity arise when the
agent is both coupled to its environment and plastic mechanisms are present. The
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combination of plasticity and situated interaction (in contrast with passively-coupled
agents) is what creates a circular interactive asymmetry in the agent.
3. We analysed the presence of long-range interactions in different variables in the form of
1=f scaling in their time series. We found 1=f scaling in variables corresponding to both
sensorimotor interaction and oscillatory patterns. We hypothesize that plastic mecha-
nisms are restricted to mesoscale dynamics that allow the connection between senso-
rimotor microscale fluctuations and oscillatory macrosocopic patterns. Moreover, 1=f
scaling is only present in both variables when sensorimotor interaction and synaptic
plasticity are simultaneously present, being sensorimotor scaling dependent on internal
synaptic plasticity and scaling in oscillatory patterns dependent on situated coupling.
This cross-dependency suggests that the system as a whole is sustained as a precarious
organization by continuous interaction between itself and the environment.
Part III. Interactive Autonomy in Social Processes
Chapter 5. Social Agency: interaction-dominant dynamics in social recipro-
city. In this chapter, we explored the situation where two autonomous agents interact in a
social task. We used the perceptual crossing experimental paradigm as a minimal model for
analysing social engagement in a simple interactive task. We found that the social interactive
space is constitutive of the ongoing social process:
1. We proposed a novel modification of the perceptual crossing task, in which the player is
faced with individual opponents that can be either other human player or programmed
bots. This setup allows us to characterize genuine social interaction versus other types
of interaction.
2. We showed how previous approaches focused only in behaviour at a specific scale might
be missing part of the dynamical richness of social engagement processes. Instead, we
defend using fractal scaling analysis to discriminate different modes of engagement.
3. We found that genuine interaction can be discriminated by fractal and multifractal mea-
sures only when the interactive space between the two players is analysed. In contrast,
social engagement can not be characterized by the individual behaviour of the interact-
ing agents studied in isolation.
4. We concluded that some social processes are constituted in the interactive space and,
therefore, the possibility of a social autonomy which takes place at a different plane
from individual neurocognitive autonomy is possible.
Chapter 6. The Collective Mind: large-scale self-organization in massive
social networks. Here we explored the possibility of large-scale social autonomy. We hy-
pothesize that the intensive use of digital communication technologies is opening the door for
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new forms of autonomous social organization at scales precluded by previous communication
forms. We focused on the analysis of the new wave of ‘networked movements’, constitutively
shaped by the use of ICT tools. We proposed the notion of ‘multitudinous identity’ to char-
acterize the forms of autonomous agency of these movements. To explore our hypothesis, we
analysed a case study based on the 15M movement in Spain, one of the most representative
cases of these network movements, using information theory and dynamical systems tools
over a dataset of Twitter activity:
1. We characterized the operational closure of the geographically distant nodes using in-
formation transfer measures and comparing them with surrogate data. We showed how
the system emerges as a strongly connected component of circular interactions among
the geographical parts of the network. Also, we were able to show how the sources of
information and the links of the network are continuously changing and reconfiguring
the network’s effective connectivity while maintaining the operational closure of the
system.
2. We hypothesize that, like in neurodynamic organization, phase-locking phenomena
might be playing a role facilitating the emergence of coherent patterns while maintain-
ing a flexible configuration allowing it to rapidly switch between different metastable
states. We hypothesized that these types of mechanisms might be behind the consti-
tution of collective agency in multitudinous identities. We used wavelet filtering and
phase-locking statistics to characterize the coordination between geographical units at
different temporal scales:
(a) We characterized the emergence of multiscale phase-locked coalitions during the
first days of the 15M movement. Comparing phase-locking statistics of analysed
series with surrogate data we found that the emergence of phase-locked coalitions
is statistically significant. We found that moments of strong embodiment of the
protests are correlated with the emergence of coalitions coordinating the activity
at many cities.
(b) Analysing a particular case, we exemplify rapid switching between two modes
of synchronized coalitions at different carrier frequencies. We analysed the reac-
tion and reconfiguration of the movement to a violent eviction attempt of one of
the main protests camps in Barcelona, showing how the system shifts from one
coalition synchronized at one specific frequency in which the node of Barcelona
is the source of information to all the other nodes mobilizing a mass of peaceful
protesters that blocked the eviction, to a new coalition synchronized at a different
frequency in which the network organized a country-wide response in the form
of protest rallies, where information sources are distributed among several cities.
3. We analysed the presence of spatial and temporal multiscale complexity at different
moments of the protests, showing how high values of TSE complexity and scale free
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1=f patterns are correlated with both a high presence of synchronized coalitions and a
strong embodiment of protests in the streets. We hypothesized how different modes of
synchronization might be coordinating the dynamics in social media with the dynam-
ical field of embodied protests, which is what constitutes the emergence of a collective
social agent.
7.2 Conclusion
We have presented different instances of how autonomous selves (be it in neurocognitive or
social domains) emerge and maintain fluid, recombinatory modes of organization that sus-
tain a myriad of modes of engagement with the world which are flexibly switched through a
metastable transient synchronization. The modes of autonomy that emerge here are differ-
ent of those of autopoietic organization, in which autonomy is based in the emergence of a
material frontier between the self and the external world and operational closure identified as
networked self-production. Previous approaches to autonomy inspired in autopoiesis have
frequently focused on internal processes leaving agent-environment interactions or coupling
as a secondary, surrogate property to be accounted for after the autonomy of the system is
determined. Instead, when looking at the autonomy from the point of view of interactions
(sensorimotor, social or otherwise), autonomy appears as the maintenance of a network of
relational invariants in the coupled activity of the agent-environment system (e.g. long-range
dependencies in different parts of the system and its interaction with the environment, or
maximization of the informational complexity of interactions between different scales of the
system). Needless to say, these interactive forms of autonomy might well be argued to de-
mand a more fundamental or basic form of autonomy, where the internal aspects and mate-
rial closure need to be granted. Our research does not lessen previous research on autonomy
but expands it, bringing new dimensions of autonomy to the foreground providing tools and
theoretical progress to study the ways in which autonomy emerges in and through interaction.
The different analyses presented here pose a challenge to one of the most entrenched as-
sumptions of our scientific heritage: that the world and the knower are independent entities.
In Varela’s words:
If we are forced to admit that cognition cannot be properly understood without
common sense, and that common sense is none other than our bodily and social
history, then the inevitable conclusion is that the knower and known, mind and
world, stand in relation to each other through mutual specification or dependent
coordination (Varela et al., 1993, p.150).
We could advance that it is not only history (evolutionary and developmental) but an extended
present constituted by coordinations at different scales, that shapes the ‘mutual specification’.
In the work presented here, we observe how we cannot distinguish an agent capturing the
structure of a pre-given world, but it is the very agent (together with its correspondent world
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of meaning) that arises through embodied interaction with its environment. The coupling
between the components of the agent and the environment gives rise to transient moments
of coherence that structure the agent as an embodied entity. The history of the sequence
of these moments of coherence with its correspondent coordinated shaping of internal and
external dynamics is what generates an identity that constitutes the autonomous self of the
agent.
A robotic agent in a world of two lights does not independently choose a route of be-
haviour or a light preference. Instead, it is the online regulation between the agent’s neurody-
namic and behavioural patterns that stabilizes certain precarious patterns of behaviour (e.g.
going to light A), which will tend to reinforce themselves until the agent-environment inter-
action faces a breakdown, in which new patterns of behaviour can arise. The agent as a ‘light-
switching’ entity does not exist a priori from its world, but emerges from a specific sequence
of interactions with a particular environmental setup. As we observed, if the sensorimotor
loop of the agent is broken (e.g. when the agent is fed an input recorded from other agent) or
if the agent gets stuck in a particular attractor of behaviour (e.g. when plasticity is stopped),
the interactive ecosystems of habits that sustain the mental life of the agents is dissolved, and
the autonomous self disappears.
Similarly, a collective subject demanding a series of democratic reforms does not exist
prior to its particular embodiment. A process of mass self-communication through online
social media allows the coordination of hundreds of thousands of people creating a collec-
tive body that enacts moments of collective coherence in a history of demonstrations, camps,
campaigns, and so forth. But it is the very process of coordinating this emerging social body
that shapes its form: the ideas it sustains, how it communicates with other agents or how it
responds to attacks, and so forth. The history of moments of coherence that emerge from dis-
tributed coordinations and how the system jumps from one to the other is what constitutes
the autonomy of the social subject. A form of social life emerges as long as this autonomy is
preserved. If the social substrate that generates the moments of coherence that constitute the
system was to be weakened, the collective subject would die as such. Equally, if the emergent
configuration of the subject was to be captured in a way in which the movement gets crys-
tallized into a particular configuration or a bureaucratic organization in which individuals
cannot influence the moments of coherence that emerge from it, the autonomous self would
also cease to exist as such.
Although the project developed here demands further work to provide a robust account
of interactive autonomy in the neurocogntive and social domains, we believe that we have
offered two contributions to the complex and multilayered research endeavour of unveiling
the nature of cognitive autonomy:
1. We have contributed to the development of a modelling route for testing, compar-
ing and validating hypothesis about neurocognitive autonomy. Through two models
of neurodynamic controllers embedded into a robotic agent in behavioural tasks, we
have provided a proof of concept for some properties described by different hypothe-
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ses about cognitive autonomy (e.g. embodiment and situatedness, sensorimotor oper-
ational closure or the emergence of a dynamic core). Furthermore, our models allow us
to tackle conceptual obstacles precluding the understanding of autonomy in the senso-
rimotor domain (how operational closure emerges, what its role in generating an agent-
environment interactive domain is) and to generate new predictions about the nature
of autonomy (multiscale-symmetry breaking, the emergence a double metastable reg-
ulatory loop or the coordination of spatial and temporal multiscale complexity).
2. We have explored the extension of our model of cognitive autonomy to the social realm.
We analyse two cases from an experimental perspective: the constitution of a collective
subject in the sensorimotor domain in a social interactive task, and the emergence of an
autonomous social identity in a large-scale technology-mediated social system. We gath-
ered experimental evidence indicating that in some cases social autonomy might emerge
based on mechanisms also present in neurocognitive autonomy (transient coalitions
of embodied action, the coordination of spatial and temporal multiscale complexity)
which might open-up the perspectives for thinking about social and political autonomy
with new conceptual and analytical tools.
Moreover, from a methodological point of view, we have shown the potential of indica-
tors of complexity (information theory measures, metastable synchronization or critical scal-
ing) to act as proxies for quantitative and qualitative aspects of autonomy. The study of in-
teraction (between elements, across temporal or spatial scales) highlights the importance of
the influence and modulation between micro, meso and macro levels of activity. Autonomy
is neither merely a process of closure or isolation from the world nor simply a structural prop-
erty. Instead, autonomous agency is a process that is deployed at different scales, which are
coordinated through circular and asymmetrical causal influences, bringing forth the agent, the
world it acts upon, and the interaction domain that connects both. Over and above of these
indicators, we have shown how conceptual aspects about how we apply these measures to
our models and experimental analyses – for example the operational closure of the network
and its precarious cross-dependences or the situated versus passively-coupled comparison –
provide a rich perspective for testing specific properties of an autonomous organization. Al-
though indicators of complexity per se are not sufficient for detecting if an organism, agent
or domain of interaction displays an autonomous organization, they can enrich qualitative
intuitions indicating so. The quantitative measures that we have presented bring us closer to
be able to measure and characterize the nature of autonomy with greater precision.
Future development of this work should include experimental validation of the results of
our model, together with further theoretical and experimental support of how models of neu-
rocognitive autonomy might be useful for understanding large-scale social autonomy, as well
as an analysis of which aspects of social autonomy are particular to this domain and cannot be
captured with notions from the neurocognitive domain (e.g. some aspects of technologically
mediated social dynamics may be drastically different from neurodynamic patterns as digital
communication tools overcome some of the limitations of biological networks). Ironically,
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this thesis may be complemented with a ‘reverse thesis’, analysing real-world experimental
data from sensorimotor processes and exploring simulation models of social agency.
Towards a Scientific Understanding of Autonomy
This thesis is focused on autonomy as a pervasive property of – biological, mental or social
– life. Why autonomy? In a world of increasing large-scale connectivity, the technological,
political and economic complexity of our societies confronts us with both the promise of a
self-organizing collective intelligence freeing and empowering individuals, and the threat of
those systemic power dynamics enslaving individual freedom. Cybernetic utopian views tend
to present self-organizing mechanisms as ‘neutral’ processes increasing the balance and equi-
librium in systems, as if there was some hidden ‘natural order’ waiting to emerge when the
components of the system are connected. Nonetheless, far from being neutral, self-organized
networks and systems can emerge with little respect for the self-determination of their com-
ponents. If we think of dramatic financial fluctuations, ecological catastrophes, or examples
of collectively sustained forms of networked authoritarianism (e.g. Treré and Barassi, 2015),
we can easily imagine a situation in which forms of complex organization threaten the indi-
vidual’s freedom rather than empowering it.
In the midst of this tension, autonomy appears as a conceptual tool to break the neutrality
of systemic perspectives. Delimiting an agencial self and its interaction with its surroundings,
the components of a system are no longer interchangeable mechanical units but play a differ-
ent role depending on their position in respect to the self-environment interactive domain.
Individual or social action can be evaluated as the action of an active agent modulating its
interaction with its environment and other agents, or as being dominated by endogenous or
exogenous dynamics. Moreover, an interactive and multiscale view of autonomy allows the
existence of agencial entities at different levels of description in such a way that being part of a
collective with an autonomous identity does not necessarily undermine individual autonomy.
Depending on the causal relationships between scales, we can distinguish between processes
of empowerment or oppression from the asymmetry between the interactions between agent
and its environment. In an increasingly complex and interconnected world, a scientific under-
standing of autonomy helps us promote the self-determination of individuals and collectives
while avoiding their subjugation to pernicious or authoritarian emergent dynamics.
The emergence of a science of adaptive complexity, together with the development of dig-
ital technologies (from advances in neuroimaging or computational capacity to digital com-
munication tools) has opened the door to the possibility of an unprecedented understanding
of our minds and our world: from nervous systems, organisms, to ecosystems and societies.
Indeed, we have at our disposal a methodological and conceptual opportunity to surf the
wave of autonomous self-organization in complex open environments. Our notion of au-
tonomy proposes a framework to unveil the loops of interaction that allow living entities to
emerge as self-referential, self-modifying, and self-sustaining dynamical processes in front of
their worlds. The patterns that they exhibit are neither imposed from outside, nor arise in-
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ternally, but are the consequence of an interface of embodied action. This ‘knotty dialectic’
is where living systems are created (from cells, to individuals, to communities), and where
they create a world of meaning, will, intention and consciousness. This is where the (neuro-
techno) dynamical machinery sustaining the system is infused with the vitality of the ghostly
shadow of autonomous agency, which is progressively becoming closer to scientific modelling
and quantification.
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